{
  "title": "Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ?",
  "publication": "IMF Working Papers, December 1, 2006",
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  "summary": "This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries. Defining a board as the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target, we discuss the possible determinants of a board's size.",
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "Summary",
      "content": "- This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries.\n- A board is defined as \"the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target.\"\n- The empirical analysis uses a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003.\n- Key empirical finding: larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Empirical approach and data",
      "content": "- Dataset scope: de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003.\n- Paper length: 46 pages.\n- Series: Working Paper No. 2006/281, Volume: 2006, Issue: 281.\n- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451865417.001\n- ISBN: 9781451865417\n- ISSN: 1018-5941"
    },
    {
      "heading": "Major findings",
      "content": "- Determinants associated with larger central bank board size:\n  - Larger countries.\n  - More heterogeneous countries.\n  - Countries with stronger democratic institutions.\n  - Countries with floating exchange rate regimes.\n  - Independent central banks with more staff.\n- The paper discusses possible determinants of a board's size and examines their empirical relevance."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Subject areas and keywords",
      "content": "- Subject: Banking; Central bank autonomy; Central bank organization; Exchange rate arrangements; Floating exchange rates.\n- Keywords: exchange rate; implementation board; monetary policy; MPC member; MPC size; WP.\n\nThis content unit: Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ? (IMF Working Papers, 2006, Issue 281).\n\n---\n\n Content in this bundle\n\n- wp06281 — References / Appendices\n  - wp06281 — References / Appendices (Markdown version){rel=\"alternate\" type=\"text/markdown\"}\n  - wp06281 — References / Appendices (PDF){rel=\"external\" type=\"application/pdf\"}\n\n---\n\nSource: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/31/central-bank-boards-around-the-world-why-does-membership-size-differ-20062"
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    "Authors: Helge Berger, Tonny Lybek, Volker Nitsch",
    "Published: December 1, 2006",
    "Series: IMF Working Papers",
    "DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451865417.001",
    "This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries.",
    "A board is defined as \"the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target.\"",
    "The empirical analysis uses a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003.",
    "Key empirical finding: larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.",
    "Dataset scope: de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003.",
    "Paper length: 46 pages.",
    "Series: Working Paper No. 2006/281, Volume: 2006, Issue: 281.",
    "DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451865417.001",
    "ISBN: 9781451865417",
    "ISSN: 1018-5941",
    "Determinants associated with larger central bank board size:",
    "The paper discusses possible determinants of a board's size and examines their empirical relevance.",
    "Subject: Banking; Central bank autonomy; Central bank organization; Exchange rate arrangements; Floating exchange rates.",
    "Keywords: exchange rate; implementation board; monetary policy; MPC member; MPC size; WP.",
    "**_wp06281 — References / Appendices**"
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