## Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ?

_IMF Working Papers, December 1, 2006_

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## Bibliographic details
- Authors: Helge Berger, Tonny Lybek, Volker Nitsch
- Published: December 1, 2006
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451865417.001

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### Summary
- This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries.
- A board is defined as "the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target."
- The empirical analysis uses a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003.
- Key empirical finding: larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.

### Empirical approach and data
- Dataset scope: de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003.
- Paper length: 46 pages.
- Series: Working Paper No. 2006/281, Volume: 2006, Issue: 281.
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451865417.001
- ISBN: 9781451865417
- ISSN: 1018-5941

### Major findings
- Determinants associated with larger central bank board size:
  - Larger countries.
  - More heterogeneous countries.
  - Countries with stronger democratic institutions.
  - Countries with floating exchange rate regimes.
  - Independent central banks with more staff.
- The paper discusses possible determinants of a board's size and examines their empirical relevance.

### Subject areas and keywords
- Subject: Banking; Central bank autonomy; Central bank organization; Exchange rate arrangements; Floating exchange rates.
- Keywords: exchange rate; implementation board; monetary policy; MPC member; MPC size; WP.

_This content unit: Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ? (IMF Working Papers, 2006, Issue 281)._

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/31/central-bank-boards-around-the-world-why-does-membership-size-differ-20062_