{
  "title": "Central Bank Governance: A Survey of Boards and Management",
  "publication": "IMF Working Papers, December 1, 2004",
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  "summary": "This paper identifies issues to consider when designing the structure, size, and composition of the governing boards and management of a central bank.",
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "Summary and scope",
      "content": "- Identifies issues to consider when designing the structure, size, and composition of the governing boards and management of a central bank.\n- Notes that central bank autonomy and accountability are generally accepted as good practice, but there is less consensus regarding the structure, size, and composition of governing bodies.\n- Surveys 101 central bank laws covering 113 countries.\n- Classifies governance structures according to degree of autonomy, functions performed, size, composition, appointment procedures, and terms of the members.\n- Publication details:\n  - By JoAnne Morris, Tonny Lybek\n  - December 1, 2004\n  - Pages: 53\n  - Volume: 2004\n  - Issue: 226\n  - Series: Working Paper No. 2004/226\n  - DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451875416.001\n  - Stock No: WPIEA2262004\n  - ISBN: 9781451875416\n  - ISSN: 1018-5941"
    },
    {
      "heading": "Key findings",
      "content": "- An appropriate balance must be struck between the functions of the governing entities, simplicity, and country specific factors.\n- The functions of the various bodies follow logically if a greater appreciation exists for the type of autonomy delegated to the central bank.\n- Governance classification dimensions used in the survey:\n  - Degree of autonomy\n  - Functions performed\n  - Size\n  - Composition\n  - Appointment procedures\n  - Terms of the members"
    },
    {
      "heading": "Policy implications and considerations",
      "content": "- Design of central bank governing boards and management should account for:\n  - The specific degree and type of autonomy delegated to the central bank.\n  - Aligning functions of governing entities with the level of autonomy and with country-specific institutional contexts.\n  - Striking a balance between institutional simplicity and the need to cover necessary governance functions."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Subjects and keywords (as recorded in the source)",
      "content": "- Subjects: Banking, Central bank accountability, Central bank autonomy, Central bank legislation, Central bank operations, Central bank organization, Central banks, Price stabilization, Prices\n- Keywords: accountability provision, Africa, Caribbean, central bank accountability, Central bank autonomy, central bank governance, central bank Governors, Central bank independence, central bank law, Central bank legislation, Central bank operations, Central bank organization, democratic deficit, exchange rate, financial condition, governance structure, government policy, implementation board, management board, Middle East, minister of finance, monetary policy, Price stabilization, supervisory board, WP\n\nIMF Working Paper: \"Central Bank Governance: A Survey of Boards and Management\", JoAnne Morris and Tonny Lybek, Working Paper No. 2004/226, December 1, 2004.\n\n---\n\n Content in this bundle\n\n- wp04226\n  - wp04226 (Markdown version){rel=\"alternate\" type=\"text/markdown\"}\n  - wp04226 (PDF){rel=\"external\" type=\"application/pdf\"}\n\n---\n\nSource: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/31/central-bank-governance-a-survey-of-boards-and-management-17846"
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    "Authors: JoAnne Morris, Tonny Lybek",
    "Published: December 1, 2004",
    "Series: IMF Working Papers",
    "DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451875416.001",
    "Identifies issues to consider when designing the structure, size, and composition of the governing boards and management of a central bank.",
    "Notes that central bank autonomy and accountability are generally accepted as good practice, but there is less consensus regarding the structure, size, and composition of governing bodies.",
    "Surveys 101 central bank laws covering 113 countries.",
    "Classifies governance structures according to degree of autonomy, functions performed, size, composition, appointment procedures, and terms of the members.",
    "Publication details:",
    "An appropriate balance must be struck between the functions of the governing entities, simplicity, and country specific factors.",
    "The functions of the various bodies follow logically if a greater appreciation exists for the type of autonomy delegated to the central bank.",
    "Governance classification dimensions used in the survey:",
    "Design of central bank governing boards and management should account for:",
    "Subjects: Banking, Central bank accountability, Central bank autonomy, Central bank legislation, Central bank operations, Central bank organization, Central banks, Price stabilization, Prices",
    "Keywords: accountability provision, Africa, Caribbean, central bank accountability, Central bank autonomy, central bank governance, central bank Governors, Central bank independence, central bank law, Central bank legislation, Central bank operations, Central bank organization, democratic deficit, exchange rate, financial condition, governance structure, government policy, implementation board, management board, Middle East, minister of finance, monetary policy, Price stabilization, supervisory board, WP",
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