{
  "title": "Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power",
  "publication": "IMF Working Papers, April 1, 2007",
  "sourceUrl": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/31/dynamic-incentives-and-the-optimal-delegation-of-political-power-20427",
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  "summary": "This paper proposes a theory to explain why a politician delegates policy tasks to a technocrat in an independent institution. It formalizes the rationales for delegation highlighted by Hamilton (1788) and by Blinder (1998).",
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    {
      "heading": "Summary",
      "content": "- Paper proposes a theory to explain why a politician delegates policy tasks to a technocrat in an independent institution.\n- Formalizes rationales for delegation highlighted by Hamilton (1788) and by Blinder (1998).\n- Delegation trades off:\n  - the cost of having a possibly incompetent technocrat with a long-term job contract; against\n  - the benefit of having a technocrat who (i) invests more effort into the specialized policy task and (ii) is better insulated from the whims of public opinion.\n- Natural application: monetary policy, where the model provides a new theory of central bank independence."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Key findings and theoretical contributions",
      "content": "- Presents a formal model capturing the dynamic incentive trade-off between politician and technocrat.\n- Identifies two principal benefits of delegation:\n  - Increased effort in specialized policy tasks by the technocrat.\n  - Greater insulation of policy decisions from short-term swings in public opinion.\n- Identifies a principal cost of delegation:\n  - Risk of appointing a possibly incompetent technocrat protected by a long-term job contract."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Application: monetary policy and central bank independence",
      "content": "- The model is applied to monetary policy to provide a new theory of central bank independence, explaining institutional delegation as a response to dynamic incentive problems facing politicians and technocrats."
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      "content": "- Authors: Eric Le Borgne, Gauti B. Eggertsson\n- Publication date: April 1, 2007\n- Series: Working Paper No. 2007/091\n- Issue: 091\n- Volume: 2007\n- Pages: 35\n- ISBN: 9781451866551\n- ISSN: 1018-5941\n- Stock No: WPIEA2007091\n- DOI: ---\n- Subjects: Banking, Central bank autonomy, Inflation, Output gap, Tax incentives\n- Keywords: mover accent, WP\n\nSource: Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power, IMF Working Papers, April 1, 2007. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/31/dynamic-incentives-and-the-optimal-delegation-of-political-power-20427\n\n---\n\n Content in this bundle\n\n- wp0791\n  - wp0791 (Markdown version){rel=\"alternate\" type=\"text/markdown\"}\n  - wp0791 (PDF){rel=\"external\" type=\"application/pdf\"}\n\n---\n\nSource: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/31/dynamic-incentives-and-the-optimal-delegation-of-political-power-20427"
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    "Authors: Eric Le Borgne, Gauti B. Eggertsson",
    "Published: April 1, 2007",
    "Series: IMF Working Papers",
    "Paper proposes a theory to explain why a politician delegates policy tasks to a technocrat in an independent institution.",
    "Formalizes rationales for delegation highlighted by Hamilton (1788) and by Blinder (1998).",
    "Delegation trades off:",
    "Natural application: monetary policy, where the model provides a new theory of central bank independence.",
    "Presents a formal model capturing the dynamic incentive trade-off between politician and technocrat.",
    "Identifies two principal benefits of delegation:",
    "Identifies a principal cost of delegation:",
    "The model is applied to monetary policy to provide a new theory of central bank independence, explaining institutional delegation as a response to dynamic incentive problems facing politicians and technocrats.",
    "Authors: Eric Le Borgne, Gauti B. Eggertsson",
    "Publication date: April 1, 2007",
    "Series: Working Paper No. 2007/091",
    "Issue: 091",
    "Volume: 2007",
    "Pages: 35",
    "ISBN: 9781451866551",
    "ISSN: 1018-5941",
    "Stock No: WPIEA2007091",
    "DOI: ---",
    "Subjects: Banking, Central bank autonomy, Inflation, Output gap, Tax incentives",
    "Keywords: mover accent, WP",
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