{
  "title": "How Should Subnational Government Borrowing Be Regulated? Some Cross-Country Empirical Evidence",
  "publication": "IMF Working Papers, March 1, 2005",
  "sourceUrl": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/31/how-should-subnational-government-borrowing-be-regulated-some-cross-country-empirical-18077",
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  "summary": "Countries have adopted various institutional responses to subnational government borrowing. Using a sample of 44 countries 1982-2000, this paper provides a panel data analysis to determine the most effective borrowing constraints for containing local fiscal deficits.",
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    {
      "heading": "Summary and main findings",
      "content": "- Countries have adopted various institutional responses to subnational government borrowing.\n- Using a sample of 44 countries 1982-2000, this paper provides a panel data analysis to determine the most effective borrowing constraints for containing local fiscal deficits.\n- The results suggest that no single institutional arrangement is superior under all circumstances.\n- The appropriateness of specific arrangements depends upon other institutional characteristics, particularly:\n  - the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance,\n  - the existence of any bailout precedent,\n  - the quality of fiscal reporting."
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      "heading": "Methodology and scope",
      "content": "- Sample: 44 countries 1982-2000.\n- Empirical approach: panel data analysis.\n- Objective: determine the most effective borrowing constraints for containing local fiscal deficits."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Policy implications and considerations",
      "content": "- No one-size-fits-all regulatory arrangement for subnational borrowing.\n- Choice of borrowing constraints should account for:\n  - the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance,\n  - whether there is a bailout precedent (which can affect incentives and market discipline),\n  - the quality of fiscal reporting (which affects transparency and enforcement).\n\n---\n\n Content in this bundle\n\n- wp0554\n  - wp0554 (Markdown version){rel=\"alternate\" type=\"text/markdown\"}\n  - wp0554 (PDF){rel=\"external\" type=\"application/pdf\"}\n\n---\n\nSource: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/31/how-should-subnational-government-borrowing-be-regulated-some-cross-country-empirical-18077"
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    "Authors: Alexander Plekhanov, Raju J Singh",
    "Published: March 1, 2005",
    "Series: IMF Working Papers",
    "DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451860733.001",
    "Countries have adopted various institutional responses to subnational government borrowing.",
    "Using a sample of 44 countries 1982-2000, this paper provides a panel data analysis to determine the most effective borrowing constraints for containing local fiscal deficits.",
    "The results suggest that no single institutional arrangement is superior under all circumstances.",
    "The appropriateness of specific arrangements depends upon other institutional characteristics, particularly:",
    "Sample: 44 countries 1982-2000.",
    "Empirical approach: panel data analysis.",
    "Objective: determine the most effective borrowing constraints for containing local fiscal deficits.",
    "No one-size-fits-all regulatory arrangement for subnational borrowing.",
    "Choice of borrowing constraints should account for:",
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