{
  "title": "Disinflation, External Vulnerability, and Fiscal Intransigence: Some Unpleasant Mundellian Arithmetic",
  "publication": "IMF Working Papers, May 22, 2017",
  "sourceUrl": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2017/05/22/disinflation-external-vulnerability-and-fiscal-intransigence-some-unpleasant-mundellian-44912",
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  "summary": "This paper examines the policy challenges a country faces when it wants to both reduce inflation and maintain a sustainable external position.",
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "Summary and main argument",
      "content": "- Examines policy challenges when a country seeks to both reduce inflation and maintain a sustainable external position.\n- Uses Mundell’s (1962) policy assignment framework to show that reducing inflation and preserving external sustainability may be mutually incompatible unless monetary and fiscal policies are properly coordinated.\n- Defines \"fiscal intransigence\" as a fiscal authority unwilling to cooperate; under fiscal intransigence, a central bank pursuing disinflation on a “go it alone” basis will cause the country’s external position to further deteriorate.\n- Echoes Sargent and Wallace’s (1981) “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic”: a “go it alone” policy may successfully stabilize prices and output only on a short-term basis."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Dynamic analysis and central bank credibility",
      "content": "- A dynamic analysis in the paper shows that:\n  - If the central bank lacks credibility in its inflation goal, it must rely even more on cooperation from the fiscal authority than otherwise.\n  - Lack of fiscal cooperation combined with limited central bank credibility exacerbates external deterioration when attempting disinflation."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Policy implications and recommendations",
      "content": "- Monetary and fiscal policy must be coordinated to achieve both disinflation and a sustainable external position.\n- Central banks attempting disinflation without fiscal cooperation risk worsening external vulnerability.\n- Strengthening central bank credibility reduces, but does not eliminate, the need for fiscal cooperation.\n- Policymakers should guard against short-term stabilization strategies that leave longer-term external positions unsustainable."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Key statistics and publication metadata",
      "content": "- Pages: 34\n- Volume: 2017\n- Issue: 118\n- Series: Working Paper No. 2017/118\n- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484300640.001\n- Stock No: WPIEA2017118\n- ISBN: 9781484300640\n- ISSN: 1018-5941"
    },
    {
      "heading": "Subjects and keywords",
      "content": "- Subject: External debt, Fiscal consolidation, Fiscal policy, Foreign exchange, Inflation, Inflation targeting, Monetary policy, Prices, Real exchange rates\n- Keywords: Africa, Assignment Problem, central bank, central bank credibility, debt ratio, exchange rate, exchange rate appreciation, exchange rate depreciation, exchange rate misalignment, External Vulnerability, Fiscal consolidation, fiscal policy adjustment, Inflation, Inflation targeting, monetary policy, net export deficit, Phillips curve, Real exchange rates, Risk Premium, WP\n\nIMF Working Paper by Evan C Tanner, May 22, 2017; Working Paper No. 2017/118.\n\n---\n\n Content in this bundle\n\n- Fiscal Politics in the Euro Area, WP/17/18, January 2017\n  - Fiscal Politics in the Euro Area, WP/17/18, January 2017 (Markdown version){rel=\"alternate\" type=\"text/markdown\"}\n  - Fiscal Politics in the Euro Area, WP/17/18, January 2017 (PDF){rel=\"external\" type=\"application/pdf\"}\n\n---\n\nSource: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2017/05/22/disinflation-external-vulnerability-and-fiscal-intransigence-some-unpleasant-mundellian-44912"
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    "Authors: Evan C Tanner",
    "Published: May 22, 2017",
    "Series: IMF Working Papers",
    "DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484300640.001",
    "Examines policy challenges when a country seeks to both reduce inflation and maintain a sustainable external position.",
    "Uses Mundell’s (1962) policy assignment framework to show that reducing inflation and preserving external sustainability may be mutually incompatible unless monetary and fiscal policies are properly coordinated.",
    "Defines \"fiscal intransigence\" as a fiscal authority unwilling to cooperate; under fiscal intransigence, a central bank pursuing disinflation on a “go it alone” basis will cause the country’s external position to further deteriorate.",
    "Echoes Sargent and Wallace’s (1981) “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic”: a “go it alone” policy may successfully stabilize prices and output only on a short-term basis.",
    "A dynamic analysis in the paper shows that:",
    "Monetary and fiscal policy must be coordinated to achieve both disinflation and a sustainable external position.",
    "Central banks attempting disinflation without fiscal cooperation risk worsening external vulnerability.",
    "Strengthening central bank credibility reduces, but does not eliminate, the need for fiscal cooperation.",
    "Policymakers should guard against short-term stabilization strategies that leave longer-term external positions unsustainable.",
    "Pages: 34",
    "Volume: 2017",
    "Issue: 118",
    "Series: Working Paper No. 2017/118",
    "DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484300640.001",
    "Stock No: WPIEA2017118",
    "ISBN: 9781484300640",
    "ISSN: 1018-5941",
    "Subject: External debt, Fiscal consolidation, Fiscal policy, Foreign exchange, Inflation, Inflation targeting, Monetary policy, Prices, Real exchange rates",
    "Keywords: Africa, Assignment Problem, central bank, central bank credibility, debt ratio, exchange rate, exchange rate appreciation, exchange rate depreciation, exchange rate misalignment, External Vulnerability, Fiscal consolidation, fiscal policy adjustment, Inflation, Inflation targeting, monetary policy, net export deficit, Phillips curve, Real exchange rates, Risk Premium, WP",
    "**Fiscal Politics in the Euro Area, WP/17/18, January 2017**"
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