## Bank Lobbying: Regulatory Capture and Beyond

_IMF Working Papers, August 9, 2019_

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [Bank Lobbying: Regulatory Capture and Beyond](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2019/08/09/bank-lobbying-regulatory-capture-and-beyond-45735)

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## Bibliographic details
- Authors: Deniz O Igan, Thomas Lambert
- Published: August 9, 2019
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484347546.001

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### Overview and scope
- Authors: Deniz O Igan, Thomas Lambert
- Publication date: August 9, 2019
- Series: Working Paper No. 2019/171
- Pages: 30
- Volume: 2019
- Issue: 171
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484347546.001
- ISBN: 9781484347546
- ISSN: 1018-5941
- Citation preview (as shown on the page): Deniz O Igan, and Thomas Lambert. "Bank Lobbying: Regulatory Capture and Beyond", IMF Working Papers 2019, 171 (2019), accessed 9/11/2026, https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484347546.001

### Key findings and empirical conclusions
- The paper examines whether and how bank lobbying can lead to regulatory capture and produce real economic consequences.
- Overall findings are consistent with regulatory capture, which:
  - lessens the support for tighter rules and enforcement;
  - in turn allows riskier practices and worse economic outcomes.
- The evidence provides insights into how the rising political power of banks in the early 2000s propelled the financial system and the economy into crisis.
- The authors caution that these findings should not be interpreted as a call for an outright ban of lobbying.

### Motivations and mechanisms analyzed
- The paper provides an overview of the motivations behind bank lobbying.
- It surveys recent empirical evidence on how lobbying influences regulatory decisions and supervisory behavior.
- The analysis connects political influence by banks to weaker regulation and enforcement, facilitating risk-taking.

### Policy implications and recommendations
- The paper points to a need for rethinking the framework governing interactions between regulators and banks.
- Policy directions emphasized:
  - Enhanced transparency of regulatory decisions.
  - Strengthened checks and balances within the decision-making process.
- These measures are presented as preferable to an outright ban on lobbying.

### Subjects and keywords (as listed)
- Subject: Banking, Deposit insurance, Economic sectors, Expenditure, Financial crises, Financial institutions, Financial sector, Global financial crisis of 2008-2009, Mortgages
- Keywords: bank lobbying, banks, financial crises, financial crisis, Financial sector, Global, Global financial crisis of 2008-2009, lobbying, lobbying agenda, lobbying bank, lobbying expenditure, lobbying operation, lobbying process, Mortgages, political economy, regulation, regulatory capture, supervision, WP

*IMF Working Paper: "Bank Lobbying: Regulatory Capture and Beyond", Deniz O Igan and Thomas Lambert, Working Paper No. 2019/171, August 9, 2019.*

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- **Working Paper**
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_Source: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2019/08/09/bank-lobbying-regulatory-capture-and-beyond-45735_