

# Is the transition countries' reliance on foreign capital a sign of success or failure?

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UNECE FfD Regional Consultation Expert Meeting Geneva, May 13, 2008


#### Outline

- Convergence in the CEE countries the role of foreign capital
- External imbalances: the flip-side of rapid convergence
  - Some reassuring trends
  - Concerns
- Policy Conclusions



# Growth in Emerging Europe is expected to slow in near term, due to global spillovers


#### **Annual GDP growth** (percent)



Source: WEO April 2008.

# Nevertheless, the region has been converging very fast


#### Convergence in Emerging Europe and in the Rest of the World, 2002–06



# Productivity improvements and capital accumulation (from abroad) have been key

#### Emerging Europe: Growth Accounting, 2002–06


(Percent per year)



# The flip-side of this are high current account deficits, especially high in the Baltics and South-Eastern Europe...


#### **Current account deficit**

(in percent of GDP)



Source: IMF WEO April 2007.


# These are closely related to financial deepening



Sources: National authorities; and IMF staff calculations.


Most of the deterioration of C/A balances is driven by an increase in investment...

#### Emerging Europe: Contributions to Current Account Deficit, 2003–07 (Percent)




#### ... and financed by FDI (and borrowing from foreign parent banks)

### C/A minus net FDI, 2002-2006 average (percent of GDP)




### EU transfers (mainly structural and agricultural funds) are an increasingly important part of the balance of payments

EU Funds, average annual commitments, 2004-6, 2007-13 financial perspectives (percent of GDP)




Exchange rate appreciations do not explain high C/A deficits...

# Emerging Europe: Change in Current Account Balance and Real Effective Exchange Rate Appreciation, 2003–07




#### ...and lack of competitiveness is not a problem






# The "EU halo effect": markets continue to reward EU membership

Risk premium: difference from fundamentals




# C/A deficits in some countries are much higher than supported by fundamentals




### External debt is growing and reserve coverage is insufficient in some countries

### External debt to GDP Change 2002-2007




#### Short-term debt / reserves, 2007




# Although lending to emerging Europe is relatively a small share in the portfolio of banks in advanced Europe...

Relative Magnitudes of Funding Exposure for Emerging and Western Europe, June 30, 2007 (*Percent*)



#### ... it exposes the region to common-lender contagion risk

### Concentration of Emerging Europe Exposure to Western Europe, June 30, 2007




Source: Bank for International Settlements, Quarterly Review, December 2007.


Note: Country names are abbreviated according to the ISO standard codes.

<sup>1/</sup> Emerging Europe exposure to western European banks is defined as the share of the reporting banks in each western European country in the total outstanding claims on a given emerging European country (both bank and nonbank sectors). For example, about 42 percent of Croatia's exposures to Western European reporting banks is owed to Austrian banks, 38 percent to Italian banks, 13 percent to French banks, etc. For the Baltic countries, 85 percent or more of exposures to the reporting banks is owed to Swedish banks.

# Credit, mostly refinanced from abroad, is concentrated on households and nontradables




# Since the onset of the global financial crisis, markets have differentiated between emerging market countries



Source: Bloomberg, national statistics.

# Particularly countries with large external imbalances face higher financing cost

#### **Emerging Europe: Bond Spreads and Current Account Deficits**



### So, are large external imbalances a risk?

#### Optimists:

- The EU's "halo" effect (about 100 bp)
- Favorable structure of financing (EU funds, remittances, FDI, low portfolio inflows)
- Presence of large EU banks

#### Pessimists:

- Historical "boom-bust" evidence of large capital inflows
- Debt financing is potentially vulnerable to sudden stops and increased cost of refinancing (as is already been felt now)
- Foreign capital mainly goes to the non-tradable sector => questions about countries' capacity to repay
- In the wake of the global credit crisis, markets are starting to punish countries with large imbalances

### Policy Dilemma

Large external imbalances should not surprise in an environment of rapid growth

- → Policy challenge: how to reduce vulnerabilities without impeding the convergence process?
- → Analytical challenge: how to distinguish "natural" convergence from overheating

### Policy agenda

- Monetary policy: address inflationary pressures, but keep an eye on interest differentials which could induce short-term capital inflows
- Fiscal policy: let automatic stabilizers work if economy slows down, but no room for additional stimulus
- Financial sector supervision: watch crossborder exposures, encourage the build-up of capital buffers
- Prepare for euro adoption by creating flexible economies and sound institutions