Self-Fulfilling Credit Market Freezes

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Motivation

- One of the interesting features of the financial crisis has been a credit freeze, whereby banks did not lend capital available to them.

- Governments have used various policy measures aimed at obtaining a credit thaw.

- Analyzing and evaluating these policy responses requires a model that is clear about the source of a freeze.

- We develop such a model and are able to identify the payoffs, limits, and relative desirability of alternative policy responses.
Credit Freezes as Coordination Failures

- Our model suggests coordination failures as a source of credit freeze.
- We describe an economy, where firms are interdependent:
  - Firm A buys inputs from firm B, whose employees are customers of firm C, who buys inputs from firm A, etc.
- In such an economy, the success of a firm depends on the success of other firms, and hence lending by a bank is worthwhile if other banks lend.
- Then, credit freezes arise as a self-fulfilling belief, because banks believe other banks are not going to lend.
Triggers and Government Policy

- We analyze what triggers a freeze and how the government can stop it.
  - Infusion of capital to banks enhances lending coordination to some extent (by increasing confidence that firms will have enough capital to succeed), but banks may still fail to coordinate on lending the capital.
  - Direct lending to firms is better at resolving the coordination problem, but problematic since governments don’t have the expertise to identify good borrowers.
  - We analyze other policy measures aimed at obtaining better results.
Some Related Literature

- Strategic complementarities in the macro economy used here have been motivated before, e.g., in Cooper and John (1988).
- Analysis of capital infusion, lender of last resort policy, etc. has been conducted in various papers, e.g., Rochet and Vives (2004).
  - Main difference is that here the infusion of capital to banks does not solve the problem, as banks may still fail to coordinate on lending. This leads to other policy tools, and their problems due to government’s lack of information.
Model

- Continuum $[0,K]$ of banks, each one holds $1$.

- Need to decide whether to invest in a risk free asset, generating $1$ (risk free rate $r$ suppressed here), or lend to operating firms.

- Bad operating firms (proportion $\beta$) always generate $0$. Good operating firms may generate $1+R$, depending if projects succeed.

- Banks can tell good firms from bad firms, and obtain the entire surplus from lending to good firms.

- Return from lending is thus:
Here:

- $\theta$ is fundamental of the economy.
- $L$ is mass of operating firms obtaining financing. In benchmark model, $L = nK$, where $n$ is proportion of banks deciding to lend.
- Fundamental $\theta$ is normally distributed with mean $y$ (public news) and standard deviation $\sigma_\theta$ (precision, $\tau_\theta = \frac{1}{(\sigma_\theta)^2}$).
- Banks obtain signals: $x_i = \theta + \varepsilon_i$, where $\varepsilon_i$ is normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation $\sigma_p$ (precision, $\tau_p = \frac{1}{(\sigma_p)^2}$).
Equilibrium

- Applying global-games techniques, as long as \( \frac{\tau_\theta}{\sqrt{\tau_p}} \leq \frac{\sqrt{2\pi}}{aK} \), there is a unique equilibrium, where:

  o Banks lend if and only if their signals are above \( x^* \).

  o Real projects succeed if and only if the fundamentals are above \( \theta^* \):

\[
\theta^* = b - aK + aK \Phi \left( \frac{\tau_\theta}{\sqrt{\tau_p}} \left( \theta^* - y + \frac{\sqrt{\tau_\theta + \tau_p}}{\tau_\theta} \Phi^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{1 + R} \right) \right) \right)
\]
Credit Freeze

• When banks observe very precise signals, i.e., $\tau_p$ approaches infinity, $x^*$ and $\theta^*$ converge to the same value:

$$\theta^* = b - aK + aK \frac{1}{1 + R}$$

• Three ranges of fundamentals:

  o Below $\underline{\theta} = b - aK$: Efficient No-Lending Equilibrium.

  o Between $b - aK$ and $b - aK + aK \frac{1}{1 + R}$: Inefficient credit freeze.

  o Above $b - aK + aK \frac{1}{1 + R}$: Efficient Lending Equilibrium.
Equilibrium Outcomes

Efficient No-Lending Equilibrium  

Inefficient Credit Freeze  

Efficient Lending Equilibrium  

$\theta$  

$\theta^*$  

$\theta$
What Triggers A Credit Freeze?

- A downward shift in fundamentals:
  - If fundamentals drop from a level above $b - aK + aK \frac{1}{1+R}$ to a level below it.

- A decrease in banks’ capital:
  - Suppose that banks lost a fraction $l$ of their capital, the threshold for a credit freeze would increase to:
    \[
    \theta^* = b - aK(1 - l) + aK(1 - l) \frac{1}{1 + R}
    \]
Government Policy 1: Capital Infusion to Banks

- Suppose that the government has total capital of \( aK \).
- What is the effect of infusing that capital to the banking system?
- This will reduce the likelihood of a freeze to:

\[
\theta_{Bank}^* = b - aK(1 - (1 - \alpha)l) + aK(1 - (1 - \alpha)l) \frac{1}{1 + R}
\]

- But, there are still inefficient credit freezes that occur just because banks believe that other banks are not going to lend to operating firms.
The Effect of Capital Infusion to Banks

\[ \theta \quad \theta^*_{Bank} \quad \theta^* \quad \theta \]

- Inefficient Freeze Sustained
- Inefficient Freeze Eliminated

\[ \theta \quad \theta^*_{Bank} \quad \theta^* \quad \theta \]
What is the mechanism at work?

- The additional capital available to banks gives other banks confidence that operating firms will do well if they receive financing, and may induce them to lend capital they already have.

- But, coordination failures still arise, as banks choose not to lend if they expect other banks will not lend.
Government Policy 2: Direct Lending to Operating Firms

- One could consider a “lender-of-last-resort” policy to provide capital directly to operating firms.

- This is more efficient in inducing banks to lend, yielding the threshold:

  \[ \theta_{Direct}^* = b - aK(1 - (1 - \alpha)l) + aK(1 - l) \frac{1}{1 + R} \]

- The fact that the government provides the capital directly to operating firms makes banks even more confident that real projects will succeed.

- But, there are inefficiencies as the government cannot identify good firms.
Comparing Capital Infusion to Banks with Direct Lending to Firms

Capital Infusion to Banks Dominates

Direct Lending to Firms May Dominate

Capital Infusion to Banks Dominates

\( \theta_{Direct} \) \hspace{1cm} \( \theta_{Bank} \) \hspace{1cm} \( \theta \)
• Overall, direct lending is preferable at an intermediate range, where it creates a thaw that could not have been generated by infusion of capital to banks.

• Formally, direct lending is preferred when:
  
  o \( y \) (known fundamental) is in an intermediate range.

  o \( \beta \) (proportion of bad firms) is low,

  o \( R \) (return on successful projects) is high.
Government Policy 3: Matching / Government Funds with Private Equity Participation

- The challenge is to have a policy that achieves the lower likelihood of credit freeze while utilizing the expertise of banks in finding good firms.

- Suppose that the government gives $\alpha l$ to a bank under the condition that it lends this amount as well as its own money $(1 - l)$ to operating firms.

- Now, a bank faces the following tradeoff:
  - Lend: $(1 - l + \alpha l)(1 + R)$ in case of success, and 0 otherwise.
  - Not lend: $(1 - l)$. 
• The result is that banks lend if and only if the fundamental is below $\theta^*_\text{Direct}$. They only lend to good firms.

• Hence, this mechanism achieves a better outcome that the other mechanisms we considered.

• Relative to direct lending by the government:
  
  o Banks are provided stronger incentive to lend.
  
  o Government capital is not guaranteed to get into the economy.
  
  o These effects cancel out, generating the same threshold $\theta^*_\text{Direct}$.
  
  o Moreover, money is only lent to successful projects.
Conclusion

• A model of credit freezes as coordination failures is developed.

• Credit freezes may be triggered by drop in fundamentals or loss of capital.

• The model is used to analyze various government tools and provides implications as to their payoffs and limits.

• Capital infusion to banks can eliminate some but not all inefficient credit freezes, while direct lending to firms is better at this but might be wasteful.

• Among non-traditional responses analyzed, government funds with private capital participation may be most effective.