


# Risk Premia in Crude Oil Futures Prices

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# One estimate of total commodity-index assets



Source: Michael Masters, Testimony before U.S. Senate, 2008.

# Literature on Commodities Markets Financialization

## Policy discussion

- ▶ Masters (2008), Kennedy (2012)

## Academic literature

- ▶ **Survey:** Irwin and Sanders (2011) and Fattouh, Kilian, and Mahadeva (2012)
- ▶ **Correlation:** Tang and Xiong (2011), Buyuksahin and Robe (2010, 2011), Fattouh, Kilian, and Mahadeva (2012)
- ▶ **Structural VAR:** Kilian and Murphy (2011), Lombardi and van Robays (2011) and Juvenal and Petrella (2011)
- ▶ **Prediction regression:** Brunetti, Buyuksahin, and Harris (2011), Irwin and Sanders (2011a, b, 2012), Stoll and Whaley (2010), Alquist and Gervais (2011), Buyuksahin and Harris (2011), Singleton (2011), Hamilton and Wu (2012)

# Effect of financialization on the futures price

**Masters' argument:** increased volume of buying may drive up the futures price

**Possible mechanism:** Sellers willing to take other side if compensated in the form of higher return

**Our paper:** explores whether this could operate through changes in the risk premium

# Keynes' theory of normal backwardation

## Keynes (1930)

- ▶ Producers hedge by **selling** futures contracts, and pay a premium
- ▶ Arbitrageurs are forced to take the other side, exposed to non-diversifiable risk, and compensated

## Empirical support

- ▶ Carter, Rausser, and Schmitz (1983), Chang (1985), Bessembinder (1992), De Roon, Nijman, and Veld (2000), and Acharya, Lochstoer, and Ramadorai (2010)

## Impact of Financial Investors?

- ▶ **Buy** commodities futures for portfolio diversification
- ▶ Exert a similar effect in the **opposite** direction
- ▶ Shift the receipt of the risk premium from the **long** side to the **short** side of the contract

# Similarity between effects of index investing and quantitative easing

Hamilton and Wu (JMCB 2012) relate price of risk to supplies of Treasury debt in QE context

**This paper:** We investigate the relation between the *price of risk* and *volume of contracts* in the index investing environment.

# Contribution

## Methodology:

- ▶ Build the interaction between commercial hedgers or financial investors and arbitrageurs into an affine factor framework
- ▶ Model the dynamics of risk premia with no-arbitrage conditions
- ▶ Develop a new algorithm for estimation using unbalanced data

## Significant changes in oil future risk premia since 2005

- ▶ Risk premia to the long position smaller or even negative
- ▶ Risk premia more volatile

## Implications:

- ▶ Financial investors become more important determining risk premia
- ▶ They become the natural counterparties of commercial hedgers

## Seasonal variation of risk premia over the month

# Outline

Introduction

Model

Estimation

Empirical Results

Conclusion



## Arbitrageur's problem

$F_{nt}$  = price at  $t$  of contract of maturity  $n$

$z_{nt}$  = notional holdings in contracts of maturity  $n$

$z_{nt}/F_{nt}$  = number of barrels purchased with contract  $n$

Arbitrageur's cash flow for  $t + 1$

$$W_{t+1} = \sum_{n=1}^N z_{nt} \frac{F_{n-1,t+1} - F_{nt}}{F_{nt}}.$$

Arbitrageur's optimization problem

$$\max_{\{z_{1t}, \dots, z_{Nt}\}} E_t(W_{t+1}) - (\gamma/2) \text{Var}_t(W_{t+1}).$$

# Assumptions

Log price linear in  $(m \times 1)$  factors  $x_t$

$$f_{nt} = \log F_{nt} = \alpha_n + \beta_n' x_t.$$

Factor dynamics

$$x_{t+1} = c + \rho x_t + \Sigma u_{t+1} \quad u_{t+1} \sim \text{i.i.d. } N(0, I_m)$$

## Equilibrium

Arbitrageur's FOC

$$\alpha_{n-1} + \beta'_{n-1}(c + \rho x_t) - \alpha_n - \beta'_n x_t + (1/2)\beta'_{n-1}\Sigma\Sigma'\beta_{n-1} = \beta'_{n-1}\lambda_t$$

$$\text{where } \lambda_t = \gamma\Sigma\Sigma' \left( \sum_{\ell=1}^N z_{\ell t} \beta_{\ell-1} \right).$$

If counterparty demands ( $z_{\ell t}$ ) are affine functions of  $x_t$ , then in equilibrium risk prices will take affine form

$$\lambda_t = \lambda + \Lambda x_t.$$

Factor loading iterations, analogous to ATSM recursion

$$\beta'_n = \beta'_{n-1}\rho - \beta'_{n-1}\Lambda$$

$$\alpha_n = \alpha_{n-1} + \beta'_{n-1}c + (1/2)\beta'_{n-1}\Sigma\Sigma'\beta_{n-1} - \beta'_{n-1}\lambda.$$

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# Data Structure

Definition of four “weeks”

$j_t = 1$  : last business day of the previous month

$j_t = 2$  : 5th business day

$j_t = 3$  : 10th business day

$j_t = 4$  : expiration day (third business before the 25th calendar day)

Unbalanced panel: the nearest three contracts

$$y_t = \begin{cases} (f_{3t}, f_{7t}, f_{11,t})' & \text{if } j_t = 1 \\ (f_{2t}, f_{6t}, f_{10,t})' & \text{if } j_t = 2 \\ (f_{1t}, f_{5t}, f_{9t})' & \text{if } j_t = 3 \\ (f_{0t}, f_{4t}, f_{8t})' & \text{if } j_t = 4 \end{cases} .$$

## Level and slope

Definition

$$y_{1t} = H_1 y_t$$

$$H_1 = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & (1/2) & (1/2) \\ 0 & -1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}.$$

Model implies

$$f_{nt} = \alpha_n + \beta_n' x_t.$$

Priced exactly

$$y_{1t} = A_{1,j_t} + B_{1,j_t} x_t$$

with

$$x_{t+1} = c + \rho x_t + \sum u_{t+1}$$

$$\Rightarrow y_{1t} | y_{t-1}, y_{t-2}, \dots, y_0 \sim N(\phi_{j_t} + \Phi_{j_t} y_{1,t-1}, \Omega_{j_t})$$

where  $\phi_{j_t}, \Phi_{j_t}, \Omega_{j_t}$  depend on structural parameters

$$\theta : (c, \rho, \Sigma, c^Q, \rho^Q, \lambda, \Lambda, \alpha_0, \beta_0)$$

# Near Contract

Definition

$$y_{2t} = H_2 y_t$$

$$H_2 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

Priced with measurement error

$$y_{2t} = A_{2,j_t} + B_{2,j_t} x_t + \sigma_{e,j_t} u_{e,t}$$

with

$$y_{1t} = A_{1,j_t} + B_{1,j_t} x_t$$

$$\Rightarrow y_{2t} | y_{1t}, y_{t-1}, y_{t-2}, \dots, y_0 \sim N(\gamma_{j_t} + \Gamma_{j_t} y_{1t}, \sigma_{e,j_t}^2)$$

where  $\gamma_{j_t}, \Gamma_{j_t}$  depend on structural parameters  $\theta$

# Step 1: OLS for unrestricted VAR

## Unrestricted VAR

$$y_{1t} | y_{t-1}, y_{t-2}, \dots, y_0 \sim N(\phi_{j_t} + \Phi_{j_t} y_{1,t-1}, \Omega_{j_t})$$

$$y_{2t} | y_{1t}, y_{t-1}, y_{t-2}, \dots, y_0 \sim N(\gamma_{j_t} + \Gamma_{j_t} y_{1t}, \sigma_{e,j_t}^2)$$

where  $\phi_{j_t}, \Phi_{j_t}, \Omega_{j_t}, \gamma_{j_t}, \Gamma_{j_t}, \sigma_{e,j_t}$  are unrestricted



## Step 1: OLS for unrestricted VAR

Log likelihood function

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathcal{L} &= \sum_{t=1}^T [\log g(y_{1t}; \phi_{j_t} + \Phi_{j_t} y_{1,t-1}, \Omega_{j_t}) \\
 &\quad + \log g(y_{2t}; \gamma_{j_t} + \Gamma_{j_t} y_{1t}, \sigma_{e_{j_t}}^2)] \\
 &= \sum_{j=1}^4 \sum_{t=1}^T \delta(j_t = j) \log g(y_{1t}; \phi_j + \Phi_j y_{1,t-1}, \Omega_j) \\
 &\quad + \sum_{j=1}^4 \sum_{t=1}^T \delta(j_t = j) \log g(y_{2t}; \gamma_j + \Gamma_j y_{1t}, \sigma_{e_j}^2)
 \end{aligned}$$

Reduced form parameters

$$\pi : (\phi_1, \Phi_1, \Omega_1, \gamma_1, \Gamma_1, \dots, \phi_4, \Phi_4, \Omega_4, \gamma_4, \Gamma_4)$$

MLE ( $\hat{\pi}$ ) can be obtained by OLS, with each week of month as separate sample

## Step 2: MCSE for structural parameters

Hamilton and Wu (J Econometrics 2012)

- ▶ Idea: choose structural parameters  $\theta$  that would imply reduced-form coefficients  $\pi(\theta)$  as close as possible to the unrestricted estimates  $\hat{\pi}$ .
- ▶ Asymptotically equivalent to full MLE.
- ▶ Computational advantages
- ▶ Interpretive advantages

## Step 2: MCSE for structural parameters

Model implies

$$\pi = g(\theta)$$

Minimum-chi-square estimation

$$\min T[\hat{\pi} - g(\theta)]' \hat{R}[\hat{\pi} - g(\theta)]$$

where  $\hat{R}$  is the information matrix of  $\hat{\pi}$

Minimized value is asymptotically  $\chi^2$  with degrees of freedom given by number of parameters in  $\pi$  minus number in  $\theta$

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
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**Empirical Results**

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# Data



Sample: January 1990 - December 2004, January 2005 - June 2011

Likelihood ratio test of structural break:  $p = 2.2 \times 10^{-16}$

# Risk Price

$$\lambda_t = \lambda + \Lambda x_t$$


1990-2004

- ▶ First element of  $\lambda + \Lambda \bar{x}$  is 0.0037 (0.0018).  
⇒ Positive compensation for long position.

2005-2011


- ▶ Large negative value for  $\Lambda_{12}$   
⇒ When the spread gets sufficiently high, a long position in the 1- and 2-month contracts would on average lose money.
- ▶ First element of  $\lambda + \Lambda \bar{x}$  is smaller, and no longer significant  
⇒ The average reward for taking long positions in the second subsample is not as evident in the first subsample

# Risk Price



# Risk Premium

$$rp_t = \tilde{f}_{nt} - f_{nt}$$





# Implications

Positive  $\bar{\lambda}_t(1)$  from 1990-2004

- ▶ Arbitrageurs: take long positions, accept positive expected earnings
- ▶ Commercial producers: hedge by short positions, pay for insurance

Index fund buyers explain why a long position no longer has a positive return.

- ▶ Serve as counterparty for commercial hedgers
- ▶ Don't demand risk compensation

Positive return to a spreading position from 2005-2011

- ▶ Arbitraders buy long-term futures from oil producers, and sell short-term futures to index-fund investors

# Conclusion

## Methodology

- ▶ Affine factor model for studying the interaction between hedgers and arbitrageurs in oil futures market
- ▶ Estimation with unbalanced panel
- ▶ Diagnostic tools

## Empirical findings

- ▶ Prior to 2005, positive compensation for a long position, with low variation of risk premium  
⇒ the premium comes from hedging demand by commercial producers
- ▶ Since 2005, lower and often negative compensation for a long position, with higher volatility  
⇒ Increased participation by financial investors change the nature of risk premia