

Statistics to Measure Offshoring and its Impact

by

Robert C. Feenstra

University of California, Davis, and NBER

For presentation at THE FOURTH IMF STATISTICAL FORUM “LIFTING THE SMALL BOATS: STATISTICS FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH,” NOVEMBER 17-18, 2016.

Outline:

“First Generation” statistics to measure offshoring:


- Share of imported intermediate inputs in total material costs
- Using to measure the shift in labor demand

“Second Generation” statistics to measure offshoring:


- Global input-output tables, to measure value chains

Both of these need to be supplemented with *price* measures to determine the impact of offshoring on welfare and on growth


Simple Model of Offshoring




Simple Model of Offshoring



Simple Model of Offshoring




Home country



Foreign country

Relative Wage and Employment of Nonproduction/Production Workers in U.S. Manufacturing, 1979-1990



Source: NBER productivity database

“First Generation” statistics to measure offshoring:

Shift in Relative Labor Demand measured by:


- Share of imported intermediate inputs in total costs (relies on *proportionality assumption* that import share of each input in each industry is the same as for the whole economy)
- *SBTC* measured by share of capital in high tech equipment (can measure share of capital *stock* or *flow*, *i.e. new investment*)
- We find that both imported inputs and capital devoted to high tech equipment are important, depending on measures used.

Table 1: Impact on the Relative Wage of Nonproduction Labor in U.S. Manufacturing, 1979-1990

	<u>Percent of Total Increase Explained by each Factor</u>	
	Offshoring	High-technology Equipment
<i>Measurement of high-tech equipment:</i>		
As a share of the capital stock	21 – 27%	29 – 32%
Share of capital flow (i.e. new investment)	12%	99%

Source: Robert C. Feenstra and Gordon H. Hanson, “The Impact of Outsourcing and High-Technology Capital on Wages: Estimates for the U.S., 1979-1990,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, August 1999, 114(3), 907-940.

But later, from 1989-2014:



Source: NBER productivity database.

But later, from 1989-2014:

- **1990-2000**: increase in the relative wage of high-skilled labor but a *reduction* in its relative employment
 - due to polarization of the labor market OR offshoring of nonproduction workers in service activities
 - Measure these use O*NET data
- **2000-2005**: this trend reverses itself
- **2006-2012**: increase in relative wage and employment
- Erratic movements after that

Limitations of First Generation Statistics

- What is the welfare impact? Real versus relative wage?
- Should use **price-based measures of offshoring**, otherwise a terms of trade improvement is inaccurately attributed to productivity growth. E.g. Housman et al. (2011):
 - This bias may have accounted for *one-fifth to one-half* of the growth in real value added in manufacturing (excluding the computer industry).
- Feenstra et al. (2013): terms of trade gain is *one-fifth* of the reported 1996-2006 increase in U.S. productivity growth
- Reinsdorf and Yuskavage (2016): *one-tenth* of the speedup in productivity over 1997-2007 can be explained by this bias.

“Second Generation” statistics to measure offshoring:

- World Input-Output Database (WIOD), or EORA
- Can construct the *domestic value-added in exports* and its counterpart, *foreign value-added in exports* $FVAiX$, to indicate the extent to which countries are tied into global supply chains.
- We illustrate $FVAiX$ for China and its supplying countries, including those of Southeast Asia (using EORA): Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, in addition to China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, which are included in WIOD

- Possible to extend the analysis to employment and growth in *supplying countries* of Southeast Asia

Limitations of Second-Generation Offshoring Statistics

- Take as exogenous the increase in exports and other changes in final demand, while in fact, such changes are endogenous
- For example, Los et al. (2015) calculate that over 2001-2006 the surge in China exports accounted for 71 million jobs.
- Related to this limitation, it is unclear how $FVAiX$ would impact *relative wage* or *employment* of high-skilled workers.
 - Reijnders, Timmer & Ye (2016) argue that SBTC & offshoring contribute equally important to declining employment

- One way to make progress on both these concerns is to focus future attention on the *price* side of global input-output models.

Price-Based Measure of Global Offshoring

The **import-based ERP** (effective rate of protection):

$$MERP_j = \frac{t_j - \sum_i t_i (a_{ij} + a_{ij}^*)}{1 - \sum_i (a_{ij} + a_{ij}^*)}.$$

- a_{ij} denotes the amount of input i that is *domestically* sourced;
- a_{ij}^* denotes input i that is sourced from *all foreign* countries for \$1 output in industry j .

- Suppose that there is a *pass-through coefficient* of $\beta \in [0,1]$ from changes in tariffs to changes in the prices of *domestically-produced* goods. In this case, the ERP becomes,

$$ERP_j = \frac{1 + \beta(t_j - 1) - \sum_i [1 + \beta(t_i - 1)]a_{ij} + t_i a_{ij}^*}{1 - \sum_i (a_{ij} + a_{ij}^*)}$$

- Setting $\beta = 0$ to hold exports prices fixed & full pass-through to imported input prices, we obtain the *ERP for exports*:

$$XERP_j = \frac{1 - \sum_i (a_{ij} + t_i a_{ij}^*)}{1 - \sum_i (a_{ij} + a_{ij}^*)}$$

Figure 9: Chinese $MERP_j$ for 10 sectors in EORA





Figure 10: Chinese $XERP_j$ for 10 sectors in EORA



Conclusions:

“*First Generation*” statistics to measure offshoring:

- Using to measure the shift in labor demand
- Need to be supplemented with measures to measure the impact of offshoring on *price* and therefore on welfare

“*Second Generation*” statistics to measure offshoring:

- Useful to measure the magnitude of global value chains
- Need to understand how labor demand is affected
- Also need to be supplemented with price measures, as I have illustrated for China

Appendix: Nominal Rate of Protection in China

