Varieties of Monetary Reforms

Author/Editor:

Pierre L. Siklos

Publication Date:

May 1, 1994

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

This paper surveys three types of monetary arrangements. It considers how the choice of an exchange rate regime, the degree of central bank independence, or choice of currency unions or boards depends not only on economic considerations but also on political economy considerations. In economic terms, the choice of monetary regime will depend on the policy that is best suited to reducing or stabilizing inflation. In political economy terms, the choice of monetary arrangement will ultimately depend on how independent a country wishes to be from shocks emanating from the rest of the world and the weight politicians attach to influencing economic conditions in their own country.

Series:

Working Paper No. 1994/057

Subject:

English

Publication Date:

May 1, 1994

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451967326/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA0571994

Pages:

30

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