Making Senegal a Hub for West Africa

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Overview

Alexei Kireyev and Ali Mansoor

Senegal is one of the most democratically developed and stable states in sub-Saharan Africa. Located in the westernmost part of the African continent, the country has an estimated population of about 14 million and the per capita income of slightly above US$1,000. A sound electoral system and a strong democratic tradition, supported by vigilant free media, proved capable of channeling social and political tensions into a democratic post-election transition in 2012. The new government is committed to respond to chronic underperformance which is reflected in the growing popular impatience at the slow pace of reforms, low growth, widespread poverty, and high unemployment. The next presidential elections are expected to take place in 2017, and there is a sense of urgency to deliver on long-overdue reforms and electoral promises.

Senegal is at an important inflection point. Growth in the past few years has been sluggish and did not make a meaningful dent in poverty. To exit the trap of low growth and high poverty, the authorities have launched a new development strategy: Plan Sénégal Emergent (PSE). The plan aims for Senegal to be an emerging market economy by 2035 by making it a hub for West Africa. To reach this objective, 2015 must mark a turning point from the mediocre growth of the past to the higher, sustainable, and inclusive growth envisaged by the PSE.

The PSE is articulated around three pillars: (1) higher and sustainable growth in the range of 7–8 percent, based on foreign direct investment (FDI) and export-driven structural transformation; (2) human development and social protection; and (3) improved governance, peace, and security. The PSE calls for continued fiscal consolidation, constrained public consumption, and increased public saving to generate fiscal space for higher public investment in human capital and public infrastructure. It also envisages structural reforms to attract FDI and boost private investment.

The main challenges for Senegal are to accelerate, broaden, and deepen reforms. The key institutional preconditions are strong ownership of the PSE at the highest political level, broad
popular demand for reforms, and strong support from development partners. On the macro side, the prospects are favorable: growth is accelerating, inflation remains low, and the fiscal deficit is under control. Senegal has access to concessional and nonconcessional resources to finance its development agenda. It should be able to mobilize financial resources with low risk of debt distress if it follows the fiscal consolidation path envisaged in the PSE and tightens public consumption, thereby creating space for public investment.

This paper identifies the policy mix needed for the PSE to succeed. Chapter 1 revisits the challenges of achieving the PSE’s growth objective by tapping into the experience of other countries that became emerging market economies. Experience of other countries across the world suggests that the ambition to rise to an emerging economy status within the next two decades is achievable. Historically, countries that have embarked on important investment programs have experienced mixed fortunes. Those that have embarked on ambitious structural reform to unlock FDI and private sector growth have become emerging economies. Those that just built up debt by ramping up public spending without accompanying reforms still remain low-income economies. Unleashing Senegal’s growth potential would require strong action on supply constraints, such as the regulatory framework and cultivation of a business climate friendly to FDI and small and medium enterprises (SMEs), together with investment in human capital and infrastructure; reduction in inequality by expanding private employment opportunities in the formal sector and broader access to education and health services; and planning for adverse shocks to ensure adequate fiscal space to sustain the PSE investment plan.

Chapter 2 discusses options for strengthening Senegal’s fiscal framework to support the authorities’ growth strategy implementation while containing risks of debt distress. The authorities’ latest development plan relies on a new composition of public finances, which envisages raising additional revenues and rebalancing spending from current to capital. These plans contrast with the experience in Senegal throughout the past decade, characterized by weak revenue performance and substantial increases in public consumption, particularly the government’s wage bill. In this context, strengthening the fiscal framework would be a key step forward to help steer public finances to support the PSE. This section highlights some areas for improvement—in particular, in identifying fiscal challenges and planning a credible medium-term fiscal strategy.

Chapter 3 assesses Senegal’s external stability. Senegal has continued to record sizable current account deficits over the past decade, financed mainly by official flows, but with increasing recourse to private flows. While official West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) reserves are currently adequate and Senegal’s exchange rate shows no significant signs of misalignment, the current account deficit is large, at about 10 percent of GDP, and there are
signs of eroding competitiveness. Senegal’s exports have not gained market share, and survey-based indicators continue to point to a need for strong measures to improve structural competitiveness and the business environment. Debt remains manageable, but there is little room for higher fiscal deficits or more nonconcessional borrowing if Senegal’s current low-risk rating is to be preserved. Given these external vulnerabilities, pro-growth fiscal policy must proceed with caution, especially in the context of a fixed exchange rate, which places almost all the weight of policy response on the budget.

Chapter 4 explores structural transformation and export of the Senegalese economy to make it more competitive through more diversified production base and exports. The PSE envisages boosting economic growth through a large scale-up of investment and structural transformation. This chapter examines these goals against the backdrop of Senegal’s historical growth performance with respect to three main areas: total factor productivity, export diversification and quality, and perceived constraints in the informal sector. It finds that in order to yield growth gains, additional capital increases need to be accompanied by increases in total factor productivity, investment in human capital, and broader financial inclusion. Diversification would benefit growth and stability mainly through increases in the shares of the existing product base, which are complemented by increases in product quality.

Chapter 5 discusses the electricity problem as a major impediment to accelerated growth and achieving the objective of the new development strategy. The fiscal cost of the electricity sector continues to weigh heavily on the government’s budget. As a result, there is an opportunity cost for development spending, while the economy still faces significant bottlenecks with high electricity costs and insufficient electricity production. Cross-country experiences provide useful guidelines on successful reforms, particularly on the fiscal front. Senegal also has an opportunity to lower tariffs, eliminate fiscal subsidies, and expand coverage—provided it accelerates the introduction of new low-cost generation. Moreover, this can be done at low cost to the government budget through the use of power purchase agreements that could be reached through transparent tenders.

Chapter 6 makes a case for developing and enhancing social safety nets, in particular to protect the poor and most vulnerable during major structural transformation. While Senegal has been successful in decreasing poverty rates, the share of the population living below the poverty line and its exposure to shock remains high, emphasizing the need for safety nets. Such nets should be scalable to respond to transient needs while ensuring minimum social protection for chronically poor and vulnerable populations. Strengthening social protection is high on the authorities’ reform agenda, including within the second pillar of the PSE. This section reviews Senegal’s current state of social protection and reforms in progress, and outlines main
strategies for the design of social security nets going forward.

Chapter 7 takes stock of Senegal’s performance under the IMF’s 2011–14 Policy Support Instrument (PSI). Senegal has had two successive arrangements under the IMF’s PSI since 2007. This section focuses on Senegal’s performance under the latest PSI with respect to three main areas: the overall macroeconomic performance, program conditionality and other policy targets, and technical assistance. It concludes that the overall macroeconomic performance has been below par but acceptable. The main PSI goals—higher growth and fiscal and debt sustainability—were broadly achieved but with less favorable outcomes than initially programmed; program performance has been mixed, with qualitative targets largely met but substantial delays in structural reforms. In addition, Senegal has found the technical assistance from the IMF to be useful, although there is scope for improvement in the implementation of the IMF’s recommendations.

To sum up, Senegal’s development goals are ambitious but achievable. Risks are substantial but manageable. The preconditions are in place, the opportunities are vast and challenging. The PSE provides a unique chance for Senegal to break with the past and join the ranks of fast growing countries in Africa and across the developing world. Now is the opportune time to go further—to work together with development partners towards an inclusive, job-rich and sustainable growth strategy. Now is the right time to start reforming institutions building on the experience of many countries that have become emerging economies. This is the right time to empower the youth, women, and the poor. Senegal could be at the front of a joint effort to put the region on the path to inclusive growth and poverty reduction, become a locomotive for other countries in WAEMU, and a real hub for West Africa at large.
Box 1. Senegal: Main Findings and Recommendations

- **Peer learning:** International experience suggests that Plan Sénégal Emergent (PSE) targets are realistic if appropriate policies are pursued. For the PSE to succeed, the government of Senegal needs to distill the experience of comparator countries that successfully became emerging market economies and put in place a package of reforms that will attract foreign direct investment (FDI), increase private investment, and expand exports. An active peer-learning effort is needed.

- **Growth:** Unlocking Senegal’s growth potential is possible with bold reforms. The authorities should focus strong actions on supply constraints, such as creating a regulatory framework and business climate friendly to FDI and to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Investment in human capital and infrastructure, reducing inequalities by expanding private employment opportunities in the formal sector, and preemptive planning for adverse shocks to safeguard the fiscal space necessary for PSE investments are also necessary.

- **Fiscal policies:** Improved revenue performance and expenditure composition are critical to the creation of the fiscal space to support the PSE. The authorities are encouraged to specify the underlying fiscal measures associated with the PSE, strengthen the fiscal planning of the PSE with contingencies, enhance fiscal transparency, and improve the effectiveness of public investment.

- **Transformation:** To raise growth, investment needs to be accompanied by improved total factor productivity, investment in human capital, and broader financial inclusion. Diversification would benefit growth and stability mainly through increases in the shares of existing products complemented by improvements in their quality.

- **Electricity:** There is an opportunity cost for development spending—the economy still faces bottlenecks from high electricity costs and insufficient electricity production. The authorities should continue reforms of the sector. Cross-country experiences provide useful guidelines on successful reforms, particularly on the fiscal front. Senegal should also eliminate fiscal subsidies to the electricity sector and expand coverage capacity, provided it accelerates the introduction of new low-cost electricity generation.

- **Social safety nets:** The share of the population living below the poverty line remains unacceptably high. Strengthening social protection should be high on the authorities’ reform agenda. The authorities are encouraged to work with the World Bank and other development partners on establishing safety nets capable of responding to transient needs and ensuring minimum social protection for chronically poor and vulnerable groups.

- **Policy Support Instrument (PSI) implementation:** Overall, program performance in 2011–14 has been mixed. The macroeconomic performance has been below par but acceptable. Key PSI goals were achieved but with outcomes less favorable than programmed. The qualitative targets were largely met, but substantial delays occurred in structural reforms. Technical assistance from the IMF was useful, although the implementation of its recommendations could be improved.
Achieving Senegal’s Growth Objective

Ali Mansoor, Albert Touna Mama, Olivier Basdevant, and Salifou Issoufou

The Plan Sénégal Emergent (PSE) aims at achieving ambitious growth objectives, which would allow to make Senegal a regional hub in the medium term. Experience of other countries across the world suggests that the ambition to rise to an emerging economy status within the next two decades is achievable. Historically, countries that have embarked on important investment programs have experienced mixed fortunes. Those that have embarked on ambitions structural reform to unlock foreign direct investment (FDI) and private sector growth have become emerging economies. Those that just built up debt by ramping up public spending without accompanying reforms still remain low-income economies. Unleashing Senegal’s growth potential would require (1) strong action on supply constraints, such as the regulatory framework and cultivation of a business climate friendly to FDI and small and medium enterprises (SMEs), together with investment in human capital and infrastructure; (2) reduction in inequality by expanding private employment opportunities in the formal sector and broader access to education and health services; and (3) planning for adverse shocks to ensure adequate fiscal space to sustain the PSE investment plan.

The PSE calls for Senegal to be an emerging market by 2035 and a hub for the region. The goal is for Senegal to be a key player in the region for a number of activities through better infrastructure, greater human development, and better governance. The plan aims to develop key sectors, such as agriculture, agribusiness, mining, and tourism. To achieve these goals,

1 With assistance from Yanmin Ye.
Senegal would need to accelerate its growth rate to the 7–8 percent range in the short term and sustain such rates in the medium term.

International experience suggests that PSE growth objectives are feasible. Historically, growth acceleration has been a frequent yet unpredictable phenomenon. Nevertheless, growth acceleration driven by economic reforms tended to be sustained. In addition, episodes of sustained growth and growth acceleration usually coincide with a sharp uptick in private investment and trade. However, macroeconomic volatility and external shocks are negatively associated with the duration of growth episodes, while export product sophistication tends to prolong growth.

For Senegal, achieving growth rates around 7–8 percent amounts to a structural break compared with past performances. The PSE projects that economic growth will double the performance recorded in the past two decades. Over the 1995–2013 period economic expansion was modest and volatile, with an average real GDP growth of 4 percent and a 1.7 standard deviation. These growth fluctuations were partly caused by uneven agricultural production, exogenous shocks, and—most important—major bottlenecks in the supply side of the economy that will need to be addressed for Senegal to achieve a balanced growth path.

This section proposes an analysis of investment, trade, and reforms as ways to achieve PSE growth objectives. Senegal needs significant private investment, particularly FDI but also investment in infrastructure and in human capital (education, health). At the same time, it faces significant supply constraints that hamper growth and development. Increased infrastructure spending, especially in transportation and power generation, plays an important role in growth, and it promotes regional and international trade. It can also help achieve such social objectives as access to clean water, education, and health care. In addition, the PSE foresees a virtuous cycle of growth set in motion by unlocking these supply constraints. Improved growth performance would raise revenue and, subsequently, increase fiscal space for investment spending without putting much pressure on the deficit or building up public debt.

2 Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005) found that growth acceleration is frequent but unpredictable. They also found economic reform to be a statistically significant predictor of sustained growth acceleration.

3 For volatility and duration of growth episodes see Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2012). For export product sophistication and growth duration see Section 4 of this paper.
International Experience

The underlying analysis is based on two sets of countries. The first set consists of high-growth countries, based on average annual growth in real purchasing-power-parity (PPP) GDP per capita and levels of real PPP per capita GDP in 1990 and 2013. From among this first set—and to facilitate drawing lessons on policy and institutional reforms—the analysis then focuses on 10 comparators that satisfy a number of additional criteria. The second set, high-debt countries, is derived by applying a range of criteria on growth in debt position as well as the evolution of debt-to-GDP ratios between 1990 and 2013 (see Annex 1 and Table 1).

Historically, countries that have embarked on significant investment programs have experienced mixed fortunes. Between 1990 and 2013 about 46 countries achieved an average growth in real PPP per capita GDP of 5 percent or more, while another 43 accumulated debt without much growth to show for it. Of the 46 countries, the 10 comparators derived from the analysis are Cabo Verde, China, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Uganda, and Vietnam.4

The successful countries emphasized measures to expand exports through more FDI; those that accumulated debt did not seem to do so (Figure 1). Indeed, comparators experienced sustained growth by relying on FDI-driven exports. During episodes of growth—and on average—exports increased by 20 percentage points of GDP for comparators, while high-debt countries, which include Senegal, saw no change in exports in percent of GDP during episodes of high debt. The FDI in percent of GDP followed a similar pattern during episodes of growth for comparators, rising from an average of 1 percent of GDP to nearly 4 percent of GDP in these 10 countries. Although Senegal has a noticeably higher share of FDI in percent of GDP, during the episode of high debt, its growth declined. This is partly explained by the lack of a significant increase in private investment, both in percent of GDP and in percent of total investment. The sustained growth in comparator countries seems also to be underpinned by

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4 This list has only three sub-Saharan African countries and includes China and India. An argument could be made that it is unrealistic for Senegal to emulate countries like China and India; however, the purpose of the analysis is to identify countries that Senegal might want to emulate if it is to become an emerging market middle-income country in 30 years. It could do so by drawing on key lessons from policies and reforms that countries like China, India, and the rest of the middle-income comparators have successfully devised and implemented in order to reach their present status.
increases in private investment in percent of GDP as well as in percent of total investment. For Senegal to achieve PSE-set goals, it would need to devise and implement a critical mass of reforms to encourage private investment, encourage and expand exports, unlock supply constraints, and promote inclusive growth.

**Promote Exports and Export Quality and Expand to New Markets**

As one of the 10 comparators, Mauritius is an example for Senegal to follow. Indeed, Mauritius achieved objectives similar to those of the PSE by promoting exports and by leveraging trade agreements. Despite poor natural resource endowments and high vulnerability to external shocks, the Mauritian story offers a remarkable example of how carefully orchestrated reforms, underpinned by the right institutional setup, can support successful structural transformation. In the post-independence era, Mauritius relied on preferential arrangements in the sugar industry and the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) preferences to promote exports of sugar and textiles. Between 1980 and 2000 GDP per capita more than tripled to reach $3,800 in 2000, while exports increased more than tenfold to reach 60 percent of GDP in 2010. The economy expanded progressively from a primary (sugar), to a secondary (textile), to a tertiary sector (tourism and financial services) to become an upper-middle-income economy today.

Senegal’s growth strategy could greatly benefit from an integrated and coordinated export strategy. Ultimately, the PSE aims to boost exports to its existing partners and mostly to the neighboring countries in West Africa, which should result indirectly through improved competitiveness and higher productivity. Less than 1 percent of public financing under the current plan will go directly to an export strategy. The Mauritius case study suggests that a well-calibrated aggressive trade policy could yield great results, including by leveraging trade agreements. More specifically, better coordination of export-oriented industries, better access to appropriate financing, and facilitation of improvement in quality and other standards could boost existing exports. For example, despite preferred access to the U.S. market through the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) since 2000, U.S. imports from Senegal remain marginal (Figure 2). To emulate Mauritius and other comparators, Senegal would also need to address key supply constraints that partly limit its growth potential.
Figure 1. Senegal: Comparators versus High-Debt Countries

Source: IMF staff estimates.

1 High-debt countries, including Senegal, are listed in Annex 1 of this section. “Before Episode” and “After Episode” are three-year averages of the series. “Before Episode” refers to three years before the start of a growth episode (for comparators) or a debt episode (for high-debt-episode countries). “After Episode” refers to three years before the end of a growth or debt episode.
Unlock Supply Constraints

Unlocking supply constraints may take longer than expected because a critical mass of reforms needs to be in place before growth can reach the target. Because these reforms will take time to be enacted, this suggests revising the speed at which Senegal could reach a growth rate of 7–8 percent. According to the PSE, growth would rebound rapidly—within a year or two. It is expected that a “big push,” with front-loaded public investment that crowds in private investment, including FDI, would lead to rapid gains. However, unlocking supply constraints is likely to take more time, since reforms to improve the regulatory framework and business climate for FDI and SMEs may not happen quickly. Moreover, undertaking new investment projects will not translate immediately into effective productive capacity. A short-term growth rebound is unlikely to come from a demand effect related to increased public spending: for...
developing economies, fiscal multipliers tend to be small—and sometimes even negative. The multipliers are low because demand-driven stimuli are hampered by supply constraints. This is likely to be the case in Senegal, where, among other things, electricity, transportation, and human capital available to the formal private sector all require policy attention. Moreover, the large informal sector and low levels of FDI are the result of a poor business climate, clearly signaled by Senegal’s low rankings in the World Bank’s Doing Business Index. To illustrate this point, we simulated an alternative growth path, using a production function, to see at what speed additional public investment expenditure would translate into higher growth performance (Figure 3).

The growth path in the PSE appears to be implicitly based on multipliers that are much larger than those found empirically. These are unlikely to materialize until reforms to address supply bottlenecks are implemented. Indeed, the production function suggests that the gains in terms of growth—while more gradual—could indeed be significant over the medium term as reforms tackle the supply constraints. Furthermore, the potential gains could, in the long run, be even more significant than envisaged in the PSE. With the right reforms, an improved business climate, and sound fiscal policy, Senegal could attract the private investment, particularly foreign investment inflows, and achieve its growth potential in an inclusive manner.

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5 Fiscal multiplier is defined as the overall impact on growth of a change in a particular fiscal policy instrument (for example, a change in value-added tax rates). The survey by Spilimbergo, Symansky, and Schindler (2009) reports that fiscal multipliers in developing and emerging market economies are between −0.2 and 0.4. Using World Bank lending data for 29 aid-dependent low-income countries from 1985 to 2009, Kraay (2010) estimates that the output multiplier for government spending ranges between zero and 0.4, but with estimates rarely significant. Based on quarterly data of government spending, Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh (2010) find that the cumulative, long-run multiplier for 24 developing economies is 0.18.
Promote Inclusive Growth

PSE policies aimed at promoting inclusive growth will be critical to sustainable higher growth. A critical challenge for many emerging market and developing economies relates to the capacity to sustain growth over time. Typically, sub-Saharan African countries’ periods of growth in GDP per capita, on average, last about 11 to 13 years and are also 10 to 11 years shorter than those of advanced and fast-growing emerging economies (see Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer 2012). In addition, sub-Saharan African countries’ growth periods tend to end with prolonged stages of negative growth (between about –3 and –7 percent). The end result has

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6 Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2012) define “growth spells” as periods of real GDP per capita growth of at least five years, identified as beginning with an “upbreak” of per capita growth above 2 percent and ending with a “downbreak,” followed by a period of average growth of less than 2 percent, or simply the end of the sample.
been overall weaker growth performance, even though most of these countries did experience periods of high growth.

Senegal’s performance is relatively lower than that of the average sub-Saharan African country. First, continued growth periods of GDP per capita lasted only about eight years in Senegal; second, average growth was lower than the average for sub-Saharan Africa. Comparing Senegal with 4 of the 10 comparators (which had a similar level of income per capita in the early 1990s but have over about 35 years achieved growth similar to that envisaged for Senegal in the PSE), four critical factors appear to explain why countries enjoy prolonged periods of positive growth: income equality, trade openness, political institutions (that is, the degree of democracy), and FDI (Figure 4). Three main stylized facts emerge.

- First, Senegal received relatively high levels of FDI during its growth episodes, which underscores the importance of attracting foreign investors when it comes to Senegal’s growth performance. In particular, continued improvements in the business climate will be essential to maintain and develop Senegal’s attractiveness. Senegal would do well to follow in the footsteps of Rwanda, which rapidly improved its business climate, and Mauritius, which strove to be in the top tier in Africa. Peer learning in this area has been supported by the World Bank and could be usefully explored.

- Second, over the past decade, Senegal has made two significant changes to its institutions that bode well for achieving PSE growth objectives. First, Senegal has become more integrated into the global economy, with more open international trade and improved diversification. Senegal scored zero on trade openness during its growth episode identified by Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2012), largely because of its marketing board, which was phased out in the early 2000s. Today, Senegal’s trade has been mostly liberalized, which translates into a trade openness index value of 1. Second, Senegal has proved that its democracy functions well, with—for example—a peaceful political change during last general elections. Thus, Senegal has the basic prerequisites for prolonged periods of high growth as envisaged by the PSE. Indeed, based on empirical results, with these two institutional improvements, Senegal could have achieved a prolonged period of growth of about 24 years instead of 8 years.

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7 These comparators are Cabo Verde, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Uganda.
8 Senegal scored zero on trade openness during its growth episode identified by Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2012), largely because of its marketing board, which was phased out in the early 2000s. Today, Senegal’s trade has been mostly liberalized, which translates into a trade openness index value of 1.
9 During its identified growth episodes, Senegal had a much lower score for democratic institutions, but it has since made significant progress, highlighted by peaceful political change and a high score in the Polity IV index, similar to those of well-established democracies (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm).
Third, the main vulnerability that faces Senegal is the degree of income inequality. Indeed, comparing Gini coefficients between Senegal and comparator countries suggests that Senegal’s distribution of income is about 20 percent less equal. This could have a very significant impact on growth prospects. Applying the result of Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer 2012, if Senegal had an income distribution similar to that of four comparators, its growth episodes could further increase from 24 to about 32 years—that is, almost exactly the average length of the four comparators’ growth episodes.

Thus, when implementing the PSE, Senegal authorities should focus on effective measures to reduce inequalities. In particular, the most effective policies usually lead to lasting improvement in income inequality by creating opportunities for private formal-sector employment and investment in human capital—through broader access to education and health services. On the contrary, direct subsidies—especially when they target producers (for example, the electricity sector)—are less likely to reduce inequalities because they poorly target the low-income population and represent an opportunity cost of forgone spending on health and education, which indirectly affects the poor the most.

**Figure 4. Factors of Prolonged Periods of Positive Growth**

![Figure 4](chart.png)

For each variable, the height of the figure shows the percentage increase in spell duration resulting from an increase in that variable from the 50th to the 60th percentile, with other variables at the 50th percentile, except forocracy, which is not a continuous variable. For forocracy, the figure shows the effects of a move from a rating of 1 (the 50th percentile) to 0 (the 73rd percentile).

*FDI: Foreign direct investment

Sources: Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2008) and authors’ calculations.
Planning for contingencies will be critical: potential risks to growth could complicate PSE implementation. Senegal faces risks to its growth pattern. An obvious risk relates to PSE implementation and would require timely implementation of reforms to bring about the growth rebound and create the needed fiscal space for investment scale-up. But Senegal is also exposed to spillover risks—that is, risks pertaining to the global economy and largely outside Senegalese control. Planning for these risks is critical, given that their potential impact on growth could derail PSE implementation. These risks can be quantified: based on the vulnerability exercise for low-income countries (VE-LIC), Senegal could lose between ½ and 1 percentage point of growth (Figure 10). This could increase tension in fiscal balances by reducing the fiscal space available for investment. Mitigating this risk requires planning and prioritization in order not to jeopardize the investment spending (both human and physical) critical to the PSE. Such planning could be based on (1) streamlining public expenditure—for example, by timely implementation of electricity sector reform, because it will also reduce the need for electricity subsidies—and (2) maintaining prudent fiscal and debt policies to allow Senegal to preserve its access to financing in case of an adverse shock. Regarding the latter, the credibility of fiscal deficit and debt objectives could be increased by adopting rules to contain recurrent spending growth and/or developing fiscal councils to enhance the effectiveness of fiscal objectives. Moreover, such actions should reduce the cost of access to capital markets, further increasing fiscal space for investment in human capital and public infrastructure.

10 Risks to the global economy are still on the downside. For Senegal the two critical sources of spillovers are (1) a tightening of monetary policy conditions in advanced economies, which would reduce demand for Senegalese products, and (2) an oil price shock, following the recent turmoil in the Middle East, which would translate into a decline in oil production and a protracted increase in oil prices.
Annex 1: Identification of High-Growth and High-Debt Countries

High-Growth Countries and Comparators

The 46 high-growth countries are those with an annual purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per capita GDP growth rate of 5 percent or more between 1990 and 2013.\textsuperscript{11}

From these countries, the comparators are derived by applying the following additional filters:

1. The country had a GDP per capita in 2013 that Senegal could achieve over 30 years if the

\begin{itemize}
\item In the October 2013 \textit{Regional Economic Outlook} (REO), the IMF staff identified six non-resource-rich sub-Saharan African countries (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda) that achieved real output growth (in national currencies) of 5 percent or more and real per capita GDP growth of more than 3 percent during the 1995–2010 period. The methodology used in this paper differs from that used in the REO in three ways: (1) the time period used is 1990 to 2013, (2) the series used to determine average growth is PPP real GDP per capita, and (3) the cutoff is 5 percent.
Plan Sénégal Emergent (PSE) succeeds in becoming an emerging market middle-income country—that is, PPP per capita GDP between $5,500 and $9,800.¹²

2. The country had a lower PPP GDP per capita than Senegal in 1990 but a higher PPP GDP per capita than Senegal in 2013.

3. The country’s export concentration is low (1/3 standard deviation below the mean) or has improved while remaining within 2/3 standard deviation above the mean.

Identification of Growth Episodes

From the list of high-growth countries, growth episodes were identified using the following criteria:

1. Real GDP growth of 5 percent or more for at least five consecutive years.

2. No more than two years of deviations from growth trend within the five-year period.

In Figure 1, the variables are computed as follows: the value for “before episode” is a three-year average before the start of the episode, while the value for “after episode” is a three-year average through the end of the growth episode.

High-Debt Countries

The list of 43 high-debt-episode countries is derived by applying the following filter:

1. A country that experienced a growth in debt position of 2 percent a year consecutively for at least five years in trend, with no more than two years of deviation from trend consecutively within the five-year period.

2. The country’s debt position exceeded 40 percent of GDP at some point between 1990 and 2013.

The variables reported in Figure 1 for high-debt countries, including Senegal, are computed as three-year averages before the start of debt episodes and through the end of the debt episode.

¹² These are the lower and upper bounds if Senegal sustains an average annual growth rate of 4.6 percent and 7.6 percent. An exception is made for African middle-income countries that achieved a higher income level in 2013.
### Table 1. List of High-Growth and High-Debt Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High-Growth Countries</th>
<th>Comparators: Growth Episodes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea, Rep.</td>
<td>Begin 1993</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>End 2003</td>
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<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>India</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Begin 1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>End 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Begin 1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macao SAR, China</td>
<td>End 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>China, P.R.: Mainland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Begin 1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>End 1997</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
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<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Begin 1990</td>
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<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>End 1997</td>
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<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>China</td>
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<td>India</td>
<td>Begin 1991</td>
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<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
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**Comparators: Growth Episodes**

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<th>Country Episode</th>
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<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
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<td>1997</td>
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High-debt episodes countries in italics have benefited from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC).
Strengthening Senegal’s Fiscal Framework

Carlos Mulas-Granados

The Plan Sénégal Emergent (PSE) relies on a new composition of public finances, which envisages raising additional revenues and rebalancing spending from current to capital. These plans contrast with the experience in Senegal throughout the past decade, characterized by weak revenue performance and substantial increases in public consumption, particularly the government’s wage bill. In this context, strengthening the fiscal framework would be a key step forward to help steer public finances to support the PSE. This section highlights some areas for improvement—in particular, in identifying fiscal challenges and planning a credible medium-term fiscal strategy.

Fiscal Performance during the Past Decade

The growth of spending above revenues has weakened the sustainability of public finances. The increase in public spending has not been accompanied by a parallel increase in public revenues (Figure 6), thus hampering public finances. As a consequence, the public deficit is at 5.2 percent of GDP in 2014 (up from less than 2 percent of GDP a decade earlier), and public debt is at 53.4 percent of GDP, which was already high after debt relief obtained under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. While the authorities have committed to deficit reduction, spending continues to exceed revenues. Financing the deficit through higher public debt may prove increasingly difficult and more costly as international markets tighten credit conditions for emerging market economies.

With contributions from Olivier Basdevant (MCD) and Renaud Duplay (FAD).
Current spending growth has been led by the wage bill and the consumption of goods and services. Between 2003 and 2014, overall spending increased by about 7 percentage points of GDP, from nearly 21 to 28 percent of GDP. This was the third-largest increase in the region and has placed Senegal among countries with the highest public spending levels in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). During that period, current spending increased by 5 percentage points of GDP, driven by increases in the wage bill, other goods and services, and, to a lesser extent, transfers and subsidies (Figure 7).²

² The figures of current and capital spending used in this section are different from published budget figures, because they include a reclassification of current spending, which was shown under the capital budget. This reclassification was done in collaboration with Senegalese authorities during a Technical Assistance mission on expenditure rationalization led by the Fiscal Affairs Department (IMF) in February 2014.
The relatively high wage bill as a share of domestic revenue raises concerns about its sustainability. The consolidated wage bill in 2014 represents about 42 percent of domestic revenue, well above the average of 30.7 and 26 percent in Africa and low-income countries, respectively (Figure 8). In addition, this ratio exceeds by a large margin the WAEMU convergence criterion ceiling of 35 percent of domestic revenues. While the size of the public workforce in Senegal (about 150,000 employees) is within international standards, the increase in the wage bill has almost entirely been driven by the use of wage supplements and allowances. Indemnities and other wage supplements surged in the past decade, while the share of base salaries in the total wage bill declined substantially over the same period (Figure 9). Allowances are a key element to attract talent and promote results-oriented performance management, but the sharp increase in allowances seems excessive in view of the modest record of sectoral reforms and macroeconomic performance during the past decade. Against the backdrop of recurrent revenue shortfalls, the large consolidated wage bill is an important source of concern.
Figure 8. The Wage Bill as a Share of Revenues, 2014

Source: IMF staff calculations.
Capital spending in Senegal has increased substantially in the past decade. As a share of GDP, the capital spending budget has almost doubled since 2008, reaching about 7 percent of GDP in 2014. A few autonomous agencies execute almost 80 percent of the capital budget. Most of the capital spending took place in the areas of urban development and sanitation, transportation infrastructure, and social infrastructure for education and health. The composition, however, varied with the source of financing. For example, the domestically financed public investment was largely devoted to projects related to improving urban development and sanitation, while the externally financed investment projects were directed toward ameliorating the education and health sectors (Figure 10). The size of administrative spending financed by domestic resources is partially explained by the need to cover operating expenses associated with development projects not financed by donors. This is an area for potential savings.
Challenges for Public Finances under the PSE

The PSE requires stronger revenue performance and a new composition of spending. The fiscal projections included in the PSE for the 2014–18 period aim at increasing public revenues at an average rate of 12.4 percent and increasing expenditures more slowly at an average rate of 10.2 percent. In perspective, this means that public revenues are expected to increase moderately following their recent trend, but current expenditures must grow only at the rate of GDP, which implies a freeze in real terms. In this context, the PSE plans to accommodate a major increase in public investment between 2014 and 2018, clearly departing from trend projections (Figure 11).
Under the PSE, public spending should be more efficient to maximize its impact on economic growth. Although Senegal’s public spending has been higher than average for the region, average GDP growth in the past decade has been below the WAEMU and low-income-country averages. Countries such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have attained higher average growth rates while maintaining lower public-expenditure-to-GDP levels. Two factors may explain this apparent inefficiency of public spending in Senegal. On the one hand, the composition of public spending, as classified in the budget, does not reflect the true size of productive spending, which is significantly lower than the headline numbers show. On the other hand, poor planning of public investment has hampered its impact. This reflects insufficient attention to economic and social cost-benefit analyses through serious feasibility studies. These problems are compounded by poor execution of the capital budget because of weak public investment management, thus leading to low efficiency. As a result, there is little correlation between spending and economic growth.

The PSE requires better classification of spending. PSE initial projections were based on a classification of spending that mixes current and capital expenditures and misclassifies part of the wage bill. In principle, the Senegalese budget system classifies current and capital spending in clearly separated chapters, but certain important budget items are mixed. Under the standard classification, current expenditure represented 60 percent of the budget in 2013, and capital expenditure represented the remaining 40 percent. With proper classification, the shares are quite different. After reclassifying budget execution according to the nature of the spending, in 2013, public consumption amounted to 77 percent of total outlays, and capital expenditures represented only 23 percent. If salaries of contractual teachers, the wage bill of public entities
(agencies, universities, hospitals), and the salaries paid under the investment budget executed by the state are added to the remuneration of central government employees, the wage bill increases by 45 percent. Similarly, total consumption of goods and services is actually 46 percent higher when the operating costs of agencies, universities, hospitals, and investment projects are added to the use of goods and services by central government ministries. In this context, the government has begun a gradual process to reclassify spending properly from the 2015 budget law onward.

The PSE needs better budget planning and execution. The PSE assumes that budget projections and execution evolve together, but this has not been the case in the recent past—and the question needs to be addressed if spending under the PSE is to have the desired economic impact. Since 2010 the authorities’ fiscal projections have been consistently overoptimistic. According to Mauro (2011), the average difference between the approved budgets and their outcomes in Senegal was about −1 percent of GDP until 2010, and the deviation of the primary balance would reach up to −2 percent of GDP in the subsequent years (Figure 12). This problem became more pronounced in the recent period between 2010 and 2013. The difference between program projections at the beginning of every year and actual year-end outcomes has been especially important in the case of revenues, reaching up to 1.2 percent of GDP in 2013. These deviations have also been very significant in the case of capital expenditures, reaching close to 0.7 percent of GDP. To preserve the deficit targets, revenue underperformance has been systematically offset by reductions in capital expenditures. This is the reverse of what is necessary to support economic development, which requires investment projects to be executed in a timely manner to maximize their economic impact. If the PSE is to succeed, such budget practices will need to be improved to maximize the economic impact of projected investment.
Strengthening Senegal’s Public Finances and Its Fiscal Framework

Substantive action should be taken to improve the composition of public finances. Additional fiscal space could be secured by increasing revenues, particularly collecting tax arrears. In addition, public consumption should be frozen in real terms through additional efforts to contain the wage bill, rationalize spending on goods and services, and reduce subsidies to the electricity sector. Subsequent savings could thus be invested in improving human capital and public infrastructure as a means to increase the growth potential of the economy.

Budget institutions could help restore fiscal sustainability and improve spending efficiency. In this context, budget institutions are defined as the structures, rules, and procedures that govern the formulation, approval, and execution of government budgets. These institutions include arrangements for understanding the government’s fiscal position, developing a credible consolidation plan, and implementing that plan through the budget process. Recent evidence (IMF 2014a) suggests that countries with comprehensive fiscal reporting, forecasting, and risk disclosure seemed to have a better assessment of their postcrisis fiscal position and prospects. Those with more credible medium-term frameworks, performance budgeting systems, and intergovernmental fiscal arrangements were quicker to announce their adjustment plans and better at protecting public investment within those plans. Finally, countries with more unified and disciplined budget processes tended to implement their plans more effectively.
Twelve budget institutions were identified by the IMF as crucial for achieving sustainable public finances and more efficient public spending. These institutions can be grouped into three larger policy areas: (1) understanding the scale and scope of the fiscal challenge, (2) developing a credible fiscal adjustment plan, and (3) implementing the plan through the budget process. These institutions and their key design features provided the basis for a 48-question survey that was completed in cooperation with the Senegalese authorities. The results show that Senegal ranks low in the aggregate ranking of budget institutions, in the lower quartile (Figure 13).

Figure 13. Overall Index of Budget Institutions

![Bar chart showing institutional scores for Advanced, Emerging, Low-income, and Senegal.]

Source: IMF staff calculations.

Senegal has the capacity to improve the credibility of its budget. Senegal scores low in assessing fiscal challenges and planning a credible budget, but it scores high in the capacity to implement the budget. In particular, Senegal could improve its assessment of the fiscal situation through more comprehensive and timely fiscal reporting, more transparent macro-fiscal forecasts, and greater analysis of fiscal risks. In addition, the credibility of fiscal adjustment plans could also be supported by better-designed medium-term frameworks, greater use of expenditure reviews, and stronger intergovernmental fiscal coordination. The single dimension in which Senegal stands out among international comparators is in the capacity to implement
the budget (Figure 14). But execution of the budget could be strengthened further through tighter controls over supplementary budgets and multiyear spending commitments.

The public investment management system could also be strengthened. Several measures could help generate better value for public money. In the short term, the linkages between the PSE, the macroeconomic framework, and the sectoral strategies of the ministries should be strengthened. In addition, the method of calculating the execution rate of investment should be revised and strict limits introduced to reduce unexpected changes in the composition of public investment. Most important, a proper appraisal mechanism is needed to enhance project selection, including systematic application of cost-benefit analysis for large projects. Finally,
projects need to be better classified and integrated into a new comprehensive database in order to enhance the monitoring of new investment.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Fiscal performance should be enhanced to guarantee the sustainability of public finances. The recent trajectory of fiscal consolidation should continue. Maintaining the commitment to a medium-term deficit target below 4 percent of GDP is fully compatible with the implementation of the PSE. Revenues should keep gaining ground once the tax reform has been implemented, whereas overall expenditures should grow more moderately. The debt-to-GDP ratio should be kept constant, and new investment projects associated with the PSE should be financed with additional revenues or with a reallocation of spending.

Improving the composition of the budget could help the PSE succeed. The impact of public spending on growth depends on the cyclical effect of public consumption in the short term and the efficiency of public investment in the medium term. In this context, the ongoing reclassification of spending should continue, because it will help identify areas for potential savings and which programs should be reinforced. Freezing public consumption by reducing the growth of the wage bill and cutting unproductive spending is a crucial aspect of the strategy. Such measures will open up fiscal space needed to finance additional PSE-related investments. At the same time, the central government should accelerate agency reform, gain control over transferred funds, and ensure greater alignment of its activities with the objectives of the PSE.

The quality of public finances could be reinforced through stronger budget institutions. By improving fiscal data and fiscal reporting, Senegal could ameliorate macro-fiscal forecasting and reduce fiscal risks. In addition, fiscal objectives should become more realistic and embedded in a medium-term budget framework fully consistent with PSE objectives. Program-based budgeting is a crucial reform that would help maximize the economic impact of public finances. In particular, the reform of the public investment management system should be geared toward increasing the number of projects that are fully implemented in a timely and cost-effective manner, especially those related to the PSE. All such actions should be part of a concerted effort to better link the assessment of fiscal challenges with budget planning and implementation.
Gillian Nkhata

Senegal has continued to record sizable current account deficits over the past decade, financed mainly by official flows, but with increasing recourse to private flows. While official West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) reserves are currently adequate and Senegal’s exchange rate shows no significant signs of misalignment, the current account deficit is large, at about 10 percent of GDP, and there are signs of eroding competitiveness. Senegal’s exports have not gained market share and survey-based indicators continue to point to a need for strong measures to improve structural competitiveness and the business environment. Debt remains manageable, but there is little room for higher fiscal deficits or more nonconcessional borrowing if Senegal’s current low-risk rating is to be preserved. Given these external vulnerabilities, pro-growth fiscal policy must proceed with caution, especially in the context of a fixed exchange rate, which places almost all the weight of policy response on the budget.

Current Account and Senegal’s Twin Deficits

Senegal’s main external risk is the current account deficit, which exceeds 10 percent of GDP in grants are excluded. Over the past decade, the current account deficit has averaged about 8.6 percent of GDP, with overall fiscal balances averaging –4.4 percent of GDP. The current account deficits have been financed mainly by grants and government borrowing (particularly project loans). Senegal is also increasingly resorting to nonconcessional commercial borrowing, which exposes it to shifting donor and market sentiment. Although the deficit is projected to decline in the long term with fiscal consolidation, it will remain high in the medium term, at more than 8 percent of GDP. The regional nominal effective exchange rate has appreciated by about 6 percent since the first quarter of 2013, mirroring euro appreciation. However, the real effective exchange rate has appreciated more moderately, by about 4 percent, owing to low inflation. It remains broadly in line with fundamentals, with Senegal’s investment–savings gap roughly equally shared by the public and private sector.
The experience in Senegal is consistent with the theory that shocks in the government budget move the current account in the same direction. From the time of the CFA franc devaluation in 1994 until 2000, Senegal maintained tight fiscal policies, with strong improvements in the central government’s fiscal position. After several years of deficit, the fiscal balance showed surpluses greater than 1.5 percent of GDP between 1996 and 1999. The external current account deficit (excluding official transfers) also declined slightly between 1996 and 1999. Between 2001 and 2008, fiscal and external imbalances grew, culminating in 2008 with a shock to the balance of payments of 5½ percent of GDP, owing to the impact of rising food and energy prices on the import bill. As a response to the price increases, the government introduced a number of untargeted subsidies, which together with other higher expenditures and lower tax revenues widened the overall fiscal deficit to 5.1 percent of GDP in 2009 from 3.7 percent of GDP two years earlier. In 2009–10, the external and fiscal balances moved in different directions, but fiscal developments in 2012 and 2013 were again accompanied by a widening current account deficit (Figure 15).

Figure 15. Current Account and Fiscal Deficit (Percent of GDP)

![Graph showing current account and fiscal deficit (percent of GDP) from 1994 to 2012. The graph includes two lines: one for overall fiscal balance (left hand side) and another for current account (right hand side). The overall fiscal balance shows fluctuations with a peak around 2008 and a significant dip in 2012. The current account shows a general decline in deficits. Source: IMF staff estimates.]
The observed correlation between Senegal’s deficits has clear policy implications. The analysis suggests that for Senegal, excessive deficit spending can result in large external imbalances. Senegal’s current account deficit will remain high in the medium term, reflecting mainly higher imports associated with infrastructure projects, although it is projected to decrease in the long term to about 8 percent of GDP. The low savings, especially in a context of large investment needs under the Plan Sénégal Emergent (PSE), could mean continued deficits over the medium term, which may become difficult to finance. This means that budget deficits must remain contained within reasonable limits, even in an ambitious investment-led strategy. In addition, fiscal prudence must be accompanied by measures to improve the productivity of public and private investment. The current weaknesses in public investment management and the business environment suggest that there is ample scope for substantial gains.

**Export Performance**

Senegal’s export climate suggests a much greater potential for export growth than has been realized to date. The country enjoys a favorable geographic location, with a major seaport and easy access to the large European and North American markets. In addition, it has the benefit of a stable regional currency and a political environment with democratic institutions. The country also offers a relatively competitive export framework, including no taxes on exports, low shipping costs, easy repatriation of capital and income, abundant semiskilled and unskilled human resources, and a relatively robust telecommunications infrastructure. Senegal is also a party to a range of agreements that provide it with privileged market access, including bilateral agreements with several large economies (in particular China and the United States), and is also signatory to the Cotonou Agreement, which provides (reciprocal) duty-free access to European Union (EU) markets for African, Caribbean, and Pacific country exports.
Despite the country’s relative strengths, Senegal’s exports are not gaining significant market share or increasing as a percent of GDP. Senegal’s global market share has barely increased over the past decade (Figure 16), while the contribution of exports to GDP has remained around 25 percent. In addition, while Senegal has a relatively diversified export basket compared with its peers, the main goods remain dominant, as do the export destinations. Senegal’s exports are also more concentrated in lower-value-added products, which exposes it to tougher competition in the global market. The WAEMU region is the primary destination for Senegal’s exports (32.5 percent of the total in 2012). The EU is the second, with almost 26 percent of the total in 2012. This is followed by Asia, whose share was 22 percent in 2012, while North America still accounts for less than 1 percent of the total. The top five country destinations in 2012, which accounted for almost 55 percent of total exports, were Mali (19.3 percent), Switzerland (12.8 percent), and India (12.6 percent), followed by Guinea (5.3 percent) and France (4.9 percent). This high concentration makes Senegal particularly vulnerable to shocks in the EU, as evidenced by the impact during the global financial crisis. Production at a zircon mine and the revival of the chemicals industry are expected to boost exports, beginning in 2015. In addition, there are signs of increasing diversification across export partners, mainly toward Asian countries, whose share has more than doubled since 2007.
Foreign Direct Investment and Remittances

Senegal also lags its comparators in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). Inward FDI averaged about 1 percent of GDP from 2000 to 2005, but rose above 2.0 percent in 2006–07. For the past five years, net FDI inflows have remained at an average of about 2 percent of GDP, compared with more than 7 percent of GDP on average in other lower-middle-income sub-Saharan African countries, as classified by the World Bank.\(^5\) There are few real legal barriers to foreign investment. The Senegalese Investment Code provides equitable treatment of foreign firms. It also offers tax holidays and tax-free export processing zones. There are few barriers regarding total ownership of businesses by foreigners. However, Senegal continues to rank among the lowest in the World Bank ease of doing business survey (see below). The main constraints include access to credit, cumbersome procedures, and enforcement of contracts, property rights, and constraints to obtaining long-term credit from commercial banks.

Remittances continue to be an important and stable source of foreign exchange, averaging about 12 percent of GDP since 2008. Workers’ remittances have been robust over the past

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\(^5\) Other lower-middle-income sub-Saharan African countries included in the comparison were Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Lesotho, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Swaziland, and Zambia.
decade, both nominally and as a percent of GDP (Figure 17). They have averaged about 12 percent of GDP since 2007, contributing nearly half as much as exports of goods and services and more than four times FDI inflows. Senegal is now among the top four recipients of remittances as a percent of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa (after Lesotho, Togo, Cabo Verde, and Guinea-Bissau). In nominal terms, remittances have increased continuously, with the exception of 2009, when they declined by 6.7 percent during the global financial crisis. This decline was modest compared with the drop in FDI inflows in the 2009–10 period (25 percent). Remittance flows are also significant as a share of reserves, amounting to 72 percent in 2013.

**Structural Competitiveness**

Senegal’s competitiveness depends critically on improving the business environment. Although Senegal has taken steps in recent years to improve its business environment, a number of competitiveness indicators suggest that much more needs to be done. According to various surveys, the business environment is notably hampered by poor investor protection, cumbersome procedures for paying taxes and registering property, inadequate supply of infrastructure, difficulty accessing financing, and corruption.

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**Figure 18. Ease of Doing Business**

*(2013, World Ranking out of 185 Countries)*

In the 2014 edition of the World Bank’s Doing Business report, Senegal ranks 178th out of 185 countries (Figure 18). It has fallen two places since the last survey in 2013 and is now below the WAEMU average (168). Its worst rankings (182) are in the getting electricity and paying taxes categories. Other categories in which Senegal scores poorly include registering property (174), protecting investors (170), and enforcing contracts (167). Senegal ranks below most other lower- and upper-middle-income sub-Saharan African countries (Figure 18).

The World Economic Forum ranked Senegal 112th in 2014–15 out of 142 countries (Figure 19). Areas in urgent need of attention include health and basic education, for which Senegal ranks 131st. According to the World Economic Forum, only three out of four children receive primary education, and communicable diseases continue to erode the health of the general population. Higher education and training (119th place) are also in need of significant improvement, while infrastructure requires significant upgrading (111st place). The report also views Senegal’s macroeconomic environment as challenging, ranking it 97th, mainly because of the high government deficit. Senegal scores better on national institutions (74th), with signs of steady improvement across a range of other indicators. The report also recognizes Senegal’s relatively efficient goods and labor markets (68th place). Senegal also fares well regarding the red tape to start a business, which is judged to be low even by international comparison (six days and four procedures; 22nd place).

**Figure 19. Global Competitiveness Index**
*(2013–14, World Ranking out of 142 Countries)*

Senegal’s government effectiveness, as measured by the World Bank’s Governance Indicators, is slightly below average compared with lower- and upper-middle-income sub-Saharan countries and has been trending downward over the past decade. By several measures, corruption remains a problem. The World Economic Forum identifies corruption as the second most problematic factor for doing business in Senegal. Transparency International ranks Senegal 112th out of 182 countries in its 2011 Corruption Perception Index. Based on the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators, corruption in Senegal is worse than the average for lower- and upper-middle-income sub-Saharan countries.

**Price Competitiveness**

The assessment of real effective exchange rate (REER) at the regional level does not suggest any significant price-competitiveness issues. The REER was assessed using three complementary methodologies developed by the Consultative Group on Exchange Rates (CGER). Although the regional nominal effective exchange rate appreciated by about 4.6 percent from the beginning of 2013, reflecting the euro appreciation, the real exchange rates appreciated only by 2.5 percent, owing to moderate inflation developments in the region. Senegal experienced a moderate REER increase (by about 4 percent), but model-based assessments do not point to significant misalignment of the REER.

**Macroeconomic Balance Approach**

The macroeconomic balance approach calculates the difference between the current account balance projected over the medium term (the “underlying” current account) and an estimated current account “norm” based on projected values of medium-term economic fundamentals. The exchange rate adjustment that would eliminate this difference over the medium term is then calculated using an estimated elasticity of the current account with respect to the real exchange rate. Senegal’s current account norm is calculated to be between –5.6 and –6.5 percent of GDP, based on coefficients estimated by Vitek (2012) and Ricci and others (2008). Assuming a trade balance elasticity of –0.71 for small countries, the difference between the underlying current account and the current account norm indicates a possible REER misalignment between –4.2 percent and 0.0 percent (see Tokarick 2010).
Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate Approach

The equilibrium real exchange rate approach directly estimates an equilibrium exchange rate as a function of medium-term fundamentals. The exchange rate adjustment needed to restore equilibrium over the medium term is then calculated as the difference between the estimated equilibrium real exchange rate and its current value. In the case of Senegal, the REER at the end of 2011 seems to be 8.5 percent below its estimated equilibrium value.

External Sustainability Approach

The external sustainability approach calculates the difference between the underlying current account balance and the balance that would stabilize net foreign assets (NFA) at some benchmark level. Using the same elasticity as in the macroeconomic balance approach, the exchange rate misalignment is equal to the adjustment necessary to bring the underlying current account in line with its NFA-stabilizing level. The current account balance necessary to stabilize Senegal’s NFA-to-GDP ratio at its 2010 level (–48 percent) is estimated to be –3.4 percent, compared with an underlying current account balance of 6.0 percent. Applying a trade balance elasticity of –.71 implies a possible 3.2 percent REER overvaluation.
Reserve Adequacy

Official reserves coverage appears adequate by traditional metrics. Reserves are pooled among WAEMU countries; therefore, reserve adequacy must be assessed at the regional level. Regional official reserves are projected to decrease from CFAF 7,051 billion (US$13.8 billion) at the end of 2012 to CFAF 6,886 billion (US$13.9 billion) at the end of 2013. Reserves coverage remains adequate at 4.7 months of next-year imports, 50 percent of broad money, and about 91 percent of short-term liabilities. An alternative analysis based on cost–benefit analysis (Dabla-Norris and others 2011) indicates that the reserves level is at the low end of the optimal reserves range, which varies between 5 and 10 months of imports depending on the interest rate differential with the rest of the world.

Debt-Related Risks

Both total public debt and external debt ratios have increased substantially over the past five years. In Senegal, the ratio of total public debt to GDP amounted to about 47 percent in 2013, up from about 25 percent in 2008. At the same time, the stock of total external public and publicly guaranteed debt has increased from about 20 percent of GDP in 2008 to just over 32 percent at the end of 2013. These levels are close to those that prevailed before Senegal benefited from debt relief under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative in 2006. Debt-servicing costs have also increased, reflecting higher recourse to market financing. External public debt service increased from 4.3 percent of exports in 2008 to about 9 percent in 2013.

In terms of composition, the bulk of Senegal’s public debt remains largely external and provided on concessional terms, but the use of financial market instruments is increasing. Most of the public debt is external (that is, owed to non-WAEMU residents); however, the share of domestic debt to GDP increased from 5.3 percent in 2008 to about 16 percent in 2013. Almost two-thirds of Senegal’s external debt is owed to multilateral creditors—primarily the World Bank and the African Development Bank. The largest groups of bilateral creditors are the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and certain Arab countries. The share of market debt is still relatively small, although it has grown rapidly over the past few years with the issuance of two Eurobonds in 2009 and 2011 and the contracting of a syndicated  

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6 Public debt refers to the debt of the central government.
7 Domestic debt includes debt issued in the WAEMU financial market.
loan in 2013, which includes a tranche in euro-targeting nonresidents. The authorities postponed a planned Eurobond issuance in 2013, following sharp tightening of financial conditions in international markets during the year. They then issued a US$500 million Eurobond in mid-2014. Conditions have been relatively favorable in international markets throughout the second part of 2014, and the authorities got a rate of 6.25 percent, a little higher than the 6 percent yield on the 2011 Eurobond. This rate was higher than expected at the time of the previous debt sustainability analysis (DSA), partly owing to market concerns about the slow pace of reform, but more favorable than might have been achieved in 2013. However, part of the proceeds was used to repay the euro tranche of the syndicated loan contracted in 2013, which has a shorter maturity and higher rate (6.5 percent).

Private external debt has averaged about 20 percent of GDP over the past decade and was estimated at about 36 percent of GDP at the end of 2013. ⁸ About half of this debt was in the form of trade credits and bank deposits; the rest consisted of debt securities, loans, and other liabilities. This exposure was partly offset by private external assets amounting to 8 percent of GDP.

Senegal remains at a low risk of debt distress. Under the baseline scenario, which is consistent with higher program ceilings for nonconcessional and semiconcessional borrowing, all the debt burden indicators remain below their policy-dependent indicative thresholds, and debt ratios in present value terms are lower than in the previous DSA. Policy-dependent thresholds were increased as Senegal was reclassified as a “strong” performer based on a higher average World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) score in 2011–13.⁹ The probability approach also shows a more favorable outlook. The stress tests result in two spikes in the debt-service-to-revenue ratio, corresponding to the repayment of two Eurobonds, which result in a small and temporary breach of the threshold. The DSA, however, suggests that there is not much space for higher fiscal deficits if the low-risk rating is to be preserved. It also indicates a need for caution in resorting to nonconcessional borrowing.

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⁸ Estimates of private sector external debt are based on Central Bank of West African States data on the international investment position.

⁹ Senegal’s CPIA score was 3.825 in 2013 and 3.81 on average during 2011–13. Under the debt sustainability framework rules, this corresponds to a “strong” performance.
Global financial conditions warrant close monitoring, because they could affect Senegal’s access to financial markets. The normalization of monetary policy in advanced economies and the repricing of emerging market risks may eventually spill over to frontier markets such as Senegal. In particular, these conditions could result either in lower appetite for Senegalese securities, an increased risk premium, or an adverse effect on Eurobond terms and issuances for frontier markets such as Senegal. To date, the impact of global tightening financial conditions has not yet had a significant impact on interest rates for Senegal. For sovereign bonds, the 2011 Eurobond yield has remained stable. More generally, there have been no visible increases in the interest rates on the regional financial market, which is not significantly integrated with international markets.10 Against this backdrop, the uncertain outlook in the global economy discussed in the first section could also eventually affect risk perceptions regarding Senegal.

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10 For example, Senegal debt is held mainly by WAEMU residents, with little foreign ownership. Further, the transmission mechanism from the policy rates to lending rate remains weak and hampered by shallow and segmented financial markets.
Reforms to Achieve Higher Exports

Senegal is well positioned to become a primary trade hub for West Africa, but more is needed to achieve the export growth required to reach the PSE objectives. Senegal has several competitive advantages: political stability, government commitment, good road networks, a major port, and a competitive exchange rate arrangement. It is also one of the most industrialized countries in the region, with favorable investment ratings. However, experiences in other countries suggest that even though access to international markets and a competitive price environment are crucial, Senegal would be better able to leverage its advantages if it improved significantly its structural competitiveness and macroeconomic environment. This would imply action on several fronts.

- **Maintain sound and credible macroeconomic policies.** With Senegal in a currency union and a regional exchange rate broadly in line with fundamentals, fiscal policy and structural measures are the only levers available to boost competitiveness. Changing the equation will require strong actions to increase net national saving by reducing fiscal deficits and stimulating household saving. Sound fiscal policies will provide the government with greater freedom to implement policies to boost exports. Credible policies overall will attract the type of investment needed to develop a more diversified and upgraded export basket.

- **Boost foreign direct investment inflows.** Empirical evidence suggests that FDI can enhance export performance, in particular, by introducing innovations and transforming the composition of exports (China, Singapore). It also shows that the impact of FDI on export growth varies with the development of the export sector. The impact is strongest at the earliest and the most advanced stages, with a lower impact in between. Senegal already has a good legal framework for encouraging investment, but it needs to pay greater attention to the consistency of the investments with its broader PSE objectives and policies in mind (for example, the upgrading of export quality and skills/technology transfer).

- **Promote export-friendly institutions.** Institutions are crucial, but experience elsewhere seems to suggest that institutions matter more at higher levels of export performance. Improved institutions will help Senegal overcome some of the main constraints to doing business,

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11 Senegal’s Standard & Poor’s credit rating is B+; Moody’s rating for Senegal’s sovereign debt is B1.
12 Studies show a U-shaped distribution, which is strong at the outset, weakens as export development advances, and becomes stronger again at later stages of export development.
such as credit access to would-be investors, cumbersome procedures, enforcement of contracts, property rights, and constraints in obtaining long-term credit from commercial banks. Better institutions should foster more efficient administration, which is important for the country’s competitiveness. Senegal needs to persevere in its efforts to work with development partners in these areas.

- **Develop infrastructure.** Export performance depends critically on physical infrastructure (roads, ports, energy, and telecommunications). Senegal’s PSE accords draw significant attention to infrastructure investments, with ambitious programs to modernize the port of Dakar, build a new international airport—which is expected to handle two times the capacity of the current one—and improve the road network.

- **Boost human capital development and productivity.** Public investment should also be devoted to increasing the availability and quality of human capital and appropriate use of technology.
The Plan Sénégal Emergent (PSE) envisages boosting economic growth through a large scale-up of investment and structural transformation. This chapter examines these goals against the backdrop of Senegal’s historical growth performance with respect to three main areas: (1) total factor productivity, (2) export diversification and quality, and (3) perceived constraints in the informal sector. It finds that in order to yield growth gains, additional capital increases need to be accompanied by increases in total factor productivity, investment in human capital, and broader financial inclusion. Diversification would benefit growth and stability mainly through increases in the shares of the existing product base, which are complemented by increases in product quality.

Growth in Senegal has been modest, with relatively high volatility compared with benchmark cases (Figure 21). Real GDP growth amounted to less than 4 percent a year on average over the past 20 years, far below a group of fast-growing sub-Saharan countries that succeeded in almost quadrupling real GDP over the same time horizon. Real GDP per capita has grown slowly, outperformed by several multiples by regional and non-regional benchmarks. The volatility of growth, however, was in line with the average in the sub-Saharan region, and driven mainly by large fluctuations in agricultural production, not sufficiently smoothed by other sectors.

This section examines Senegal’s growth performance against the backdrop of three areas of relevance for the PSE:

- Growth decomposition: Total factor productivity (TFP) and human capital are highlighted as constraints from the production side, with the manufacturing, wholesale, and agricultural sectors experiencing particular problems in this area. Capital’s relative size and contribution
to growth is shown to be high compared with other countries. Consequently, increases in investment volume should be accompanied by efficiency increases to yield growth dividends.

- **Export diversification and quality:** Senegal has made strong progress in the diversification of its export product and partner base over the past decades, but additional diversification could yield significant growth and stability gains, especially if complemented by improvements in export quality, which still lags far behind benchmark countries. Increasing the shares of products of comparatively high quality could boost growth but will require investment in human capital and institutions.

- **Informality:** In addition to the constraints described above, a recent informal business survey points to limited access to finance and limited education as major structural problems in the informal sector.

**Factor Inputs**

Low factor productivity has moderated growth in several sectors (Figure 22). A growth decomposition exercise shows that growth was driven mainly by capital growth, and human capital development and TFP growth had, respectively, a modest and even negative effect. A sectoral composition of TFP reveals that its unfavorable contribution has been driven mainly by wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing, and agriculture; mining, construction, and service contributed positively to TFP growth. Similar conclusions can be drawn from a decomposition of labor productivity, which benefited, on average, only modestly from increases in human capital and TFP increases over the past decade.

With productivity the main constraint, policies targeting higher growth should therefore focus on increasing efficiency and developing human capital. The results indicate that additional increases in investment volumes may not result in desired growth gains if they are not accompanied by gains in productivity. Given low public investment management scores, improving the quality of investment and efficiency of the public investment management system will be important. For example, enhancing project evaluation through ex ante cost-benefit analysis and alignment of the project evaluation cycle with the annual budget process can bring about such improvement (Figure 22, lower left panel). Given that 93 percent of public primary and secondary education spending represents personnel costs (of which 28 percent is paid to nonteaching staff), improvements to human resource management—including better systems and controls at the central level—will be necessary to leave more room for classroom supplies, textbooks, and teacher training. Finally, improvements to the business environment
could yield substantive gains, with the electricity sector currently constituting the main constraint.

**Figure 21. Growth and Volatility**

a. *Growth has been outperformed by several benchmarks...*

**Real GDP, 1994—2013**
*(Index, 1995=100)*

b. *...and per capita income has grown only modestly.*

**Real GDP Per Capita Growth, 1994—2013**
*(In Percent)*

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<thead>
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<td>WAEMU</td>
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<td>Burkina Faso</td>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

c. *Growth has been volatile, ...*

**Growth and Volatility in SSA since 1960**
*(Growth: Five-Year Averages, Volatility: Five-Year Standard Deviation)*

d. *...mainly driven by large swings in the agricultural sector.*

**Real GDP Growth, 1995—2013**
*(Year-on-Year Change, in Percent)*

WAEMU: West African Economic and Monetary Union

Figure 22. Productivity

a. The contributions of labor and capital to growth have been stable, but TFP growth has been weak, ...

b. ...due to negative TFP growth in several sectors...

c. ...which has also dampened labor productivity growth.

d. The capital-to-output ratio is similar to sub-Saharan Africa and other regions' averages, but human capital and TFP are low.

e. Boosting growth will require improving the quality of public investment...

f. ...and substantial improvements in the business climate.

Sources: Top four panels: Dabla-Norris and others (2013); lower left panel: Dabla-Norris and others (2011); lower right panel: World Bank (2013).
Export Diversification

Senegal’s exports have been increasingly diversified, with convergence to benchmark countries (Figure 23). Unlike in the average WAEMU country, overall export diversification of export products in Senegal has been increasing over the past decades, mainly because of a more intensive margin of product diversification (see Box 2). Although diversification is still lower than observed in some African and non-African benchmark countries, such as Tanzania and Vietnam, and the major export categories are still important, some convergence to benchmark levels has been ongoing over the past two decades. The same trend has been observed for diversification across export partners, but through a diversification of both the extensive and intensive margins.

**Box 2. Export Diversification and Quality**

Export product diversification is captured by the Theil index, which can be decomposed into a “between” and a “within” subindex:

\[
\text{Theil Index} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i} \frac{\text{Export Value}_i}{\text{Average Exp. Value}} \cdot \ln \frac{\text{Export Value}_i}{\text{Average Exp. Value}}
\]

\[
= \text{Theil}_{between} + \text{Theil}_{within},
\]

in which \(i\) is the product index and \(N\) the total number of products. The “between” Theil index captures the extensive margin of diversification—that is, the number of products—while the “within” Theil index captures the intensive margin (product shares).

Export partner diversification: The Theil index is also available across export partners. In this case, \(i\) and \(N\) in the above relationship represent the export partner index and number of export partners, respectively.

Export quality is measured by the export’s unit value adjusted for differences in production costs, relative distance to the trade partner, and the development of a country through the following relationship:

\[
\text{Trade Price}_{mxt} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \ln \text{unobservable quality}_{mxt} + \alpha_2 \ln \text{p. c. income}_{mxt} + \alpha_3 \ln \text{Distance}_{mxt} + \epsilon_{mxt},
\]

in which the subscripts \(m, x,\) and \(t\) denote importer, exporter, and time period, respectively.

Sources: IMF (2014b), and Henn, Papageorgiou, and Spatafora (2013).

Further product diversification could yield growth gains (Figure 23, bottom right panel). While Senegal’s economy is already relatively diversified, better product variety could improve growth.
Based on the estimates in IMF 2014b, a 1 standard deviation increase in low-income countries’ export diversification raises the growth rate by about 0.8 percentage point. For Senegal, this translates into estimated growth gains of ¼ percentage point if export diversification rises to levels observed, for example, in Tanzania.

Further diversification across products and partners could also help restrain the volatility of growth (Tables 3 and 4). The methodology in IMF 2014b suggests estimating a two-stage general method of moments regression to quantify the effect of diversification on the volatility of growth in a dynamic panel. This chapter focuses on sub-Saharan African countries and extends the regressions by examining the effects of the extensive margin of product diversification and the effect of a diversification in export partners. The results show volatility is more likely to decrease through an increase in the intensive margin of product and export partner diversification and that the gains are economically significant. All else equal, the estimates imply that increasing product diversification to levels in Tanzania or Vietnam could reduce volatility by about one-sixth and one-quarter, respectively, with similar magnitudes implied by boosts in export partner diversification.
Figure 23. Export—Diversification

a. Product diversification has improved, mainly driven by improvements in the intensive margin...

b. ...in line with trends observed in benchmark countries.

Product Diversification Index
(Higher Score = Less Diversification)

Extensive and Intensive Margin of Product Diversification
(Theil Index Decomposition)

WAEMU: West African Economic and Monetary Union

c. However, main export categories remain relatively dominant.

Share of Top Export Good
(2 Digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), in Percent of Exported Goods)

b. ...in line with trends observed in benchmark countries.

Extensive and Intensive Margin of Partner Diversification...

Partner Diversification Index
(Higher Score = Less Diversification)

WAEMU: West African Economic and Monetary Union

f. Growth effects from further product diversification could be substantial.

Growth Effects from Increased Diversification in Senegal and the WAEMU
(Increase in Annual Growth Rate, Average 2001—2010)
Table 3. Output Volatility and Product Diversification in Sub-Saharan Africa

(*Higher Theil Index = Less Diversification*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Export Diversification</th>
<th>Export Diversification and Openness</th>
<th>Export Diversification and Controls</th>
<th>Export Diversification, Controls and Trade Interaction</th>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged growth volatility</td>
<td>0.174 **</td>
<td>0.174 **</td>
<td>0.310 ***</td>
<td>0.128 *</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
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<td>1.514 **</td>
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<td>-5.99 ***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.647)</td>
<td>(0.636)</td>
<td>(0.558)</td>
<td>(2.254)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Within-Export Theil Index</td>
<td>2.211 ***</td>
<td>1.501 **</td>
<td>1.559 ***</td>
<td>4.588 ***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.638)</td>
<td>(0.595)</td>
<td>(0.562)</td>
<td>(1.234)</td>
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<td>Between-Export Theil Index</td>
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<td>(1.329)</td>
<td>(1.538)</td>
<td>(1.939)</td>
<td>(4.165)</td>
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<td>Trade Openness</td>
<td>0.035 *</td>
<td>0.032 *</td>
<td>0.039 **</td>
<td>-0.38 ***</td>
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<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
<td>(0.0157)</td>
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<td>(0.008)</td>
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<td>0.923 **</td>
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<td>Arellano-Bond AR(2)</td>
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<td>0.801</td>
<td>0.550</td>
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Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Period dummies were included, but are not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Source: IMF staff estimates.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
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<td>(0.063)</td>
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Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Period dummies were included, but are not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Product Quality

There is a large scope for both agricultural and manufacturing upgrading. Export quality (see Box 2) has not caught up to that of benchmark countries. Agricultural export quality has been outperformed even by the WAEMU, the immediate regional reference group, and manufacturing quality has been hovering far below that of fast quality-upgrading countries, such as Vietnam. An increase in the agricultural and manufacturing quality indices by 0.1 is associated with additional annual GDP per capita growth rates of $\frac{1}{2}$ and 1 percentage points (IMF 2014b), respectively, so the growth losses from this limited convergence could be large (Figure 24).

Figure 24. Agricultural and Manufacturing Quality

Convergence in export quality has been slow in both agricultural and manufacturing sectors.

Export concentration appears to be highest in low-quality sectors, while higher-quality exports bear a comparatively lower weight. Figure 25 illustrates the dilemma in quality upgrading compared with three benchmark countries with two-digit Standard International Trade Classification–level disaggregated industries. In Senegal, sectors for which the quality of exported products is comparatively low—such as food and live animals—constitute a large share of exported products. In comparison, in Vietnam the largest export shares are devoted to product categories with relatively higher quality. With Senegal’s labor force concentrated in
agriculture, policies fostering agricultural quality may be the first priority.

**Figure 25. Export Concentration and Quality**

*(Size of Bubbles Proportional to Product Share)*

*A large part of Senegal’s export products is of comparatively lower quality, while the export share of higher-quality—for example, manufactured—goods remains comparatively low.*

**Senegal**

![Graph showing export concentration and quality for Senegal](image)

**Vietnam**

![Graph showing export concentration and quality for Vietnam](image)

Sources: IMF (2014b), and Henn, Papageorgiou, and Spatafora (2013).
Informality

An informal business survey confirms a gap in human capital and highlights financing as another constraint to growth. Figure 26 highlights the main results of a survey covering Senegal’s nonagricultural informal sector enterprises. This sector employs about 2.2 million people and contributes about two-fifths to Senegal’s total GDP (ANSD 2013). It therefore represents Senegal’s economy well. In line with the constraints to education highlighted in this section, the results of the survey show that the majority of actors in the informal market do not possess education above the primary level. Among the most severe perceived constraints to the business environment is access to finance, with the majority of participants relying on their personal savings as their main sources of financing.

Conclusions

Policies should target increases in TFP productivity, and further export diversification should be complemented with improvements in product quality. With TFP and human capital the main constraints from the production side, and the relative level of capital already high compared with that of other countries, any investment scale-up should be accompanied by efficiency increases and investments in human capital to yield growth dividends. Sectors that could benefit the most from increased productivity are manufacturing, wholesale, and agriculture. Senegal has made strong progress in the diversification of its export product and partner base over the past decades, but export quality is lagging that of benchmark countries. Increasing the shares of products of comparatively high quality could boost growth but will require investments in human capital and institutions as well. Increasing access to finance and education could be priority structural reforms from the informal sector’s perspective.
Figure 26. The Informal Nonagricultural Sector

a. Commerce and food processing constitute the main sectors of the nonagricultural informal sector.

Contribution to Value Added
(In Percent of Informal Nonagricultural Value Added)

- Mining
- Food
- Manufacturing
- Water, Electricity
- BTP
- Commerce
- Restaurants, Hotels
- Transport/Telecom.
- Other

b. Only a few firms are officially registered...

Registration to NINEA
(In Percent of Survey Respondents)

- BTP
- Water, Electricity
- Manufacturing
- Food
- Transport/Telecom.
- Mining
- All
- Commerce
- Other
- Restaurants, Hotels

...so that the tax ratio is modest.

Taxes Paid
(In Percent of Value Added)

- Commerce
- Total
- Service
- Industry

6.9
4.2
3.8
0.9

...so that the tax ratio is modest.

c. ....so that the tax ratio is modest.

Taxes Paid
(In Percent of Value Added)

- Commerce
- Total
- Service
- Industry

6.9
4.2
3.8
0.9

d. The educational attainment is low.

Highest Educational Attainment
(In Percent of Survey Respondents)

- Other
- Tertiary
- Secondary
- Primary
- No

- Commerce
- Total
- Service
- Industry

6.9
4.2
3.8
0.9

...with most equipment financed through personal savings.

f. ....with most equipment financed through personal savings.

Main Source of Financing
(In Percent of Survey Respondents)

- Place of Business
- Machinery
- Furniture/Office Supplies
- Personal Savings
- Other or Not Disclosed

- Bank Loan or Micro Credit
- Friends/Family
- Personal Savings
- Other or Not Disclosed

NINEA: Numerical Identification of National Enterprise and Associations
BTP: Building and Public Works
Source: ANSD (2013).
Solving the Electricity Puzzle

Olivier Basdevant

The fiscal cost of the electricity sector continues to weigh heavily on the government’s budget. As a result, there is an opportunity cost for development spending, while the economy still faces significant bottlenecks with high electricity costs and insufficient electricity production. Cross-country experiences provide useful guidelines on successful reforms, particularly on the fiscal front. Senegal also has an opportunity to lower tariffs, eliminate fiscal subsidies, and expand coverage—provided it accelerates the introduction of new low-cost generation. Moreover, this can be done at low cost to the government budget through the use of power purchase agreements that could be reached through transparent tenders.

The Electricity Sector Represents Both Challenges and Opportunities for the Plan Sénégal Emergent

Limited access to affordable electricity is a significant impediment to private sector development. Electricity is generated primarily by oil-fired plants. As a result of this limited access to electricity, Senegal suffers from one of the highest production costs in sub-Saharan Africa: about US$0.30 a kilowatt-hour (kWh). To illustrate how bad this is, power tariffs in most emerging market areas fall in the range of US$0.04 to US$0.08 a kWh. Even relative to sub-Saharan Africa, Senegal scores badly; its tariff is more than twice the average tariff of US$0.13 a kWh. In parallel, its electricity prices are among the highest in sub-Saharan Africa, set at about 30–40 percent below cost recovery. Overall, access to electricity remains low because of high costs and insufficient generation. Senegal receives its lowest score in the World Bank Doing Business indicators for the access to electricity: 182nd out of 189.13

In addition, Senegal allocates a significant portion of its budget to support the electricity sector, which represents a major opportunity cost in terms of forgone development spending. In order to limit the pass-through of production costs to retail prices, the government subsidizes the electricity sector, which results in an explicit tariff compensation of about 1–1½ percent of GDP in recent years. These direct transfers also complicate budget management, as they are usually higher at the end of the year than initially budgeted (Figure 27). In addition to the explicit fiscal transfer to compensate for tariffs, the electricity company, Senelec, has accumulated tax arrears (0.7 percent in 2013) and benefited from government financing for some of its investments (0.3 percent in 2013). Thus, the total fiscal cost of the electricity sector is significantly higher than just the direct transfer and amounted to 2.5 percent of GDP in 2012 and 2.0 percent in 2013. In addition, empirical evidence on Senegal and elsewhere from the mid-2000s suggests that tariff subsidies do not benefit primarily the poor, since most of them are not connected to the power grid as a result of either unavailability or cost (Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham 2010; World Bank 2008). Even subsidies that benefited the poor in absolute terms were regressive in their distributional effects because electricity consumption is itself unevenly distributed across regional areas and income groups. Finally, subsidies to the electricity sector divert important resources needed to finance propoor and priority spending. For example, annual transfers to Senelec were comparable to or higher than the resources allocated for capital spending in the health or education sectors (Figure 27).

However, the electricity sector represents an opportunity for Senegal, as investment in more efficient plants will eventually solve these issues. The authorities have adopted an investment plan to reduce production costs and increase capacity, but recurrent delays and changes to the plan hamper its effectiveness. The plan relies on more efficient power plants (Sendou, Tobène, Africa Energy) and imports from Mauritania. Eventually, electricity production would combine coal, natural gas, hydropower, and renewable energy. This program would not only increase production but also substantially reduce unit production costs. As a result of these delays, three issues mentioned above (electricity cost, lack of generation, and high budgetary costs) continue to weigh negatively on Senegal’s growth potential. Against this backdrop, successful experiences in implementing energy sector reforms in some sub-Saharan African countries could help Senegal ensure that reforms move forward and, subsequently, make the PSE growth objectives a reality.
a. Electricity production costs are much higher than in advanced and emerging market economies.

b. In addition, tariffs are set well below cost recovery, in part because tariffs are already high.

c. As a result, the budget finances the electricity sector, which leaves fewer resources for poverty-reducing expenditures.

d. Moreover, the ex post transfers to the electricity company Senelec tend to be higher than ex ante.

Figure 27. The Fiscal Costs of the Electricity Sector

KWh: Kilowatt per hour

Sources: Country authorities, World Bank, and IMF staff estimates and projections.
Successful Electricity Reforms

Successful electricity reforms in sub-Saharan African countries can help elucidate how Senegal could address its own challenges (IMF 2013). Low access, high costs, and unreliable supply plague much of the continent, so although Senegal is among the outliers, it is not the only African country to face this challenge and can build on the experience of other countries’ past reforms. Successful reforms incorporate price adjustment, investment in cost reduction, proper outreach to users, and a strategy that includes social safety nets.

Investing to reduce cost and increase generation is the right strategy. Fundamentally, Senegal’s strategy is the right one. All successful cases of energy reforms have indeed implemented investment to improve the energy mix, thus reducing electricity costs, improving generation capacity, and phasing out budgetary costs. What is peculiar about Senegal’s situation are the recurrent delays in implementing the investment plan. An avenue that could be explored is finding ways to strengthen credibility in the plan by demonstrating commitment to implement it. To do so, three avenues could be explored, which have been used by other sub-Saharan African countries: (1) establishing a public debate with a view to creating a large political and social consensus on all aspects of the reforms (that is, not just the investment plan), (2) considering tariff adjustments to mitigate the budgetary impact of potential delays and preserve room for development spending in the budget, and (3) developing social safety nets that can be more efficient in reaching the poor. These three points are discussed further in the following paragraphs.

Strengthening support for reform. Electricity subsidies are a highly visible way for governments to benefit their people, even if, overall, they mostly benefit the rich. Strengthening support for subsidy reforms would typically involve communicating their redistributive implications and convincing the population that overall reforms would benefit the majority by better targeting the poor and by unleashing the country’s growth potential. In this respect Senegal could consider using elements of communication strategies used in Ghana and Kenya, two countries that achieved successful reforms.

- Ghana’s 2005 reform included an active campaign, using media and consultation with civil society to communicate the benefits of the reform and involve all stakeholders (IMF 2013).
- Kenya consulted with stakeholders early in its reform process, allaying concerns of people working in utilities. The consultation culminated in Kenya’s 2004 energy policy, which increased tariffs to match long-term marginal costs. Costs increased concurrently with improvements in quality of service, placating consumers (IMF 2013).
Senegal’s authorities could communicate the potential gains from a reallocation of government spending away from electricity subsidies. A convincing argument could be made about the opportunity cost of subsidizing electricity in terms of forgone development spending or tax cuts targeted to crowd in private investment, particularly foreign direct investment (FDI). Furthermore, consumers may become aware that reforms that improve the financial position of Senelec would also lead to better electricity service and access. In order to be effective, the support for the reform could rely on two specific initiatives related to fiscal transparency. First, the fiscal cost of the electricity sector could be presented in its entirety in budget documents—that is, covering not only the direct transfer but also tax arrears and investment financed by the government. For example, a welcome development is the inclusion of some estimates in the 2015 budget. Second, the fiscal cost would not be considered “given” but would be set as a complement to Senelec’s own efforts to reduce its operating costs. In this context, Senelec’s performance contract is likely to adequately complement the efforts at fiscal transparency by providing more information on Senelec’s own efforts.

Developing social safety nets to protect the poor. Successful reforms have included programs targeting the poor through two actions: maintaining cheaper electricity for them and improving their access to electricity (notably by the electrification of rural areas). For example, Kenya maintained lifeline (below-cost) tariffs to households consuming less than 50 kWh a month, which was cross-subsidized through higher rates for larger consumers. In addition, access was improved for the poor, using subsidies financed by donors to invest in infrastructure. Gabon adopted a similar approach, allowing households with extremely low electric bills access to free electricity up to a certain amount. Senegal has made efforts to move in this direction. Specific investments are planned in electricity distribution through the strengthening and modernization of networks, stations, and power lines. To achieve the target of 60 percent rural electrification by 2016, a priority rural electrification three-year program (2014–16) was developed. In parallel, efforts have been made to revamp social safety nets, with a view to better targeting the poor. The authorities have worked closely with development partners, notably the World Bank, on this issue; however, these efforts will take time to bear fruit, notably in terms of electrification of rural areas.

Along with cost-reduction investments, price adjustments are usually necessary. This is particularly relevant if the utility company needs the tariffs to cover not only its operating costs but also the cost of its investment. Kenya has undergone reforms that began in the 1990s and continued into the 2000s. At present, this utility company has some flexibility to invest (Ajodhia, Mulder, and Slot 2012). The price-adjustment mechanism includes a pass-through of fuel prices and exchange-rate fluctuations. Senegal already has high electricity tariffs compared with those...
of the region. As such, the scope for an across-the-board price adjustment is limited; however, options could be considered to increase tariffs temporarily and selectively in order to reduce the fiscal burden. But Senegal may be able to avoid price adjustments if it can rapidly expand low-cost generation from coal to replace existing high-cost fuel plants. Moreover, if the majority of the investment is undertaken under power purchase agreements, then there would be no need for the state (or Senelec) to borrow to finance the expansion plans beyond the cost of the distribution network. In turn, grants from the EU and other donors for infrastructure targeted to the poor could finance a significant share of this spending without generating financial pressures on the budget, Senelec, or electricity consumers.

**Conclusion**

Overall, Senegal's strategy to address electricity sector issues is sound and in line with international successful experiences. In particular, the investment plan, as well as efforts to improve Senelec’s financial transparency, goes in the right direction in terms of reducing costs and improving access to electricity.

In order to strengthen the effectiveness of their strategy, the authorities could consider continued efforts in building consensus, especially if difficult decisions, such as price adjustments, were to become necessary. In this respect, an active communication strategy on the gains from a reallocation of government spending away from electricity subsidies would be helpful. This could also persuade the population to accept costs in exchange for improved accessibility and eventual reduced costs. In addition, continued efforts in developing social safety nets would also help mitigate the social costs during the transition.
While Senegal has been successful in decreasing poverty rates, the share of the population living below the poverty line and its exposure to shock remains high, emphasizing the need for safety nets. Such nets should be scalable to respond to transient needs while ensuring minimum social protection for chronically poor and vulnerable populations. Strengthening social protection is high on the authorities’ reform agenda, including within the second pillar of the Plan Sénégal Emergent (PSE). This section reviews Senegal’s current state of social protection and reforms in progress, and outlines main strategies for the design of social security nets going forward.

Senegal has made progress in poverty alleviation, but the poverty incidence remains high, and households are vulnerable to shocks (Figure 29, top left panel). In 2001–11 poverty rates declined by 8.5 percentage points, with the largest decreases observed in Dakar, but almost half of the population continues to live below the poverty line. The poorest households are particularly vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks, such as the loss of livestock or harvest, or exogenous shocks—for example, to the prices of such major imports as oil, rice, and wheat. The majority of households do not have mechanisms to mitigate the impact of such shocks, resulting in their often tapping into savings and selling assets in response to shocks, with the risk of being locked into long-term poverty.

**Government Response to Shocks and Existing Safety Nets in Senegal**

Government’s response to exogenous shocks has included financial support to farmers, general assistance to the rural population, and subsidies (Figure 29). In response to droughts, the

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The government has historically offered food and agricultural inputs, interest rate subsidies, and debt forgiveness, while fuel and food price hikes have been countered by a series of fiscal measures, including subsidies for basic foodstuffs as well as for gasoline, butane, and electricity. Most of these measures are poorly targeted: interest rate subsidies tend to benefit larger rural producers and those able to participate in the formal credit system. Subsidies in response to price hikes may be very expensive and may not reach the intended part of the population. For instance, such subsidies absorbed 2½ percent of GDP in 2008, while only 7 or 9 percent of water or electricity subsidies went to the poorest quintile, and urban dwellers accounted for the majority of beneficiaries.

**Figure 28. Senegal: Expenditure on Subsidies (Percent of GDP)**

Untargeted subsidies constitute a large share of the government’s expenditure.

Source: IMF staff and country authorities.

**Figure 29. Poverty, Shocks, and Consumption**

a. *Senegal has made progress in poverty alleviation, but poverty rates remain high, …*

b. *…and problems satisfying basic needs persist.*
c. Households remain vulnerable to shocks, ...

**Exposure to Shocks of Poorest 20 Percent of Households**

- At least one shock: 45%
- Loss of livestock: 35%
- Loss of harvest: 25%
- Serious illness/accident: 15%
- Death of family member: 5%

**Average Daily Expenditure per Person**

- Dakar: 1442 FCFA
- Other Cities: 841 FCFA
- Rural: 486 FCFA
- Senegal: 780 FCFA

Source: ANSD (2013).

A review of social safety net programs identified a dozen examples in place in Senegal in 2011, often with national coverage. Box 3 summarizes the dozen social safety nets that were in place in 2011, covering, for instance, school lunches, food assistance, and support to the elderly and disabled, and two pilot cash-transfer programs. Expenditures on these programs averaged about 0.3 percent of GDP over 2008–11, with school lunch programs accounting for more than 70 percent of this spending, reflecting their large coverage. Between 64 and 99 percent of expenditures were dedicated to the cost of the transfers themselves, with the remainder covering administration, monitoring, and evaluation. Eight programs had national or quasinational coverage, but three of the newer programs intervened in more restricted areas: NETs in selected poor rural districts, WFP CV in selected urban areas, IPSEV in rural and semiurban areas, and the PRP in the rural areas of only three regions.

d. ... and have insufficient mechanisms to cope with them.

**Strategy to Cope with Shocks**

- Utilization of savings: 90%
- Sale of assets: 30%
- Aid from friends: 10%
- No strategy: 5%

**Consumption by Income Percentile**

- First (20 percent poorest): 20%
- Second: 25%
- Third: 20%
- Fourth: 15%
- Fifth (20 percent richest): 20%
However, the programs in place in 2011 were not sufficient to protect the poor or adequately respond to shocks (Figure 30). In particular, at that time, programs suffered from the following problems:

- **Coverage**: Annually, almost one-quarter of the population received some type of assistance; however, this number likely overestimated effective coverage of the poor, as recipients of food distribution and school lunches accounted for about 97 percent of beneficiaries, and neither of these two programs screened beneficiaries based on need.

- **Targeting**: Predominantly categorical targeting was often reinforced by geographical prioritization or confirmed through community-based mechanisms. The performance of these targeting systems was mixed: some programs were effective, concentrating on the poorest households (PRN and agricultural support programs), and others exhibited significant leakage. For example, the elderly health care program benefited primarily the best-off 40 percent of households concentrated in urban areas.

- **Impact**: Actual spending per beneficiary showed wide variations between programs. The transfer programs NETS and PAM CV sought a meaningful impact within an affordable program able to scale up, while the smallest costs per beneficiary were the school lunch...
program and the food distribution through CSA. While coverage of CSA was large, its impact was likely to be limited, at a cost per beneficiary of CFAF 353 a year (Figure 31).

- **Coordination:** Overall, safety net programs tended to be fragmented, lacking coordination, and not adapted to respond rapidly to shocks. Institutional anchorage of the programs was linked mainly to the individual program objectives and its target groups, combined with institutional mandates instead of a coordinated strategy of interventions.

- **Monitoring:** There was no standardized monitoring of program implementation across safety net interventions. With each program establishing its monitoring and evaluation plan and information often collected via program-specific information systems, a national perspective on coverage and impact of safety net programs was missing.

- **Funding:** Safety net funding remained largely dependent on development partner financing.

![Figure 31. Cost per Beneficiary per Program](image)

*Figure 31. Cost per Beneficiary per Program (In Thousands of CFA Francs)*

*Spending per beneficiary varies widely across programs, with some likely having only minor impact.*

Box 3. Social Safety Programs in Senegal in 2011

In 2011 major benefits were carried out by way of monetary transfers, food aid, and fee waivers for health services through programs in the following areas:

Food programs

- Food Security Commissariat (Commissariat à la Sécurité Alimentaire, CSA) offers food aid for vulnerable populations in response to catastrophes or through rice distribution at public rallies and religious festivals.
- National School Lunch Program (Programme d’alimentation scolaire, DCaS) provides school lunches funded through the national budget.
- WFP School Lunch Program (PAM Cantines Scolaires) supports the national school lunch program by providing hot meals in pre- and primary schools located in rural and periurban vulnerable areas.
- WFP Vouchers for Food Pilot Program (Bons d’Achat, PAM CV) addresses food insecurity among vulnerable households due to rising food prices.

Emergency fund

- National Solidarity Fund (Fonds de Solidarité Nationale, FSN) provides immediate responses to crisis and emergency situations, including financial, medical, and material support.

Support targeted at children

- Pilot Cash Transfers for Child Nutrition Program (Nutrition ciblée sur l’enfant et transferts sociaux, NETS): cash grants to mothers of vulnerable children under five years old to mitigate the negative impacts of food price increases.
- Educational Support for Vulnerable Children (Bourses d’étude pour les orphelins et autres enfants vulnérables, OEV): a program through the National HIV-AIDS Council to provide schooling or professional training to children orphaned or affected by HIV/AIDS and other vulnerable children.
- The Social Protection Initiative for Vulnerable Children (Initiative de protection sociale des enfants vulnérables, IPSEV): cash grants to households to help them maintain vulnerable children and ensure access to health and education services.

Support targeted to other categorical groups

- Community-Based Readaptation Program (Programme de réadaptation à base communautaire, PRBC) provides social, economic, and cultural integration for disabled persons via material support and funding of income-generation activities.
- Old Age Support Program (Projet d’appui à la promotion des aînés, PAPA) aims to address the vulnerable elderly via capacity strengthening, grants, and subsidized loans for income-generating activities to groups of elderly.
- Sesame Plan (Plan Sésame) waives health service fees for all persons over 60 years old.
Poverty Reduction Program (Programme d’appui à la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie de Réduction de la Pauvreté, PRP) supports grants for income-generating activities for vulnerable groups, primarily women, the disabled, and HIV/AIDS–affected populations.

Renewed Efforts to Establish an Effective National Social Protection System

Recently, the government has taken important steps to set up new institutional arrangements and programs to strengthen Senegal’s social protection system:

- **Délégation Générale à la Protection Sociale et à la Solidarité Nationale (DGPSN):** In 2012 DGPSN was established to help define social protection policy, implement social protection programs, coordinate the National Social Protection Strategy, and participate in monitoring its implementation. To help it play its role of overall leadership and coordination of the social protection sector, an Inter-ministerial Steering Committee on Social Protection was established, which includes both civil society and development partners.

- **Interministerial committee:** The recently established framework includes an interministerial committee with overall responsibility for formulation of the country’s social protection strategy implementation. In addition, a technical steering committee is being established to lead the efforts in terms of social safety net implementation at a technical level.

- **Programme National de Bourses de Sécurité Familiale:** The government has launched this effort, a conditional cash-transfer program that aims to provide support to the most vulnerable households and to promote investments in human capital on a national scale. The implementation of this program provides the basis for the definition of tools and instruments (for targeting, registry, payment and monitoring, and evaluation) that can be used by other social safety nets in the country. Started in October 2013, the program is expected to reach 250,000 households by 2017.

- **Caisse Autonome de Protection Sociale Universelle:** Work in progress also includes the setup of an Autonomous Social Protection Fund, which would be responsible for organizing the financing of social protection activities, such as universal health coverage, the national conditional cash-transfer program, and pensions for the elderly. The fund, which is still in its conceptual phase, would be responsible for mobilizing resources from a variety of sources, such as individual premiums or contributions, government general resources, private sector resources, special taxes, and contributions from development partners.
Recommendations to Further Consolidate the National Social Protection System

The overall goal of the recommendations is to strengthen coordination between currently isolated programs, improve their targeting, increase their coverage, and, more generally, improve the ability of the national social protection system to effectively protect the most vulnerable and respond to shocks.

Build synergies between existing individual programs to progress toward a unified national safety net system. To move to a national safety net system would require building explicit synergies between currently isolated programs. For example, households enrolled in cash-transfer programs could be automatically eligible for health or education fee waivers, or households participating in public works could be linked with income-generating projects, microfinance, or other asset-building programs. Interoperable management information systems across programs, as well as a central registry of vulnerable households, can provide an important platform to promote connections between programs.

Strengthen collaboration between agencies and other key players. Currently, programs develop their own local coordination mechanisms, with multiple committees and consultation mechanisms—a common institutional platform would thus create synergies. Collaboration could also expand to other relevant sectors, such as health and education services and natural disaster management. Harmonization with external partners, including international agencies and non-government organizations, can be improved through central-level coordination. The newly formed DGPSN and the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the National Social Protection Strategy have an important role to play to continue strengthening such collaboration.

Design a medium-term expenditure framework and integrate it into the budget process. Moving from an individual program approach to a national safety system will require developing an overall financial framework for the sector that prioritizes expenditures and builds a sustainable funding basis for safety nets. Such a framework would help translate a national safety strategy into public spending priorities within a multiyear macroeconomic and fiscal framework integrated into the budget process. Central-level coordination will help underpin the sustainability of the system. Furthermore, this effort can help rationalize existing programs—redesigning (better targeting, more efficient management, and so on) or eliminating the least effective ones.

Develop central monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that inform strategic decision making.
and allow program evaluation. A key function of the DGPSN and Inter-Ministerial Committee is to promote the use of rigorous data on various programs. This should help inform the design and implementation of programs and make it possible to demonstrate their impact to political decision makers, development partners, and civil society, thus enhancing global knowledge of the social safety nets. To this end, it is important that each program develop its own management information system to monitor and evaluate its implementation. It is also critical that these program-specific management information systems be interoperable across programs so that the coordinating agency can draw from these sources for its sector-wide analysis and facilitate targeting and coordination through a central registry of beneficiaries.

Improve targeting to reach the most vulnerable parts of the population. The targeting methodology adopted for the national conditional cash-transfer program relies on a combination of community-based targeting and the application of an objective proxy means test that combines information on household characteristics, correlated with poverty and vulnerability, to confirm their eligibility. In the coming years, it will be important to keep improving on the methodology as new data become available and to ensure that all programs improve their targeting of households. The development of a unique registry with ample information on the most vulnerable households is an important step to help each program efficiently apply its own selection criteria without having to replicate the data-collection effort.

Further strengthen the institutional framework. In the coming years, it is important for DGPSN to develop its capacity to provide the leadership required for the coordination of the sector and the implementation of the national strategy. In the future, given that cross-country evidence suggests that coordination and implementation of specific programs are often separated with maturing systems, DGPSN could focus its efforts on the overall leadership of the sector and the implementation of the National Social Protection Strategy. It could thus oversee the management of the sector and monitor implementation and results; the implementation of programs would remain the responsibility of sectoral institutions.
Senegal has had two successive arrangements under the IMF’s Policy Support Instrument (PSI) since 2007. This section focuses on Senegal’s performance under the latest PSI with respect to three main areas: the overall macroeconomic performance, program conditionality and other policy targets, and technical assistance. It concludes that the overall macroeconomic performance has been below par but acceptable. The main PSI goals—higher growth and fiscal and debt sustainability—were broadly achieved but with less favorable outcomes than initially programmed; program performance has been mixed, with qualitative targets largely met but substantial delays in structural reforms. In addition, Senegal has found the technical assistance from the IMF to be useful, although there is scope for improvement in the implementation of the IMF’s recommendations.

The 2011–14 PSI is the latest arrangement in a long history of IMF involvement in Senegal. At the authorities’ request, the three-year PSI—approved by the Executive Board on December 3, 2010—was extended by one year during the Fifth Review, and it was set to expire on December 2, 2014. Under the PSI, Senegal has sought the IMF’s advice, monitoring, and endorsement of the authorities’ policy framework without using the IMF’s financial assistance.

Senegal’s PSI was based on country-owned poverty-reduction strategies. For the initial implementation period, the PSI was aligned with the projections underlying the second Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP-II 2006–10), including an updated macroeconomic framework for 2011–15. In mid-2012 the authorities finalized their National Strategy of Economic and Social Development (NSES D), which outlined policies and reforms for 2013–17 and became the new national strategy supported by the PSI. The NSES D devised policies required to push forward the authorities’ agenda for high, sustained, and inclusive growth and poverty reduction.
Within the overriding goal of fostering economic growth, the government’s action plan outlined a number of key objectives. Backed by the 2011–14 PSI, these included (1) pursuing a prudent fiscal and debt policy and improving expenditure quality so as to maintain macroeconomic stability; (2) raising revenue to create more fiscal space for priority spending, including additional infrastructure investment; (3) further strengthening public financial management and governance to enhance fiscal transparency, budget planning, and execution, improve the productivity of public expenditure, and reduce budgetary risks; and (4) stimulating private sector development through structural reforms, particularly in the energy and financial sectors, and other reforms related to the business climate.

Macroeconomic Performance

Senegal’s macroeconomic policies supported by the PSI have remained aligned with the authorities’ own development and poverty reduction strategies. The NSESD included three growth scenarios. Under the baseline, optimistic, and pessimistic scenarios, average 2013–17 growth was expected to reach 4.9 percent, 6.8 percent, and 3.2 percent, respectively. The underlying assumptions of these three scenarios differed with respect to the anticipated level of financing, the absorptive capacity of the economy, and progress in implementing key reforms. The NSESD’s baseline scenario was broadly in line with the PSI.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5. Growth Projection Errors</th>
<th>(Percentage Points)</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relative to:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP II update</td>
<td>–3.0</td>
<td>–2.7</td>
<td>–3.0</td>
<td>–1.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI request</td>
<td>–2.3</td>
<td>–1.3</td>
<td>–1.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSESD optimistic scenario</td>
<td>–0.5</td>
<td>–0.3</td>
<td>–2.1</td>
<td>–1.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSESD baseline scenario</td>
<td>–0.5</td>
<td>–0.3</td>
<td>–0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Senegal’s actual growth performance in 2011–14 diverged substantially from all scenarios (Table 5 and Figure 32). Growth projections seem to have been systematically biased upward. On average, the projection under the NSESD baseline scenario was the closest to the outcome, with a mean forecast error of only –0.4 percent, a relatively low standard deviation of about 0.4, and an approximately symmetric and relatively peaked distribution. The largest deviation between the projections and the outcome was under the updated IMF Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II (PRSP II) growth scenario, which was the authorities’ central scenario at the
time of PSI request, in which growth was strongly overestimated as the forecast error on average reached –2.6 percentage points with very skewed and flat distribution.

Inflation remained subdued during most of the program period. In 2011 inflation peaked at 3.4 percent, driven by a spike in international food and oil prices as well as by transportation costs. The authorities responded with a temporary freeze on key food prices, but later allowed a full pass-through of international food prices and resumed the adjustment of domestic petroleum product prices to reflect world prices. With several increases in the Central Bank of West African States’ (BCEAO) policy rate, lower import prices, and good domestic harvests, Senegal’s inflation quickly returned to the projected path and continued on a downward trend toward the end of the program.

The authorities’ fiscal performance has also diverged from their own and program projections. The authorities’ PRSP II update did not include independent fiscal projections, as they were fully aligned with the projections underlying the PSI request. Such projections were published only in the NSESD and included three scenarios. Under the baseline scenario, the average fiscal deficit was projected at 4.1 percent of GDP in 2013–17, broadly in line with the PSI. The deficit was supposed to expand to 5.0 percent of GDP in the optimistic scenario, as higher growth should have been financed by new borrowing, and contained at 4.2 percent of GDP in the pessimistic scenario.
Figure 32. Macroeconomic Developments

a. Real growth has been systematically overestimated

b. ...while inflation has been lower than expected

c. The fiscal deficit has been substantially higher than expected...

d. ...and contributed to the expansion of the current account deficit.

e. External debt has grown more slowly than projected...

f. ...largely offset by a more-rapid-than-projected accumulation of domestic debt.

Source: IMF staff reports.
By mid-2014, neither of the fiscal scenarios was in line with projections. On average, the smallest mean errors were observed under both NSESD scenarios. The actual deficit was substantially better than projected, compared with the optimistic scenario (by an average of 0.3 percent of GDP). At the same time, the deficit was considerably higher, compared with both the NSESD baseline scenario and the PSI request scenario, on average by 0.4 and 1.1 percent of GDP, respectively. This suggests that neither the baseline scenario nor the optimistic scenario was realistic from the outset.

The divergence of fiscal projections from targets was driven by forecasting weaknesses of both revenue and expenditure (Figure 33). Tax and nontax revenue underperformed on average by 0.5 percent of GDP during the program period. This one-sided error in revenue projections points to systematic revenue overestimation. The opposite is true for expenditures, which have been systematically underestimated by about 1.5 percent of GDP on average. As a result of this and the protracted revenue shortfalls and expenditure underestimations, the authorities had to make fiscal adjustments of about 2 percent of GDP each year on average in order to meet the fiscal deficit target during the program period. This, in turn, led to high volatility in government investment, which carried substantial burden in the adjustment.
Figure 33. Detailed Fiscal Performance

a. Realized fiscal deficit differed substantially from all scenarios....

b. ...as revenue collection was lower than expected...

c. ...and the overall expenditure was systematically underestimated.

d. Investment was used as the main adjustment expenditure item.

PRSP: Poverty reduction strategy paper
PSI: Policy support instrument
NSESD: National Strategy of Economic and Social development
Source: IMF staff reports.

The current account deficit has been systematically underestimated during the program period. The average difference between the projection and the outcome was 0.6 percent of GDP—strongly skewed and peaked. On the one hand, developments in the current account broadly mirrored and were driven, at least in part, by the evolution of the fiscal deficit, although the
divergence from the baseline in the current account was somewhat lower. On the other hand, during the program period, Senegal was hit by exogenous shocks, related mainly to sharp increases in imported food and oil prices, and regional geopolitical tensions, which also contributed to the expansion of the current account deficit. The private sector offset at least part of these exogenous shocks by adjusting its saving investment balance accordingly.

Finally, the rate of accumulation of domestic public debt has been higher than program projections. The overall average deviation from the projections is relatively small—about 0.7 percent of GDP—and the trajectory of the overall debt accumulation was below the projected trend during the first half of the program. However, it substantially exceeded the projected level toward the end. External debt accumulation was substantially lower than projected, by about 2.8 percent of GDP on average each year. It was explained mainly by the authorities’ prudent policies, low availability of concessional financing, and conditionality on external debt included in the PSI. At the same time, the authorities extensively used domestic and regional financing, which led to rapid domestic debt accumulation at a rate exceeding the baseline projections by 2.1 percent of GDP.

Several factors may explain the systematic deviations of key macroeconomic variables from their projected path during the 2011–14 PSI.

- **First, protracted delays in key structural reforms:** Higher growth, strong revenue collection, and lower fiscal deficits required ambitious structural reforms. Most structural reforms—in particular, related to the energy sector and public financial management—have been delayed, scaled down, or implemented inconsistently, which weighed heavily on growth and revenue.

- **Second, systematic upward biases in the authorities’ macroeconomic projections:** In the recent past, growth was projected to exceed its historically observed averages and even the empirically estimated potential. To achieve such ambitious growth rates would have required either a substantial increase in total factor productivity, for which the potential is limited without a profound economic modernization, or new labor and capital, which is held back by the lack of productive employment opportunities and financial constraints.

- **Third, an external environment less favorable than anticipated:** Senegal was negatively affected by several oil and food price increases in international markets, which led to both lower growth and unanticipated increases in fiscal subsidies. At the regional level, Senegalese export demand was somewhat affected by regional crises in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali.
Finally, the domestic political cycle did not allow for the vigorous pursuit of reforms that could have had social impact. For almost a year ahead of the March 2012 presidential elections and for several months ahead of the June 2014 local elections, most structural reforms moved ahead much more slowly than anticipated, and the most critical were postponed until the postelection period.

Program Performance

Senegal’s performance under the 2011–14 PSI program has been satisfactory (Figure 34). After initial difficulties in meeting the assessment criteria during the first half of the program period, program implementation improved during the second half. The quantitative assessment criteria were largely met, and only 3 out of 48 quantitative assessment criteria were missed, in both cases by small margins. Specifically, the authorities missed (1) the assessment criteria (AC) on the basic fiscal deficit by 0.2 percent of GDP because of lower-than-projected oil revenue (First Review), (2) the overall fiscal deficit target by 0.4 percent of GDP because of administrative weaknesses leading to expenditure overruns (Third Review), and (3) the ceiling on nonconcessional borrowing by 0.4 percent of GDP due to the failure to classify properly a loan with an 11 percent grant element as nonconcessional (Eighth Review).

The authorities’ capacity to control expenditure strengthened during the program period, although serious deficiencies remain. Fiscal deficit targets have been met—however, always at the expense of curtailing expenditure, mainly domestically financed investment, toward year end. At the same time, weaknesses in revenue collection have persisted, and the indicative floor on tax revenue was missed by 1.3 percent of GDP during the Seventh Review. The indicative ceiling on the share of public contracts signed by a single tender was missed by a small margin at the Fifth Review, reflecting mainly coordinating difficulties in the procurement process.

The implementation of structural reforms has been uneven. Of the 35 structural measures included in the program, about three-quarters have been implemented either on time or with delays. However, the remaining measures either have not been done or were dropped altogether. All measures aimed at controlling the fiscal deficit, improving tax revenue, and enhancing the quality of expenditure and of debt management have been broadly implemented, although some with substantial delays. This was especially the case for the public financial management (PFM) during the program’s second half. The single treasury account has not yet been implemented, and the continuous benchmark on the cost-benefit analysis of the creation of new agencies was missed. Because no new projects exceeding CFAF 10 billion were included in the 2014 budget, the benchmark on their cost-benefit assessment could not be met,
while the rollout of the new payroll software was met with a substantial delay. Structural problems persisted in the area of private sector development, business climate, investment, and infrastructure. Most were related to delays in reforms to the energy sector, electricity subsidies, and other infrastructure investment.
Figure 34. Performance under the 2011–14 IMF Policy Support Instrument

Quantitative assessment criteria and indicative targets have been largely met, although often with last-minute expenditure cuts and other adjustments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantitative Assessment Criteria and Indicative Targets</th>
<th>First review</th>
<th>Second review</th>
<th>Third review</th>
<th>Fourth review</th>
<th>Fifth review</th>
<th>Sixth review</th>
<th>Seventh review</th>
<th>Eighth review</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Excellence in fiscal balance</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceiling on the overall fiscal balance</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceiling on the contracting or guaranteeing of new non-concessional external debt (0.5% of IFS)</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceiling on spending outside normal procedures</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceiling on government external payment arrears</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceiling on the amount of the budgetary deficit</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceiling on nonconcessional debt with a minimum grant</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Met</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indicative targets:
- Quarterly ceiling on the share of the value of public sector external debt contracted by single tender (percent): 20
- Floor on social expenditures (percent of total spending): 35
- Floor on tax revenue: 20

Structural performance under the program has been mixed, as many measures have been implemented with substantial delays.

Table showing structural benchmarks for 2011–2014:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Benchmarks, 2011–2014</th>
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</table>

Although there were fewer benchmarks during the second half of the program, performance remained mixed.
PSI design and conditionality has appropriately focused on areas of IMF expertise and critical importance for Senegal. The program has been mainly fiscal in nature, targeting both fiscal and debt sustainability. At the First Review, the main program AC was changed from the basic balance to the overall fiscal balance because of an increased focus on debt sustainability. To address difficulties with revenue collection, an indicative target on tax revenue was introduced at the Sixth Review. At the same time, substantial flexibility has been built into the program by way of adjustors on the fiscal deficit to allow the full use of all concessional financing. The ceilings on nonconcessional and semiconcessional external financing have been increased several times to allow Senegal to make full use of additional resources to finance investment in macrocritical areas, such as energy and infrastructure.

Technical Assistance

During the 2011–14 PSI, Senegal has been a high-intensity user of the IMF’s technical assistance (TA; Figure 35). In terms of years of staff/expert time (full-time equivalent, FTE), Senegal ranked in the top quartile among sub-Saharan African countries, with an average of 2.2 years of TA provided during the PSI program period. In terms of volume, TA to Senegal substantially exceeded that to all other West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries, with the exception of Togo, and was comparable to the TA provided by the IMF to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and Nigeria. Compared with those of an average sub-Saharan African country, Senegalese officials received more training provided by the IMF’s Institute for Capacity Development.

The IMF’s TA to Senegal has focused on several priority areas. About 90 percent was devoted—directly or indirectly—to public finances, compared with 50 percent in other sub-Saharan African countries. To strengthen Senegal’s public financial management (PFM), the IMF’s TA has focused on reinforcing budget accounting, improving the coverage and timeliness of fiscal reporting, strengthening cash management, establishing a single treasury account, and implementing the new WAEMU PFM directives. Priorities in the TA related to tax policy have included support for the development of a new tax code, reforms to the value-added tax (VAT), particularly the VAT credit system and exemptions, the personal income tax, and the taxation of the banking system. Reforms in tax and customs administration have been geared toward modernizing their functional structures (for example, establishment of a medium-size taxpayers’ office in Dakar) and strengthening risk-based audits to improve compliance. TA on debt management has contributed to the establishment of a single debt-management unit in the Ministry of Finance and the development of a new debt-management strategy. Finally, Senegal has continued to strengthen its macroeconomic statistics, including the production of quarterly...
national accounts and the introduction of a producer price index, with the ultimate objective of complying with Special Data Dissemination Standards. Because Senegal is a member of the WAEMU, its TA needs in the monetary and financial sector areas have been addressed mainly at the regional level.

Figure 35. The IMF’s Technical Assistance

- **a.** TA to SSA by Country FY2011-14, Average (Full time equivalent)
- **b.** ICD Training Program in participant weeks of training
- **c.** TA by Main Topic Area, FY 2011-14
- **d.** Senegal: TA Delivery FY 2011-2014 Cumulative Full Time Equivalent

Sources: IMF staff reports.
Conclusions

Senegal’s macroeconomic performance under the PSI-supported program was satisfactory. Key program goals—growth, fiscal and debt sustainability—were achieved and the overall macroeconomic stability preserved, although outcomes were less favorable than initially programmed. Consequently, the achieved growth rate and fiscal policies were not sufficient to make a visible dent in poverty reduction and improve other social indicators. While the authorities’ own growth and poverty-reduction strategies had set the appropriately high targets to achieve the desired growth and fiscal and social outcomes, the projections turned out to be excessively ambitious and inconsistent with historically observed trends. Unrealistic expectations have led to systematic upward biases in program projections of key macroeconomic variables.

Senegal’s performance under the PSI-supported program was an important guiding post for domestic reforms and their external support. The satisfactory macroeconomic performance and the compliance with key quantitative assessment criteria were somewhat overshadowed by slow program implementation on the structural side. There is a strong case for continued active cooperation between the IMF and Senegal, either in a program or regular surveillance context.

The IMF’s technical assistance to Senegal has been helpful in accompanying important reforms. The priority areas should remain broadly the same, but more emphasis is needed on implementation and follow-up on earlier advice. Tax collection and expenditure rationalization are the two priority TA areas for the short term that could contribute to more manageable fiscal performance, reduce the need for disruptive ad hoc adjustments, and improve overall fiscal predictability. Additional TA in public debt management, strategic fiscal policy, and PFM issues will be needed. Emphasis on public investment management may be called for in view of the planned increase in infrastructure spending under the PSE.
References


