

## Discussion of Chapter 6: Reducing Debt Short of Default

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Sovereign Debt: A Guide for Economists and Practitioners  
International Monetary Fund  
September 14, 2018

# Summary

- **Question:** how can governments reduce public debt?
- Paper focuses on strategies available to governments who have decided to reduce debt-to-GDP
- *Does not* focus on:
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- **Contribution:** synthesize the trade-offs and effectiveness of debt reduction policies
  - Relies on economic research, outcomes of episodes
  - Conclusions: debt reduction policies can be costly
    - ⇒ dampen short run growth, fuel political headwinds

# Findings

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- Financial repression:** effective in an era of favorable growth, inflation, & negative real interest rates

# Comments

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- Appeals to simple, standard models and frameworks
- Incorporates both model based and empirical evidence

# Suggestions

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  - What worked to reduce debt? Costs vs. benefits
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  - Chari et al. (2018): only optimal without commitment, reduces default temptation when debt held by banks
  - Scheer et al. (2017, fig. 2): declining debt-to-GDP exerts downward pressure on inflation and output



# References

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