

Session 7: Governance and Transparency

Algorithmic Governance in the Financial Sector

Mikari Kashima Bank of Japan

Views expressed in this presentation are those of the presenter and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Japan.

Widespread use of algorithms for decision-making in the financial sector

Algorithms: encoded procedure to transform input data into "desired output", based on specific calculations (Gillespie 2013)

Customer-focused uses	Operations-focused uses	Trading and portfolio management	Regulatory compliance and supervision	DLT with no central authority
Credit scoring	 Capital optimization 	Trading execution	Regtech	Cryptoassets
 Insurance Client-facing chatbots 	 Model risk management Market impact analysis 	 Portfolio management 	Suptech	• DAO

Source: Based on FSB "Artificial intelligence and machine learning in financial services" (November 2017)



Quantum computing and other technological developments are expected to further facilitate use of big data and Al/machine learning

While the use of algorithms bring benefits, its use for automated decision-making raise regulatory concerns

Decision-making by algorithms

- "Code is law" (Lessig, 1999)
- *"Algorithmic harms"* (Andrews, 2017)
 - Bias
 - Manipulation
 - Lawbreaking
 - Usage in propaganda
 - Brand contamination
 - ✓ Unknowns ("black-box", "singularity")

...and thus the need for adequate "governance of algorithms"

Algorithmic decision-making

• Automation of the following processes:



> More problematic if Als become homogenous ("model monoculture")

Approaches to "governance of algorithms"

- Self-governance
 - Technological solutions (eg. privacy by design, non-discriminatory data mining techniques), and standardization efforts
 - Internal governance of the institution (eg. BCBS Principles for the Sound Management of Operational Risk)
 - Industry-level self regulation
 - Self-governance of the (decentralized) network
- Market mechanism (enhancing accountability/transparency)
- Adequate allocation of liabilities among involved parties
- Regulation
 - Need to be mindful: i) not to stifle innovation; and ii) not to create "model monoculture"

Enhancing accountability/transparency of algorithms is important, but not a panacea

- Use of algorithms with auditability could increase scrutiny of interested parties
- Regulation can play a role
 - eg. HFT regulations requiring i) information on governance structure to develop/maintain IT systems; ii) test data; and iii) regular reporting
- However, full transparency is not a panacea
 - Constraints due to trade secrets, data privacy protection
 - Complexity
 - > Capacity and resource constraints of users, regulators/supervisors

Possible regulatory approaches



- Require storage of data/records, disclosure
- Require certain program designs
 - Auditability
 - Exclusion of certain data input
 - > Obligation to ensure compliance with market integrity regulation
- Require adequate management framework (internal governance and control)
 - eg. Japan Financial Instruments and Exchange Act on HFT systems, MiFIDII regulation of algorithmic trading systems

Possible regulatory approaches (cont'd)

- Registration requirements for FI staff designing/approving IT systems
- Expand scope of regulated entities to those responsible for designing the algorithm (Eg. IT developers)
- Reconsider subjective grounds for market conduct regulations



Focus on enhancing auditability, ensuring robust processes and control mechanisms for development/management of the algorithm.

Allocation of liabilities



- Allocation of liability should be clear to:
 - give parties ex-ante incentive
 - ensure adequate compensation of the customer
- How should liability be allocated?
 - Guidance based on "cheapest cost avoider" test
 - Complexity could arise in the case of AIs ("black-box")
 - How to avoid stifling innovation while ensuring adequate customer protection?

Challenges in the case of distributed networks



- > How can regulators ensure regulatory goals are achieved?
- > Are self-governance and market mechanisms sufficient?
- Should the government consider ways to influence the technical code?
- Need to require a central authority for critical operations (eg. FMIs)?
- Decision-making for modifying protocols could be challenging
 - Rule-making *de facto* controlled by few persons (eg. core developers, few miners)... change of rules may favor specific members
 - > How can the governance framework be strengthened?



Thank you !



mikari.kashima@boj.or.jp