Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan

Low oil prices and deepening conflicts continue to weigh on economic activity in the MENAP region.

The growth prospects for most oil exporters have been revised down markedly since last October, amid a continued rout in the global oil market. Oil exporters’ growth is still projected to rise from 2 percent in 2015 to 3 percent this year; however, this is mainly due to increased oil production in Iraq and post-sanctions Iran. In the GCC, economic activity is projected to slow further. Ambitious fiscal consolidation measures are being implemented this year, but budget balances will deteriorate nonetheless given the sharp drop in oil prices. An additional and substantial deficit-reduction effort is required over the medium term to restore fiscal sustainability, and, in the GCC countries, to support the exchange rate pegs. An equally important priority is to ensure that the private sector can create enough jobs for a young and growing population at a time when public sector job creation will be constrained. This will require deep structural reforms to improve medium-term prospects and facilitate economic diversification. Policymakers in most countries are increasingly determined to be proactive in addressing the challenges posed by the oil price malaise.

After four years of stagnation, economic activity in MENAP oil importers is starting to strengthen, albeit gradually and unevenly. Growth increased from 3 percent in 2011–14 to 3¾ percent in 2015 and is projected to remain around that level in 2016–17. Lower oil prices, less fiscal drag, and improved confidence owing to progress with recent reforms are supporting this recovery. Yet security disruptions and social tensions persist, and adverse spillovers from regional conflicts—including economic pressures from hosting refugees—and, more recently, slowdowns in the GCC, strain the outlook. Reforms of generalized energy subsidies have helped stabilize public debt and preserve macroeconomic stability, and improved targeted safety nets have helped protect the vulnerable. However, additional fiscal consolidation is still needed to put public debt firmly on a sustainable path and rebuild policy buffers. In some cases, greater exchange rate flexibility would also help reduce vulnerabilities and improve competitiveness. Stepped-up structural reforms in business, labor and financial markets, and trade are critical for boosting economic prospects, improving living standards, and creating much-needed jobs.

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<td>2015</td>
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<td>2016</td>
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Sources: National authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
<sup>1</sup>Countries in conflict include Iraq, Libya, and Yemen. Data for Syria are not available.
MENAP Oil-Exporting Countries: Adjusting to Cheaper Oil

New Oil Market Reality

Over the past decade, MENAP oil exporters enjoyed large external and fiscal surpluses and rapid economic expansion on the back of booming oil prices. However, with oil prices plunging in recent years, surpluses have turned into deficits and growth has slowed, raising concerns about unemployment and financial risks. How should the region adjust to the new oil reality?

The oil price drop since mid-2014 has been spectacular: prices have fallen nearly 70 percent to about $40 a barrel. Futures markets anticipate oil prices to recover only modestly to $50 a barrel by the end of this decade, though much uncertainty surrounds this forecast (Figure 1). The weak price prospects reflect the expectation that global oil supply growth will moderate only slowly as Iran boosts its exports and other MENAP oil exporters maintain high output, at a time of sluggish global growth.

MENAP oil exporters declined by $390 billion in 2015 (17½ percent of GDP). Despite a partial offset from reduced imports owing to subdued prices of non-oil commodities, the combined current account of the GCC and Algeria has reversed from a comfortable surplus to a projected deficit of about 8 percent of GDP in 2016. The deficit of other MENAP oil exporters is projected to be 4¾ percent of GDP this year. The current account is expected to improve only gradually over the medium term, as the oil price recovers somewhat and fiscal adjustment unfolds.

Mirroring the large loss in export receipts, fiscal balances have deteriorated considerably (Figure 2). The ample surpluses of the GCC countries and Algeria have turned into significant deficits, projected to average 12¾ percent of GDP in 2016 and remain at 7 percent over the medium term, despite the implementation of sizable deficit-reduction measures. For other MENAP oil exporters—those generally less reliant on oil but with smaller fiscal buffers—the combined deficit is projected to average 7¾ percent of GDP in 2016, and gradually close by the end of the decade as oil output increases and conflicts are assumed to ease.

Large Revenue Losses

The outlook for lower oil prices implies weak oil revenues for years to come, dramatically reducing the capacity of governments to spend. Export receipts in 2014

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
95% Confidence interval
86% Confidence interval
68% Confidence interval
Brent futures

Sources: Bloomberg and IMF staff calculations.
1 Derived from prices of futures and options on March 2, 2016. The average price of oil in U.S. dollars a barrel was $59.79 in 2015; the assumed price based on futures markets is $34.75 in 2016 and $40.99 in 2017.

Figure 1
Brent Crude Oil (U.S. dollars a barrel)

Figure 2
Overall Fiscal Balance (Percent of GDP)

Sources: National authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Libya excluded from Other MENAP Oil Exporters.
Policy Adjustment Underway

For most MENAP oil exporters, the fiscal adjustment needed to absorb the oil price shock is unprecedented. Last year, many countries adopted significant deficit-reduction measures, while drawing down financial buffers, where available, or borrowing to smooth the adjustment to lower oil prices. This year’s budgets suggest that policy effort will only intensify (Figure 3).

The bulk of this adjustment has so far comprised spending cuts; however, new sources of revenue are also being considered. Algeria, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and, to a lesser extent, Oman have focused on capital spending cuts. Current spending reductions are an important part of the adjustment process in Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar. New revenue measures are being taken in Oman (an increase in the corporate income tax), Bahrain (tobacco and alcohol taxes), and Iran (reduced exemptions and better tax administration). The GCC is planning to introduce a VAT in the coming years.

![Figure 3: Fiscal Consolidation Measures, 2015–16](Image)

Significantly, many MENAP oil exporters have initiated substantial energy price reforms in response to lower oil prices. In the GCC, most countries have raised fuel, water, and electricity charges, with some announcing further increases in the coming years. Oman and the United Arab Emirates have introduced automatic pricing mechanisms. Outside the GCC, Algeria recently hiked fuel, electricity, and natural gas prices, and Iran increased fuel prices. Still, local energy prices remain well below global benchmarks in most countries (Figure 4). To minimize the impact of these reforms on vulnerable income groups, targeted support schemes should be strengthened.

![Figure 4: Premium Gasoline Prices](Image)

In tandem with the fiscal adjustment, Algeria and Iran have allowed their currencies to depreciate. This has boosted local currency budget revenues from oil exports, but the fiscal gains will only last if expenditures, particularly the public wage bill, do not rise in response to depreciation. The GCC countries have maintained their long-standing pegs, underpinned by substantial net foreign assets. Pressures on these pegs in forward currency markets have increased in recent months, although the forward markets are relatively illiquid and most GCC countries have significant buffers.

Further Fiscal Policy Action Needed

Despite the announced policy measures, medium-term fiscal positions remain challenging given the expectation of oil prices remaining low (Figure 2). The cumulative fiscal deficits of the GCC and Algeria are projected at almost $900 billion during 2016-21. Algeria, Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia will become significant debtors over this period as their
financing needs are expected to exceed their current liquid financial buffers. The budgets of almost all non-GCC countries are also projected to remain in deficit by the end of the decade.

Further saving measures are needed over the medium term to restore fiscal sustainability, rebuild buffers, and save sufficiently for future generations. In the GCC, ambitious fiscal consolidation is also required to support the fixed exchange rate regimes. The timing and composition of these policy measures should be designed to minimize the short-term impact on growth, while enhancing equity and medium-term growth prospects. Structural policies (see below) can complement fiscal adjustment efforts.

Large fiscal adjustment will inevitably entail difficult choices, including rethinking the role and size of the public sector and modifying the social contract. There is room to cut public spending, which ballooned during the oil price boom, and to raise new revenues. On average, the GCC countries spend twice as much on their public wage bills as other emerging market and developing countries, and almost 50 percent more on public investment as a share of GDP. Further energy price reforms could save some 1½ percent of GDP. Revenue efforts should focus on designing broad-based tax systems. For example, introducing a 5 percent VAT could raise about 1½ percent of GDP.¹

Deficits are being financed with asset drawdowns and debt issuance. After the significant withdrawals of financial savings last year, some countries may issue more debt this year. Policymakers need to strike a balance between drawing down buffers, issuing domestic debt—thus helping to develop domestic capital markets, but potentially crowding out private investment—and borrowing abroad. Yet with lower oil prices and rising U.S. interest rates, funding costs have risen. A number of sovereign credit ratings have been downgraded. CDS spreads have widened, but remain well below the peaks of the global financial crisis.


Sharp Worsening in Growth Prospects

The slump in oil prices is straining growth prospects of MENAP oil exporters. With oil prices lower and fiscal policy tighter, growth projections for almost all MENAP oil exporters have been revised down significantly since last October. In particular, in the GCC and Algeria, growth is now expected to slow more sharply because of tighter fiscal policy, weaker private sector confidence, and lower liquidity in the banking system (Figure 5).

Nonetheless, increased oil production and non-oil economic activity in postsanctions Iran,² and the projected bottoming out of activity in Libya and Yemen with the assumption of conflicts gradually easing, are projected to raise the aggregate growth rate of MENAP oil exporters to 2.9 percent in 2016 and 3.1 percent in 2017 from 1.9 percent last year.

With oil prices projected to remain low and fiscal tightening expected to weigh on economic activity, medium-term growth forecasts have been revised down in most countries. Non-oil growth in the GCC is

² For more details on the economic effects of easing sanctions on Iran, see the October 2015 REO, available at www.imf.org.
now projected at 3¼ percent over the next five years—well below the 7¼ percent in 2006–15.

Risks Are Tilted to the Downside

Risks to this outlook are mainly to the downside. Planned fiscal deficit-reduction measures could exert a larger-than-expected drag on growth, especially given tightening financial conditions. In some countries, the fiscal consolidation implemented so far has not yet been sufficient to restore fiscal sustainability, potentially reducing confidence and increasing uncertainty. The recent increase in oil prices could result in some improvement. However, in view of the persistent excess in global oil supply over demand, a further drop in prices cannot be ruled out, especially in the case of a further slowdown in China’s growth. Another risk relates to regional conflicts, which could become more protracted, disrupting economic activity. A faster-than-anticipated increase in U.S. interest rates would further raise external borrowing costs and feed into higher domestic interest rates.

Domestic financial risks are also on the rise. Amid worsening fiscal balances and slowing economic activity, public and private sector bank deposit growth has stalled, reducing liquidity in the financial system (Figure 6). Meanwhile, policymakers in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have hiked policy rates after the Fed’s interest rate increase in December 2015. These developments will moderate private sector credit growth. Authorities have eased liquidity pressures by increasing loan-to-deposit ratios (Saudi Arabia), cancelling T-bill auctions (Qatar), and preparing to reactivate central bank lending facilities (Algeria). Bank asset quality may deteriorate as the non-oil economy slows, eroding bank profitability, although capital buffers generally remain strong.

Greater risks call for enhancing financial surveillance and policies. Priorities include the design and implementation of policies for effective monitoring and management of liquidity, operationalizing central bank lending facilities, developing appropriate collateral regimes, and enhancing public debt management strategies. Given the increased cross-border activities of banks, enhanced cooperation between home and host supervisors is needed.

![Figure 6: Deposit Growth in GCC and Algeria (Percentage change, y-o-y)](chart)

Urgent Need to Reduce Oil Dependence

With medium-term growth prospects weakening significantly as a result of the slump in oil prices, the need to reduce oil dependence has become even more critical. The current growth model based on the redistribution of resources by the government is no longer sustainable, given the fiscal retrenchment and a rapidly growing labor force. In light of budget pressures, the public sector will not be able to absorb all the new labor market entrants.

Hence, a deepening of structural reforms is essential to promote diversification and non-oil sector growth in order to create jobs for the growing workforce. Job creation and growth in the oil-exporting countries in the region will also have important positive spillovers for trading partners, who will benefit from higher trade and remittances. Reform priorities include further improvements in the business environment, a reduction in the public-private sector wage gap, and education and skills becoming more aligned to market needs. Privatization of state-owned enterprises would increase productivity and efficiency—Oman and Saudi Arabia, for example, have indicated plans to privatize selected state assets.

Iran’s post-sanctions growth dividend, meanwhile, depends crucially on the implementation of much-needed domestic reforms. In conflict countries (Iraq, Libya, Yemen), improving security is a prerequisite for further development and diversification (Box 1).

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3 For more details on diversification in the GCC, see Cherif, R., F. Hasanov, and M. Zhu (2016) “Breaking the Oil Spell: the Gulf Falcons’ Path to Diversification.”
MENAP Oil-Importing Countries: Gradual but Uneven Economic Recovery

Economic Activity Trending Up

Since the onset of political transitions in 2011, MENAP oil importers have struggled to meet the public’s demands for higher living standards and better access to business opportunities and jobs. Recent reforms have helped preserve macroeconomic stability. Yet, unemployment remains high at 10 percent, especially among the young (25 percent). Thus, strengthening economic growth and making it more inclusive remains a high priority.

The recent pick-up in economic activity in some countries is a start. Growth averaged 3¼ percent in 2015, compared to 3 percent over 2011–14 (Figure 7). Lower oil prices, less drag from fiscal consolidation, and improved confidence owing to progress with recent reforms—including reforms to reduce fiscal deficits and improve the business environment (Morocco, Pakistan)—supported the recovery, helping to counteract the negative impact of rising security risks and spillovers from regional conflicts—including large inflows of refugees (Box 1) and trade disruptions—as well as slower growth in the oil-exporting trading partners (the GCC).

In 2016–17, growth is expected to remain, on average, near 4 percent. Investment growth is gradually strengthening, mainly because recent subsidy reforms and lower oil prices have increased room for public infrastructure spending. Consumption is growing steadily, supported mainly by large public sector wage bills. Savings from lower oil prices—following energy subsidy reforms, most countries now pass through changes in global oil prices to domestic retail fuel prices (Figure 8)—are also supporting consumption, offsetting slowing remittances due to lower flows and currency appreciation against the euro. Continued security risks and spillovers from conflicts, meanwhile, still weigh on domestic demand.

The pick-up in economic activity is proceeding unevenly. In 2015, Mauritania’s exports slowed due to lower iron ore prices and weaker demand from China. In Tunisia, heightened security threats hampered confidence and tourism. Spillovers from Syria’s conflict hurt confidence in Jordan and exacerbated the difficulties in
Lebanon from the domestic political impasse and lack of structural reforms. In Egypt, growth is being held back by concerns over security and rising external vulnerabilities (see below). Economic activity is also expected to slow in Morocco, reflecting lower agricultural production.

External positions are weakening because of slowing exports and remittances but are being supported by lower energy import bills. Exports of goods are declining—mainly to the euro area and China (35 percent and 5 percent of the region’s exports, respectively) (Figure 9). Against a backdrop of stable demand from the region’s main export markets, this reflects an erosion of cost-competitiveness (evidenced by appreciating real exchange rates), which, along with heightened security concerns, has also reduced tourist receipts from the euro area. Declining remittances add to these pressures. In

2016, the region’s current account deficit is projected to remain unchanged for a third straight year (at 4½ percent of GDP). Yet the drop in imports (mainly energy products), supported by stable financial flows, is set to raise reserve coverage by 1 month of imports to 6¾.

In some cases, international reserve coverage is very low. In Egypt, where the current account is worsening from near balance in 2014 to a projected 5¼ percent of GDP deficit in 2016, reserve coverage is at 3 months of imports. Against this backdrop, the depreciation of the currency, by 13 percent against the U.S. dollar in March 2016, is a welcome development. In Sudan, limited access to external financing and de-risking by international banks have complicated the policy adjustment and kept international reserves low.

**Sharply Declining Inflation**

Continuing a sharp decline that began in mid-2014, inflation is projected to fall to 6 percent this year—a 1 percentage point drop from last year and a 3½ percentage point decline since 2014. Among other factors, lower food and energy prices (where pass-through has been allowed) and currency appreciation against the main import partners—China and the euro area (15 and 25 percent of imports, respectively)—are the main drivers. Continued energy subsidy phase-outs (including in electricity), monetization of fiscal deficits, and, in some cases, exchange rate depreciation are preventing a faster decline in inflation.

**Downside Risks Dominate**

The economic outlook is subject to significant downside risks. A worsening in security conditions or social tensions, reform fatigue, or increased spillovers from regional conflicts could derail policy implementation and weaken economic activity. Downside external risks have also risen since last October. Tighter and more volatile global financial conditions—arising from movement in the U.S. interest rate and recent turbulence in global financial markets—could raise external borrowing costs, feed into domestic interest rates, and slow capital inflows. Weaker growth in China could reduce infrastructure financing (Egypt, Pakistan) and put further pressures on commodity prices—weakening international reserves in commodity exporters (especially Mauritania). Weaker growth in the GCC could dampen remittances, tourism, exports, investment, and official financial
support. Weaker growth in the euro area and/or emerging markets would have similar effects. On the upside, a faster improvement in domestic confidence in response to ongoing reforms may bolster growth.

**Fiscal Positions Improving Yet Still Vulnerable**

Concerted fiscal efforts, together with lower oil prices, have reduced fiscal deficits. The region’s average deficit is expected to fall to 6½ percent of GDP in 2016 from a 2013 peak of 9½ percent. This improvement is mainly due to subsidy reforms (Figure 10). Where reforms are yet to be completed (Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia), low oil prices have reduced energy subsidy bills. In some cases, low oil prices have also improved the balance sheets of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—especially in electricity (Jordan, Pakistan)—reducing their borrowing from the banking system and arrears. To lower the adverse impact of fiscal consolidation on growth and stimulate job creation, some savings from lower energy subsidies are being channeled toward infrastructure, health, and education spending, as well as targeted social assistance and wage bills (Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, Tunisia).

Spending pressures are mounting with the need to address social tensions and the rising costs of basic public services, in part owing to growing numbers of refugees (Jordan, Lebanon). Tax revenues are suffering from lower ad valorem fuel tax revenues (Jordan) and weak collection.

This year, revenues are expected to rise with the elimination of exemptions (Pakistan), a reduction in tax loopholes, income tax reforms (Jordan), higher excises, and strengthened administration. Many of these revenue reforms, however, are yet to be implemented and unexpected shocks or lower growth could undermine these efforts. Financial assistance from GCC countries is also expected to slow in line with their economies.

Despite recent stabilization, public debt ratios remain high, especially in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon where they range between 90 and 145 percent of GDP (Figure 11). These large ratios undermine investor confidence, particularly in a volatile global financial market environment, raising debt servicing costs and financing needs. High public sector loan concentrations, absent deeper financial markets, could pose risks to the stability of the banking sector, which has remained liquid, capitalized, and profitable, despite a recent rise in non-performing loans stemming from weak economic activity.

Against a backdrop of high spending pressures and downside risks to growth, maintaining progress with fiscal consolidation is a challenge.

To put debt on a sustainable path, continued fiscal consolidation is needed. Revenue measures
targeting the higher income segments of the population and more efficient tax collection—such as moving to a technology-based system—can advance fiscal consolidation with a smaller impact on growth than spending measures. Low oil prices provide an opportunity to complete on-budget energy subsidy reforms and reduce the losses of energy SOEs by advancing automatic pricing. The current sociopolitical environment makes shrinking large public wage bills difficult, but they could be contained through civil service and pension reforms that free resources for basic services and infrastructure, stimulating private sector growth and creating several times the job opportunities that can be found in the public sector. Improved financial management can raise efficiency. Where vulnerabilities are high, fiscal gains should be saved to build buffers against future adverse shocks. Where buffers are already strong, part of the gains could be used to increase growth-enhancing spending, which would also create jobs. Greater exchange rate flexibility would support fiscal consolidation by partly absorbing external shocks and would improve external positions by strengthening competitiveness.

Creating Jobs and Raising Living Standards

Besides macroeconomic stability, much higher, and more inclusive, economic growth is needed to create jobs and improve living standards. Targeted structural reforms are key to boosting growth.\(^1\) The cost of doing business, as well as supply-side bottlenecks—which hold back productivity—can be reduced through better protection of investor rights, more efficient and better quality infrastructure, and regulatory reform. Raising labor market efficiency and matching education to private sector needs are both critical to reducing unemployment and increasing worker productivity. Greater coverage of credit bureaus would facilitate access to finance. And increased trade openness can enable countries to join job-creating global manufacturing supply chains.

Box 1. A Roadmap for Countries to Emerge From Conflicts

Violent conflicts continue to batter the MENAP region. Their humanitarian cost is immense. The United Nations (UN) estimates that the conflict in Syria alone has killed as many as 250,000 people, with many millions more displaced. Between October 2015 and March 2016, more than 600,000 people fled the country, bringing the total number of Syrian refugees to almost 5 million. During the same period, violent non-state actors carried out more than 30 attacks on civilians in the region (outside Syria), killing more than 800 people and wounding hundreds more. These groups were also responsible for attacks worldwide.

The massive costs in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen continue to mount. Intense violence has caused a scarcity of food and other necessities, damaged infrastructure and institutions, driven up inflation, hurt savings, and worsened fiscal and external positions. The economic impact has been sizable. Due to the protracted conflict, Syria’s GDP today is less than half of what it was before the war, while Yemen’s real GDP per capita is estimated to have contracted by more than 40 percent since 2010. By curtailing and diverting resources away from much-needed social spending and transfers, as well as from capital spending, conflicts undermine countries’ economic prospects.

Other countries in the region have suffered significant spillovers. The task of hosting large refugee populations has put enormous pressure on government budgets, public infrastructure, and services. Worsened security and confidence have also weighed on trade, investment, and tourism, weakening growth. The World Bank estimates that the conflict in Syria has lowered Lebanon’s real GDP growth by almost 3 percentage points every year since it started, and that the worsening of the crisis in Syria and Iraq in 2015 also had a negative impact on economic growth in Jordan. Conflicts also continue to diminish the willingness of countries in the region to undertake necessary, though politically difficult, economic reforms.

Countries in the region have been adapting to their circumstances in a number of ways. For example, Lebanese traders who suffered a drop in demand from Syria have since found new export markets.

In cooperation with the UN and other relief agencies, countries hosting refugees have developed plans to respond to the needs of refugees and host communities, such as through the provision of temporary employment subsidies, expanding the enrollment of refugees in schooling, supporting local authorities to provide public services, and various infrastructure projects.1

Given the mounting costs of conflicts, the international community needs to scale up and better coordinate its support. In addition to humanitarian assistance, developmental assistance should entail long-term support to rebuild infrastructure in conflict countries, and to strengthen resilience across the region. There are large financing needs, with host countries requiring additional financing to fund crisis-related projects. Aid agencies, meanwhile, are suffering from funding gaps. The international community has started to recognize these needs. The February 2016 London Supporting Syria and the Region conference, for example, led to commitments to step up financial support for refugees and host communities. It is now imperative that these pledges are translated into on-the-ground support in a timely and effective manner.

1 Rother and others (forthcoming) “The Economic Impact of Conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa Region: Macroeconomic Effects, Policy Implications, and the Role of the IMF.”
### MENAP Region: Selected Economic Indicators, 2000–17

*(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)*

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<td>Overall Fiscal Balance</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
<td>-9.4</td>
<td>-7.7</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
<td>-6.6</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation, p.a. (annual growth)</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arab World</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP (annual growth)</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Account Balance</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>-8.6</td>
<td>-6.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Fiscal Balance</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-11.2</td>
<td>-12.7</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation, p.a. (annual growth)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: National authorities; and IMF staff calculations and projections.

12011–17 data exclude Syrian Arab Republic.

Notes: Data refer to the fiscal year for the following countries: Afghanistan (March 21/March 20) until 2011, and December 21/December 20 thereafter, Iran (March 21/March 20), and Egypt and Pakistan (July/June).

MENAP oil exporters: Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

GCC countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.

Non-GCC oil exporters: Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen.

MENAP oil importers: Afghanistan, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Sudan, Syria, and Tunisia.

Arab World: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisa, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.