

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

May 14, 2013

2013 REVIEW OF THE FUND'S TRANSPARENCY POLICY—BACKGROUND PAPER

MAIN FINDINGS

Key Trends

- Publication rates have risen since the last review, averaging around 90 percent for country reports and policy papers. However, the share of published FSSAs is low and volatile, and the proportion of published UFR reports has fallen in the past couple of years.
- Nearly half of the Fund members now allow all documents to be published, a more than two-fold increase since 2006–08, but a smaller though still significant group of countries do not permit the publication of staff reports.
- Average publication lags have fallen, reaching 35 days in 2009–12 for Article IV/UFR cases compared with 42 days in 2006–08. Average publication lags are higher in emerging markets (EMs) (36 days) than in advanced markets (AMs) (nine days), and marginally higher in low-income countries (LICs) (42 days). However, a significant number of reports are published with considerably longer delays.
- Modification rates have risen significantly during the crisis. AMs account for the highest share of both corrections and deletions, although individual countries with the highest modification rates include several EMs and LICs.

Analysis of Modifications

 An in-depth analysis of samples of deletions and corrections points to a significant reduction in the share of cases in the "gray zone" where modifications do not fully comply with Fund rules. Staff assesses that around 5 percent of deletions and 10 percent of corrections on account of evident ambiguity fall into this "gray zone" category.

Views of Civil Society Organizations

Civil Society Organizations provided a number of recommendations on the IMF's
transparency policy. In particular, they called on the Fund to emulate other IFIs in terms
of publication and information disclosure, to allow broader involvement in staff policy
papers before they are presented to the Executive Board, increase transparency on the
Fund's decision-making and improve the clarity of communications.

Stakeholder Surveys

Survey respondents were generally positive about the reforms undertaken in 2009, and
the responses indicate that publication intentions have not been dented by the crisis. The
major concern of Executive Directors and country authorities was a perceived lack of
evenhandedness in the implementation of the policy, with a number of respondents
expressing concern at the high rate of modifications for reports on AMs. In some regions,
particularly in the Middle East, there were worries about the treatment of confidential
information.

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
I. KEY TRENDS¹

Publication trends have broadly improved since the introduction in 2009 of the "transparency principle" and changes in the way that members consent to publication. The share of published staff reports has increased somewhat, to above 90 percent on average, all countries have published at least one of the documents considered by the Board in 2009–12, and publication lags have declined or stabilized in all regions except in the Middle East. Nevertheless, publication rates for Financial Sector Stability Assessments (FSSAs) remain low, modification rates have increased since the crisis, particularly for advanced markets (AMs), and there has been a reduction in the publication of program documents in recent years.

A. Publication Rates and Lags

1. The introduction of the transparency principle in 2009 and earlier progressive extension of the "voluntary but presumed" publication regime to a greater range of documents appear to have helped raise the publication rates of country reports. On average, 92 percent of country reports (Article IV, UFR, or combined) were published in 2009–12 compared

with 85 percent prior to the last review. Nevertheless, this upward trend is not uniform for all country reports during 2009–12: the publication rate for standalone Article IVs has edged upwards towards the 90 percent level, whereas the rate for UFR cases has fallen back from the 95–100 percent rates achieved in 2009–10. The latter reflects the heavy incidence of exceptional access cases at the peak of the crisis² (Table 1b) and more recently the non-publication of a



few mainly low-income country (LIC) program cases (see Table 11 and discussion below).³

2. However, certain country reports exhibit volatile publication rates. For instance, the extension of the "voluntary but presumed" publication regime to FSSAs appears not to have delivered a meaningful increase in their publication rates, which continue to fluctuate in the

³ In this chapter, the term low-income country (LIC) is used to describe countries referred to in the tables as "developing countries".





¹ Prepared by Sarah Kwon and Nicolas Million (SPR).

² The Managing Director will generally not recommend the approval of a request or completion of a review for exceptional access cases and flexible credit lines (FCLs) unless the member consents to the publication of the associated staff report. There were 10 such requests in 2009, and 6 per year in 2010, 2011, and 2012.

65-85 percent range.⁴ This may be partly due to the sensitivity of information in FSSAs, particularly at a time of a financial crisis. Moreover, the share of published ROSCs has fallen to just under 50 percent, compared with 80 percent before 2009.

- **Publication rates for policy papers have edged higher.** The share of published policy papers has increased from 84 percent in 2006–08 to 89 percent in 2009–12, peaking at 98 percent in 2012. Unpublished policy papers are mainly those pertaining to the Fund's finances.
- 4. The differences in publication rates across country groupings have narrowed, with emerging markets (EMs) and low-income countries (LICs) starting to catch up with advanced markets (AMs) (Table 2a):
- As was the case in 2006–08, all Article IV and UFR staff reports for AMs as well as EMs in Central and Eastern Europe continue to be published. Publication rates for both EMs and LICs have each risen by around 5 percentage points to average around 90 percent during 2009–12.
- Among EMs and LICs, publication rates in Africa and the CIS have remained at or in excess of 90 percent, and rates for Asia have climbed steadily. Publication rates are lower in the Middle East and Western Hemisphere, and in the latter case edged downwards in 2012.





⁴ Until 2010, the publication of FSSAs was merely voluntary.

⁵ These figures consider only policy papers for which there is a presumption of publication. The publication rate in 2009–12 was 85 percent based on a wider sample including all policy papers.


- **5.** The number of countries permitting publication of all their country documents has increased steadily.⁶ In 2012, nearly half the membership allowed all their documents to be published, more than double the rate in 2006–08 (Table 8), and all members published at least some of the country documents considered by the Board in 2009–12 (Table 12). Five members (Brunei Darussalam Eritrea, Oman, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) did not authorize publication of their staff reports during 2009–12, of which three (Oman, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) are among the 25 countries that require explicit consent to publication and have not yet agreed to provide consent on a non-objection basis.⁷
- 6. The number of non-publishers of Article IVs has been stable whereas the number of countries not permitting the publication of UFR staff reports has increased since 2009.

In 2011–12, some 10 countries did not publish their Article IVs (Table 10), but two large economies—Saudi Arabia and Brazil—permitted the publication of their Article IVs for the first time, in 2011 and 2012 respectively (Table 6). In 2009, only two countries did not publish all staff reports relating to Fund-supported programs, compared with four such countries in 2012 (Table 11). In recent years non-publishers have been concentrated in Africa, the Middle East and the Caribbean.

Publication lags

7. Publication lags have decreased since the last review (Table 3a and 3b). The average lag

for Article IV, UFR, and combined reports fell from 42 days in 2006–08 to 32 days in 2012, and for FSSAs, from around 80 days to below 20 days. The declining trend in average lags for UFR staff reports was reversed in 2012 because of an uptick in the number of cases that were published more than 100 days after the Board meeting. Meanwhile, a small but growing number of reports is being published the day of the Board meeting, and the longest lag has declined from 615 days to 401 days



(Table 14); in 2012 only six reports were published with delays in excess of 150 days.

⁶ Country documents considered here are: staff reports, PINs, UFR/PSI Chairman's Statements, Selected Issues, Statistical Appendices, Informational Annexes, Background Documents, Authorities' Statements, and HIPC documents.

⁷ See Tables 9 and 13.


⁸ The average publication lag for FSSAs spiked upwards in 2009 because of two outliers Romania and Mozambique.


⁹ These included Comoros (238 days), Djibouti (169 days) and Jordan (Request for a Stand-by Arrangement; 146 days).


¹⁰ Countries whose staff reports were published on the same day as their Board meetings included Greece, Italy, Jordan (2010 Article IV), Mexico, New Zealand, and Poland.

8. The declining average lag masks significant differences between country income groups, as well as a number of outliers with extremely long publication lags (Table 3a):

- AMs continue to have the shortest publication lags, averaging 9 days in 2009–12, with 90 percent of reports published within 20 days.
 Only three reports on AMs were published 20 or more days after the Board meeting.¹¹
- Lags for EMs remain longer, averaging 36 days in 2009–12.
 Although 75 percent of reports were published within 50 days, the most delayed 10 percent of reports were published between 80 and 224 days after the Board meeting.
- **LICs** exhibit the longest average lags of 42 days in 2009–12, although this represents a decline of 6 days relative to 2006-08. Longer average lags in LICs reflect capacity constraints, and in some cases the need to translate reports into languages other than English. This average lag masks significant differences across countries: while just over 50 percent of reports are published within 30 days, the 10 percent of reports with the longest lags are published between 90 and 158 days after the Board meeting.







 $^{^{\}rm 11}$ The longest average lag among AMs is 23 days for Czech Republic.


- **9.** Among EMs and LICs, publication lags continue to vary widely across regions.¹² Countries in Central and Eastern Europe have the shortest average lag (22 days in 2009–12, a decline since 2006–08), while the longest lags are concentrated in the Middle East and Western Hemisphere countries (Table 3a). Lags have fallen in most regions except in the Middle East, reflecting challenging developments in Arab countries in transition, and Asia.
- 10. Publication lags reflect common factors and country-specific features. The main crosscutting reason is staff's reluctance to enforce the presumption of publication. Under the policy, consent to publication of country documents is obtained on a "non-objection" basis, and documents should be published "promptly" after the meeting or adoption of the LOT decision, unless the member has notified the Fund that it objects to publication, requires more time to decide, or seeks some modifications before publication. In practice, however, staff continues to seek the authorities' explicit consent for publication, leading to publication delays. Differences across regions likely reflect capacity constraints and the need to translate documents in some cases.

B. Modifications

Deletions

- 11. The incidence of deletions to published staff reports has risen sharply since the last review (Table 4a). In 2009–12, deletions occurred in some 21 percent of published staff reports, compared with around 10 percent before the last review. This has been driven by a significant jump in the rate of deletion of financial sector issues, which rose from 4 percent during 2006–08 to some 12 percent of total deletions during 2009–12. This reflects not only the sensitivity of financial sector issues during the crisis, but also longer-term attempts by Fund staff to provide more in depth coverage of financial sector issues. By contrast, the other major theme of deletions— exchange rate issues—has remained around the pre-crisis level of 6 percent.
- **12. Deletion rates have become tilted towards AMs (see text table).** During 2009–12, the deletion rate for AMs averaged around 35 percent, outstripping EMs (24 percent) and LICs (11 percent). This represents a change from the past, when EMs had consistently recorded the highest deletion rates. The rate of deletions to stand-alone UFR documents for AMs is much higher than the rate for EMs, but falls to zero if Greece, Ireland and Portugal are excluded.

¹² The main contributors to the reduction in publication lags are Dominica and Haiti in WHD, Liberia, Lesotho and Kenya in AFR and Czech Republic, Belarus, Spain, Macedonia, Romania and Poland in EUR.



Incidence of Deletions (2009-2012)

	NIf	
	No. of	
	Published	% with
Stand-alone Article IV	Reports	deletions
AM	113	19
EM	166	19
LIC	72	11
Stand-alone UFR		
AM	26	58
EM	124	18
LIC	160	10

13. The increase in deletion rates in AM reports is largely explained by the impact of

Fund-supported programs for euro area countries and the greater coverage of financial-sector issues in staff reports for these countries. During 2009–12, the majority of deletions made to reports of AMs were related to banking or financial sector issues, while deletions for EMs and LICs are more widely dispersed across six major areas. Deletions for countries with fixed or crawling pegged exchange rates have also increased since 2009, reflecting more in-depth and candid exchange rate analysis. For these regimes, the deletions rate rose from some 8 percent in 2009 to 21 percent in 2011 (Table 4b).

Reports with the Largest Number of Deletions in 2012

- 1 Antigua and Barbuda (4th, 5th and 6th Reviews under the SBA)
- 2= Spain (2012 Art IV)
- 2= Jordan (Request for a SBA)
- 2= Zambia (2012 Art IV)
- 5= Macedonia (2011 Art IV)
- 5= Armenia (2012 Art IV & 5th reviews under the EFF and under the ECF)
- 7 Korea (2012 Art IV)
- 8= Tunisia (FSSA)
- 8= Sri Lanka (8th Review under the SBA)
- 8= Nicaragua (2012 Art IV)
- 8= St. Kitts and Nevis (5th review under the SBA
- 8= Antigua and Barbuda (2012 Art IV & 7th review under the SBA)
- 13= Japan (FSSA)
- 13= St. Kitts and Nevis
- 13= Belarus (2012 Art IV & 2nd PPM)
- 13= San Marino (2012 Art IV)
- 13= Israel (FSSA)
- 13= Jamaica (2012 Art IC)
- 19= Armenia (4th reviews under the EFF and ECF)
- 19= Spain (FSSA)

Corrections

14. Around 65 percent of published staff reports were subject to corrections in 2009–12 (Table 5a), a ten percentage point increase since the last review. The incidence is even more heavily tilted towards AMs than is the case for deletions, with 92 percent of reports on AMs subject to corrections, compared with 68 percent for EMs and 48 percent for LICs. Reports on AMs also account for just over half of the country documents with the highest number of corrections, with a number of EMs also appearing in the top 20. Traditional explanations for the greater incidence of corrections to reports on AMs have been their greater familiarity with the IMF's rules on corrections and the fact that the Fund's relationships with AMs is more likely to be surveillance, implying less frequent contact. Conversely, the greater incidence of Fund arrangements among EMs and LICs implies closer engagement with Fund staff, potentially reducing the need for corrections. Staff

believes these traditional explanations remain broadly valid, even though there are some counter-examples among the countries that request the largest number of deletions. The increase in the rate of corrections was already evident in 2009, and so pre-dates the introduction of the possibility of corrections on account of evident ambiguity.

Reports with the Largest Number of Corrections in 2012

- 1 Turkey (2012 Art IV)
- 2 Korea (2012 Art IV)
- 3 Japan (FSSA)
- 4= Mexico (2012 Art IV)
- 4= France (2012 Art IV)
- 6 Australia (FSSA)
- 7= Sweden (2012 Art IV)
- 7= United Kingdom (2012 Art IV)
- 9 Ireland (2012 Art IV)
- 10= Jordan (Request for SBA)
- 10= Australia (2012 Art IV)
- 10= Ireland (8th Review under EA)
- 13 Ireland (6th Review under EA)
- 14 Russia (2012 Art IV)
- 15 Hungary (2012 Art IV and 2nd PPM)
- 16 Fiji (2012 Art IV)
- 17 India (FSSA)
- 18= Ireland (5th Review Under the EA)
- 18= Spain (2012 Art IV)
- 20 Morocco (Request for an Arrangement Under the PLL)

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^{1/} Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006 - 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.

^{2/} Data include documents issued for the information of the Board and documents sent to the Board for consideration on lapse-of-time basis.

^{3/} Includes initial ROSC assessments and reassessments produced by the IMF, as well as the World Bank and, in the case of AML/CFT ROSCs, by FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRB), issued on a stand-alone basis or in FSSAs. Does not include assessments done under detailed standards assessments. Completions and publications for the three standards led by the World Bank are updated as of February 28, 2009.

^{4/} Publication rate of PINs is expressed as a share of the number of relevant Article IV Board discussions; by definition, 100 percent of PINs are published.

^{5/} Does not include authorities' statements that are included in ROSCs. Includes Executive Directors' Statements and "right of reply" documents.

^{6/} Includes LOIs/MEFPs and TMUs issued in the context of SMPs and PSIs.

^{7/} Only includes policy papers for which publication is presumed under the Transparency Policy. Data collection started in January 2002.

Table 1b. Trends in Publication Rates (2009–12)^{1/2/}

	20	009	20	010	20)11	20)12
Type of Report	Reports discussed	Published (percent)	Reports discussed	Published (percent)	Reports discussed	Published (percent)	Reports discussed	Published (percent)
Staff Reports	231	94	251	93	227	91	221	90
Article IV, UFR, or Combined	208	94	222	92	204	91	189	93
Stand-alone Article IV	94	88	105	87	100	90	97	90
Article IV combined with UFR, PPM, SMP, EPA, PSI	26	100	29	100	22	91	26	100
Stand-alone UFR	88	98	88	97	82	93	66	94
Stand-alone PPM, SMP, EPA, PSI	12	92	7	100	17	88	16	75
Joint Staff Advisory Note	7	100	11	91	6	100	12	67
HIPC Country Papers	4	100	11	100	0	n/a	4	100
Selected Issues/Statistical Annexes	57	82	46	74	56	84	46	87
FSSAs	16	69	15	67	22	82	17	65
ROSCs 3/	67	45	64	38	66	53	52	52
Article IV Public Information Notices (PINs) 4/	118	99	132	98	121	98	100	99
UFR and PSI Chairman's statements	113	100	118	100	127	94	81	100
Authorities' statements ^{5/}	194	79	177	80	168	90	160	77
Country Policy Intention Documents	258	100	291	97	254	98	275	99
LOIs/MEFPs ^{6/}	165	100	177	97	152	98	192	100
TMUs ^{6/}	85	100	93	97	83	98	66	100
PRSPs, I-PRSPs, and related reports	8	100	21	95	19	100	17	82
All Policy Papers	54	91	63	75	68	87	46	91
Policy Papers that are presumed to be published ^{7/}	54	91	56	84	65	91	43	98

^{1/} Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006 - 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.

^{2/} Data include documents issued for the information of the Board and documents sent to the Board for consideration on lapse-of-time basis.

^{3/} Includes initial ROSC assessments and reassessments produced by the IMF, as well as the World Bank and, in the case of AML/CFT ROSCs, by FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRB), issued on a stand-alone basis or in FSSAs. Does not include assessments done under detailed standards assessments. Completions and publications for the three standards led by the World Bank are updated as of February 28, 2009.

^{4/} Publication rate of PINs is expressed as a share of the number of relevant Article IV Board discussions; by definition, 100 percent of PINs are published.

^{5/} Does not include authorities' statements that are included in ROSCs. Includes Executive Directors' Statements and "right of reply" documents.

^{6/} Includes LOIs/MEFPs and TMUs issued in the context of SMPs and PSIs.

^{7/} Only includes policy papers for which publication is presumed under the Transparency Policy. Data collection started in January 2002.

Table 2a. Trends in Publication Rates for Article and UFR Staff Reports (2003–12)^{1/}

(by economic and regional characteristics)

	2003	- 2005	2006	- 2008	2009	- 2012
_	Reports	Published	Reports	Published	Reports	Published
Reports by group	discussed	(percent)	discussed	(percent)	discussed	(percent)
Article IV, UFR, or Combined staff reports	598	83	547	88	823	92
Advanced markets	75	100	70	100	144	100
Emerging markets	150	77	112	84	361	90
Developing countries	373	83	365	87	318	92
Emerging market and developing countries ^{2/}	523	81	477	86	679	91
Africa	167	89	172	92	211	94
Asia	76	68	71	82	112	89
Central and Eastern Europe	68	93	52	100	77	100
CIS and Mongolia	47	91	46	91	72	93
Middle East	33	52	40	75	67	82
Western Hemisphere	132	76	96	74	140	85

^{1/} Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006 - 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009. 2/ WEO definitions.

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Table 2b. Trends in Publication Rates for Article IV and UFR Staff Reports (2009–12)^{1/}

(by economic and regional characteristics)

	20	09	20	10	20)11	20	12	
-	Reports	Published	Reports	Published	Reports	Published	Reports	Published	
Reports by group	discussed	(percent)	discussed	(percent)	discussed	(percent)	discussed	(percent)	
Article IV, UFR, or Combined staff reports	208	94	222	92	204	91	189	93	
Advanced markets	28	100	37	100	43	100	36	100	
Emerging markets	92	91	101	90	72	86	96	91	
Developing countries	88	94	84	90	89	91	57	91	
Emerging market and developing countries ^{2/}	180	93	185	91	161	89	153	91	
Africa	57	96	53	94	51	94	50	92	
Asia	30	87	29	93	26	81	27	96	
Central and Eastern Europe	20	100	22	100	19	100	16	100	
CIS and Mongolia	21	95	20	90	15	93	16	94	
Middle East	15	87	20	85	14	71	18	83	
Western Hemisphere	37	89	41	83	36	86	26	81	

^{1/} Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006 · 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.

^{2/} WEO definitions.

Table 3a. Trends in Publication Lags (2003–12)^{1/2/}

(by type of reports, and by economic and regional characteristics)

		2003 -				2006 -	- 2008		2009 - 2012				
			percent with lag	percent with lag			percent with lag	percent with lag			percent with lag	percent with lag	
Reports by type and group	Number published	Average lag 4/	> 1 month	> 2 months	Number published	Average lag 4/	> 1 month	> 2 months	Number published	Average lag 4/	> 1 month	> 2 months	
Article IV and UFR staff reports	498	49	41	21	481	42	38	18	761	35	32	13	
Article IV	222	48	33	20	259	38	27	12	351	29	29	11	
Combined UFR	87 189	57 47	54 43	29 18	71 151	58 41	39 42	21 21	101 309	40 35	44 30	19 12	
Advanced markets	75	13	7	1	70	14	6	3	144	9	5	1	
Emerging markets	115	59	44	25	94	42	44	21	324	36	37	15	
Developing countries	308	54	48	24	317	48	44	20	293	42	39	16	
Emerging market and developing countries 3/	423	56	47	24	411	47	44	20	617	37	38	16	
Africa	148	54	58	29	158	46	50	18	199	42	41	16	
Asia	52	44	44	19	58	32	22	9	100	35	36	14	
Central and Eastern Europe	63	31	18	10	52	28	19	15	77	22	22	4	
CIS and Mongolia	43	28	28	9	42	32	38	7	67	27	27	10	
Middle East	17	41	53	24	30	30	40	10	55	46	47	22	
Western Hemisphere	100	94	58	36	71	90	69	51	119	49	46	24	
Selected other documents													
FSSAs	40	39	35	23	36	84	53	33	50	52	38	18	
Selected Issues/Statistical Annexes	301	46	43	23	281	52	44	21	168	25	24	7	
Article IV Public Information Notices (PINs) 5/	350	33	29	12	361	24	20	6	465	20	19	6	
UFR and PSI Chairman's statements	266	1	0	0	245	2	1	0	432	8	4	2	
Country Policy Intention Documents ^{6/}	470	31	29	17	413	24	20	12	738	39	27	11	
Policy papers ^{7/}	103	78	38	20	57	43	28	18	197	20	11	5	

^{1/} Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006 - 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.

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^{2/} Country-specific documents are published as soon as the final consent from the member country is received by the Fund, with technical delays typically not exceeding a couple of business days. Policy papers are published after authorization by the Board.

^{3/} WEO definitions.

^{4/} Number of calendar days.

^{5/} Publication rate of PINs is expressed as a share of the number of relevant Article IV Board discussions; by definition, 100percent of PINs are published.

^{6/} Includes LOIs/MEFPs/TMUs issued in the context of SMPs and PSIs.

^{7/} Only includes policy papers for which publication is presumed.

Table 3b. Trends in Publication Lags 1/2/

(by type of reports, and by economic and regional characteristics)

		20	009			20	010			20	011		2012			
Reports by type and group	Number published		percent with lag > 1 month	percent with lag > 2 months	Number published		percent with lag > 1 month		Number published	Average lag 4/	percent with lag > 1 month	percent with lag > 2 months	Number published	Average lag 4/	percent with lag > 1 month	percent with lag > 2 months
Article IV and UFR staff reports	195	42	41	15	205	36	31	15	186	28	22	9	175	32	33	12
Article IV	83	37	34	16	91	28	26	11	90	25	26	10	87	26	32	9
Combined	26	50	58	23	29	41	38	21	20	33	35	15	26	33	42	15
UFR	86	40	42	13	85	38	34	16	76	24	13	5	62	36	31	15
Advanced markets	28	12	7	4	37	5	3	0	43	8	5	0	36	5	6	0
Emerging markets	84	46	42	18	91	46	36	19	62	24	29	8	87	34	38	15
Developing countries	83	46	51	17	77	39	39	17	81	37	25	14	52	42	44	15
Emerging market and developing countries ^{3/} Africa	167	43	46	17	168	37	38	18	143	29	27	11	139	36	40	15
	55	60	55	20	50	37	38	16	48	27	25	10	46	42	46	15
Asia	26	41	35	19	27	45	44	22	21	29	24	10	26	23	38	4
Central and Eastern Europe	20	24	30	5	22	29	23	9	19	19	21	0	16	13	13	0
CIS and Mongolia	20	43	60	25	18	17	17	0	14	17	7	7	15	27	13	7
Middle East	13	56	62	31	17	33	47	18	10	27	20	10	15	63	53	27
Western Hemisphere	33	32	36	9	34	62	47	32	31	53	45	23	21	50	62	38
Selected other documents FSSAs Selected Issues/Statistical Annexes	11	114	36	36	10	51	30	20	18	34	56	6	11	16	9	9
	47	38	36	15	34	26	26	0	47	16	15	0	40	19	17	17
Article IV Public Information Notices (PINs) ^{5/} UFR and PSI Chairman's statements	117 113	24	23	8	130 118	21 4	16 2	0	119 120	20 22	22 12	7 5	99 81	13 1	14 0	1 0
Country Policy Intention Documents ^{6/} Policy papers ^{7/}	173	32	45	11	191	50	28	14	168	38	26	11	206	17	11	6
	49	16	16	4	47	26	17	11	59	25	19	7	42	6	5	2

^{1/} Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006 - 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.

^{2/} Country-specific documents are published as soon as the final consent from the member country is received by the Fund, with technical delays typically not exceeding a couple of business days. Policy papers are published after authorization by the Board.

^{3/} WEO definitions.

^{4/} Number of calendar days.

^{5/} Publication rate of PINs is expressed as a share of the number of relevant Article IV Board discussions; by definition, 100percent of PINs are published.

^{6/} Includes LOIs/MEFPs/TMUs issued in the context of SMPs and PSIs.

^{7/} Only includes policy papers for which publication is presumed.

		200	3 - 2005			200	6 - 2008		2009 - 2012					
		With deletions	With deletions for exch. rate issues	With deletions for fin. sector		With deletions	With deletions for exch. rate issues	With deletions for fin. sector		With deletions	With deletions for exch. rate issues	With deletions for fin. sector		
Reports by group	Number published	percent of all publ. reports	percent of all publ. reports	percent of all publ. reports	Number published	percent of all publ. reports	percent of all publ. reports	percent of all publ. reports	Number published	percent of all publ. reports	percent of all publ. reports	percent of all publ. reports		
All Article IV and UFR reports	498	14	5	7	481	10	6	4	761	21	7	12		
Advanced markets EU Other Europe ROW	75	7	4	1	70	13	6	4	144 80 27 37	35 36 22 14	3 3 0 5	25 26 19 8		
Emerging markets Developing countries	115 308	30 9	6 4	18 4	94 317	22 6	14 4	10 2	324 293	24 11	11 3	11 6		
Emerging market and developing countries ^{3/} Africa Asia	423 148 52	15 3 14	5 0 4	8 1 14	411 158 58	10 4 7	6 1 5	4 3 2	617 199 100	18 5 20	7 1 14	9 1 6		
Central and Eastern Europe CIS and Mongolia Middle East	63 43 17	27 7 18	14 2 12	13 5 0	52 42 30	25 7 17	23 5 10	12 2 0	77 67 55	22 25 13	9 16 7	16 15 5		
Western Hemisphere	100	28	6	13	71	13	3	6	119	33	7	18		
Countries with fixed or crawling pegs or bands Countries with other exchange rate regimes	305	11 15	6 4	4 8	194 287	9 11	6 6	4	345 416	18 23	7 6	11 13		

^{1/} Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006 - 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.

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^{2/} Because a single report can have deletions falling into multiple categories, e.g., exchange rate, financial sector and/or other areas, there is no fixed relationship between the second column and the third and fourth columns under each year.

^{3/} WEO definitions.

Table 4b. Deletions in Article IV and UFR Staff Reports (2009–12)^{1/2/} (by economic and regional characteristics)

			2009				2010				2011				2012	
		With deletions	With deletions for exch. rate issues	With deletions for fin. sector		With deletions	With deletions for exch. rate issues	With deletions for fin. sector		With deletions	With deletions for exch. rate issues	With deletions for fin. sector		With deletions	With deletions for exch. rate issues	With deletion for fin. sector
Reports by group	Number published	percent of all publ. reports	percent of all publ. reports	percent of all publ. reports	Number published	percent of all publ. reports	percent of all publ. reports	percent of all publ. reports	Number published	percent of all publ. reports	percent of all publ. reports	percent of all publ. reports	Number published	percent of all publ. reports	f percent of all publ. reports	percent of all publ. reports
All Article IV and UFR reports	195	18	7	11	205	14	8	7	186	22	4	11	175	17	5	11
Advanced markets	28	36	4	29	37	14	3	5	43	37	2	28	36	25	3	19
EU	15	27	0	27	19	21	5	5	25	56	4	40	21	33	0	29
Other Europe	5	80	0	60	8	13	0	13	7	14	0	14	7	0	0	0
ROW	8	25	13	13	10	10	0	10	11	0	0	0	8	25	13	13
Emerging markets	84	17	10	7	91	18	13	8	62	31	8	10	87	20	8	13
Developing countries	83	13	5	8	77	10	4	8	81	7	2	4	52	8	0	2
Emerging market and developing countries 3/	167	15	7	8	168	14	9	8	143	17	5	6	139	15	6	9
Africa	55	7	2	2	50	0	0	0	48	4	0	0	46	2	0	0
Asia	26	23	15	8	27	22	22	7	21	10	5	5	26	12	8	0
Central and Eastern Europe	20	25	20	10	22	9	9	9	19	21	0	16	16	13	0	13
CIS and Mongolia	20	35	15	30	18	6	6	0	14	21	14	14	15	33	27	13
Middle East	13	0	0	0	17	24	18	6	10	0	0	0	15	13	7	7
Western Hemisphere	33	9	0	6	34	32	9	24	31	45	13	10	21	38	5	33
Countries with fixed or crawling pegs or bands	84	8	6	5	95	18	11	11	87	21	7	10	79	1	13	11
Countries with other exchange rate regimes	111	25	7	15	110	11	5	5	99	23	2	12	96	7	9	11

^{1/} Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006 - 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.

^{2/} Because a single report can have deletions falling into multiple categories, e.g., exchange rate, financial sector and/or other areas, there is no fixed relationship between the second column and the third and fourth columns under each year.

^{3/} WEO definitions.

Table 5a. Corrections in Article IV and UFR Staff Reports (Average 2009–12) 1/2/

(by economic and regional characteristics)

			2009 - 2012	
		With corrections	With corrections for Evident Ambiguity	With corrections for Mischaracterization
Reports by group	Number published	percent of all publ. reports	percent of all publ. reports	percent of all publ.
All Article IV and UFR reports	761	65	15	13
Advanced markets	144	92	40	33
EU	80	91	43	25
Other Europe	27	93	26	30
ROW	37	95	46	51
Emerging markets	324	68	13	14
Developing countries	293	48	3	3
Emerging market and developing countries 3/	617	59	6	7
Africa	199	44	2	2
Asia	100	61	8	11
Central and Eastern Europe	77	79	17	16
CIS and Mongolia	67	54	4	1
Middle East	55	51	13	11
Western Hemisphere	119	74	16	16
Countries with fixed or crawling pegs or band	345	59	12	11
Countries with other exchange rate regimes	416	69	17	16

^{1/} Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006 - 2008 refers to documents published by

^{2/} Because a single report can have deletions falling into multiple categories, e.g., exchange rate, financial sector and/or other areas, there is no fixed relationship between the second column and the third and fourth columns under each year. 3/ WEO definitions.

Table 5b. Corrections in Article IV and UFR Staff Reports (2009–12)^{1/2/}

(by economic and regional characteristics)

			2009				2010				2011		2012				
		With	With corrections for Evident Ambiguity	With corrections for Mischaracterization		With	With corrections for Evident Ambiguity	With corrections for Mischaracterizati on		With	With corrections for Evident Ambiguity	With corrections for Mischaracterizati on		With	With corrections for Evident Ambiguity	With corrections for Mischaracterizati on	
		percent of				percent of				percent of				percent of			
Reports by group	Number published	all publ. I reports	percent of all publ. reports	percent of all publ. reports	Number published	all publ. d reports	percent of all publ. reports	percent of all publ. reports	Number published		percent of all publ. reports	percent of all publ. reports	Number published	all publ. reports	percent of all publ. reports	percent of all publ. reports	
All Article IV and UFR reports	195	66	0	10	205	63	10	14	186	69	23	15	175	62	27	15	
Advanced markets	28	96	0	25	37	86	30	38	43	95	58	30	36	92	61	36	
EU	15	93	0	13	19	89	26	26	25	92	56	24	21	90	71	33	
Other Europe	5	100	0	20	8	75	13	25	7	100	43	43	7	100	43	29	
ROW	8	100	0	50	10	90	50	70	11	100	73	36	8	88	50	50	
Emerging markets	84	68	0	12	91	67	8	13	62	87	24	19	87	54	24	13	
Developing countries	83	53	0	4	77	47	3	3	81	41	4	4	52	56	10	4	
Emerging market and developing countries 3/	167	60	0	8	168	58	5	8	143	61	3	4	139	55	19	9	
Africa	55	56	0	4	50	42	2	2	48	38	0	0	46	37	4	2	
Asia	26	77	0	15	27	48	4	7	21	57	10	14	26	62	19	8	
Central and Eastern Europe	20	60	0	10	22	86	14	14	19	100	21	21	16	69	38	19	
CIS and Mongolia	20	60	0	0	18	56	0	0	14	36	7	0	15	60	13	7	
Middle East	13	38	0	0	17	47	6	6	10	70	30	20	15	53	20	20	
Western Hemisphere	33	64	0	8	34	76	9	21	31	84	26	19	21	71	38	14	
Countries with fixed or crawling pegs or band	84	57	0	8	95	58	8	12	87	66	17	13	79	54	23	10	
Countries with other exchange rate regimes	111	72	0	12	110	67	11	15	99	72	28	17	96	67	31	19	

^{1/} Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006 - 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.
2/ Because a single report can have deletions falling into multiple categories, e.g., exchange rate, financial sector and/or other areas, there is no fixed relationship between the second column and the third and fourth columns under each year.
3/ WEO definitions.

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Table 6. First-Time	Publishers	of Article IV/UFR	Staff Reports	$(2009-12)^{1/2}$
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2003 - 2005		2006	2006 - 2008 2009 - 2012		2009 - 2012	
Afghanistan, I. R. of	Korea	Bhutan	Namibia	Brazil	Myanmar	
Angola	Libya	Egypt	Philippines	Dominican Republic	Saudi Arabia	
Antigua and Barbuda	Micronesia	El Salvador	Qatar	Guyana	Thailand	
Central African Republic	Samoa	India	Seychelles	Kosovo	Tuvalu	
China, P.R. of	Serbia and Montenegro	Lebanon	Syrian Arab Republic	Malaysia		
Congo, Republic of	Sierra Leone	Maldives	Togo			
Djibouti	Singapore	Marshall Islands, Rep.	Uzbekistan			
Ecuador	Solomon Islands	Republic of Montenegro	Yemen, Republic of			
Equatorial Guinea	Suriname					
Eritrea	Timor Leste					
Honduras	Tonga					
Indonesia	United Arab Emirates					
Iraq	Zambia					
Jordan						

^{1/} Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006 - 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.

^{2/} Timor Leste, Republic of Montenegro, Kosovo, and Tuvalu joined the Fund in 2002, 2006, 2009, and 2010 respectively.

Table 7. Members Publishing all Article IV/UFR Reports ^{1/}

2000 - 2008	2006	- 2008		2009 - 2012	
Afghanistan, I. R. of	Australia	Luxembourg	Afghanistan, I. S. of	Kyrgyz Republic	United Kingdom
Algeria	Austria	Macedonia, FYR	Albania	Lao People Dem. Rep.	United States
Armenia	Bahamas	Madagascar	Algeria	Latvia	Vanuatu
Austria	Bangladesh	Malawi	Armenia	Lebanon	Zambia
Bahamas	Barbados	Malta	Australia	Liberia	Zimbabwe
Belgium	Belarus	Marshall Islands, Rep.	Austria	Lithuania	
Bolivia	Belgium	Mauritania	Azerbaijan	Luxembourg	
Cambodia	Belize	Mauritius	Bahamas	Macedonia, FYR	
Canada	Benin	Mexico	Bangladesh	Malaysia	
Chile	Bhutan	Micronesia	Barbados	Maldives	
Colombia	Bolivia	Moldova	Belarus	Mali	
Congo, Democratic Republic of the	Bosnia & Herzegovina	Mongolia	Belgium	Malta	
Costa Rica	Botswana	Montenegro, Republic of	Belize	Marshall Islands, Rep.	
Croatia	Bulgaria	Morocco	Benin	Mauritania	
	. 3		Bhutan		
Cyprus	Burkina Faso	Mozambique		Mauritius	
Czech Republic	Burundi	Namibia	Bolivia	Mexico	
Denmark	Cambodia	Nepal	Bosnia & Herzegovina	Micronesia	
Dominica	Cameroon	Netherlands	Botswana	Moldova	
Estonia	Canada	New Zealand	Bulgaria	Mongolia	
Finland	Cape Verde	Niger	Burkina Faso	Montenegro, Republic of	
rance	Central African Republic	Nigeria	Burundi	Morocco	
Germany	Chad	Norway	Cambodia	Mozambique	
Greece	Chile	Pakistan	Cameroon	Namibia	
Grenada	China, P.R. of	Palau	Canada		
				Nepal	
celand	Colombia	Papua New Guinea	Cape Verde	Netherlands	
raq	Comoros	Paraguay	Chile	New Zealand	
reland	Congo, Democratic Rep.	o Philippines	Colombia	Niger	
srael	Congo, Republic of	Poland	Comoros	Nigeria	
italy	Costa Rica	Portugal	Congo, Republic of	Norway	
Jamaica	Cote d'Ivoire	Qatar	Costa Rica	Palau	
Japan	Croatia	Romania	Cote d'Ivoire	Panama	
Lao People Dem. Rep.	Cyprus	Russian Federation	Croatia	Papua New Guinea	
Latvia	Czech Republic	Rwanda	Cyprus	Paraguay	
Liberia	Denmark	Samoa	* *		
			Czech Republic	Peru	
Lithuania	Dominica	San Marino	Denmark	Philippines	
Luxembourg	Egypt	Sao Tome & Principe	Dominica	Poland	
Malawi	El Salvador	Senegal	Egypt	Portugal	
Malta	Equatorial Guinea	Serbia, Republic of	El Salvador	Qatar	
Mauritius	Estonia	Sierra Leone	Estonia	Romania	
Montenegro, Republic of	Ethiopia	Singapore	Fiji	Russian Federation	
Nepal	Finland	Slovak Republic	Finland	Rwanda	
Netherlands	France	Slovenia	France	Samoa	
New Zealand	Gambia	Solomon Islands	Gabon	San Marino	
Norway	Georgia	South Africa	Gambia	Sao Tome & Principe	
Pakistan	Germany	Spain	Georgia	Senegal	
Palau	Greece	St. Kitts & Nevis	Germany	Serbia, Republic of	
Poland	Grenada	St. Lucia	Ghana	Seychelles	
Portugal	Guinea	St. Vincent and Grenadines	Greece	Singapore	
Romania	Guinea-Bissau	Suriname	Guatemala	Slovak Republic	
Russian Federation	Hungary	Swaziland	Guinea	Slovenia	
San Marino	Iceland	Sweden	Guinea-Bissau	Solomon Islands	
Sao Tome & Principe	India	Switzerland	Haiti	South Africa	
Serbia, Republic of	Indonesia	Syrian Arab Republic	Hong Kong SAR	Spain	
Slovenia			Hungary	·	
	Iran. I. Rep of	Tajikistan	J ,	Sudan	
Spain	Iraq	Tanzania	Iceland	Suriname	
St. Lucia	Ireland	Timor Leste	India	Sweden	
Sweden	Israel	Tonga	Indonesia	Switzerland	
Switzerland	Italy	Trinidad & Tobago	Iran. I. Rep of	Syrian Arab Republic	
Timor Leste	Jamaica	Tunisia	Iraq	Tajikistan	
Trinidad & Tobago	Japan	Turkey	Ireland	Tanzania	
Tunisia	Jordan	Uganda	Israel	Thailand	
United Kingdom	Kazakhstan	Ukraine		Timor Leste	
			Italy		
United States	Korea	United Arab Emirates	Japan	Togo	
	Kyrgyz Republic	United Kingdom	Jordan	Tonga	
	Lao People Dem. Rep.	United States	Kazakhstan	Trinidad & Tobago	
	Latvia	Uruguay	Kenya	Tunisia	
	Lesotho	Uzbekistan	Kiribati	Turkey	
	Liberia	Vanuatu	Korea	Tuvalu	
	Libya	Vietnam	Kosovo	Ukraine	

^{1/} Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006 - 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.

Table 8.	Members	Publishing	ΑII	Documents 1/2/
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2003 - 2	2005	2006 - 2008		2009 - 2012	
Afghanistan, I.R. of	Switzerland	Albania	Afghanistan, I. R. of	Maldives	Tonga
Albania	Trinidad & Tobago	Austria	Albania	Mali	Trinidad & Tobag
Angola	Tunisia	Belarus	Austria	Malta	Tuvalu
Austria	United Arab Emirates	Bhutan	Azerbaijan	Marshall Islands, Rep.	United Kingdom
Belarus	United Kingdom	Bolivia	Bangladesh	Mauritania	Vanuatu
Benin	Vanuatu	Chile	Belize	Mauritius	Zambia
Botswana	Variation	Cyprus	Benin	Moldova	Zimbabwe
Cambodia		Denmark	Bhutan	Montenegro, Republic of	Zimbabwe
Chile		Estonia	Bosnia & Herzegovina	Monzambique	
Croatia		Ethiopia	Botswana	Namibia	
Cyprus		Finland	Burundi	Nepal	
Denmark		Guinea	Cambodia	Netherlands	
Equatorial Guinea		Guinea-Bissau	Cameroon	Niger	
Estonia		Indonesia	Cape Verde	Norway	
Finland		Iran, I. Rep of	Chile	Palau	
Gabon		Iran, I. Rep oi Israel	Colombia	Panama	
Gambia		Korea	Costa Rica		
ambia Shana				Papua New Guinea	
		Latvia	Croatia	Paraguay	
Guinea-Bissau		Lesotho	Cyprus	Peru	
celand		Luxemboug	Czech Republic	Philippines	
raq		Moldova	Denmark	Poland	
Lao People Dem. Re	p.	Morocco	Egypt	Portugal	
Latvia		Mozambique	El Salvador	Rwanda	
Lesotho Liberia		Namibia Nigeria	Finland Gabon	Samoa San Marino	
Lithuania		Portugal	Gambia	Senegal	
Malta		Romania		Serbia, Republic of	
viaita Mexico		San Marino	Georgia		
			Germany	Seychelles	
Norway		Serbia, Republic of	Ghana	Singapore	
Panama		Spain	Greece	Slovenia	
Papua New guinea		Suriname	Guinea	Solomon Islands	
Romania		Swaziland	Guinea-Bissau	South Africa	
Rwanda		Switzerland	Haiti	Spain	
San Marino		Tajikistan	Iceland	Suriname	
Servia and Montene	egro	Timore Leste	India	Sweden	
Slovak Republic		Tunisia	Indonesia	Switzerland	
Slovenia		United Kingdom	Iran. I. Rep of	Syrian Arab Republic	
Spain			Italy 	Tajikistan -	
Suriname			Jordan	Tanzania	
Sweden			Kiribati	Thailand	
			Luxembourg	Timor Leste	
			Malaysia	Togo	

^{1/} Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006 - 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.

^{2/} Documents considered here include: Staff Report, PIN, UFR/PSI Chairman's statement, Selected Issues, Statistical Appendix, background documents,

Table 9. Members Not Publishing Any Article IV/UFR Staff Reports $^{1/}$

2000 - 2008 2009 - 2012

Bahrain Brunei Darussalam

Brazil Eritrea Brunei Darussalam Oman

Dominican Republic Turkmenistan Guyana Uzbekistan

Malaysia Myanmar Oman

Saudi Arabia Thailand Turkmenistan Venezuela

1/ Publication refers to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication list for 2000 - 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.

Table 10. Members	Not	Publishing	Article IV	/ Staff Reports	1/
Table To. Mellibels	IVUL	rubiisiiiiu	Alucieiv	, Stall Repuls	,

2009	2010	2011	2012
Angola	Brazil	Libya	Brunei
Brazil	Brunei	Brazil	Chad
			Congo, Democratic Republic
Brunei	Honduras	Brunei	of
China	Kingdom of Lesotho	Equatorial Guinea	Grenada
Eritrea	Kingdom of Swaziland	Ethiopia	Guyana
Guyana	Myanmar	Myanmar	Jamaica
Honduras	Nicaragua	Oman	Kingdom of Bahrain
Kingdom of Bahrain	Oman	St. Lucia	Oman
Myanmar	Saudi Arabia	Turkmenistan	Uzbekistan
Saudi Arabia	St. Kitts and Nevis	Vietnam	
Turkmenistan	St. Vincent and the Grenadi	nes	
	Turkmenistan		
	Uzbekistan		
	Yemen		

1/ Publication refer to documents considered by the Board during the period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for January 1, 2005 - December 31, 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.

Table 11. Members Not Publishing UFR Staff Reports 1/

2009	2010	2011	2012
Nicaragua	Antigua and Barbuda	Antigua and Barbuda	Antigua and Barbuda
Pakistan	Grenada	Djibouti	Malawi
	Malawi	Dominican Republic	Yemen
		Honduras	
		Sri Lanka	

1/ Publication refer to documents considered by the Board during the period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for January 1, 2005 - December 31, 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.

Table 12. Members Not Publishing Any Documents 1/2/

2003 - 2005	2006 - 2008	2009 - 2012
Myanmar	Eritrea	
Qatar	Kiribati	
Seychelles	Zimbabwe	
Turkmenistan		
Venezuela		

^{1/} Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006 - 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009. The following countries did not have any Article IV or UFR discussions during the periods: Somalia (2003-2005); Fiji, Somalia, and Venezuela (2006-2008); Argentina, Ecuador, Madagascar, Somalia, South Sudan and Venezuela (2009-2012).

TRANSPARENCY POLICY REVIEW—BACKGROUND PAPER

^{2/} Documents considered here include: Staff Report, PIN, UFR/PSI Chairman's statement, Selected Issues, Statistical Appendix, background documents, Authorities' Statement, and HIPC documents.

Table 13. Members Requesting Explicit Consent Prior to Publication

Bahrain

Brazil

Bulgaria

Cape Verde

Dominican Republic

Egypt

Guyana

Haiti

Iraq

Jordan

Kuwait

Lebanon

Maldives

Oman

Panama

Qatar

Saudi Arabia

Suriname

Syrian Arab Republic

Timor-Leste

Trinidad and Tobago

Turkmenistan

United Arab Emirates

Uzbekistan

Yemen

Table 14. Longest and Shortest Lags for the Publication of Article IV/UFR Staff Reports $^{1/}$

Longest Publication Lags ^{2/}		Shortest Publication Lags ²	2/	
Board date	<u>Country</u>	<u>Days</u>	Board date <u>Country</u>	<u>Days</u>
03/03/09	Liberia	401	02/06/09 Italy	0
04/07/10	Dominican Republic	349	04/17/09 Mexico	0
02/09/09	Kingdom of Lesotho	332	05/06/09 Poland	0
05/23/12	Botswana	332	10/16/09 Mexico	0
07/21/09	Djibouti	302	10/28/09 Iceland	0
02/28/11	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	287	03/25/10 Mexico	0
05/28/10	Congo, Republic of	279	09/20/10 Jordan	0
11/06/09	Sri Lanka	273	12/17/10 Greece	0
03/11/09	Congo, Democratic Republic of	257	01/10/11 Mexico	0
01/12/11	St. Lucia	240	01/21/11 Poland	0
06/15/12	Comoros	238	02/25/11 Ireland	0
02/12/11	Maldives	226	05/09/11 New Zealand	0
04/15/09	Lebanon	211	03/29/10 Germany	1
12/17/10	Dominican Republic	208	05/07/10 Colombia	1
01/30/12	Central African Republic	196	05/09/10 Greece	1
12/21/11	Burkina Faso	194	10/27/10 Australia	1
	Lao People's Democratic			
07/30/10	Republic	192	11/08/10 United Kingdom	1
11/09/09	Dominican Republic	189	12/16/10 Ireland	1
03/17/10	Guyana	184	04/06/11 Czech Republic	1
02/04/10	Jamaica	176	05/25/11 Guinea-Bissau	1
06/29/09	Central African Republic	169	07/11/11 Italy	1
02/06/12	Djibouti	169	08/23/11 Chile	1
02/22/12	Nigeria	153	09/12/11 Portugal	1
10/22/10	Dominican Republic	151	10/05/11 Australia	1
06/29/12	Ukraine	151	12/19/11 Portugal	1

1/ Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006 - 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2/ Calendar days.

II. ANALYSIS OF MODIFICATIONS¹

To complement the analysis of overall trends in modification rates, staff carried out an indepth examination of a sample of deletions and corrections to determine whether there was any evidence that the rules were not being fully respected ("gray zone" modifications) in a significant share of the sample;² and if so whether there was any evidence of a bias toward larger and more influential members. The analysis showed that although gray zone modifications persist, they seem to have diminished significantly since this exercise was last undertaken in 2009, and staff could find no meaningful evidence of a bias.

A. Context and Policy Background

- 1. The Fund's modification policies were established to protect the integrity of Fund documents in a consistent way across the membership. The deletions policy aims to preserve the candor of published reports, while allowing deletions of certain types of material to protect members, and support the Fund's role as a confidential advisor. Since deletions affect only the published versions of reports, they enable staff to be as candid as needed in the report presented to the Executive Board ("internal candor"), while retaining the main messages and clarity in the published report ("external candor"). This approach reduces the risk of staff self-censorship, and helps ensure that the Board receives an unembellished assessment of the member's economy, thereby promoting meaningful peer review. The rules for corrections—which affect the internal versions of reports—are intended to ensure that reports are factually correct and do not mislead readers. A
- **2.** Concerns have emerged in the past that modification policies may not have been applied evenhandedly. The 2009 review highlighted the differences in modification rates between different groups of members, with emerging markets (EMs) making the greatest use of deletions, and advanced markets (AMs) making the most use of corrections, and considerably lower modification rates for low-income countries (LICs). Staff suggested in 2009 that these patterns could be due to differing degrees of administrative capacity, a higher degree of market sensitivity in EMs and, for corrections, the close program engagement of many LICs. But there would be greater concerns to the extent this reflects differing ability or inclination to influence staff and management.

¹ Prepared by Nicolas Million (SPR).

² The term "gray zone" was introduced in the 2009 Review of the Fund's Transparency Policy to describe modifications to staff reports that with hindsight do not appear to fully comply with the rules of the policy.


³ Deletions are limited to information not already in the public domain that constitutes either highly market-sensitive material or premature disclosure of the authorities' policy intentions.

⁴ Corrections are limited to: (i) typographical errors; (ii) factual mistakes; (iii) mischaracterization of the authorities' views; and (iv) evident ambiguity.

⁵ Modification rates increased further in 2009–12, and AMs now account for the highest rates of both deletions and corrections (see Chapter I. Key Trends).

- The 2009 review uncovered cases of modifications that were not fully in line with the 3. policy, but concluded that there was insufficient evidence to suggest systematic bias. Around 25 percent of deletions were found to be in a "gray zone" that did not fully comply with the rules, as were over 20 percent of corrections. The 2009 review also noted a higher incidence of "gray zone" modifications for larger or "influential" countries, but not sufficiently as to suggest that the policy was not being implemented evenhandedly.
- 4. Measures have been put in place since then to help address these concerns. A new category of corrections on account of evident ambiguity was introduced with the aim of allowing the Fund to accept requests that help external audiences to understand the meaning of a text but were not previously permitted under the policy, while drawing a firmer line around unacceptable requests. A detailed guidance note for the Transparency Policy was prepared in 2010, and operational procedures have been strengthened.
- 5. To reassess whether the modifications policy is being applied even-handedly, staff

conducted an ex-post assessment of a sample of modifications in recent years. This involved a detailed re-examination of whether modifications in the sample conformed to the policy and if not, if there was any evidence of bias. The exercise was based on 25 percent of all deletion requests to country reports presented to the Executive Board between 2009 and 2012. The same sample of reports was used to examine whether corrections on grounds of evident ambiguity were in line with the policy.6




B. Assessing the Implementation of the Deletions Policy


The sample of deletions under examination is primarily composed of cases in EMs and **Europe** (see text figures). Just over half the total is accounted for by EMs, reflecting the high share of reports covering EMs issued to the Board, and a relatively high incidence of deletions for EM reports (26 percent). AMs represent just under 30 percent of the sample, reflecting their smaller

⁶ The 25 percent share represented 43 memoranda of deletion requests, with each memorandum containing one or more requests. These reports were selected by a random draw from a pool of member countries (AMs, EMs, and LICs). To ensure that the sample of Board documents was representative of all deletion requests, the sample was stratified, and a target number of documents specified to match the percentage of the income group within each stratum. Documents considered for the sample were: Article IV Reports, UFR Staff Reports, Combined Reports (i.e. UFR/Art. IV) and FSSAs.

share in the total number of reports issued to the Board but higher incidence of deletions (34 percent). LICs account for only 16 percent of sample, due to the lower share of LIC reports issued to the Board and the lower incidence of deletions in this group (11 percent). Around 90 percent of the sample covered requests to delete highly market sensitive (HMS) information, against 20 percent concerning deletions on account of premature disclosure of policy intentions.

- 7. Financial sector issues made up the largest single category of deletions. This is a departure from the pre-crisis period, when issues surrounding exchange rate assessments, exchange rate regimes, or reserves dominated. These external sector issues have now been displaced into second position. Fiscal policy, debt, output/inflation and political or governance issues account for smaller shares of deletions, and there were no deletions relating to structural issues such as labor markets.
- 8. The rising rate of deletions and compositional shift is to be expected during the global financial crisis. Staff's increased focus on risks and financial sector issues during the global financial crisis meant that staff reports have included more sensitive material than in the past. The higher number of deletions for AMs and EMs may be due to the location of the crisis, as well as the size and interconnectedness of their financial systems. Staff reports for these economies are therefore more likely to contain highly market-sensitive information than those for LICs.





- A detailed examination of the deletions sample suggests that the "gray zone" has 9. diminished significantly, but not disappeared altogether, and there is no evidence of bias towards any particular group of countries. Staff re-examined all cases in detail and found only two cases—representing 5 percent of the total—of deletions that were approved even though they did not seem to fully meet the relevant criteria. The reduction in the gray zone seems to reflect the changes made since 2009. Even so, assessing whether information is highly market-sensitive can involve careful judgments, including on the likelihood and severity of a market reaction, making it hard to eliminate entirely the "gray zone".
- All the deletions for premature disclosure of policy intentions were found to be in line 10. with the policy. This category of deletion is requested primarily by EMs and LICs, which have a close policy dialog with the IMF, including through IMF-supported programs. Most of these deletions involved detailed information, such as petroleum price increase schedules or tax reforms, which if released would have complicated the authorities' efforts to implement these policies.
- 11. As in the last review, staff found instances where more text than strictly needed had been deleted, which is strongly discouraged by the policy. This mostly relates to reports on EMs, where entire paragraphs had unnecessarily been deleted, in sections on the exchange rate assessments. Only 60 percent of the deletions fully complied with the requirements of the policy which recommends a high degree of parsimony.

C. Assessing Corrections for Evident Ambiguity

12. To assess whether the corrections policy is being implemented evenhandedly, staff also carried an in-depth analysis of corrections on account of evident ambiguity. This category was introduced to ensure factual accuracy by correcting the possibility of a plausible, specific misinterpretation.⁸ As this involves a degree of judgment, especially about whether there is ambiguity, there seems to be a higher risk that such cases could fall into the gray zone. Staff is aware of a few cases where requests for deletions were rejected, but the authorities subsequently successfully requested a correction to the same material on account of evident ambiguity. Focusing on this subset of corrections could shed light on whether the "gray zone" has indeed declined, or perhaps shifted from deletions towards corrections for evident ambiguity.

⁷ The two countries were both EMs, involving information about the banking sector and reserves respectively. Both are small, together representing only 0.2 percent of the aggregate quota base.

⁸ In some cases, correction requests may reflect a fear that the public will misunderstand or misinterpret the unmodified text.

- 13. Staff's first step was to return to the sample of country reports used for the analysis of deletions and examine all cases of corrections for evident ambiguity. Since they had been subject to deletions, many of the reports in this sample included complex and sensitive material. It was also likely that any corrections on account of evident ambiguity would involve difficult issues requiring careful judgment, with the possibility of cases where the rules had not been fully respected.
- 14. The incidence of "gray zone" cases in this sample seems modest, albeit slightly higher than for deletions, but again not enough for a conclusive evidence of bias. Around 10 percent of cases appear not to comply fully with the rules, including both AMs and Ems, and there are signs of an increase as the global financial crisis intensified in 2010–11 (see Box 1 for examples). However, given the modest proportion of gray zone cases, this exercise provides no conclusive support for claims that the policy is not being implemented evenhandedly.

Box 1. Examples of 'Gray Zone' Corrections for Evident Ambiguity

EM: a sentence was toned down even though there was no clear evidence of a plausible, specific misinterpretation:

for "with the private sector becoming the driver for growth and employment." read "with enhancing the private sector's role for growth and employment."

AM: a correction on the ground of evident ambiguity appears to cover sensitive material that does not qualify for HMS.

for "Disclosure of financial sector data falls short of best international practice and enhancements would be highly desirable."

read "...banks, and listed companies more generally, make extensive public financial disclosures under IFRS, and as a result of bank regulations (Pillar III of Basel II). Nonetheless, disclosure of financial sector data falls short of best international practice and enhancements would be highly desirable."

AM: a correction on the grounds of evident ambiguity requested the addition of a long footnote to the staff appraisal summarizing policy developments since the issuance of the Staff Report to the Board. According to the Transparency Policy, corrections should not be used to extend the staff's or authorities' arguments, or to update information after the report has been issued to the Board.

D. Implementation Challenges

- **15.** To widen the scope of the analysis, staff also examined in depth a small number of controversial cases of modification requests. Six cases (Table 1)—four AMs (all in Europe), one EM and one LIC—were selected based on their complexity.
- 16. Staff sees these cases as illustrative of the more extreme challenges that can materialize in implementing the policy. Each of the six cases initially involved requests to delete

⁹ This included a small EM and two large AMs.

sensitive material, which staff rejected as they did not fully meet the relevant criteria under the policy. In most cases, this led to follow-up requests for corrections on account of evident ambiguity. The requests were ultimately rejected in two cases and the staff report was published without modification, while modifications were made in the other four cases, suggesting that they might qualify as gray zone cases. In practice, only few requests, such as these six, have involved pressure on staff to identify options to satisfy country authorities. In the vast majority of cases, staff is able to apply the policy evenhandedly, and to reject cases that do not comply with the rules.

Country Group	Initial Modification request	Process	Request Accepted
АМ	Request to delete a sentence relating the size of the financial sector and openness of the economy to contagion and financial stability risks.	Staff rejected the request because it did not meet the criteria for HMS deletions (not already in the public domain, market-relevant within the near term, sufficiently specific to create a clear risk of triggering a disruptive market reaction if disclosed).	No
АМ	Third party request to delete all references to its name in a report referring to risks in the Euro Area.	Staff rejected the request because it did not meet the criteria for HMS deletions (not already in the public domain, market-relevant within the near term, sufficiently specific to create a clear risk of triggering a disruptive market reaction if disclosed).	No
АМ	Request to delete 'GIIPS" acronym.	After staff rejected the initial request, it was resubmitted as a request to correct on account of evident ambiguity.	Partially
АМ	Two requests to delete politically sensitive material.	After staff rejected the initial request to delete, the authorities requested corrections on account of mischaracterization of their views and evident ambiguity.	Yes
EM	Request to delete reference to possible deposit outflows and recapitalization needs.	Staff initially rejected the requests, because they were not specific	Yes
LIC	Request to delete politically sensitive material, including a reference to a politician's powerbase ahead of elections.	After staff rejected the initial requests, they were resubmitted as requests for corrections on account of evident ambiguity.	Partially

III. CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION (CSO) VIEWS ON THE IMF'S TRANSPARENCY POLICY¹

To ensure that a wide range of views are reflected in the 2013 review, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were invited to express their views on the Fund's transparency policy. The consultation comprised two approaches. First, CSOs were invited to respond to an online consultation page. Second, representatives from selected CSOs participated in a conference call to exchange views on the Fund's Transparency Policy.^{2,3} While CSOs conceded that some improvements have occurred since the 2009 review, they saw the need for further reforms for the Fund to catch up with current international standards. The discussions centered around five key themes summarized below:

Overarching Principles: Follow the lead of other IFIs

Despite recent reforms, the Fund's transparency policy continues to be seen as more restrictive than that of other IFIs, including the World Bank. The CSOs urged the Fund to follow the lead of other IFIs in the following areas:

- Presumption of disclosure. The World Bank moved in 2010 to a policy of full disclosure except for a limited set of documents on a "negative list," an approach that was seen as superior to the Fund's practice of seeking consent from country authorities or Board approval prior to publication.
- Executive Board meetings. Some institutions provide live streaming of Board meetings and the World Bank issues summary minutes immediately after the meeting. In contrast, the Fund's summings up are issued later, without attribution, and verbatim minutes are made available to the public with a five-year lag. More generally, information about the Fund Board's calendar and activities is seen as limited and often unreliable; the calendar is available only seven days in advance (whereas the World Bank's calendar is released two months in advance).
- Governance of information releases. A number of IFIs have clear procedures for handling
 information requests from the public and have established independent bodies to
 adjudicate complaints in this area, including appeals when information requests are turned
 down. The Fund has not established such developed procedures.

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¹ Summary prepared by Mame Astou Diouf (SPR).

² CSOs were also invited to provide comments via the online <u>CSO Consultation Page for 2013 Transparency Review</u>. Two institutions provided written comments: Global Research Priorities in Global Governance (UK) and New Rules for Global Finance (US).

³ Eight organizations participated in the conference call, which was held on March 8: Save the Children (Norway), European Network on Debt and Development (Belgium), Human Rights Watch (US), ITUC (US), Oxfam (US), ONE Campaign (US), Center for Law and Democracy (Canada), The Bretton Woods Project (UK).

Consultations with Stakeholders: Gather Broader Perspectives

- The Fund should strike a balance between its duty to advise country authorities and its wider responsibility to countries as a whole. In response to worldwide moves towards participatory democracy, the Fund should step up its interaction with other stakeholders, e.g. parliaments, opposition groups, CSOs and trade unions.
- The Fund's handling of consultations with CSOs on policy papers is seen as suboptimal, including the current review of the transparency policy, as CSOs are allowed only to provide general comments ahead of the issuance of draft policy papers to the Board, limiting their scope to influence decisions. Instead, CSOs should be given an opportunity to review and comment on draft policy papers before they are issued to the Executive Board.
- The Fund should increase its interactions with CSOs and representation on public forums, including through IMF's Resident Representatives (Res. Rep.) offices.
- The Fund should publish CSOs' full comments on its website.

Candor and Timely Disclosure: Increase Transparency on Decision-Making Processes

- Greater candor and timely disclosure of information would enhance the Fund's accountability, and reduce the risk of it being used as a scapegoat by governments.
- The emphasis on market sensitivity in the Fund's transparency policy was seen as overblown. The Fund should define more clearly the concept of "market sensitivity." The Fund should put the emphasis on keeping the public informed rather than on maintaining market stability in cases when these two objectives come into conflict. In general, the Fund should realize the difference between secrecy and responsibility.
- Fund documents should clearly highlight differences of views between the various parties concerned: the Board, staff, management, and the authorities. This would strengthen staff independence and avoid the suppression of views, as flagged by the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO). More attribution of views was also seen as needed in Board summing ups.
- The Fund should disclose the list of unpublished and modified documents, as well as modification requests with justifications as to why they have been permitted. If documents are modified, they should be published with black line redactions to clarify the nature of the change.
- While the Fund is seen as having made progress at releasing information on "outcomes", information on "processes" that lead up to decisions is more limited. There is a need for more systematic disclosure on how decisions are made, including on technical assistance, funding, and program conditionality.

Evenhandedness: A New Approach to Information Sharing

- The Fund should be more willing to respond to information requests from IMF outside stakeholders. This would improve evenhandedness as information would be "pushed out" in addition to voluntary publication.
- The Fund should systematically include a section on stakeholders' views in staff reports.

Communication: Cut Back on Jargon and Improve Ease of Access

- The Fund should cut back on jargon, and more broadly use language that makes documents more accessible to the general public. More documents—including policy papers—should be translated, including into languages beyond the five official UN languages. Country papers should be translated into at least the language of the country concerned.
- The Fund should make a clearer distinction between papers with policy content cleared by the Fund, and those that do not represent the Fund's official position. Doing so would help clarify the Fund's position on key issues and the Fund's message to stakeholders.
- The Fund should create a web page for all resident representative offices, and those offices should maintain a mailing list of key CSOs and distribute news releases electronically.
- Information related to a country should be housed in a single location to facilitate searching. In addition, country pages on the IMF website should include a factsheet on IMF involvement with the country, and a list of forthcoming and recently completed interactions with authorities (staff visits, technical assistance, meetings with CSOs, etc.). Information on ways to engage with the visiting teams should also be disclosed.

IV. SUMMARY OF SURVEYS OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS, COUNTRY AUTHORITIES, AND MISSION CHIEFS¹

To strengthen the evidence base for the review, staff solicited views from IMF Executive Directors, country authorities, IMF mission chiefs, and the media.² The major concern for Executive Directors and country authorities was a perceived lack of evenhandedness in the implementation of the policy, with a number of respondents expressing concern at the high rate of modifications for reports on advanced markets (AMs). There were also some worries about the treatment of confidential information, which was an issue in a few countries, particularly in the Middle East. All respondents were generally positive about the reforms undertaken in 2009, and the majority doubted that there was a need to make the policy more flexible.

A. Introduction

- 1. The surveys addressed core aspects of the Fund's Transparency Policy, centered on the following four themes:
- Publication and Communication. A number of questions focused on whether country authorities' willingness to publish country documents had diminished during the global financial crisis with the increased coverage of sensitive issues in staff reports. Other questions looked at views on publication lags, and the scope for streamlining post-Board outputs. Respondents were also asked whether the changing shape of Fund surveillance, such as more explicit risk assessments and exchange rate analyses, has complicated efforts to publish candid staff reports.
- Candor. Another focal point, was whether there were factors that may have affected the candor of Fund documents both with respect to external audiences and internally, for instance because members of staff might be self censoring themselves to avoid conflicts with country authorities over publication.
- **Evenhandedness.** Following up on concerns expressed during previous reviews, the survey asked respondents whether they thought that the transparency policy is being applied evenhandedly across the Fund membership, and invited comments on reasons behind perceptions.

¹ The surveys were prepared by Wasima Rahman-Garrett (SPR) and conducted by Kevin Bailey (TGS). The summary was prepared by Perry Perone, Mame Astou Diouf and Di Wang (SPR).

² A detailed presentation of responses and response rates can be found in Appendix I.


 Reforming the policy. Finally, the surveys asked about experiences with the 2009 transparency policy reforms, and invited respondents to provide further suggestions to improve the policy.


B. Publication and Communication

2. The surveys provide a reassuring message that country authorities' willingness to

publish has been largely unaffected by the crisis. Around 75 percent of country authorities said their willingness to publish has remained unchanged, with a similar proportion of mission chiefs supporting this view. Only 7 percent of the responding country authorities reported that they had become more reluctant to publish, with higher shares among emerging markets (EMs) and African countries.

3. Most respondents doubted that the increased focus on external sector assessments and risks would hinder the publication of staff reports. These constitute some 80 percent of mission chiefs, 65 percent of Directors and 56 percent of country authorities. Mission chiefs who found that the increased risk focus did, to some extent, hinder publication, were mostly working on EMs and low-income countries (LICs). Likewise, a majority of country authorities and Executive Directors thought the material in staff reports on risk assessments was appropriate; less than 5 percent of country authorities (from EMs and LICs only) viewed this material as excessively alarmist. Views differed somewhat across regions:





respondents in Africa were more comfortable with external assessments, while a smaller share of them viewed risk assessments as appropriate. The reverse relationship held in Asia – and especially the Middle East, with the latter region having the highest share of comfort with risk assessments. Most mission chiefs thought that the increased focus on risk did not impede their ability to prepare candid staff reports, or had a neutral stance on this issue, although around 20 percent of them almost evenly spread across the Fund, did have concerns. Only a small number of mission chiefs

expressed concerns about new products such as the pilot External Sector Report or Spillover Reports, with which many mission chiefs may not yet have experience.

- 4. The surveys also underscored the importance of reducing publication lags and shed some light on the factors that might be behind lags:
- The media emphasized the importance of efforts to reduce publication lags. Over 90 percent of respondents took the view that Board documents should normally be published immediately after the Board meeting, and some 60 percent of respondents thought that the Fund needed to speed up its overall approach to publication.
- On the causes of delays, the main factor cited by mission chiefs (especially those working on EMs and LICs) was the continuing tendency to obtain the authorities' explicit consent even though it is no longer necessary in the "voluntary but presumed" publication framework. Communications with the authorities on corrections and deletions also ranked high for them. Executive Directors attached roughly equal weight to discussions within the Fund on modifications alongside communication with country authorities, while country authorities mostly non-G20 non-program countries, (about 59 percent of respondents)—emphasized discussions on modifications. Several mission chiefs and country authorities mentioned the need to translate documents as a reason for delays.
- 5. Most mission chiefs saw scope to streamline summary documents produced for Board meetings. Irrespective of the countries they cover, most mission chiefs agreed that merging some of the outputs prepared following Board meetings would help to avoid duplication and reduce the risk of confusing the outside world. Suggestions included combining the Chairman's Statement and the Summing-up, and merging the press release with the Public Information Notice (PIN).

C. Candor and Integrity

- 6. The Fund aims to ensure candor between authorities, the staff and the Executive Board ("internal candor") while maintaining candor in publications ("external candor"). The transparency policy allows staff to report to sensitive issues to the Board, with the assurance that the most sensitive information can be removed from the document for publication. However, because allowed modifications are limited, there is a risk that the original Fund documents may be drafted to avoid what might be controversial, to reduce the likelihood of non-publication. The survey explored stakeholder views on how candor has been affected by the policy.
- 7. The surveys indicate that there is marginal loss of candor arising from external pressures on staff before publication. Few Executive Directors thought that reports had been watered down to facilitate publication. A few others attributed loss of candor to concerns about the risk of leaks. For country authorities, political processes were the most acknowledged as a factor in the dilution. About one-quarter—mostly in the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere—cited the risk of leaks as a constraint for publication of candid reports. To the extent that mission chiefs felt pressure to dilute messages, it was mostly slight, and it came from the authorities, Executive


Directors and, to a lesser extent, from Fund senior staff and management. Those reporting high external pressure were mostly mission chiefs covering European countries, followed by the Western Hemisphere. Some 20 percent of mission chiefs flagged the need to maintain good relations with the authorities as a factor constraining their ability to product candid staff reports, but the vast majority thought that all the important economic information remained in the published staff reports.

- 8. The surveys also indicate that the rules on modifications have allowed for the preparation of candid staff reports. All groups surveyed generally thought that the policy on corrections and deletions did not impede candor in staff reports, and that important economic information was rarely omitted from reports as a result of modifications. However, a few mission chiefs on EMs, mostly in the Americas, thought that some important economic information had been omitted.
- **9.** The media generally had a positive view on the candor of Fund documents. Around 60 percent or more of media respondents thought that the Fund was candid in its presentation of financial stability risks, risks more generally, and of its lending operations.

D. Evenhandedness

10. A significant number of respondents had doubts, that the Fund is applying the policy evenhandedly, although the strength of views varies significantly by type of respondent (see Box 2):

- Executive Directors were the most concerned, with about half of the respondents disagreeing that the policy is applied evenhandedly (including 11 percent who were in strong disagreement), while a third of Executive Directors had a neutral stance on this issue.
- Mission chiefs, on balance, felt the policy is not applied evenhandedly, although views were not as strongly felt as Directors. Some



- 30 percent of mission chiefs thought the policy was not applied evenhandedly, versus 18 percent who thought it was. However, around half, working on various country types, took a neutral stance on this issue.
- Country authorities were, on average, more positive about the Fund's evenhandedness, although with significant differences between different groups. Around half thought the policy was applied evenhandedly to some or a great extent, whereas only 16 percent thought it was not at all or only slightly evenhanded. Perhaps reflecting their distance from decisions concerning other countries, around 35 percent of country authorities had no views on this issue. The


greatest concerns about evenhandedness were expressed by country authorities in the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere.


Box 1. Assessing the Evidence on Evenhandedness


The surveys shed some light on the discussion of evenhandedness. So far, discussions in this area had focused on the ex post rate of modification to reports for various groups. In principle, however, the ex post modification rate can be decomposed into the product of: (i) the ex ante rate of requests from different groups, and (ii) the share of requests that are rejected. Staff has little scope to influence the rate of requests. However, it would be a source of concern if rejection rates were materially higher for certain groups.

Propensity to request modifications. Staff believes that the higher incidence of modifications to reports for AMs is largely due to much higher rates of requests from AMs. In the absence of comprehensive data set on modification requests, surveys asked respondents whether or not they made any requests. The aggregate response varies between mission chiefs and country authorities. With regards to corrections, the surveys broadly supported staff's views that request rates are highest for AMs, followed by EMs and with lower rates for LICs. Concerning deletions, however, the surveys are inconclusive. While the mission chief survey is aligned with staff's priors of a very low rate of request from LICs (reflecting lower market development), the survey of country authorities suggests a higher rate of request. We should note the low participation of LICs in the survey.

Rejection rates. The surveys provide some more limited – and illustrative – evidence on rejection rates. Results need to be interpreted with considerable caution as respondents were asked essentially qualitative questions, which complicates efforts to aggregate them into one answer. On this basis, surveys suggest marginally higher rates of rejection in the case of corrections for EMs than for AMs, but even higher rates of rejection for LICs (particularly in the survey of mission chiefs). By contrast, in the case of deletions, the rejection rate is systematically higher for AMs, suggesting no bias in their favor in this category.










11. Those who claimed that the policy is not being implemented evenhandedly tended to cite the larger number of modifications in favor of AMs. They attributed the results to the greater leverage of these countries to push through their proposals. Some respondents pointed out, however, that unlike in the past, the dividing line is more between larger economies—including influential emerging markets—and smaller countries that lack the administrative capacity or clout to lobby for changes. Staff takes the view that *ex post* modification rates are a poor indicator of evenhandedness, because they are heavily influenced by the rates of requests for modifications, which largely lie outside staff's control (Box 2).

E. Reforms to the Transparency Policy

Views on 2009 reforms

12. All groups broadly supported the reforms that came into effect after the last review.³

Response rates to this question were low, with half the Executive Directors, 42 percent of country authorities, and around 30 percent of mission chiefs expressing no view. Of those with a view, around two-thirds of mission chiefs and country authorities agreed to some or a great extent that the 2009 reforms had made the policy more flexible, while 89 percent of Directors with a view thought the policy had become more effective. Negative views were concentrated among country authorities, with



11 percent of respondents—mainly from EMs and LICs—judging that the 2009 reforms had done nothing to make the policy more flexible


Options for further changes


13. The respondents' views on the consequences of making the policy on modifications more flexible varied.

 An equal share of country authorities thought that greater flexibility would reduce the risk of reports being misinterpreted and improve candor. While agreeing on the need for greater flexibility, Executive Directors and mission chiefs generally believed that this could come at the cost of less candid staff reports.

³ The key change was the introduction of evident ambiguity as a new reason for corrections.

- A large majority of Directors and mission chiefs thought that more flexibility would result in more publication, whereas only a small number of country authorities (all from LICs), supported that view. Some mission chiefs and Executive Directors (20 percent in each group) thought that publication rates would be unaffected.
- Although a majority of Directors and mission chiefs thought that greater flexibility would make it easier to strike reasonable agreements with stakeholders, a higher share of both groups were worried that this would make it harder for them to resist unreasonable requests Most mission chiefs also expressed concerns about the additional staff time that would be required to respond to requests.
- 14. Surveys indicate that country authorities and mission chiefs see no need for major changes to strengthen safeguards in the transparency policy. Most country authorities responding to the survey thought that the current transparency rules provide adequate protection against adverse market reactions, premature release of information on planned policies, possible misinterpretation of information in reports by the public, and disclosure of confidential information. However, views varied across regions, with lower support in Africa and the Americas as regards adverse market reactions, and in the Middle East concerning confidential information. While most mission chiefs did not have an opinion, the majority of those who responded thought there was no need to tighten confidentiality understandings. Mission chiefs who felt a need to tighten these agreements were predominantly those working on LICs and EMs (13 percent of both groups), and from a regional perspective only those working in the Middle East (31 percent of the total) versus less than 10 percent of mission chiefs working on other regions.





Appendix I. Methodology and Survey Results

- 1. Staff conducted five separate surveys of stakeholders to create an evidence base for the review. The surveys were distributed by email in January/February 2013, and responses were provided anonymously. The surveys included questions to help stratify the results by various categories, including income level, size (G-20 as a proxy for a large country), region, program or non-program country. To ensure the confidentiality of all responses, no individual respondents were identified and the survey results were provided in aggregate groupings that are large enough to ensure the anonymity of respondents.
- 2. The response rate varied significantly among the various groups. The highest response rates came from those inside the Fund, namely Executive Directors and IMF mission chiefs, with responses rates in both cases similar to the level for the surveys conducted for the 2011 TSR. However, lower rates were recorded for country authorities and the media, in the latter cases considerably below the 2011 TSR result. The response rate for the survey of financial markets was too low for inclusion.

2013 Transparency Review: Survey Statistics

		No. of Responses			
Survey	No. of Surveys Sent	Received	Response Rate (i	n percent)	Comment
			Transparency 2013	TSR 2011	
Country Authorities	362	102	28.2	32.9	_
Executive Directors	24	20	83.3	75.0	
IMF Mission Chiefs	163	97	59.5	61.7	
Media	90	12	13.3	32.2	
Financial markets	320	8	2.5	13.7	Not Used

Two main problems emerged. The response rate for financial markets was deemed too low for inclusion, which deprives the review of a potentially useful source of views. Also, response rates varied by region, and thus the sample of respondents to a survey may not be fully representative of the original population targeted. Results are made available by relevant subsets in the tables that follow.

Appendix, Table 1. Transparency Policy Review Country Authorities' Survey Results 1/

							Distribut	ion of an	swer in p	ercentag	je				
				Ву і	income le	vel			By regio			G-20 or	non-G-20	IMF Pro	gram?
			Overall	Advanced E	moraina	Low income	Africa	Asia Pacific		Middle East	Americas	C 20	Non-G-20	Yes	No
		Number of Responses 2/	102	32	merging 46	24	Airica 12	Pacific 15	42	14	Americas 19	15	87	21	81
	Partici	pation Rate (in Percentage)	28.2	32	40	24	12		72		13	13	0,		01
		Strongly disagree	39	61	33	21	17	36	54	43	21	53	36	52	35
1. The 2007-08 financial		Disagree	34	29	29	50	25	50	24	29	53	27	35	19	38
crisis made us more		Neutral	19	10	27	17	42	14	20	14	11	13	20	19	19
reluctant to publish our		Agree	5	-	4	13	17	-	-	14	5	-	6	10	4
country reports.		Strongly agree	3	-	7	-	-	-	2	-	11	7	2	-	4
		Weighted average score 3/	1.99	1.48	2.22	2.21	2.58	1.79	1.73	2.00	2.32	1.80	2.02	1.86	2.03
		Not at all	61	64	72	35	55	67	67	38	67	67	60	41	66
	The political process in	Slightly	25	24	13	50	27	33	24	31	13	17	26	29	24
	your country	To some extent	12	12	13	10	9	-	9	31	13	8	13	24	9
	,,	To a great extent	2	-	3	5	9	-	-	-	7	8	1	6	1
		Weighted average score	1.56	1.48	1.46	1.85	1.73	1.33	1.42	1.92	1.60	1.58	1.56	1.94	1.46
2. To what extent did															
any of the following cause the message of		Not at all	80	88	85	56	44	91	91	83	67	82	80	69	83
the reports on your		Slightly	13	8	5	38	44	-	6	17	13	18	12	25	9
country to be "watered	Staff or IMF management	To some extent	5	4	5	6	11	9	-	-	13	-	6	6	5
down"?		To a great extent	3	-	5	-	-	-	3	-	7	-	3	-	3
		Weighted average score	1.30	1.16	1.31	1.50	1.67	1.18	1.15	1.17	1.60	1.18	1.32	1.38	1.28
		Not at all	80	93	91	20	-	75	93	50	100	80	80	40	88
		Slightly	7	-	-	40	-	25	-	25	-	-	8	20	4
	Others	To some extent	3	7	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	4	-	4
		To a great extent	10	-	9	40	100	-	-	25	-	20	8	40	4
		Weighted average score	1.43	1.14	1.27	2.60	4.00	1.25	1.14	2.00	1.00	1.60	1.40	2.40	1.24

^{1/} Country authority surveys were sent to both the central bank/financial supervision agency and the ministry of finance/treasury of each member country.

^{2/} A weighted average was used to convert the responses to questions to select one from four or five answer choices to a 4-point or 5-point scale to make the responses more comparable across questions.

Appendix, Table 1. Transparency Policy Review Country Authorities' Survey Results (continued)

									answer in p						
				В	y income level			By	region			G-20 or non	-G-20	IMF Progr	am?
								Asia		Middle					
			Overall	Advanced	Emerging Lo	w-income	Africa	Pacific	Europe	East	Americas	G-20 No	on-G-20	Yes	No
3. To your knowledge did any of the following	The political process in the country concerned		32	34	28	38	25	33	33	43	26	27	33	29	33
cause the message of the reports on other countries to be	Staff or IMF management		21	28	17	17	17	20	21	7	32	33	18	19	21
"watered down"?(Please mark all			48	41	52	50	58	60	45	29	53	27	52	57	46
that apply)	Others		9	13	9	4	8	-	7	14	16	33	5	10	9
		Not at all	87	100	93	61	71	75	100	80	83	100	85	87	88
	Concerns on possibility/continuation of	Slightly	6	-	-	22	14	17	-	-	8	-	7	7	5
	an IMF arrangement	To some extent	7	-	7	17	14	8	-	20	8	-	8	7	7
		To a great extent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-
4. Aside from pressures from other parties in		Weighted average score	1.20	1.00	1.13	1.56	1.43	1.33	1.00	1.40	1.25	1.00	1.23	1.20	1.20
question 3, did any of		Not at all	71	96	68	47	50	85	84	45	65	83	69	56	75
the following factors	Concerns about risk of	Slightly	14	4	8	37	25	15	10	27	6	-	16	31	9
constrain you in	leaks	To some extent	9	-	11	16	25	-	3	18	12	-	10	13	8
consenting to the publication of a candid		To a great extent	6	-	14	-	-	-	3	9	18	17	4	-	8
staff report?		Weighted average score	1.50	1.04	1.70	1.68	1.75	1.15	1.26	1.91	1.82	1.50	1.50	1.56	1.48
		Not at all	81	92	83	50	-	75	93	40	88	83	80	75	81
	Other Factors	Slightly	10	8	-	33	-	25	-	20	13	17	8	25	7
	Ollioi i doloi 3	To some extent	3	-	-	17	-	-	-	20	-	-	4	-	4
		To a great extent	6	-	17	-	-	-	7	20	-	-	8	-	7
		Weighted average score	1.35	1.08	1.50	1.67	-	1.25	1.21	2.20	1.13	1.17	1.40	1.25	1.37
5. Did you request any corrections on the reports on your		No	28	24	27	33	75	21	28	15	11	21	29	43	24
country?		Yes	72	76	73	67	25	79	72	85	89	79	71	57	76

Appendix, Table 1. Transparency Policy Review Country Authorities' Survey Results (continued)

						Distribu	tion of a	nswer in p	percenta	ge				
			В	y income l	evel			By regio			G-20 c	r non-G-20	IMF Pro	gram?
							Asia		Middle					
		Overall	Advanced	Emerging	Low-income	Africa	Pacific	Europe	East	Americas	G-20	Non-G-20	Yes	No
	Yes, all the requests were approved	18	9	28	8	33	33	14	30	6	-	21	20	18
	Most of the requests were approved	42	64	28	38	67	22	57	40	24	55	39	50	40
6. Were the requests for corrections approved?	Some requests were approved	25	18	28	31	-	22	14	30	47	36	23	-	30
	Only a few of the requests were approved	13	9	13	23	_	22	14	-	18	9	14	30	11
	None of the requests were approved	1	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	2	-	2
7. Did you request any deletions on the reports	No	63	72	61	54	100	57	67	54	42	57	64	76	59
on your country?	Yes	37	28	39	46	-	43	33	46	58	43	36	24	41
	Yes, all the requests were approved	12	13	13	10	-	-	8	20	20	17	11	-	13
	Most of the requests were approved	21	25	25	10	-	17	38	20	-	17	21	-	23
8. Were the requests for deletions approved?	Some requests were approved	38	25	38	50	-	50	31	60	30	50	36	50	37
	Only a few of the requests were approved	24	25	19	30	-	33	23	_	30	_	29	50	20
	None of the requests were approved	6	13	6	_	-	-	-	_	20	17	4	_	7
	Strongly disagree	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	1	-	1
9. All the important	Disagree	3	7	2	-	-	7	3	-	5	7	2	-	4
economic information	Neutral	6	-	7	13	25	-	3	8	5	-	7	5	6
was included in the	Agree	76	77	75	78	58	93	78	75	74	87	74	85	74
staff reports for your	Strongly agree	13	17	14	9	17	-	18	17	11	7	15	10	14
country.	Weighted average score	3.98	4.03	3.95	3.96	3.92	3.86	4.10	4.08	3.79	3.93	3.99	4.05	3.96

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Appendix, Table 1. Transparency Policy Review Country Authorities' Survey Results (continued)

						Distribu	tion of ar	nswer in p	ercentac	ne				
			В	y income le	evel			By regio		,,,	G-20 o	r non-G-20	IMF Pro	gram?
							Asia		Middle					Ĭ
		Overall	Advanced	Emerging	Low-income	Africa	Pacific	Europe	East	Americas	G-20	Non-G-20	Yes	No
10. Are you familiar	No	18	28	11	17	33	8	20	-	21	20	17	10	20
with the IMF's rules on	Somewhat	30	17	32	42	42	31	28	54	11	13	33	38	28
corrections?	Yes	53	55	57	42	25	62	53	46	68	67	50	52	53
corrections:	Weighted average score	2.35	2.28	2.45	2.25	1.92	2.54	2.33	2.46	2.47	2.47	2.33	2.43	2.33
11. Would you agree	Not at all	6	-	13	-	-	-	5	-	15	-	8	-	8
that the IMF's rules on corrections allow for	Slightly	10	7	8	22	33	13	5	20	8	-	13	22	8
the preparation of	To some extent	42	20	54	44	33	50	37	60	38	50	39	33	44
candid staff reports for	To a great extent	42	73	25	33	33	38	53	20	38	50	39	44	41
your country?	Weighted average score	3.19	3.67	2.92	3.11	3.00	3.25	3.37	3.00	3.00	3.50	3.11	3.22	3.18
12. Are you familiar	No	23	23	20	29	50	14	20	23	21	20	24	29	22
with the IMF's rules on	Somewhat	34	23	32	50	33	43	33	46	21	20	36	38	32
deletions?	Yes	43	53	48	21	17	43	48	31	58	60	40	33	45
ueledolis:	Weighted average score	2.19	2.30	2.27	1.92	1.67	2.29	2.28	2.08	2.37	2.40	2.16	2.05	2.23
13. Would you agree	Not at all	5	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	18	-	6	-	6
that the IMF's rules on deletions allow for the	Slightly	12	7	14	20	50	17	11	-	9	-	16	29	9
preparation of candid	To some extent	54	47	57	60	50	50	56	75	45	67	50	57	53
staff reports for your	To a great extent	29	47	19	20	-	33	33	25	27	33	28	14	32
country?	Weighted average score	3.07	3.40	2.86	3.00	2.50	3.17	3.22	3.25	2.82	3.33	3.00	2.86	3.12

Appendix, Table 1. Transparency Policy Review Country Authorities' Survey Results (continued) Distribution of answer in percentage By income level G-20 or non-G-20 IMF Program? By region Asia Middle Advanced Emerging Low-income East Americas G-20 Non-G-20 Overall Africa Pacific Europe Yes 14. The IMF's rules on No corrections are sufficiently flexible Yes Result in more candid 15. Indicate how more flexibility in the IMF's rules on corrections in Result in more publication. staff reports would help Reduce the possibility of misinterpretation of Not at all Slightly Adverse market reactions To some extent To a great extent Weighted average score 2.91 3.21 2.88 2.59 2.75 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.69 3.08 2.88 2.72 2.97 Release of information on planned policies that could Slightly undermine the authorities' To some extent 16. Do you think that the effort to implement their To a great extent policies IMF's transparency Weighted average score 2.67 3.06 2.96 3.39 2.85 2.86 2.92 3.15 2.75 2.81 3.15 2.93 2.61 rules provide adequate Not at all protection against the Possible misinterpretation following? Slightly of messages and/or To some extent information by the general public To a great extent Weighted average score 2.89 3.17 2.79 2.78 3.25 2.50 3.09 3.00 2.53 2.54 2.96 2.83 2.91 Not at all Slightly Disclosure of information provided to staff on a To some extent confidential basis To a great extent Weighted average score 2.99 3.36 2.95 2.61 3.00 2.69 3.24 2.93 3.25 2.94 2.72 3.06

Appendix, Table 1. Transparency Policy Review Country Authorities' Survey Results (continued)

							Distribu	tion of ar	nswer in p	ercenta	ge				
				В	y income l	evel			By regio			G-20 c	r non-G-20	IMF Pro	gram?
			Overall	Advanced	Emerging	Low-income	Africa	Asia Pacific	Europe	Middle East	Americas	G-20	Non-G-20	Yes	No
17. Did the reforms introduced in 2009, such		Not at all	10	-	10	20	33	-	-	14	30	-	12	23	7
as the addition of a new		Slightly	22	29	17	27	-	45	29	14	-	13	24	31	20
justification ("evident ambiguity") for		To some extent	60	64	62	53	67	55	67	57	50	75	58	46	64
corrections, make the Transparency Policy		To a great extent	7	7	10	-	-	-	4	14	20	13	6	-	9
more flexible?		Weighted average score	2.64	2.79	2.72	2.33	2.33	2.55	2.75	2.71	2.60	3.00	2.58	2.23	2.76
		Not discussed/NA	3	-	2	8	8	7	-	-	5	-	4	5	3
		Insufficien	4	3	-	13	8	14	3	-	-	-	5	10	3
	In your country	Useful	28	27	27	29	50	21	30	15	21	40	25	33	26
	in your country	Appropriate	61	70	64	46	33	57	68	77	58	53	63	48	65
18.The information in		Too alarmist	4	-	7	4	-	-	-	8	16	7	4	5	4
IMF reports on risks surrounding the		Weighted average score	3.59	3.67	3.73	3.25	3.08	3.29	3.65	3.92	3.79	3.67	3.58	3.38	3.65
macroeconomic outlook		Not discussed/NA	11	7	9	21	33	-	8	-	21	13	11	14	10
was		Insufficien	13	17	11	13	-	14	13	15	21	20	12	14	13
	In other countries	Useful	23	13	27	29	42	29	20	23	16	27	23	33	21
		Appropriate	49	63	45	38	25	57	58	54	37	40	51	38	52
		Too alarmist	3	-	7	-	-	-	3	8	5	-	4	-	4
		Weighted average score	3.19	3.33	3.30	2.83	2.58	3.43	3.35	3.54	2.84	2.93	3.24	2.95	3.26
19. In your view to what		Not at all	6	-	15	-	-	-	4	-	30	8	6	-	7
extent is the IMF's		Slightly	20	5	19	39	43	18	7	50	20	23	20	60	13
Transparency Policy		To some extent	53	74	37	56	14	55	75	38	30	46	55	20	59
applied evenhandedly across countries?		To a great extent	20	21	30	6	43	27	14	13	20	23	20	20	20
		Weighted average score	2.88	3.16	2.81	2.67	3.00	3.09	3.00	2.63	2.40	2.85	2.88	2.60	2.93

							Distribu	ion of ar	nswer in p	ercentac	ge				
				В	y income le	evel			By regio	n		G-20 o	r non-G-20	IMF Pro	ogran
			Overall	Advanced	Emerging	Low-income	Africa	Asia	Europe	Middle	Americas	G-20	Non-G-20	Yes	
20.To what degree do															
oncerns about the		Not at all	57	85	46	42	56	36	71	30	61	46	59	56	
MF's external ssessments (including		Slightly	16	-	22	26	33	27	3	30	17	8	17	25	
xchange rate ssessments) hinder the		To some extent	22	15	24	26	11	27	24	30	17	38	19	13	
cternal publication of aff reports for your		To a great extent	5	-	8	5	-	9	3	10	6	8	4	6	
ountry?		Weighted average score	1.74	1.31	1.95	1.95	1.56	2.09	1.59	2.20	1.67	2.08	1.68	1.69	
		Not at all	51	87	42	26	44	23	78	27	38	33	55	35	
	The need for internal	Slightly	26	13	28	37	11	46	22	-	46	33	24	41	
	discussions among our	To some extent	18	-	22	32	22	31	-	55	15	17	18	12	
	authorities	To a great extent	5	-	8	5	22	-	-	18	-	17	3	12	
		Weighted average score	1.77	1.13	1.97	2.16	2.22	2.08	1.22	2.64	1.77	2.17	1.70	2.00	
. To what extent were		Not at all	40	67	33	20	44	23	55	40	21	36	41	38	
gs in publication of	Discussions on	Slightly	32	21	27	55	44	46	23	30	36	45	30	44	
our country's staff	corrections/deletions	To some extent	21	13	24	25	11	31	19	20	21	18	21	19	
port the result of the llowing?		To a great extent	6	-	15	-	-	-	3	10	21	-	8	-	
illowing?		Weighted average score	1.94	1.46	2.21	2.05	1.67	2.08	1.71	2.00	2.43	1.82	1.95	1.81	
		Not at all	82	86	86	67	100	67	86	100	67	83	82	-	
		Slightly	6	14	-	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	9	-	
	Others	To some extent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
		To a great extent	12	-	14	33	-	33	-	-	33	17	9	100	
		Weighted average score	1.41	1.14	1.43	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.14	1.00	2.00	1.50	1.36	4.00	

Α	ppendix, Table 1. T	ransparency Policy	Review	/ Coun	try Auth	oritie	es' Su	ırvey	Resu	ults (co	onclu	ded)		
						Distribu	ution of a	nswer in		ge				
				By income	evel		Asia	By region	on Middle		G-20 c	or non-G-20	IMF Pr	ogram?
		Over	Advance	d Emerging	Low-income	Africa				Americas	G-20	Non-G-20	Yes	No
	Existing policies on public access to the Fund's archives are appropriate, and I do not favor any further reductions in the waiting periods.	4:	3 47	57	33	42	27	50	50	63	80	43	43	49
	The three-year time period for access to Board papers is too long	2	, 28	22	38	17	33	29	29	26	13	30	24	28
	Earlier release of Board papers would affect candor	11) 6	5 11	13	8	20	5	14	11	27	7	5	11
22. The Fund has been making efforts to facilitate public access to its Archives.	The five-year time period for access to Executive Board minutes is too long	3	34	30	42	17	53	31	36	37	20	37	24	37
	Earlier release of Board minutes would affect the candor of Board discussions	1:	2 16	9	13	8	20	10	7	16	33	8	10	12
	It does not matter when Board minutes are released, as long as the staff reports are published on time	2	3 13	26	29	33	33	17	29	16	7	25	29	21
	The release of Board minutes is more important to me than the release of staff reports		3	7	8	8	20	2	7	-	-	7	-	7

								Dist	tribution	of answer in	percentage						
			By	y income leve	el		Ву	region			G-20 or r	non-G-20			IMF Pro		
															All or most of the countries		
													Some are	country	in my	my	
													G-20,		constituency		
		Overall	Advanced	Farancian	Low-income	Africa A	Asia Pacific	Europe	Middle	Americas	C 20	Non-G-20	others are non-G20	without a program	have programs	have	
	Number of Responses	20	Advanced 8	emerging 9	LOW-INCOME 3	2 AITICA P	ASIA PACIFIC	Europe 7	EdSt 3	Americas 4	8		7	program 5		programs 4	programs
	Participation Rate (in Percentage)	83.3	· ·	•		-		•		•	·	•	•	·	-		
In the five years preceding the financial	Strongly disagree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
crisis, the Fund generally published reports on	Disagree	10	2	16	14	-	-	1	35	22	-	20	14	-	-	-	22
countries in your	Neutral	30	12	39	50	57	70	-	35	31	38	20	29	20	50	25	33
constituency within one month of the board	Agree	35	45	28	29	43	30	49	15	24	25	20	57	40	50	25	33
meeting.	Strongly agree	25	41	17	6	-	-	49	15	24	38	40	-	40	-	50	11
	Weighted average score 3/	3.75	4.24	3.46	3.28	3.43	3.30	4.47	3.08	3.49	4.00	3.80	3.43	4.20	3.50	4.25	3.33
2. In the aftermath of the	Strongly disagree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
financial crisis, the Fund	Disagree	10	2	16	14	-	-	1	35	22	-	20	14	-	-	-	22
has generally published reports on countries in	Neutral	25	12	28	50	57	70	-	-	31	25	20	29	-	50	25	33
your constituency within	Agree	45	57	39	29	43	30	63	50	24	38	40	57	60	50	50	33
one month.	Strongly agree	20	28	17	6	-	-	36	15	24	38	20	-	40		25	11
	Weighted average score	3.75	4.12	3.57	3.28	3.43	3.30	4.33	3.44	3.49	4.13	3.60	3.43	4.40	3.50	4.00	3.33
	Strongly disagree	10	4	17	6			8	50		13	20		20			11
3. The 2007-08 financial	Disagree	50	47	39	91	100	10	64	15	53	38		71	40	100	25	
crisis made us more	Neutral	35	37	44	3	100	90	14	35	47	50		29	40	100	50	
reluctant to publish our	Agree	5	12	-	-		-	14	-	-	-	20	-	-		25	
country reports.	Strongly agree	-	-						_			-				-	
	Weighted average score	2.35	2.58	2.27	1.96	2.00	2.90	2.33	1.85	2.47	2.38	2.40	2.29	2.20	2.00	3.00	2.22

^{1/} A weighted average was used to convert the responses to questions to select one from four or five answer choices to a 5-point scale to make the responses more comparable across questions.

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		Distribution	of answer in per	rcentage													
			By income level			By region					G-20 or non-	-G-20	Some are G-20,	IMF Program? A single- country constituency	the countries in my	f None of the countries in my constituency	countri my
									Middle				others are	without a	have	have	have
		Overall	Advanced Em				Asia Pacific		East A	mericas			non-G20	program	programs	programs	progra
In the past few years w often have	Never	10 65	- 82	11 60	34 32	43 43	- 60	14 63	85	71	13 63	20 60	- 71	20 60			_
w often nave thorities in your	Occasionally	65	82	60	32	43	60	63	85	/1	63	60	/1	60	50	/5	•
nstituency requested	Frequently	25	18	28	34	14	40	23	15	29	25	20	29	20		25	5
corrections on the	-1,																
orts on countries?	Weighted average score	2.15	2.18	2.17	2.01	1.71	2.40	2.09	2.15	2.29	2.13	2.00	2.29	2.00	1.50	2.25	
	Yes, all the requests were																
	approved Most of the requests were	11	-	25	-	-	-	-	35	24	14	-	14	25	-	-	
	approved	50	81	27	17	_	60	81	_	45	71	25	43	75	-	75	5
lease indicate if the	Only a few of the requests	50											- 13	.,,		,,	
uests were generally	were approved	22	16	31	14		30	9	50	24	14	50	14	_		25	5
roved.	Some of the requests were																
	approved	17	4	17	69	100	10	9	15	8	-	25	29	-	100	-	
	None of the requests were																
	approved	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
the past few years																	_
often have	Never	25 75	25 75	22	34	43	30 70	14	35	24 76	50 50	20	-	60 40	50		
orities in your	Occasionally	/5	/5	78	66	57	70	86	65	/6	50	80	100	40	50	/5)
stituency requested	Frequently	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	
deletions on the orts on countries?	,																
orts on countries?	Weighted average score	1.75	1.75	1.78	1.66	1.57	1.70	1.86	1.65	1.76	1.50	1.80	2.00	1.40	1.50	1.75	
	Yes, all the requests were	_															
	approved Most of the requests were	7	-	15	-	-	-	-	-	31	-	-	14	-	-	-	
	Most of the requests were approved	53	68	48	26	_	43	75	23	59	75	50	43	100		100)
ease indicate if the	Only a few of the requests	33								- 33	,,,	30	- 15	100		200	
ests were generally	were approved	20	21	21	14		43	9	77	-	25	50	-	_			
oved.	Some of the requests were																
	approved	20	11	16	60	100	14	16	-	10	-	-	43	-	100	-	
	None of the requests were																
	approved		_	_	_	_	_	_	-	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	

Appendix, Table 2. Transparency Policy Review Executive Directors' Survey Results (continued)

										id ibudion (of answer in p							
				Ву	income level			Ву	region			G-20 or no	n-G-20			IMF Prog		
																All or most of		
															-	the countries	countries in	countries in
														Some are	country	in my	my 	m _i
										Middle				G-20, others are	constituency without a	constituency have	constituency have	constituenc
			Overall	Advanced	Emerging L	ow-income	Africa A	Asia Pacific	Europe		Americas	G-20 N	Ion-G-20	non-G20	program	programs	programs	programs
		Strongly disagree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	program -	programs -	programs -	program
. All the important		Disagree	5	-	10	3	-	-	-	35	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	1
conomic information was		Neutral	15	12	17	17	14	40	-	-	31	13	-	29	20	-	25	1
cluded in the staff		Agree	50	39	52	74	86	60	37	50	45	50	40	57	40	100	25	5
eports for countries in		Strongly agree	30	49	21	6	-	-	63	15	24	38	40	14	40	-	50	2
our constituency.		Weighted average score	4.05	4.37	3.83	3.84	3.86	3.60	4.63	3.44	3.92	4.25	4.00	3.86	4.20	4.00	4.25	3.89
1. The rules on deletions		Strongly disagree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
nd corrections allow for		Disagree	5	-	10	3	-	-	-	35	-	-	20	-	=	-	-	1
e preparation of candid		Neutral	25	25	26	23	43	60	14	-	24	38	-	29	40	50	-	2
taff reports for countries		Agree	55	47	58	68	57	40	64	50	53	38	60	71	40	50	75	5
n my constituency.		Strongly agree	15	28	6	6	-	-	22	15	24	25	20	-	20	-	25	1
		Weighted average score	3.80	4.04	3.59	3.78	3.57	3.40	4.08	3.44	4.00	3.88	3.80	3.71	3.80	3.50	4.25	3.67
		Not at all	5	-	10	3	-	-	-	35	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	1:
	******************	Slightly	25	28	28	6	-	60	8	50	24	38	20	14	40	-	25	2
	Adverse market reactions	To some extent	30	23	24	68	86	-	29	-	45	13	20	57	20	100	-	3
		To a great extent	40	49	37	23	14	40	63	15	31	50	40	29	40	-	75	3
		Weighted average score	3.05	3.21	2.89	3.11	3.14	2.80	3.55	1.94	3.08	3.13	2.80	3.14	3.00	3.00	3.50	2.89
. Abstracting from the	Release of information on	Not at all	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
eparate risk of leaks, do	planned policies that could	Slightly	25	27	28	11	-	60	1	35	45	38	-	29	40	-	25	2
ou think that the rules on eletions provide	undermine the authorities' ability to implement these	To some extent	40	40	24	86	100	10	58	29	8	25	60	43	40	100	-	4
dequate protection	policies	To a great extent	35	33	48	3	-	30	41	35	47	38	40	29	20	-	75	3
gainst the following?		Weighted average score	3.10	3.06	3.19	2.92	3.00	2.70	3.40	3.00	3.02	3.00	3.40	3.00	2.80	3.00	3.50	3.11
	Baranta and data and data	Not at all	10	4	16	9	-	-	8	50	-	-	40	-	-	-	-	2
	Possible misinterpretation of messages and/or information		25	37	22	-	-	60	14	35	24	50	-	14	60	-	25	1
	by the general public	To some extent	35	35	18	84	100	10	42	-	29	13	40	57	20	100	25	3
	a, and general public	To a great extent	30	24	43	6	-	30	36	15	47	38	20	29	20	-	50	3
		Weighted average score	2.85	2.80	2.88	2.88	3.00	2.70	3.06	1.79	3.24	2.88	2.40	3.14	2.60	3.00	3.25	2.78

Appendix, Table 2. Transparency Policy Review Executive Directors' Survey Results (continued)

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

									Dist	tribution o	of answer in pe	ercentage						
				Ву	income level			Ву	region			G-20 or non	n-G-20			IMF Prog	ram?	
																All or most of	None of the	Some of the
															A single-	the countries	countries in	countries in
														Some are	country	in my	my	my
														G-20,	,	constituency	,	constituency
			Overall	Advanced	Emerging Lo	uu incomo	Africa A	ria Dacific		Middle East	Americas	G-20 N		others are non-G20	without a	have	have	have
		Not at all	Overali 44	Advanced 68	28	15	Allica A	33	Europe 66	41	Americas 49	G-20 N	25	40	program 50	programs	programs 50	programs 50
	Reduce the possibility of	Slightly	13	28	-	-	_	33	21	-	-	29	-	-	50	-	-	-
	misinterpretation of	To some extent	19		35	30	50	-		_	51	-	-	60	-	50	25	17
	information	To a great extent	25	4	37	56	50	33	13	59	-	14	75	-	_	50	25	33
		Weighted average score	2.25	1.40	2.82	3.27	3.50	2.33	1.59	2.76	2.02	1.71	3.25	2.20	1.50	3.50	2.25	2.33
		Not at all	31	54	12	15	-	-	66	-	49	29	25	40	25	-	50	33
	Make your job easier, e.g., by	Slightly	31	46	23	8	-	67	34	59	-	57	25	-	75	-	-	33
	facilitating reasonable 4ments with the stakeholders	To some extent	13	-	30	-	-	33	-	-	26	14	-	20	-	-	25	17
. More flexibility in the les on corrections (as	4ments with the stakeholders	To a great extent	25	-	34	77	100	-	-	41	26	-	50	40	-	100	25	17
posed to current rule		Weighted average score	2.31	1.46	2.86	3.40	4.00	2.33	1.34	2.83	2.28	1.86	2.75	2.60	1.75	4.00	2.25	2.17
	Make your job more difficult,	Not at all	20	16	14	47	50	50	-	41	-	17	50	-	-	50	-	33
tual errors,	e.g., by increasing the	Slightly	27	33	20	30	50	-	21	-	51	33	-	40	33	50	50	-
- 5p	number of requests for	To some extent	20	16	30	-	-	50	21	-	26	33	-	20	33	-	25	17
	changes	To a great extent	33	35	35	23	-	-	57	59	23	17	50	40	33	-	25	50
e authorities' views, and		Weighted average score	2.67	2.70	2.87	1.99	1.50	2.00	3.36	2.76	2.72	2.50	2.50	3.00	3.00	1.50	2.75	2.83
dent ambiguity)		Not at all	38	5	63	51	50	50	11	50	51	17	60	40	-	50	50	43
uld	Result in less candid reports	Slightly	19	47	-	-	-	50	38	-	-	50	-	-	67	-	-	14
	Result III less caridia reports	To some extent	31	31	30	35	50	-	30	50	26	33	20	40	33	50	25	29
		To a great extent	13	18	7	13	-	-	21	-	23	-	20	20	-	-	25	14
		Weighted average score	2.19	2.62	1.82	2.11	2.00	1.50	2.60	2.00	2.21	2.17	2.00	2.40	2.33	2.00	2.25	2.14
	Result in more staff reports	Not at all	29	26	33	21	-	-	39	15	66	-	20	60	-	-	-	57
	being published on the	Slightly	7	23	-	-	-	50	-	-	-	25	-	-	-	-	-	14
	external website	To some extent	43	52	40	35	50	-	61	50	34	50	40	40	100	50	67	14
		To a great extent	21	-	27	44	50	50	-	35	-	25	40	-	-	50	33	14
		Weighted average score	2.57	2.26	2.61	3.01	3.50	3.00	2.22	3.06	1.69	3.00	3.00	1.80	3.00	3.50	3.33	1.86

Reduce the possibility of misinterpretation of information Reduce the possibility of misinterpretation of information To some extent To a great extent Weighted average score 225 1.72 2 Make your job easier, e.g., by facilitating reasonable 4ments with the stakeholders To a great extent 18. More flexibility in the rules on deletions (as opposed to current rule limiting deletions to highly e.g., by increasing the market sensitive material number of requests for To some extent 27 27 and premature disclosure of policy intentions) would Result in less candid reports Result in more staff reports Not at all 44 51 30 30 missing the Slightly 15 some extent 25 4 4 267 2 Not at all 48 29 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30	ne level	By									
Reduce the possibility of misinterpretation of information To some extent To a great extent Weighted average score 2.25 1.72 Amake your job easier, e.g., by facilitating reasonable 4ments with the stakeholders To some extent Weighted average score 2.25 1.72 2 Not at all 38 58 Slightly 19 28 4ments with the stakeholders To some extent 19 14 To some extent 19 14 To some extent 25 - Weighted average score 2.31 1.56 2 Weighted average score 2.31 1.56 2 Slightly 27 33 arrived sensitive material number of requests for To some extent 27 27 To some extent 27 24 Slightly 27 33 To some extent 27 24 Slightly 25 31 To some extent 31 38 Weighted average score 2.60 2.59 2 Slightly 25 31 To some extent 31 38 Weighted average score 2.44 2.67 2 Not at all 32 21 Result in more staff reports Weighted average score 2.44 2.67 2 Not at all 32 21			region		G-20 or n	non-G-20			IMF Prog		
Reduce the possibility of misinterpretation of information Reduce the possibility of misinterpretation of information To some extent To a great extent Weighted average score 2.25 1.72 2.25 Make your job easier, e.g., by facilitating reasonable 4ments with the stakeholders To some extent 2.5 Make your job easier, e.g., by facilitating reasonable 4ments with the stakeholders To some extent 19 14 To some extent 25 - Weighted average score 2.31 1.56 2 Poposed to current rule miting deletions to highly e.g., by increasing the Meighted average score 2.31 1.56 2 33 33 34 30 To some extent 25 - Weighted average score 2.60 2.59 2 Slightly 25 31 To some extent 31 38 Weighted average score 2.60 2.59 2 Slightly 25 31 To some extent 31 38 Weighted average score 2.44 2.67 2 Not at all 38 Not at all 38 Not at all 38 Not at all 38 All to the picture of the pic	raina Low-income Afr	ica Asia Pacific	Midd Europe Eas'		C 20		Some are G-20, others are non-G20	A single- country constituency without a	have	countries in my constituency have	countri
Reduce the possibility of misinterpretation of information To some extent To a great extent Weighted average score Amake your job easier, e.g., by facilitating reasonable 4ments with the stakeholders Weighted average score Amake your job easier, e.g., by facilitating reasonable 4ments with the stakeholders Weighted average score Weighted average score 2.25 1.72 2 Not at all 38 58 Slightly 19 28 51 50 50 50 50 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 6	45 21	ICA ASIA PACIIIC		st Americas 50 74	43	40	50	program 50	programs	programs 50	1 7
misinterpretation of information To some extent To a great extent Weighted average score 2.25 1.72 2 Make your job easier, e.g., by facilitating reasonable 4ments with the stakeholders B. More flexibility in the siles on deletions (as plopsoed to current rule miting deletions to highly e.g., by increasing the mumber of requests for To some extent To a great extent 25 - Weighted average score 2.31 1.56 2 Make your job easier, e.g., by Sightly 19 28 Slightly 19 14 To some extent 20 16 Slightly 27 33 arket sensitive material number of requests for To some extent 27 27 To some extent 27 27 Weighted average score 2.60 2.59 2 Not at all 31 20 Not at all 31 20 Slightly 25 31 To some extent 31 38 Weighted average score 2.44 2.67 2 Not at all 32 21 Not at all 33 20 Not at all 34 25 Not at all 35 Not at all 36 Not at all 37 Not at all 38 Not at all Not at al		- 33	23		29	40	-	50		-	
To a great extent 25 4 Weighted average score 2.25 1.72 2 Make your job easier, e.g., by facilitating reasonable 4ments with the stakeholders To a great extent 19 14 To some extent 19 14 To a great extent 25 - Weighted average score 2.31 1.56 2 Weighted average score 2.31 1.56 2 Make your job more difficult, Not at all 20 16 Initing deletions to highly e.g., by increasing the arket sensitive material and premature disclosure of hanges To a great extent 27 27 Indigenal of the process of the arket sensitive material and premature disclosure of hanges To a great extent 27 27 Result in less candid reports Slightly 27 33 Not at all 30 20 Slightly 27 33 Not at all 30 20 Slightly 27 33 Slightly 27 33 Not at all 31 20 Slightly 27 33 Not at all 31 20 Slightly 25 31 To some extent 27 24 Slightly 25 31 To some extent 31 38 Weighted average score 2.44 2.67 2 Result in more staff reports (Weighted average score 2.44 2.67 2 Not at all 23 21	19 27	50 33		- 26	14		50		50	25	
Make your job easier, e.g., by facilitating reasonable 4ments with the stakeholders To some extent 19 14 14 15 16 25 15 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16	36 51	50 33	14	50 -	14	60	-		50	25	
Make your job easier, e.g., by facilitating reasonable 4ments with the stakeholders To some extent 19 14 14 15 10 a great extent 25 - 10 a great extent 25 - 10 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16	2.47 3.09 3.5	50 3.00	1.65 2.5	50 1.51	2.00	2.80	2.00	1.50	3.50	2.25	
facilitating reasonable Aments with the stakeholders I. More flexibility in the les on deletions (as poposed to current rule niting deletions to highly e.g., by increasing the policy intentions) Puld Result in less candid reports Facilitating reasonable Aments with the stakeholders To a great extent To a great extent 25 - Weighted average score 2.31 1.56 2 Make your job more difficult, Not at all 20 16 Slightly 27 33 arket sensitive material of policy intentions) Weighted average score 2.60 2.59 2 Not at all 31 20 Slightly 25 31 To some extent 27 24 Weighted average score 2.60 2.59 2 Slightly 25 31 To some extent 27 27 Value Not at all 31 38 Weighted average score 2.44 2.67 2 Not at all Result in more staff reports Not at all 23 21	20 23		79	17 49	29	50	40	25	-	50	
Aments with the stakeholders To some extent 19 14 To a great extent 25 - To a great extent 25 - Weighted average score 2.31 1.56 2 Make your job more difficult, Not at all 20 16 Weighted service sensitive material of premature disclosure policy intentions) Weighted average score 2.60 2.70 27 Aments with the stakeholders To a great extent 27 27 To some extent 20 16 Weighted average score 2.60 2.59 2 Not at all 31 20 Slightly 25 31 To some extent 27 27 To some extent 27 33 Weighted average score 2.60 2.59 2 Not at all 31 20 Slightly 25 31 To some extent 27 27 To some extent 27 33 To some extent 27 33 To some extent 27 32 To some extent 27 33 To some extent 27 33 To some extent 27 27 To a great extent 27 24 Weighted average score 2.60 2.59 2 Slightly 25 31 To some extent 31 38 Weighted average score 2.44 2.67 2 Not at all 23 21 Not at all 32 21	15 -	- 33	21	41 -	43	-	-	75	-	-	
Nore flexibility in the less on deletions (as proposed to current rule niting deletions to highly e.g., by increasing the arket sensitive material of premature disclosure policy intentions) Result in less candid reports Result in more staff reports To a great extent 22 11 1.56 2 Weighted average score 2.31 1.56 2 Slightly 27 33 3 To some extent 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27	30 -	- 67	-	- 26	29	-	20	-	-	25	
les on deletions (as possed to current rule niting deletions to highly e.g., by increasing the arket sensitive material of premature disclosure policy intentions) Not at all 20 16 Slightly 27 33 To some extent 27 27 Angreat extent 27 24 Weighted average score 2.60 2.59 2 Not at all 31 20 Slightly 25 31 Not at all 31 20 Slightly 25 31 To a great extent 27 24 Not at all 31 20 Slightly 25 31 To some extent 31 38 Weighted average score 2.44 2.67 2 Not at all 31 38 Weighted average score 2.44 2.67 2 Not at all 31 38 Weighted average score 2.44 2.67 2	34 77 1	.00 -	-	41 26	-	50	40	-	100	25	
riting deletions to highly e.g., by increasing the arket sensitive material number of requests for d premature disclosure policy intentions) Parket sensitive material number of requests for thanges To some extent 27 24 24 24 24 25 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 28 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29	2.78 3.31 4.0	00 2.67	1.21 2.6	66 2.28	2.00	2.50	2.60	1.75	4.00	2.25	
To some extent 27 27 27 27 27 27 28 28	14 47	50 50	-	41 -	17	50	-	-	50	-	
Description Premature disclosure Changes To a great extent 27 24	20 30	50 -	21	- 51	33	-	40	33	50	50	
Not at all September Sep	35 -	- 50	43	- 26	33	-	40	33	-	25	
Not at all 31 20	31 23		36	59 23	17	50	20	33	-	25	
Result in less candid reports Slightly 25 31	2.83 1.99 1.5	50 2.00	3.14 2.7	76 2.72	2.50	2.50	2.80	3.00	1.50	2.75	
To some extent	34 51	50 50	11	50 26	17	60	20	-	50	25	
To some extent 13 11 To a great extent 31 38 Weighted average score 2.44 2.67 2 Result in more staff reports Not at all 23 21 Clickly.	28 -	- 50	38	35 -	67	-	-	100	-	25	
Weighted average score 2.44 2.67 2 Not at all 23 21 Clickets.	19 -	-	19	- 26	-	-	40	-	-	-	
Result in more staff reports Not at all 23 21 Stabble.	19 49	50 -	32	15 49	17	40	40	-	50	50	
Result in more staff reports	2.22 2.46 2.5	50 1.50	2.71 1.7	79 2.98	2.17	2.20	3.00	2.00	2.50	2.75	
Cliabtly	28 15		30	- 66	-	-	60	-	-	-	
being published on the			-		-	-	-	-	-	-	
external website To some extent 46 79	38 8	- 50		59 34	75	50	20	100	-	67	
To a great extent 31 - Weighted overage score 2.85 2.59 2	34 77 1 2.79 3.48 4.0	.00 50	-	41 - 41 1.69	25 3.25	50	20 2.00	3.00	100 4.00	33 3.33	

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

									Dist	ribution o	of answer in p	ercentage						
				Ву	income level			Ву	region			G-20 or no	n-G-20			IMF Prog	ıram?	
																All or most of	None of the	Some
															A single-	the countries	countries in	coun
														Some are	country	in my	my	
														G-20,	constituency	constituency	constituency	const
										∕liddle				others are	without a	have	have	
			Overall	Advanced	Emerging Lo	w-income		sia Pacific	Europe	East	Americas		Non-G-20	non-G20	program	programs	programs	pr
	Communication with the	Not at all	27	47	-	34	43	-	38	-	31	60	20	-	100	50	25	
	authorities on the rules for	Slightly	33	42	20	40	57	57	38	-	10	20	20	60	-	50	25	
	corrections/deletions	To some extent	33	12	63	24	-	43	24	45	59	20	40	40	-	-	50	
	corrections/deletions	To a great extent	7	-	16	3	-	-	-	55	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	
		Weighted average score	2.20	1.65	2.96	1.96	1.57	2.43	1.86	3.55	2.28	1.60	2.60	2.40	1.00	1.50	2.25	
). To what extent were		Not at all	38	62	28	6	-	43	68	50	-	67	20	20	100		-	
	The internal IMF processes	Slightly	25	20	13	63	86	-	11	15	31	17	40	20		100	25	
our staff report the	on corrections/deletions	To some extent	25	18	30	28	14	14	21	-	69	-	20	60	_		50	
sult of the following?		To a great extent	13	-	29	3	14	43		35	-	17	20	-			25	
		Weighted average score	2.13	1.56	2.61	2.27	2.14	2.57	1.52	2.21	2.69	1.67	2.40	2.40	1.00	2.00	3.00	
				94						2.21								
		Not at all	60	• •	8	78	100	100	72	-	-	60	50	100	50	100	100	
	Other	Slightly	10	-	27	-	-	-	-	41	-	20	-	-	25	-	-	
		To some extent	10	6	14	15	-	-	11	17	-	-	25	-	-	-	-	
		To a great extent	20	-	51	7	-	-	18	41	-	20	25	-	25	-	-	
		Weighted average score	1.90	1.12	3.08	1.50	1.00	1.00	1.75	3.00	-	1.80	2.25	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	
	Existing policies on public		32	25	32	55	75	43	29	39	18	27	50	29	20	100	14	
	The three-year time period		16	20	15	11	13	7	14	22	22	13	13	21	10	-	43	
	Earlier release of Board papers would affect candor																	
). The Fund has been	TI . C		14	11	16	12	-	-	18	9	18	13	13	14	20	-	-	
aking efforts to facilitate	The five-year time period fo access to Executive Board																	
ublic access to its	minutes is too long		14	20	10	11	13	7	14	_	22	7	13	21	_	_	43	
chives.	Earlier release of Board											•						
	minutes would affect the																	
	candor of Board discussions		22	25	21	12		43	18	30	18	33	13	14	40			
	It does not matter when																	
	Board minutes are released,																	
	as long as the staff reports																	
	are nublished on time		3	-	5	-	-	-	7	-	-	7	-	-	10	-	-	
	The release of Board minute is more important to me that the release of staff reports.																	
	the release of staff reports			_	-	-	_		_		_							

			Distribution	of answer in	percentage	е									
				By income			By region	1				G-20 or n	on-G-20	IMF Pro	gram?
								Asia		Middle					
			Overall			Low-income			Europe		Americas	G-20	Non-G-20		No _
		Number of Responses Participation Rate (in Perc	97 59.5	17	40	40	27	14	22	13	21	12	85	43	5
		Yes, the report was published within one month of the Board discussion.	66	88	55	68	70	86	77	46	48	75	65	70	6
1. Was your staff report		Yes, the report was published, but with a lag longer than one-month.	23	6	30	23	15	14	18	31	38	25	22	21	2
oublished?		No, the report was not published.	11	6	15	10	15	-	5	23	14	_	13	9	1
		As far as I know, this country rarely or never publishes its staff reports.	_		-	-	_	_	-	-	-		-		-
		Strongly diagree	47	65	38	49	48	50	55	33	43	50	46	45	4
2. The 2007-08 financial		Disagree	34	29	33	38	41	43	32	33	24	42	33	36	;
crisis increased the eluctance of the		Neutral	11	6	18	8	7	-	9	25	19	-	13	7	
enuctance of the authorities in my country	<i>I</i>	Agree	5	-	8	5	4	-	-	8	14	-	6	10	
o publish reports.		Strongly agree	2	-	5	-	-	7	5	-	-	8	1	2	
		Weighted average score	1.81	1.41	2.10	1.69	1.67	1.71	1.68	2.08	2.05	1.75	1.82	1.88	1.7
		Not at all	69	65	55	84	81	71	68	67	53	58	70	80	6
	Authorities/Executive	Slightly	22	24	29	13	12	21	23	25	32	25	21	15	:
	Directors	To some extent	9	12	13	3	8	7	9	8	11	17	7	5	
		To a great extent	1	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	1	-	
		Weighted average score	1.42	1.47	1.63	1.18	1.27	1.36	1.41	1.42	1.68	1.58	1.40	1.24	1.5
. To what extent did		Not at all	78	73	81	78	76	69	76	82	89	73	79	83	
ressures from the	Staff (e.g., front office	Slightly	14	13	11	17	16	23	10	18	6	18	13	13	
ollowing parties cause he message of your	reviewers) or	To some extent	6	13	3	6	4	8	10	-	6	-	6	5	
taff report to be	management	To a great extent	2	-	5	-	4	-	5	-	-	9	1	-	
watered down"?		Weighted average score	1.32	1.40	1.32	1.28	1.36	1.38	1.43	1.18	1.17	1.45	1.30	1.23	1.4
		Not at all	96	100	89	100	100	100	100	83	90	100	95	100	9
		Slightly	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Others	To some extent	4	-	11	-	-	-	-	17	10	-	5	-	
		To a great extent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	<u> </u>	Weighted average score	1.08	1.00	1.22	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.33	1.20	1.00	1.09	1.00	1.1
/ A weighted everage was	used to convert the respon	ses to questions to select one	from four or	five anawar al	noinon to n	4 point or E p	oint coole t	o maka	the reco	nnon mo	ro compore	blo poroco	vuontiona		

G-20 or no	Non-G-20	IMF Pr	rogram?
58			
58		Yes	No
	42	45	
	40	43	
33	15	7	
-	2	5	
1.75		_	
-			
-	4	5	
-	-	-	-
1.00	1.18	1.22	1.10
83	74	69	8.
17	21	26	15
-	4	2	. 4
-	1	2	-
1.17	1.32	1.38	1.23
67	52	57	5
17	34	31	32
17	12	10	15
-	2	2	. 2
1.50	1.65	1.57	1.68
83	54	62	54
17	29	14	37
-	15	19	9
-	2	5	-
1.17	1.67	1.67	1.56
100	88	86	94
-	4	-	6
		1.75 1.79 100 86 - 10 - 4 - - 1.00 1.18 83 74 17 21 - 4 - 1 1.17 1.32 67 52 17 34 17 12 - 2 1.50 1.65 83 54 17 29 - 15 - 2 1.17 1.67 100 88	1.75 1.79 1.71 100 86 83 - 10 12 - 4 5 - - - 1.00 1.18 1.22 83 74 69 17 21 26 - 4 2 - 1 2 1.17 1.32 1.38 67 52 57 17 34 31 17 12 10 - 2 2 1.50 1.65 1.57 83 54 62 17 29 14 - 15 19 - 2 5 1.17 1.67 1.67 100 88 86

1.11 1.00 1.33 1.00

1.29

1.00

1.19 1.29

1.06

To a great extent

Weighted average score

1.17

1.40

1.27

1.00

		Distribution	n of answer ir	n percentag	е									
			By income	e level		By region	ı				G-20 or no	on-G-20	IMF Pro	ogram?
							Asia		Middle					
		Overall	Advanced	Emerging	Low-income	Africa	Pacific	Europe	East	Americas	G-20	Non-G-20	Yes	No
5. Did the authorities equest any corrections	No	49	6	43	75	89	29	23	62	33	17	54	60	
o your report?	Yes	51	94	58	25	11	71	77	38	67	83	46	40	
	Yes, all the requests were approved (either directly or after consulting with SPR)	24	19	30	20	-	30	12	-	50	20	26	18	
i. Were the requests for	Yes, most of the requests were approved	16	31	13	-	-	20	18	20	14	30	13	18	
corrections approved?	Yes, some of the requests were approved	37	38	39	30	33	40	53	40	14	50	33	24	
	Only a few of the requests were approved	20	13	17	40	33	10	18	40	21	-	26	35	
	None of the requests were approved	2	-	-	10	33	-	-	-	-	-	3	6	
'. Did the authorities equest any deletions to	No	76	53	73	90	100	86	55	85	57	75	76	70	
our report?	Yes	24	47	28	10	_	14	45	15	43	25	24	30	
	Yes, all the requests were approved (either directly or after consulting with SPR)	13	13	18	-	-	_	10	-	22	33	10	8	
Were the requests for leletions approved?	Most of the requests were approved Only a few of the requests	17	-	27	25	-	50	-	-	33	-	20	15	
	were approved None of the requests were	52	63	36	75	-	50	60	50	44	33	55	62	
	approved	17	25	18	-	-	-	30	50	-	33	15	15	
Did the publication of office the publication of office the publication of the publicatio	No	91	88	90	100	-	100	80	100	100	67	95	92	
narket or public eaction?	Yes	9	13	10	_	_	_	20	_	_	33	5	8	

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

			Distribution	n of answer i	n percentage	e									
				By income	level		By region					G-20 or n	on-G-20	IMF Pro	gram?
			Overall	Advanced	Emerging	Low-income		Asia Pacific		Middle East	Americas	G-20	Non-G-20	Yes	No
10. Was any important		Not at all	88	94	76	100	95	93	91	100	68	91	88	84	,
economic information omitted from the		Slightly	7	-	16	-	5	7	5	-	16	9	7	8	
published staff report as		To some extent	5	6	8	-	-	-	5	-	16	-	5	8	
a result of modifications before publication?		To a great extent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
		Weighted average score	1.16	1.12	1.32	1.00	1.05	1.07	1.14	1.00	1.47	1.09	1.18	1.24	1.1
11. Would you agree		Not at all	6	7	8	4	-	-	10	9	10	9	6	3	
that the rules on		Slightly	14	20	14	12	19	18	5	18	15	27	12	13	
corrections allow for the		To some extent	31	27	24	42	38	18	20	55	30	18	33	31	
preparation of a candid staff report?		To a great extent	49	47	54	42	44	64	65	18	45	45	49	53	
жин торогт.		Weighted average score	3.22	3.13	3.24	3.23	3.25	3.45	3.40	2.82	3.10	3.00	3.25	3.34	3.
12. Would you agree		Not at all	7	-	11	4	6	10	6	-	11	18	5	3	
hat the rules on		Slightly	18	31	17	12	19	10	12	27	21	18	18	19	
deletions allow for the preparation of a candid		To some extent	33	38	26	40	25	30	29	64	26	36	32	32	
staff report?		To a great extent	42	31	46	44	50	50	53	9	42	27	45	45	
<u> </u>		Weighted average score	3.11	3.00	3.06	3.24	3.19	3.20	3.29	2.82	3.00	2.73	3.18	3.19	3.
		Not at all	5	-	3	10	-	21	-	8	-	-	6	6	
	Adverse market	Slightly	17	-	18	23	26	7	5	31	17	17	17	17	
	reactions	To some extent	37	53	26	42	47	43	25	46	28	58	33	46	
		To a great extent	42 3.15	3.47	53 3.29	26 2.84	26 3.00	29 2.79	70 3.65	15 2.69	56 3.39	25 3.08	44 3.17	31 3.03	3.
		Weighted average score	3.15	3.47	3.29	2.84	3.00	2.79	3.65	2.69	3.39	3.08	3.17	3.03	3.,
3. Abstracting from the	Release of information	Not at all	8	6	8	9	5	14	10	15	-	9	8	8	
separate risk of leaks, do you think that the	on planned policies that could undermine the	Slightly	13	6	8	23	27	-	5	31	5	-	15	15	
Fund's transparency rules provide adequate	authorities' ability to	To some extent	40	47	29	49	36	57	29	38	45	64	37	41	
safeguards against the	implement these policies	To a great extent	39	41	55	20	32	29	57	15	50	27	41	36	
following?		Weighted average score	3.10	3.24	3.32	2.80	2.95	3.00	3.33	2.54	3.45	3.09	3.10	3.05	3.
	Possible	Not at all	11	19	8	11	5	21	16	8	11	-	13	10	
	misinterpretation of	Slightly	22	6	17	34	41	-	16	31	16	9	24	33	
	messages and/or	To some extent	41	63	39	34	27	64	42	31	47	82	36	38	
	information by the general public	To a great extent	25	13	36	20	27	14	26	31	26	9	28	18	
	general public	Weighted average score	2.80	2.69	3.03	2.63	2.77	2.71	2.79	2.85	2.89	3.00	2.78	2.64	2.

		Distribution	of answer in	percentage										
			By income I	evel		By region					G-20 or n	on-G-20	IMF Pro	ogram?
		Overall	Advanced E	Emerging I	_ow-income		Asia Pacific		Middle East	Americas	G-20	Non-G-20	Yes	No
14. Did the reforms introduced in 2009, such	Not at all	3	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	13	11	2	4	
as the addition of a new justification ("evident	Slightly	31	27	31	36	43	44	20	44	25	44	29	25	;
ambiguity") for	To some extent	51	40	50	64	57	56	55	44	44	33	54	58	
corrections, make the Transparency Policy	To a great extent	15	33	13	-	-	-	25	11	19	11	15	13	
more flexible?	Weighted average score	2.77	3.07	2.69	2.64	2.57	2.56	3.05	2.67	2.69	2.44	2.83	2.79	2.7
15. The increased focus	Strongly diagree	6	-	13	3	-	14	5	8	10	8	6	7	
on risks in surveillance	Disagree	25	29	25	24	36	29	23	15	19	42	23	20	
has unduly complicated efforts to prepare reports	Neutral	48	41	43	58	52	50	41	38	57	33	51	54	
that can be published	Agree	16	24	15	13	12	7	23	31	10	8	17	15	
without significant deletions.	Strongly agree	4	6	5	3	-	-	9	8	5	8	4	5	
	Weighted average score	2.86	3.06	2.75	2.89	2.76	2.50	3.09	3.15	2.81	2.67	2.89	2.90	2.8
	Strongly diagree	8	6	5	11	8	21	9	-	-	9	7	8	
16. The transparency	Disagree	23	24	29	16	8	-	23	62	32	18	23	15	2
policy is applied	Neutral	52	47	50	55	68	50	45	31	53	55	51	55	4
evenhandedly across	Agree	16	18	13	18	16	21	18	8	16	18	16	23	1
countries.	Strongly agree	2	6	3	-	-	7	5	-	-	-	2	-	
	Weighted average score	2.83	2.94	2.79	2.82	2.92	2.93	2.86	2.46	2.84	2.82	2.83	2.93	2.7
	Strongly diagree	2	-	-	5	-	7	-	-	5	-	2	-	
17. There is a need to	Disagree	27	18	33	26	32	29	18	23	33	25	28	20	;
tighten confidentiality agreements to better	Neutral	60	82	55	55	60	57	73	46	57	67	59	68	
protect certain types of	Agree	8	-	13	8	8	-	9	23	5	8	8	7	
data.	Strongly agree	2	-	-	5	-	7	-	8	-	-	2	5	
	Weighted average score	2.81	2.82	2.80	2.82	2.76	2.71	2.91	3.15	2.62	2.83	2.81	2.98	2.69

			Distribution	n of answer in	n percentage	е									
				By income	level		By region					G-20 or n	on-G-20	IMF Pr	ogram?
			Overall	Advanced	Emerging	Low-income	Africa	Asia Pacific	Europe	Middle East	Americas	G-20	Non-G-20	Yes	No
18. Did concerns about		Not at all	81	73	78	87	89	83	80	73	76	82	81	85	7
the Fund's external-		Slightly	10	20	14	_	_	8	10	9	19	9	10	6	1
sector assessments (including exchange		To some extent	8	-	8	13	11	8	5	18	5	9	8	6	1
rate assessments) hinder the publication of your		To a great extent	1	7	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	1	3	-
staff reports?		Weighted average score	1.30	1.40	1.30	1.26	1.21	1.25	1.35	1.45	1.29	1.27	1.31	1.26	1.3
		Not at all	35	35	42	28	32	50	38	25	33	45	34	35	3
	Reduce the possibility	Slightly	28	29	28	28	37	-	33	17	39	-	32	35	2
	of misinterpretation of	To some extent	27	18	25	34	32	25	19	42	22	36	25	19	3
	information	To a great extent	10	18	6	10	-	25	10	17	6	18	8	10	1
		Weighted average score	2.11	2.18	1.94	2.28	2.00	2.25	2.00	2.50	2.00	2.27	2.08	2.03	2.10
		Not at all	48	53	51	42	50	46	59	42	40	64	46	44	5
	Make your job easier, e.g., by facilitating	Slightly	22	18	24	21	35	-	27	8	25	-	25	31	1
	reasonable 4ments with	To some extent	17	18	14	21	10	31	9	17	25	18	17	17	1
	the authorities	To a great extent	13	12	11	15	5	23	5	33	10	18	12	8	1
		Weighted average score	1.94	1.88	1.84	2.09	1.70	2.31	1.59	2.42	2.05	1.91	1.95	1.89	1.98
19. More flexibility in		Not at all	20	12	18	26	35	17	9	17	20	30	18	27	1
the rules on corrections	Make your job more difficult by making it	Slightly	16	24	11	19	10	25	18	17	15	10	17	24	1
(as opposed to the	more difficult to resist	To some extent	38	35	37	42	35	33	32	58	40	20	41	30	4
current rule limiting	unreasonable requests	To a great extent	26	29	34	13	20	25	41	8	25	40	24	18	3
corrections to factual errors, typographical		Weighted average score	2.70	2.82	2.87	2.42	2.40	2.67	3.05	2.58	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.39	2.8
errors,	Make your job more	Not at all	16	12	13	23	33	18	9	8	11	27	15	26	1
mischaracterizations of	difficult by increasing	Slightly	20	29	13	23	10	18	23	33	21	-	23	23	1
the authorities' views,	the number of requests	To some extent	39	24	47	37	38	36	41	58	26	36	39	37	4
d evident ambiguity) for chan	for changes, absorbing more staff time	To a great extent	25	35	26	17	19	27	27	-	42	36	23	14	3
- · · · ·	more stan time	Weighted average score	2.72	2.82	2.87	2.47	2.43	2.73	2.86	2.50	3.00	2.82	2.70	2.40	2.94
rouid.		Not at all	27	19	25	33	29	20	19	23	38	33	26	37	2
	Result in less candid	Slightly	27	31	20	33	29	40	33	31	10	17	28	37	2
	reports	To some extent	28	38	30	20	29	20	29	38	24	33	27	17	3
		To a great extent	19	13	25	13	14	20	19	8	29	17	19	9	2
		Weighted average score	2.38	2.44	2.55	2.13	2.29	2.40	2.48	2.31	2.43	2.33	2.39	1.97	2.67
		Not at all	20	25	21	15	23	22	27	-	21	20	20	14	2
	Result in more staff	Slightly	41	50	36	45	46	78	45	22	21	80	37	43	4
	reports being published	To some extent	34	13	36	40	31	-	18	78	43	-	37	38	3
	on the external website	To a great extent	5	13	7	-	-	-	9	-	14	-	6	5	
		Weighted average score	2.25	2.13	2.29	2.25	2.08	1.78	2.09	2.78	2.50	1.80	2.29	2.33	2.20

			Distribution	n of answer i	n percentag	je									
				By income	e level		By region	ı				G-20 or n	on-G-20	IMF Pro	gram?
			Overall	Advanced	Emerging	Low-income	Africa	Asia Pacific	Europe	Middle East	Americas	G-20	Non-G-20	Yes	No
		Not at all	68	77	58	77	89	63	65	60	58	57	70	74	6
	Communication with	Slightly	14	15	18	10	5	13	15	30	16	29	13	6	
	the authorities on the rules for	To some extent	5	-	12	-	-	-	5	10	11	-	6	9	
	corrections/deletions	To a great extent	12	8	12	13	5	25	15	-	16	14	12	11	
		Weighted average score	1.61	1.38	1.79	1.50	1.21	1.88	1.70	1.50	1.84	1.71	1.59	1.57	1.6
		Not at all	69	62	61	83	89	50	60	67	68	57	71	70	
	The internal access of	Slightly	16	23	15	14	11	25	25	33	-	29	15	12	
		To some extent	11	8	21	-	-	-	10	-	32	-	12	18	
		To a great extent	4	8	3	3	-	25	5	-	-	14	3	-	
20. To what extent were		Weighted average score	1.49	1.62	1.67	1.24	1.11	2.00	1.60	1.33	1.63	1.71	1.47	1.48	1.
ags in the publication of our staff report the	The practice of	Not at all	46	83	27	52	50	33	58	40	39	57	45	55	
esult of the following?	obtaining the authorities' explicit	Slightly	21	8	21	26	25	22	16	30	17	14	22	18	
	consent even within the	To some extent	13	8	18	10	10	11	11	20	17	-	14	18	
	current "voluntary but	To a great extent	20	-	33	13	15	33	16	10	28	29	19	9	
	framework.	Weighted average score	2.07	1.25	2.58	1.84	1.90	2.44	1.84	2.00	2.33	2.00	2.07	1.82	2.
	Not at all	38	75	33	27	33	50	60	-	33	-	38	40		
		Slightly	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Oth	Other.	To some extent	38	25	33	45	67	-	40	100	-	-	38	60	
Of		To a great extent	24	-	33	27	-	50	-	-	67	-	24	-	
		Weighted average score	2.48	1.50	2.67	2.73	2.33	2.50	1.80	3.00	3.00	_	2.48	2.20	2.7

Appendix, Table 3. Transparency Policy Review Mission Chiefs' Survey Results (concluded)

						Distrib	ution of a	nswer in	percenta	age				
			E	By income I	evel			By region			G-20 or	non-G-20	IMF Pi	rogram?
		Overall	Advanced	Emerging	Low-income	Africa	Asia Pacific	Europe	Middle East	Americas	G-20	Non-G-20	Yes	١
21. Do you see scope to rationalize the number	Not at all	16	15	15	18	17	17	11	8	27	10	17	13	1
of summary documents produced after Board	Slightly	10	15	9	9	17	-	11	-	13	-	11	10	1
meetings (e. PINs, press releases, chairman's	To some extent	41	46	38	41	35	67	50	31	27	60	38	38	4
statements, summing	To a great extent	33	23	38	32	30	17	28	62	33	30	34	38	29
up)?	Weighted average score	2.91	2.77	3.00	2.88	2.78	2.83	2.94	3.46	2.67	3.10	2.89	3.03	2.81
22. Does the	Strongly diagree	2	6	3	-	-	-	9	-	-	9	1	3	2
transparency policy	Disagree	11	6	18	5	4	14	14	15	10	9	11	13	9
include sufficient	Neutral	66	71	49	82	80	57	59	54	70	64	66	68	6
provisions for handling	Agree	19	18	26	13	12	29	18	31	15	18	19	13	2
the increased focus on risk assessments?	Strongly agree	2	-	5	-	4	-	-	-	5	-	2	5	-
risk assessifierits?	Weighted average score	3.09	3.00	3.13	3.08	3.16	3.14	2.86	3.15	3.15	2.91	3.11	3.05	3.11
23. Have you encountered any specific problems regarding modifications in multi-country products, such as the	No	94	100	88	100	100	80	100	80	100	80	96	93	94
products, such as the spillover reports, and the external sector report that warrant changes to the transparency policy?	Yes	6	-	12	-	-	20	-	20	-	20	4	7	(

							ion of answer	n perce	entage				
					By income	e level					region		
									Asia		Middle		
			Overall	Advanced Em	erging Lov	v-income	N/A	Africa	Pacific I	urope	East	Americas	N/
		Number of Responses 2/	12										
	Partici	pation Rate (in Percentage)	13.3										
	I understand why some IMF reports are												
	published and others are not.		67	67	67	33	100	_	50	70	100	25	
•													
	I know broadly when to expect publication												
	of IMF reports on countries I follow.		58	67	83	67	50	-	100	60	-	75	
Please indicate which of the	I am aware that published IMF country												
ollowing statements apply to you	reports may have market-sensitive												
	information deleted from them.		33	22	67	33	50	-	25	40	-	50	
]	The fact that published IMF country												
	reports may have information deleted from												
	them greatly concerns me.		17	22	-	33	-	-	-	20	-	-	
•	I have noticed increases in IMF												
	transparency since the 2007/8 financial												
	crisis.		50	56	50	33	_	_	50	50	_	50	
(A - 1)	onvert the responses to guestions to select on	a from four or five answer she									nc	30	

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Appendix, Table 4	. Transparency Policy	Review Media' Survey	Results (continued)
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					Distribut	ion of answe	r in perce	ntage				
				By incom	ie level					egion		
		Overall	Advanced Er	merging Lov	w-income	N/A	Africa	Asia Pacific Eu		1iddle East	Americas	N/A
	The IMF's surveillance of member countries, i.e. the IMF's regular economic monitoring of member countries	67	67	83	67	50	-	75	70	-	75	100
	The IMF's financial sector surveillance of member countries, such as the IMF's regular financial monitoring of member countries through Financial System Stability Assessments	58	67	67	67	50	-	75	60	-	75	100
2. The IMF information or reports that I find most useful are (mark	IMF lending and policy recommendations to member countries with IMF-supported programs	58	56	67	33	50	-	50	60	-	75	100
all that apply):	Global developments, such as the World Economic Outlook, the Global Financial Stability Report, and the Fiscal Monitor	83	89	83	100	100	-	100	80	100	100	100
	Macroeconomic and financial spillovers	67	67	100	67	50	-	75	80	-	75	100
	Policy developments at the IMF	50	44	67	67	50	-	50	50	100	75	-
	Cross-country issues (e.g. a report that covers issues that are common to several countries)	50	44	67	100	-	-	25	60	_	75	-
	IMF data and statistics	42	44	67	67	_	_	50	50	_	75	
	Others						_					

							ion of answe	r in perce	ntage		egion		
		By income level											
									Asia				
			Overall	Advanced E	merging Lo	w-income	N/A	Africa	Pacific	Europe	East	Americas	N/A
	To obtain factual information and data on countries		58	67	67	67	100	_	100	50	100	75	
3. Please indicate for what purpose(s) you most use IMF information (mark all that apply):	To analyze IMF staff's views on its independent assessment of economic developments and government policies		67	67	83	33	50		75	70	- 100	75	
	To analyze the IMF's its description of the country authorities' views		42	33	50	33	-	-	-	50	-	50	
	To understand IMF policies		33	33	50	-	-	-	50	30	-	50	
	Other (please explain):		8	11	-	33			-	10		-	
		Strongly disagree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
.The IMF provides information		Disagree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
nd/or data that is not available		Neutral	33	33	17	33	-	-	-	40	-	25	
rom other sources.		Agree	58	56	67	67	100	-	75	50	100	75	
		Strongly agree	8	11	17	-	-	-	25	10	-	-	
		Weighted average score	3.75	3.78	4.00	3.67	4.00	-	4.25	3.70	4.00	3.75	4
.The IMF is candid in its		Strongly disagree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
ssessment of countries'		Disagree	17	22	17	-	-	-	-	20	-	25	
conomies, including its		Neutral	25	33	17	-	50	-	25	30	-	-	
resentation of the risks of		Agree	50	33	50	67	50	-	50	40	100	50	
nacroeconomic instability.		Strongly agree	8	11	17	33	-	-	25	10	-	25	
		Weighted average score	3.50	3.33	3.67	4.33	3.50	-	4.00	3.40	4.00	3.75	
.The IMF is candid in its		Strongly disagree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
ssessment of financial stability		Disagree	17	22	-	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	
sks in its reports on individual		Neutral	17	22	33	-	50	-	25	20	-	25	
countries.		Agree	58	44	50	67	50	-	50	50	100	50	
		Strongly agree	8	11	17	33	-	-	25	10	-	25	
		Weighted average score	3.58	3.44	3.83	4.33	3.50	-	4.00	3.50	4.00	4.00	

Appendix, Table 4. Transparency Policy Review Media' Survey Results (continued)

Appendix, Table 4. Transparency Policy Review Media' Survey Results (continued) Distribution of answer in percentage By income level By region Middle Asia Africa Pacific Europe East Americas N/A Advanced Emerging Low-income 7. In current market Strongly disagree circumstances, it is hard to provide candid assessments of Disagree 25 22 17 50 20 100 25 financial stability without Neutral 17 11 17 20 discussing highly market sensitive information such as 42 100 50 50 50 50 100 Agree 44 50 developments in individual financial institutions. Strongly agree 17 25 22 17 50 10 Weighted average score 3.50 3.67 3.67 4.00 3.00 4.50 3.50 2.00 3.75 4.00 Strongly disagree 8. The IMF is candid about its Disagree 8 11 33 10 lending operations and policy Neutral 33 33 17 33 25 30 50 recommendations to countries Agree 50 44 67 33 100 50 50 100 50 100 with IMF-supported programs. Strongly agree 8 11 17 25 10 Weighted average score 3.58 3.56 4.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.60 4.00 3.50 4.00 Much worse 9. How would you rate the Slightly worse information content of IMF About average 25 22 17 33 30 25 reports compared with other 58 67 75 Slightly better 67 67 50 75 60 100 sources?

17

3.92

11

3.89

17

4.00

3.67

50

4.50

25

4.25

10

3.80

100

3.75

4.00

5.00

Much better

Weighted average score

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		Distribution of answer in percentage											
				By incon	ne level				Вуг	region			
								Asia		Middle			
		Overall	Advanced Em	erging Lo	w-income	N/A	Africa	Pacific E	urope	East	Americas	N/A	
	Never	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
O. I check the IMF's website	Less than once a month	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
www.imf.org) for the latest	About once a month	25	22	33	-	100	-	50	20	100	-		
nformation on individual	Less than once a week	8	-	17	-	-	-	-	10	-	-		
countries.	At least once a week	58	67	50	100	-	-	25	70	-	75		
	Every day	8	11	-	-	-	-	25	-	-	25		
	Weighted average score	5	5	4	5	3	-	4	5	3	5		
	Never	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
1. I frequently check the IMF's	Less than once a month	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
vebsite (www.imf.org) for the	About once a month	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
atest information on the global	Less than once a week	25	-	33	33	50	-	-	20	100	25		
conomy.	At least once a week	67	89	67	67	50	-	75	80	-	50		
	Every day	8	11	-	-	-	-	25	-	-	25		
	Weighted average score	5	5	5	5	5	_	5	5	4	5		

Appendix, Table 4. Transparency Policy Review Media' Survey Results (continued)

						Distribut	ion of answer	in perce	ntage				
					By incom	ne level				Ву	region		
									Asia	Asia			
			Overall	Advanced E			N/A	Africa	Pacific	Europe	East	Americas	N/A
		Strongly diagree	8	-	17	33	-	-	-	10	-	25	
	The non-publication of IMF reports is a	Disagree	8	11	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	
	the financial markets.	Neutral	17	11	17	-	50	-	25	10	100	-	
	, ,	Agree	42	56	50	67	50	-	50	50	-	50	10
		Strongly agree	25	22	17	-	-	-	25	20	-	25	
		Weighted average score	3.67	3.89	3.50	3.00	3.50	-	4.00	3.60	3.00	3.50	4.00
		Strongly diagree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	IMF reports should normally be publish immediately after the relevant board meeting. Published IMF country reports influence the financial markets. Published IMF country reports influence the policy debate in a given country or	Disagree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
which you agree with the	-	Neutral	8	-	17	33	-	-	-	10	-	25	
	meeting.	Agree	50	56	33	67	100	-	50	50	100	25	10
	immediately after the relevant board meeting. Published IMF country reports influence to the financial markets.	Strongly agree	42	44	50	-	-	-	50	40	-	50	
	Weighted average score	4.33	4.44	4.33	3.67	4.00	-	4.50	4.30	4.00	4.25	4.00	
		Strongly diagree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Published IMF country reports influence	Disagree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
		Neutral	25	11	33	33	-	-	-	30	-	25	
•		Agree	75	89	67	67	100	-	100	70	100	75	10
		Strongly agree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
		Weighted average score	3.75	3.89	3.67	3.67	4.00	-	4.00	3.70	4.00	3.75	4.00
		Strongly diagree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
		Disagree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
		Neutral	17	11	17	33	-	-	-	20	-	25	
	region.	Agree	67	67	67	33	100	-	100	60	100	50	10
		Strongly agree	17	22	17	33	-	-	-	20	-	25	
		Weighted average score	4.00	4.11	4.00	4.00	4.00	-	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
		Strongly diagree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	•	Disagree	8	11	-	33	-	-	-	10	-	-	
	-	Neutral	50	33	50	33	100	-	25	50	100	25	10
	hinder their usefulness for me.	Agree	42	56	50	33	-	-	75	40	-	75	
		Strongly agree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	IMF information and reports are released in a timely fashion, without lags that hinder their usefulness for me. Wei Stro St	Weighted average score	3.33	3.44	3.50	3.00	3.00	-	3.75	3.30	3.00	3.75	3.00

						Distribut	tion of answer	in perce	ntage				
					By incom	ne level				Ву	region		
									Asia		Middle		
			Overall	Advanced E	merging Lo	w-income	N/A	Africa	Pacific	Europe	East	Americas	N
		Strongly diagree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	The IMF has not gone far enough in	Disagree	17	11	-	-	50	-	-	10	100	-	
	expanding risk assessments in published	Neutral	58	56	67	67	50	-	50	60	-	75	
	reports.	Agree	25	33	33	33	-	-	50	30	-	25	
		Strongly agree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
		Weighted average score	3.08	3.22	3.33	3.33	2.50	-	3.50	3.20	2.00	3.25	
12. (cont'd) Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:		Strongly diagree	8	11	-	33	-	-	-	10	-	-	
	The IMF's risk assessments in published	Disagree	42	44	33	33	100	-	75	30	100	50	
	reports are too alarmist.	Neutral	42	33	67	33	-	-	25	50	-	50	
		Agree	8	11	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	
		Strongly agree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
		Weighted average score	2.50	2.44	2.67	2.00	2.00	-	2.25	2.60	2.00	2.50	
		Strongly diagree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Economic information is becoming more	Disagree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	and more available on a real-time basis, and the IMF needs to speed up its	Neutral	42	33	33	33	100	-	50	30	100	50	
	publication policies in response	Agree	42	44	50	33	-	-	50	50	-	25	
		Strongly agree	17	22	17	33	-	-	_	20	-	25	
		Weighted average score	3.75	3.89	3.83	4.00	3.00	-	3.50	3.90	3.00	3.75	
13. Which of the following IMF communication products do you consult regularly (mark all that apply):	Public Information Notices		92	89	100	100	100	_	100	90	100	100	
	Press releases		75	67	100	67	100	-	75	80	100	75	
рргу).]	Other		25	11	17	33	50			20	100	_	