Transcript

April 16, 2013
Washington DC
Panelists:
Carlo Cotterelli, Director, Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF
Philip Gerson, Deputy Director, Fiscal Affairs Department
Martine Guerguil, Assistant Director, Fiscal Affairs Department
Simonetta Nardin, Deputy Division Chief, External Relations Department

Mr. Cottarelli - Thank you for coming to this press conference. I will highlight the main points of the Fiscal Monitor.

First, in 2013 two important milestones will be reached in the process of fiscal adjustment in advanced economies. I will tell you in a moment what these milestones are.

Second, fiscal adjustment is proceeding at a pace that we consider as appropriate in general, but again there are some exceptions that I will comment on in a moment.

Third, emerging economies are pausing the process of fiscal adjustment, which is fine in the short run as fiscal vulnerabilities are less severe in these economies, but more rapid adjustment, more rapid adjustment is needed in some cases.

Let me provide some more detail on these points.

First, in almost all advanced economies the fiscal accounts continue to improve. Two important milestones will be reached in 2013, first reflecting the decline in deficits in almost all countries. This year, the average fiscal deficit, which is the difference between revenues and spending, will be about half of what it was in 2009 at the peak of the crisis: 9 percent on average for the advanced economies in 2009, a bit more than 4.5 percent now. About half this year.

So, half of the fiscal adjustment road has been covered. Indeed, one could say more than half, because not all countries need to reach a balanced budget.

The second milestone is that after continuously rising since 2007 we project this year the average public debt-to-GDP ratio for advanced economies to stop rising, and indeed to decline slightly, although of course it is still very high at about 110 percent of GDP.

These are averages, and so let's look more closely now at which countries still face the most challenging tasks. If we leave aside smaller economies, the countries where fiscal imbalances remain most severe are ten. We have ten advanced economies with more severe fiscal problems—the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and then seven euro area members: France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and of course Greece, Ireland, and Portugal.

These countries all have a debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 90 percent and still rising, although at different speeds. The good news is that it is only 10 economies. The bad news is that they are pretty large economies and they account for 40 percent of world GDP. So what happens to fiscal policy in these countries matters quite a lot for the rest of the world.

Of course, this fiscal adjustment has been costly in terms of short run growth. We cannot pretend there were no costs in terms of growth. There were costs in terms of growth. This does not mean that further fiscal adjustment should be postponed altogether, but that it should proceed at a proper speed. In a way, fiscal austerity is a bit like medicine. It should be taken in the right amount. If you do not take enough, you remain sick. If you take too much, its side effects can be very severe.

Our message here has not changed. Take the right amount of medicine. In general, a gradual pace of fiscal adjustment within a credible medium-term adjustment plan is preferable for countries not subject to market pressures.

In this respect we believe that the pace of fiscal adjustment in 2013 is broadly appropriate in most cases, with some caveats. So let me tell you what are these caveats.

First, on the one hand, Japan has not yet started the process of fiscal adjustment. As you can see, the deficit remains stuck at about 9 percent of GDP. Its most recent fiscal adjustment package can help growth in the short run, but it does increase the fiscal risks over the medium term.

It is therefore even more important than before that Japan defines a clear medium-term fiscal adjustment plan. On other hand, you have the United States which is tightening fiscal policy this year at rate that we think is unnecessarily rapid, in light of the still uncertain pace of economic recovery. The tightening, of course, is not as strong as would have occurred under the fiscal cliff scenario, which was avoided. But it is still the largest adjustment in a single year in the last three decades, including because of the sequester.

A slower pace of adjustment would be preferable, particularly in the context of a medium-term adjustment plan supported by Congress, which still missing.

In addition to these two countries, some advanced economies in which private demand has been chronically disappointing should consider smoothing the pace of consolidation if they have the fiscal room to do so.

One final concern relates to euro area countries where there is a need to avoid an excessive focus on nominal deficit targets rather than focusing structural targets, or specific fiscal measures. Focusing nominal targets, the nominal deficit-to-GDP ratio, for example, implies that when growth disappoints, countries would be forced to introduce new tightening measures. This implies procyclical policies, policies that make the deceleration of economic activity even worse. And these procyclical policies should be avoided. We are encouraged by the increased flexibility shown by the European institutions in this area, with an increased focus on structural rather than headline targets.

Let me move to emerging economies.

Here, things look better overall, as I explained on previous occasions. 2013, like 2012, will be a year of pause in the process of fiscal consolidation, reversal or no decline the average deficit. This pause is appropriate in general terms, as the fiscal accounts of emerging economies are relatively good. But there are also some areas of concern here.

First, some countries are in need of more urgent fiscal adjustment. Some of them are in the Middle East: Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and these countries have been hit hard by higher oil prices and rising spending. Pakistan is another country where deficits are quite high.

Second, some large emerging economies where fiscal challenges are not as acute are still in need of sizable fiscal adjustment over the medium term. So, less acute problems, but still fiscal problems. For example, public debt remains too high from a medium-term perspective in India and Brazil, and India the deficit remains also very high. In this respect, drawing on a recent study we conducted and was recently published on energy subsidies, this issue of the Fiscal Monitor reiterates the call for phasing out energy subsidies. These subsidies are large, costly, and crowd out more productive spending like infrastructure and investment, and education.

Moreover, they're not very efficient in protecting the poor, as most subsidies go to the rich. Subsidies should be phased out with appropriate compensation for the poor.

Finally, there is a need to improve fiscal transparency. That is, the quality and quantity of information provided by governments on their fiscal accounts.

This issue is an important one in emerging economies, but improvements are also needed in advanced economies.

We are revamping our fiscal transparency agenda. There are specific examples in the Fiscal Monitor of issues related to fiscal transparency, including a box covering the issue of local government deficit and debt statistics in China. This is an issue that is certainly not trivial given the importance of the country. The Chinese authorities are aware of these issues and they are working to improve the quality of statistics on deficits and debt of local governments.

Let me stop at this point, and we of course are happy to take your questions.

QUESTION: There are some worries about fiscal dominance as the advanced economies have launched aggressive monetary easing in the past five years. What do you think of this concern?

Mr. Cottarelli - Of course, when fiscal deficits are very large, when public debt is very large, and at the same time you see a lot of central bank financing going to deficits, purchases of government paper by central banks, the issue of the risk of fiscal dominance must necessarily come up. Regarding what is important, there are two considerations.

First of all, the purchase of large amounts of government paper by central banks in several advanced economies that we have seen recently is primarily related to supporting economic activity, not per se to the financing of the government. At the same time, in order to reduce the risk of concerns about fiscal dominance, I think it is important that, while these relaxed monetary policies are undertaken the process of fiscal adjustment continues. We underscore that it must continue at the right pace, but if fiscal progress continues, I don't think the issue of fiscal dominance will be a relevant issue because the relaxed monetary policy accompanies and does not replace the fiscal adjustment.

QUESTION: You say that it is about taking on measures at the right speed and highlight the U.S. with a 1.8 percent cyclically adjusted primary balance as to fast and U.K. which is a 1 percent cyclically adjusted primary balance change as also too fast. How much slower should these countries go and can you be a little specific and how much benefit would that give to their economies?

Mr. Cottarelli - Let me talk about the United States first.

There are two issues in the United States. First is the magnitude of the adjustment, which is close to 2 percent. Actually, in headline terms it is about 2 percentage points of GDP. That is large, the largest adjustment in the last 30 years. Part of this is due to the sequester.

The other issue relates to the tools to achieve this fiscal adjustment. The sequester is a very simple tool in a way. It cuts spending across the board. It does not distinguish between good spending and bad spending. So, we think something significantly smaller than 1 3/4 percent, something closer to 1, between 1 and 1 1/4 could be probably most appropriate, which would be more or less what you would have without the sequester. But there is also another issue. There is a need in any case to replace the sequester with something more tailored to the needs of the U.S. economy.

Regarding the United Kingdom, one has to take into account that structural fiscal tightening in the U.K. in fiscal year 2013 and 2014 is now forecast anyway to be smaller than anticipated at the time of the 2012 budget. And, meeting the supplementary debt target has also been delayed by two years. So the authorities have slowed down the pace of adjustment and this is welcome.

Nevertheless, given the weak economic recovery, reflecting lackluster demand, the planned acceleration of structural fiscal tightening in the near term is still significant given the weakness of economic recovery.

Although, the government's commitment to medium-term fiscal consolidation remains important, at least consideration should be given to greater near term flexibility in the path of fiscal adjustment. I cannot give you any numbers. As I said, at least consideration should be given to a greater near-term flexibility. We will discuss these issues during the forthcoming Article IV consultation -- our annual consultation with all our members. I think the role of fiscal policy needs to be assessed in the context of the broader policy framework, and not in a way seen in isolation.

QUESTION: A question on Egypt regarding subsidies. How do you phase out energy subsidies without causing a hike in prices of commodities related to that, such as bread? And you are looking at a country with political problems in and of itself, an inability to bring consensus. Also, you mentioned that subsidies must be targeted toward the poor. But, you have interest groups that are benefiting from the subsidies that already exist, and they won't necessarily easily let go of those, so can you speak to that?

Mr. Cottarelli - You mentioned the interest groups, so let me start. That indeed makes a difference in reforming energy subsidies in many countries, the fact that there are interest groups. What I think is critical is to remove subsidies because they benefit the rich more than the poor. And, so, when you remove subsidies, you need to compensate the poor for the loss of subsidies, but at the same time, you also save money because you are not subsidizing the rich, that is basically the advantage of eliminating subsidies and replacing them with cash transfers. This is what has been done, this is in a way the best way to do it. There are other ways to compensate the poor. But, one way to do it is through cash transfers, so they are compensated for the increase in prices.

Of course, when you remove subsidies, there will be an increase in prices, but it is important that those who cannot afford those prices get compensation.

But, the point is, by removing subsidies, you save resources because you stop subsidizing the rich which do not need subsidies.

Ms. Nardin - On the subsidies, a few weeks ago we published a major paper exactly on the lessons from reform of energy subsidies in many countries. They're all available on our website, including in several languages.

QUESTION: Just two things. You talked about average public debt stopping to rise in 2013. Now, what would be the direct implication of that trend on investment decisions within local businesses, and also for foreign investment by multi-nationals who are in the U.S. and invest overseas?

And two, what is your assessment of efforts by developing countries, especially those in Africa, actually how they spend their money, and not just meeting basic targets?

Mr. Cottarelli - I will take the first question.

In itself, the stabilization of the public-debt-to-GDP ratio for advanced economies, which we project for this year, is a first step. What would be important is to lower the debt-to-GDP ratio over time. If this does happen, high debt is bound to affect the decisions of the private sector. That will be because in general higher interest rates will be related to very high public debt remaining high for several years, higher interest rates will discourage investment. There will be ultimately less growth. That is why many econometric studies find that there is a link between high public debt and low long-term growth. And that is a main motivation of why we argue that at the right pace, it is necessary to reduce the burden of public debt in the country that now have debt exceeding at least 90 percent, with 80, 90 percent as a threshold often seen for advanced economies, beyond which high public debt is related to low potential growth, low growth in the long term.

Ms. Guerguil - On your second question, you are absolutely right, that it is equally important to monitor not only the level of spending but the quality of spending. There have been efforts in that area in many countries.

In the case of Africa, one unfortunate aspect is the low quality of investment. There is a general consensus that there is a need to increase public investment in Africa, particularly road and power and the basic infrastructure. But, it is very important to ensure that the investments that are selected are the ones that will effectively contribute to higher growth so that they can be properly repaid.

The same applies in some way to current spending. As Mr. Cottarelli said earlier, many countries, including in Africa, have large universal subsidies for fuel and food products. The weight of these subsidies has increased in recent years because international prices have increased. The efficiency of these subsidies is very questionable because a large part, in fact, goes to higher income groups. So, it is important to replace them with social protection, social transfers mechanisms that are well targeted to the people they are intended to help.

QUESTION: Next year, the deficit in Spain is going to go up 6.9 percent. There is a need for more fiscal adjustment. I would like to know if you can be a little bit more specific on what other measures does the government need to take and if these measures are going to impact growth, and if there is any possibility of going back or staying in a recession.

Mr. Gerson - Let me start by pointing out that in 2012 there was substantial fiscal adjustment in Spain. The authorities took measures. If we look at the cyclically overall balance, which is how we try to assess progress, we can take away the impact of faster or slower growth. There is fiscal adjustment of about 2.5 percentage points of GDP reflected in the underlying balance. That doesn't show up in the headline balance partly because there is also significant support to the financial sector last year, and so that obscures some of the progress made. So let me start by saying there has been a lot of adjustment in Spain already in 2012.

For 2013, we're projecting further adjustment of about 1 percentage points of GDP which we think is an appropriate pace of adjustment. We think going forward, obviously, Spain needs to continue to reduce its deficit, but it needs do that at pace that is gradual for the reasons that Mr. Cottarelli laid out in the introductory remarks, a pace that maintains a balance between bringing down debt and deficits, and providing adequate support to the economy. So we do see a need for Spain to continue to make adjustments. There is a need as well for reforms at the national and European level, like banking union, greater progress on labor reform. Really a whole suite of measures on the fiscal and non-fiscal side that Spain need to implement over the next several years.

QUESTION: Two questions for Mr. Cottarelli. The first, if I understood you correctly you said that when countries were facing market pressure, that excused them from the recommendation that they slow down a bit. My question is, how easy is this market pressure to foresee? How much advanced warning do you think there is for such market pressure?

My second question regards the trade-off which you and I believe Mr. Blanchard earlier mentioned between short term and medium-term adjustment where you suggested that it would be better to move more slowly, but that it should be coupled with credible policies in the medium term. How would you assess that sort of credibility? We have seen in the United States, for example, policies where you get medium-term cuts by promising not to pay doctors through Medicare, which are then reconsidered when the time comes. What sort of assessments do you make about credibility when you talk about that substitution?

Mr. Cottarelli - These are difficult questions, to the point that I'm not sure I can answer them. First of all, it is clear that when you see market pressure, you recognize it pretty easily. You see interest rates rising, and definitely we are talking about those countries. The question is, there are cases in which you don't yet see market pressure, and then you try to guess how risky the situation is. I don't know honestly, but one thing important to keep in mind is always the composition of the investor base. If the investor base is, for example, more domestic, that is something that reduces the risk of an immediate loss of confidence. There is a sort of home bias that is well documented in the economic literature. That is a consideration that needs to be given.

We have discussed in our issues of the Fiscal Monitor the factors that, indeed in this Fiscal Monitor we discuss the factors that strengthen the investor base and make it less likely that a sudden loss of confidence arises. But, again, it is an art, not a science.

On how you assess the credibility, one issue is the credibility of a fiscal plan, and then you want to see whether the plan is specified, for example, in sufficiently detailed terms. The other issue is how you assess in general the credibility of the intention to implement fiscal policy. That again is a much more difficult issue.

Of course, you can look at the past record of certain countries in implementing fiscal adjustment. That is an important indication.

QUESTION: I would like to ask you something about Italy. In the report you say that for Italy there is little or no further adjustment required. But, we have a difficult political situation. What do you think can be the impact of the political uncertainty on this scenario, and how much can be the impact of this political uncertainty on growth in Italy?

Mr. Cottarelli - Again, we have seen in several countries that political uncertainty is obviously very important, it involves uncertainty about economic prospects. Because, if there is political uncertainty, essentially, you know what the economic policies are going to be. In almost any economy the decision has a forward-looking components. Investors, for example. If you want to invest, you want to know at what rate your profits will be taxed. The existence of political uncertainty is certainly something that reduces the prospects for growth.

Obviously as you can imagine we don't have a specific estimate in the case of Italy, a specific number. In general terms, it is clear that an uncertain political situation is not good for economic growth.

QUESTION: In the report you expressed some concerns on China's subnational government debt, especially through the creation of local government financing vehicles. So could you elaborate a little bit on that, and also to what extent would this impact China's debt repayment capability? What can China do to mitigate this risk?

Ms. Guerguil - We actually in the report have a box that tried to discuss the different sources of hidden or contingent liabilities, and I the case of China, the subnational governments have increased investment quite largely in the past years, as part of their stimulus package. Now, they have borrowed or obtained resources for these investments that have not been reported as debt. Because, they cannot borrow officially, so they use these vehicles to gather resources for these investments.

The point we wanted to make, and this is, it is a potential increase in debt, not all of it may be debt. But, some of it certainly is debt. And it would be quite important to have this number included in the budget, and in the level of debt and in the level of deficits, so that there is better awareness and understanding of what the potential risks are and the repayment obligations are. That is an important message. This is generally the case in China, but in other countries there has been an increase in liabilities that were not properly reported. This is for advanced economies as well as emerging economies. And, in fact in the Fiscal Affairs Department we have pushed very strongly to increase transparency, providing capacity building and technical assistance to countries, so that they can reach better reporting of this. And, as Mr. Cottarelli said, the Chinese authorities have taken measures to that end.

QUESTION: I want to ask Mr. Cottarelli if, in Egypt, there is another side of adjustment fiscally, other than subsidies. Actually, what about the new adjustment in tax law? Of course, you have heard about it.

Ms. Guerguil - Egypt is certainly in a difficult economic situation, and with an increase in the deficit and that does justify measures to reduce the deficit, and control the increase in debt. Carlo has talked about the importance of reforming subsidies, but reconsidering revenue and ensuring there are no undue loopholes in the tax capacity is an important element. And, there are also discussions in this way in Egypt. And, discussions are ongoing right now on different options that could be considered to contain the fiscal deficit and whatever stabilization package. Tax is certainly an important element.

QUESTION: The former trend in tax laws was the indirect one, to be more specific. Now we see a direct one, a new direct adjustment, direct tax adjustment. What do you prefer in the IMF, direct or indirect adjustment taxes?

Ms. Guerguil - I don't think there is a given preference. It all depends obviously on the country's specificity. In many countries, particularly in the Middle East, there is a significant degree of weakness in tax administration, or in tax evasion, that says the tax receipts are often less than what is the tax rate would make us believe. Therefore, it is important to look on a country-by-country basis. Where is the basis to effectively mobilize more revenue in an efficient and fair manner?

QUESTION: I would like to know if you are confident that fiscal multipliers are well tuned in the European Monetary Union and especially in the eurozone periphery countries that are under troika programs? And let me be more specific. We know that in the short run fiscal multipliers are sensitive to structural features such as the share of liquidity. Therefore, in Cyprus, the troika had planned a front-loaded fiscal adjustment program. Also, the country has a liquidity problem. Do you believe that this will undermine Cyprus's recovery efforts?

Mr. Cottarelli - I will answer the question in general.

I think there is now broad consensus that fiscal multipliers in the current situation are pretty high, for two reasons. One is that many countries are operating at below full capacity. So, when you cut demand or you cut spending, this directly affects output. Secondly, because of what you mentioned, the liquidity considerations, the fact that interest rates are already low and banks are not able to increase their lending. So, when you have a decline in public sector demand, you have more difficulty for the private sector demand to recover.

Having said this, we have for a long time underscored that the level of the fiscal multipliers is not the only thing that matters to decide the proper stance of fiscal policy and the amount of fiscal tightening. There are countries unfortunately, as I said, that cannot borrow at low rates, or even have lost market access, for which it is necessary to go ahead with a faster fiscal adjustment. Now, of course, fiscal adjustment is necessary also in Cyprus. Cyprus enters into this group of countries that having faced a crisis, as we were saying before, needs to address more rapidly their fiscal issues than other countries.

So, we need to take into account not only the level of multipliers, but also the situation, magnitude of the fiscal progress that the country is facing, and also the access to markets, whether the country can borrow or not from the financial markets.

Ms. Nardin - A question online about Argentina, about energy subsidies. Again, we have published a report exactly on how to implement subsidies reform in many countries, so I would refer you to that paper that is online.

QUESTION: I have a question about public public-debt-GDP ratio. You were drawing a line at 90 percent. Why do you use 90 percent? Can we see any difference above 90 percent and below 90 percent? Is it the figure which the IMF or G-20 is targeting in the short term or medium term?

Mr. Cottarelli - Let me clarify two things. First of all, where does the 90 percent come from? As I said, there are several econometric studies, including our own -- we have a paper on this published, I think, in 2011 -- showing that when the public-debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 90 percent, there is more clear statistical evidence that growth suffers from this. That is the first clarification. This, however, does not -- well, of course, there is some uncertainty around this, whether it is 90 percent, 80 percent. We actually find that there is an effect on growth even at lower levels, but not as significant, not as clear-cut as when you go beyond 80, 90 percent.

The other consideration that, again, if you believe that there are negative effects arising from public debt at 90 percent, you don't want to target 90 percent in the long run. You want to stay well below 90 percent. That is why we argued that there is a need for advanced economies not just to stabilize the current level which would be around 100, 110 percent, not just to go below 90 percent, but to go significantly below 90 percent. Essentially, to go at least back to where they were before the crisis.

The average debt-to-GDP ratio for advanced economies, before the crisis, was about 60 percent. Of course, some economies were above, some economies were below, but that is the average. So, I hope that you understand that for us the 90 percent is not in itself a target. It is a relevant threshold, beyond which we are more certain that high public debt affects long-term growth.

QUESTION: On Honduras -- no English translation provided).

Mr. Gerson - Let me speak a little about policy in Latin America, about the fiscal challenges in Latin America. Carlo mentioned in his presentation at the beginning that emerging market economies have over the last couple of years slowed their pace of fiscal adjustment. Generally over the last couple of years they have kept their cyclically adjusted deficits more or less constant. For most of them that is appropriate given the fact that their fiscal conditions are generally less dire than those of some of the advanced economies, given that the global economy has been slowing down.

There are in a number of those countries, including countries in Latin America, medium-term issues, issues related to population aging, issues in Mexico, for example, related to the decline in oil revenues going forward. There are issues in some countries with state-owned banking sectors. One of the things we have learned in the crisis is that problems in the banking sector can very quickly spill over into the government's balance sheet. Even though most countries in Latin America have been appropriately taking advantage of their current fiscal space to slow the pace of adjustment, there is still a need over the medium term to continue to make progress. In fact, if you look at the aggregates in Latin America for debt and deficits, they're still higher now than before the crisis. So, over the medium term many of the countries in Latin America need to continue to make progress to rebuild fiscal buffers in order to be in a position to withstand the next shock that is coming down the line. We don't know what it is, we don't know when it is, but surely at some point in the future there will be other shocks and countries will want to have the fiscal space to respond to those.

QUESTION: Just one question. What is the recommended level of net debt or gross public debt, and fiscal, just to have these buffers up?

Mr. Gerson - I don't know, as Martine was saying, and as Carlo was saying in responding to the question about the debt level, it is hard to say that there is a universal debt level and universal surplus level at which you will be secure from any future shock. It is also generally true that on both of these the lower the better. That needs to be balanced against legitimate needs for expenditure, for social spending, for investment.

Before the crisis we were looking at debt ratios of about 60 percent of GDP for advanced economies, and about 40 percent of GDP for emerging market economies as reasonable benchmarks. I don't think there is anything that has happened since the crisis that led us to think that, no, those were too low, that countries should have been more indebted when they started. But, as Carlo pointed out, the econometric evidence says debt ratios of about 90 percent of GDP are where we begin to say for certain this is having a negative impact on growth. So if you think 90 percent is where the negative impact starts, if you want to have some buffers so when a shock comes you are not immediately pushed above 90 percent, 60 percent may still be a reasonable number.

Again, it is hard to find a specific number where you can say, as long as you are below this, you are fine, for advanced economies. For emerging market economies, given the fact that they are hit by larger shocks typically and given the fact that markets in the past at least have tended to be less accommodating, a bit less generous, less ready to tolerate increases in debt, one would expect for emerging market economies the appropriate ratio may be below that 60 percent that I was talking about for advanced economies.

QUESTION: Mr. Cottarelli mentioned Brazil and India with high levels of debt. I would like you to comment. Brazil has high debt, if you consider the gross one, but very low nominal deficit. How do you see this apparent paradox and the consequences for the country.

Mr. Gerson - Brazil, as you mentioned, does have for an emerging market economy a relatively high debt ratio, and it also has a very strong primary surplus, has for some time. The government is targeting a primary surplus of 3.1 percent of GDP for this year, which we think is an appropriate target, and we think it is important that target be achieved with minimum recourse to some of the adjustors built into the budget system. Brazil for some time as you know has had a strategy of trying to maintain a high primary surplus to take some of the pressures off of interest rates and allow them to bring interest rates down from what were quite high levels in the past. That has been successful. The SELIC has come down significantly from the level it was at a few years ago. We think that is a process that should continue, that the authorities should continue to run a high primary surplus in order to continue to support monetary policy, and also to help over time to bring the debt ratio down, given some of the pressures that are going to come from population aging, for example.

Ms. Nardin - Thank you very much. This concludes this press conference on the Fiscal Monitor. Again, thank you all for being here and watching online.