Auction Format Matters: Evidenceon Bidding Behavior and Seller Revenue
Summary:
This paper evaluates the importance of auction format on bidding behavior and seller revenue, focusing on differences in performance under uniform-price and discriminatory-price formats. The analysis is based on a standard benchmark model from which empirically-testable hypotheses are derived on the optimal amount of bid shading that generates revenue equivalence between the two formats. Applying this model to data from the IMF gold auctions run in 1976-80, we find evidence of statistically significant shading in excess of the theoretically-derived optimum under the discriminatory format. This evidence suggests greater seller revenue under the uniform-price format.
Series:
Working Paper No. 1995/047
Subject:
Commodities Commodity markets Financial markets Gold Gold prices Prices
Notes:
Also published in Staff Papers, Vol. 43, No. 2, June 1996.
English
Publication Date:
May 1, 1995
ISBN/ISSN:
9781451846607/1018-5941
Stock No:
WPIEA0471995
Pages:
30
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