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Author/Editor:
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Gray, Simon
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Publication Date:
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February 01, 2011
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Electronic Access:
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Free Full text
(PDF file size is 1,444KB).
Use the free
Adobe Acrobat Reader
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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
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Summary:
Most central banks oblige depository institutions to hold minimum reserves against their liabilities, predominantly in the form of balances at the central bank. The role of these reserve requirements has evolved significantly over time. The overlay of changing purposes and practices has the result that it is not always fully clear what the current purpose of reserve requirements is, and this necessarily complicates thinking about how a reserve regime should be structured. This paper describes three main purposes for reserve requirements - prudential, monetary control and liquidity management - and suggests best practice for the structure of a reserves regime. Finally, the paper illustrates current practices using a 2010 IMF survey of 121 central banks.
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Order a print copy
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Series:
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Working Paper No. 11/36
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Subject(s):
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Central bank policy | Central banks | Commercial banks | Depositories | Liquidity management | Reserve requirements
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Author's Keyword(s):
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Reserve requirements | central bank | monetary control | remuneration of reserves |
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English
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Publication Date:
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February 01, 2011
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Format:
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Paper
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Stock No:
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WPIEA2011036
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Pages:
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56
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Price:
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US$18.00 )
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Please address any questions about this title to
publications@imf.org
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