Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium

 
Author/Editor: Hatchondo, Juan Carlos ; Martinez, Leonardo ; Roch, Francisco
 
Publication Date: January 01, 2012
 
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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
 
Summary: This paper finds optimal fiscal rule parameter values and measures the effects of imposing fiscal rules using a default model calibrated to an economy that in the absence of a fiscal rule pays a significant sovereign default premium. The paper also studies the case in which the government conducts a voluntary debt restructuring to capture the capital gains from the increase in its debt market value implied by a rule announcement. In addition, the paper shows how debt ceilings may reduce the procyclicality of fiscal policy and thus consumption volatility.
 
Series: Working Paper No. 12/30
Subject(s): Debt restructuring | Economic models | Fiscal policy | Risk premium | Sovereign debt

Author's Keyword(s): Fiscal rules | debt ceiling | fiscal consolidation | default | sovereign default premium | debt exchange | countercyclical policy | endogenous borrowing constraints | long-term debt | debt dilution
 
English
Publication Date: January 01, 2012
Format: Paper
Stock No: WPIEA2012030 Pages: 27
Price:
US$18.00 (Academic Rate:
US$18.00 )
 
 
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