IMF Working Papers

Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation

By Kurt Annen, Luc Moers

August 1, 2012

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Kurt Annen, and Luc Moers. Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2012) accessed September 20, 2024
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation.

Subject: Budget planning and preparation, Competition, Financial markets, Foreign aid, Poverty, Poverty reduction, Public financial management (PFM)

Keywords: Aid allocation, Aid Effectiveness, Aid Fragmentation, Budget planning and preparation, Competition, Donor competition, Donor Coordination, Donor fragmentation, Donor ranking, Foreign Aid, Global, Poverty reduction, WP

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    37

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

    ---

  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 2012/204

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA2012204

  • ISBN:

    9781475505542

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941