Credibility Effects of Price Controls in Disinflation Programs

Author/Editor:

Pierre-Richard Agénor

Publication Date:

October 1, 1992

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

This paper examines whether price controls may enhance the credibility of a disinflation program, using a framework in which agents behave strategically. The analysis indicates that a partial price freeze is not fully credible, and may result in inflation inertia. The authorities may be able to determine optimally the intensity of price controls so as to minimize the policy loss associated with a discretionary monetary strategy. But the optimal intensity of controls is shown to be significantly different from zero only if the cost of enforcing price ceilings is not too high, or if the weight attached to price distortions in the policymaker’s loss function is small.

Series:

Working Paper No. 1992/083

Subject:

English

Publication Date:

October 1, 1992

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451850482/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA0831992

Pages:

23

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