Washington, DC: The
Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the
Article IV consultation
[1]
with the Kingdom of Lesotho.
Lesotho’s economy continues to face a number of challenges in the wake of
the pandemic. Climate shocks, delays to infrastructure projects, high food
and fuel prices, declining diamond prices, layoffs in the textiles sector,
and weak regional and external demand are weighing on activity. High public
expenditure also continues to distort incentives and hinder private sector
development.
Headline inflation remained elevated averaging 8.4 percent in FY22/23, two
percentage points higher than the year before. Furthermore, food inflation
rose to 10.4 percent during the same period. To anchor inflation
expectations and support the exchange rate peg, the Central Bank of Lesotho
has continued to track the policy rate changes of the South African Reserve
Bank, raising rates by 425 basis points since November 2021.
The government is prioritizing fiscal consolidation on the back of windfall
transfers from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which have helped
alleviate near-term pressures on financing and reserves. However, the
fiscal deficit deteriorated to 7.7 percent in FY22/23, due to lower revenue
and rigid expenditure, with public debt increasing to almost 60 percent of
GDP.Efforts to restrain expenditure have been hampered by
persistent weaknesses in public financial management. The current account
deficit is projected to widen to 7.9 percent of GDP in FY22/23, mirroring
developments with the fiscus. As of end-March 2023, gross international
reserves (excluding the second phase of the Lesotho Highlands Water
Project) had declined to 3.8 months of imports.
Despite ample liquidity in the financial sector, credit growth only
increased slightly to
8.7 percent year-on-year by the end of FY22/23 despite tighter financial
conditions. Overall, credit to the private sector remains broadly flat at
around 20 percent of GDP with banks primarily lending to households.
Looking ahead, the outlook is subdued with real GDP projected to grow at
2.1 percent in FY23/24 and average the same over the medium term. In the
absence of stronger consolidation, the fiscal position is projected to
deteriorate over the medium term due to lower SACU transfers, wage bill
pressures, and recapitalization of the pension fund. The government is
encouraged to push ahead with upfront growth-friendly fiscal adjustment to
ensure debt sustainability and safeguard the exchange rate peg, alongside
broad-ranging structural reforms to support the transition from
government-centric to private sector-led growth.
Executive Board Assessment[2]
In concluding the Article IV consultation with Kingdom of Lesotho,
Executive Directors endorsed the staff appraisal as follows:
Staff commends the new government on their bold reform agenda and
encourages them to make the most of the economic, financial, and political
window of opportunity. With the health crisis largely abated, staff
welcomes the government’s vision of a smaller and more efficient public
sector with a high quality of service delivery that provides space for the
private sector to grow. The SACU windfall, if well-managed, also provides
the opportunity to build buffers and finance a durable, growth-friendly
fiscal consolidation, through a well-paced sequence of reforms and CD.
The recommendations of the 2022 Article IV consultation still stand. The
fixed exchange rate means adjustment must fall on fiscal policy and
structural reforms. If unchanged, current policies could result in abrupt
adjustment with a significant impact on growth and inequality. The gradual
weakening in the external position, which is assessed in FY22/23 to be
weaker than that implied by fundamentals and desired policies, underlines
the fragility of the current economic model and the need to consolidate
public finances.
Fiscal sustainability will require determined efforts to contain spending
upfront and implement PFM reforms, without which Lesotho’s boom-bust fiscal
cycle will continue. Despite the recent SACU windfall, pressures are
expected to resume over the medium term, risking reserves and debt
sustainability once again. Critical for adjustment is reducing current
spending (notably public sector wages) and rationalizing public investment,
complemented by broad PFM reforms. Tax policy and revenue administration
measures can also improve fiscal outcomes in the near term, while
minimizing the impact on growth. In this way, the government would find
itself better placed to finance key development priorities and stronger
social safety nets.
Alongside, broad-ranging structural reforms will be vital for the economy
to transition to durable, resilient, inclusive, job-rich, and sustainable
private sector-led growth. Staff strongly encourages efforts to improve the
business environment, strengthen financial stability, and enhance business
lending. As the public sector recedes, enlarging financial access and
improving the business environment will be critical. Therefore, the premium
on undertaking reforms to address credit constraints, insolvency
frameworks, consumer protection, and governance and corruption
vulnerabilities as soon as possible to restore investor confidence and
create a growth-friendly environment is higher than ever. A governance
diagnostic can build on the commitments from the 2020 RCF/RFI.
Staff strongly encourages the authorities to continue their efforts to
increase capacity, improve data quality, and coordinate closely on
macroeconomic policies. High data quality and information sharing are
critical for policymaking—from measuring economic performance to
forecasting. Close coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities is
also necessary to balance competing objectives for spending, debt, and
reserves and ensure consistency of macroeconomic policies with the exchange
rate regime. In the absence of coordination, credibility will suffer, and
confidence will be lost.
Staff recommends that the next Article IV consultation for Lesotho be held
on the standard
12-month cycle.
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Table 1. Lesotho: Selected Economic Indicators,
2019/20–2028/291
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Population (thousands; 2021 est.):
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2,281
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
GNI per capita (US$; 2021 est.):
|
1,210
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Poverty rate at national poverty line (percent; 2017
est.):
|
49.7
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019/20
|
2020/21
|
2021/22
|
2022/23
|
2023/24
|
2024/25
|
2025/26
|
2026/27
|
2027/28
|
2028/29
|
|
|
Act.
|
Act.
|
Act.
|
Est.
|
Projections
|
|
|
(12-month percent change, unless otherwise indicated)
|
|
National Account and Prices
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
GDP at constant prices (including LHWP-II)
|
-2.0
|
-3.9
|
1.8
|
2.1
|
2.1
|
2.3
|
2.5
|
2.1
|
1.8
|
1.6
|
|
GDP at constant prices (excluding LHWP-II)
|
-2.1
|
-2.2
|
1.5
|
1.6
|
1.7
|
1.5
|
1.5
|
1.5
|
1.5
|
1.5
|
|
GDP at market prices (Maloti billions)
|
35.1
|
34.9
|
37.8
|
41.8
|
45.5
|
49.1
|
52.7
|
56.5
|
60.4
|
64.4
|
|
GDP at market prices (US$ billions)
|
2.4
|
2.1
|
2.5
|
2.5
|
2.4
|
2.6
|
2.7
|
2.8
|
2.9
|
2.9
|
|
Consumer prices (average)
|
4.9
|
5.4
|
6.4
|
8.4
|
6.7
|
5.4
|
4.9
|
5.0
|
4.9
|
4.9
|
|
Consumer prices (eop)
|
4.0
|
6.5
|
7.2
|
7.9
|
5.9
|
5.0
|
4.9
|
4.9
|
4.9
|
4.9
|
|
GDP deflator
|
4.8
|
3.5
|
6.3
|
8.4
|
6.7
|
5.3
|
4.8
|
5.0
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4.9
|
5.0
|
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External Sector
|
|
|
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|
|
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|
|
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Terms of trade ("–" = deterioration)
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2.0
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4.0
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-2.3
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-3.0
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2.3
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1.2
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1.4
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1.1
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0.7
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0.5
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Average exchange rate
|
|
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|
|
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(Local currency per US$)
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14.8
|
16.4
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14.9
|
17.0
|
...
|
...
|
...
|
...
|
...
|
...
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|
Nominal effective exchange rate change (– depreciation)
2
|
-4.7
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-8.7
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6.3
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-3.0
|
...
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...
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...
|
...
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...
|
...
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|
Real effective exchange rate (– depreciation)
2
|
-2.1
|
-6.0
|
8.7
|
-1.9
|
...
|
...
|
...
|
...
|
...
|
...
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Current account balance (percent of GDP)
|
-1.5
|
-1.0
|
-4.4
|
-7.9
|
-2.6
|
-4.1
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-8.7
|
-7.1
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-5.5
|
-4.2
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|
(excluding LHWP-II imports, percent of GDP)
|
0.5
|
2.3
|
-2.0
|
-5.5
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1.7
|
1.0
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-4.0
|
-3.3
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-2.6
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-2.0
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Gross international reserves
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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(excluding imports for LHWP-II, months of imports)
|
4.7
|
4.2
|
4.3
|
3.8
|
4.1
|
4.1
|
3.8
|
3.6
|
3.3
|
3.0
|
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Money and Credit
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
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Net international reserves
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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(US$ millions)
|
670
|
718
|
846
|
663
|
756
|
813
|
784
|
753
|
722
|
693
|
|
(Percent of M1 Plus)
|
140
|
109
|
127
|
97
|
111
|
117
|
109
|
103
|
96
|
90
|
|
(US$ millions, CBL calculation)
|
605
|
777
|
756
|
855
|
845.3
|
842.8
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N.A.
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N.A.
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N.A.
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N.A.
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(Percent of M1 Plus, CBL calculation)
|
126
|
118
|
114
|
125
|
124.4
|
121.2
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N.A.
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N.A.
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N.A.
|
N.A.
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Domestic credit to the private sector
|
12.9
|
-3.0
|
6.7
|
8.7
|
8.3
|
8.4
|
7.8
|
8.3
|
8.7
|
7.9
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Reserve money
|
-3.8
|
17.2
|
1.0
|
24.5
|
8.3
|
-2.5
|
1.1
|
1.4
|
1.8
|
1.9
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Broad money
|
11.8
|
12.2
|
0.0
|
19.6
|
3.9
|
4.9
|
5.9
|
5.6
|
6.1
|
5.8
|
|
Interest rate (percent) 3
|
3.9
|
3.5
|
2.8
|
4.6
|
7.0
|
6.0
|
5.0
|
5.0
|
5.0
|
5.0
|
|
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(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
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Public Debt
|
57.0
|
53.6
|
55.7
|
59.8
|
60.4
|
60.4
|
60.7
|
61.3
|
61.8
|
62.3
|
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External public debt
|
45.4
|
42.1
|
40.4
|
43.9
|
44.8
|
44.3
|
44.1
|
44.3
|
44.4
|
44.9
|
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Domestic public debt
|
11.6
|
11.5
|
15.3
|
15.9
|
15.5
|
16.1
|
16.5
|
17.0
|
17.4
|
17.5
|
|
Central Government Fiscal Operations
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|
|
|
|
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Revenue and grants
|
46.8
|
53.4
|
44.9
|
41.5
|
51.4
|
49.7
|
46.1
|
45.7
|
45.8
|
45.8
|
|
(excluding SACU transfers and grants)
|
25.5
|
24.6
|
26.0
|
25.4
|
26.5
|
25.0
|
26.0
|
26.1
|
26.3
|
26.3
|
|
SACU transfers
|
17.7
|
25.7
|
15.9
|
12.9
|
22.3
|
22.1
|
17.6
|
17.0
|
17.0
|
17.0
|
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Grants
|
3.5
|
3.0
|
3.1
|
3.2
|
2.6
|
2.5
|
2.5
|
2.5
|
2.5
|
2.5
|
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Recurrent expenditure
|
39.2
|
42.2
|
36.8
|
37.1
|
37.8
|
37.8
|
37.7
|
37.5
|
37.2
|
36.9
|
|
Of which: wages, including social contributions
|
16.9
|
17.3
|
16.2
|
16.6
|
16.4
|
16.2
|
16.0
|
15.8
|
15.6
|
15.5
|
|
Capital expenditure
|
13.2
|
11.2
|
13.2
|
12.0
|
12.5
|
12.3
|
12.2
|
12.1
|
12.0
|
12.0
|
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Overall balance
|
-5.6
|
0.0
|
-5.1
|
-7.7
|
1.1
|
-0.4
|
-3.8
|
-3.9
|
-3.3
|
-3.1
|
|
(excluding SACU transfers and grants)
|
-26.8
|
-28.7
|
-24.1
|
-23.7
|
-23.8
|
-25.0
|
-23.9
|
-23.5
|
-22.9
|
-22.7
|
|
Primary balance
|
-4.2
|
1.5
|
-3.8
|
-6.2
|
2.6
|
1.3
|
-2.0
|
-1.9
|
-1.3
|
-1.1
|
|
(excluding SACU transfers and grants)
|
-25.4
|
-27.2
|
-22.8
|
-22.3
|
-22.3
|
-23.4
|
-22.1
|
-21.5
|
-20.9
|
-20.7
|
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Statistical discrepancy
|
0.0
|
-1.1
|
1.1
|
0.0
|
0.0
|
0.0
|
0.0
|
0.0
|
0.0
|
0.0
|
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Sources: Lesotho authorities, World Bank, and IMF staff
calculations.
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1 The fiscal year runs from April 1 to March
31.
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2 IMF Information Notice System
trade-weighted; end of period.
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3 12-month time deposits rate.
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[1]
Under Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds
bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff
team visits the country, collects economic and financial
information, and discusses with officials the country's economic
developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff
prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the
Executive Board.
[2]
The Executive Board takes decisions under its laps-of-time
procedure when the Board agrees that a proposal can be considered
without convening formal discussions.