How to Deal with Debt’s Downside
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- Authors: ANNE O KRUEGER
- Published: March 3, 2025
Overview
- Mounting debt in developing economies is a growing concern; some countries, including Sri Lanka and Zambia, have declared they cannot service their debts and have sought international assistance.
- Many developing countries face onerous debt service obligations amounting to several percentage points of GDP.
- Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect IMF policy.
Debt as a blessing and a curse
- Debt enables financing for investment in roads, schools, hospitals, and other areas that can turn prospects into realities when investment yields high returns.
- Historical example: Korea in the 1960s
- Domestic saving rate: less than 10 percent.
- Borrowed about 10 percent of GDP a year.
- Fast-growing economy generated high investment returns so that its debt servicing ratio fell.
- Over time, domestic saving rose and the country sustained investment-led growth without foreign debt; today Korea is among the world’s richest nations.
- Debt becomes problematic when used to finance current consumption or poorly conceived investment; if investment does not pay off:
- The borrower is poorer but still must service loans.
- Creditworthiness concerns push up interest rates.
- Creditors may refuse to roll over debt.
Range of risks creditors weigh
- Lenders consider the country’s macroeconomic policies and prospects and possible swings in prices of principal commodity exports.
- Promises of policy reform—perhaps linked to an IMF program—can convince lenders to roll over maturing debt.
- If government policy produces poor results and politicians refuse to change course, lenders will likely insist on repayment; result: a debt crisis with acute balance of payments pressures that can prevent payment for essential imports.
Sri Lanka case study (crisis dynamics and recovery prerequisites)
- Crisis outcomes when it hit in 2021:
- Country could afford imports only of essentials (food and fuel).
- Buses did not run; people could not go to work.
- Many factories could not obtain raw materials, intermediate goods, or spare parts.
- Lengthy power outages were common.
- Economic activity fell sharply, by 7.8 percent in 2022 and a further 3.8 percent in 2023.
- Grocery stores emptied; inflation spiked.
- Three necessary actions to rebuild credibility and set stage for recovery and sustainable growth:
- Provide a source of foreign exchange to buy essential imports to restart power plants, factories, transport, and other essential services.
- Restructure debt so lenders can be confident that debt will be serviced.
- Implement domestic policy reform.
- Political dynamics:
- Policy reform often encounters stiff political resistance; the choice is between short-term pain or worse long-term pain.
- Reform became possible in Sri Lanka only when a new president took office in 2024.
- Risk that reforms do not go far enough and fail, leading to unfair blame on reformers.
The IMF’s role and constraints
- The IMF’s mandate: safeguard the international monetary system and assess countries’ macroeconomic situations.
- The Fund has financial resources that can be lent (usually for not longer than three to five years) to support countries in difficulty.
- The IMF charter requires reasonable assurances that the borrower will be able to service the loan.
- Debt restructuring is often needed alongside IMF-supported reform programs because the IMF cannot lend if creditors suspect their loans will be used to finance debt service to a holdout country.
Challenges from creditor coordination and holdouts
- Past practice: sovereign creditors met through the Paris Club; private creditors also met, with the IMF consulted; restructurings often involved a “haircut” and possibly a pause in payments.
- China’s recent role:
- China has become a large sovereign creditor in the past decade but has chosen to remain outside the Paris Club.
- While it has granted debt relief in many cases, it does not have fully developed internal processes for considering haircuts and has given its lenders only limited discretion to reschedule debt service payments.
- Sri Lanka was among the first cases with China as a large creditor where debts proved unsustainable; it took almost two years to reach an agreement satisfying Chinese creditors, delaying the IMF program by nearly a year and prolonging hardship.
- Holdout creditor problem:
- When a creditor refuses to accept restructuring terms, other creditors and the IMF may withhold lending; delays in restructuring while awaiting a holdout’s decision can pile pressure on the crisis country and delay recovery.
Policy recommendations and institutional reforms proposed
- Minimum requirement: countries in crisis must be able to develop a restructuring plan with the IMF, the Paris Club, and other creditors.
- Strengthen arrangements so that a holdout sovereign creditor will not receive debt service payments until it accepts the same terms as other creditors (beyond current incentives of the IMF’s lending-into-arrears policies).
- It would be preferable for China to join the Paris Club.
- Superior reform: establish an internationally agreed procedure and tribunal where creditors and debtors can present their claims; the tribunal could determine a settlement that:
- Enables normal economic activity and sustainable growth to resume.
- Gives creditors as fair a settlement as possible under the circumstances.
- With mounting debt problems, the author argues it is time to reform existing arrangements.
ANNE O. KRUEGER is a senior fellow at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and the Caroline Ritch Emeritus Professor of Sciences and Humanities in Stanford University’s economics department. She is a former World Bank chief economist and IMF first deputy managing director.
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- How to Deal with Debt’s Downside