Transparency Makes Central Banks More Effective and Trusted
IMF Blog, July 30, 2020
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Bibliographic details
- Authors: Tobias Adrian, Ghiath Shabsigh, Ashraf Khan
- Published: July 30, 2020
Overview
- Publication: "Transparency Makes Central Banks More Effective and Trusted"
- Authors: Tobias Adrian, Ghiath Shabsigh, Ashraf Khan
- Date: July 30, 2020
- Context: Since the 2008 global financial crisis, central bank roles and mandates have broadened and become more complex; unconventional and large-scale interventions (as seen again during the COVID-19 pandemic) have increased scrutiny and demands for transparency and accountability.
Accountability and effectiveness
- Central banks have expanded responsibilities, including supervision and other financial stability functions.
- Transparency is presented as an instrument to facilitate accountability by allowing the public to better understand how central bank actions serve public interest and are consistent with mandates.
- The increasing responsibilities and significant expansion of balance sheets drive demand for clearer explanations of what central banks do, how, and why.
- "In central bank parlance, transparency and accountability become the collateral guarantee of independence."
The Central Bank Transparency Code: purpose and structure
- Developed by the IMF to help member countries meet demands for greater transparency, increase trust and support, and facilitate more effective communication between central banks and stakeholders.
- Nature: voluntary code.
- Scope: allows central banks to measure transparency in five key areas or "pillars":
- governance
- policies
- operations
- outcomes
- official relations
- Under each pillar, the code provides a list of best practices categorized as "core" to "expanded" to "comprehensive" for key functions such as monetary or macroprudential policy.
- The code is designed to accommodate the diversity of the IMF’s 190 members central banks in legal frameworks, governance arrangements, and levels of economic and financial development.
- The code is explicitly not a ranking tool and avoids expressing preferences or making recommendations about mandates, institutional setups, or governance procedures.
- The code recognizes that transparency is not an absolute goal and includes qualifications for legitimate reasons to delay or withhold publication.
Confidentiality and legitimate exceptions
- Central banks have legitimate reasons for confidentiality, including:
- market sensitive data
- financial stability considerations
- personal data
- Specific areas where confidentiality is particularly relevant:
- foreign exchange interventions
- reserve management
- supervisory decisions on individual institutions
- emergency liquidity assistance
- The code outlines the general principle that central banks should develop clear policies explaining and justifying what is kept confidential.
Dialogue with stakeholders and development process
- Preparation involved extensive consultations with central banks, monetary unions, international financial institutions, and standard-setting bodies.
- Input included contributions from 73 central banks representing diverse regional and economic development backgrounds.
- An advisory panel of eminent academics and former governors provided additional perspective and practical experience.
- The code was designed to be applicable across countries regardless of income level, exchange rate regime, or geographical location.
- Assessments using the code can be performed in full or with a subset of principles and practices applicable to specific circumstances.
- IMF staff can assist with evaluations; assessments can be used as diagnostic tools for designing targeted capacity development programs.
- Several pilot assessments are planned to help implementation over the coming years.
Reception and endorsement
- IMF Executive Board members commended the code’s flexibility and attention to individual circumstances.
- On approving the code in mid-July, the Executive Board said in a statement that it is a "timely and useful tool for central banks to guide their transparency practices and strengthen accountability, ensuring more effective policy outcomes and better-informed dialogue with stakeholders."
Conclusion and policy implication
- The IMF transparency code, developed with and for central banks, aims to help central banks maintain and strengthen stakeholder and societal support while performing crucial roles.
- As central banks are called to step up actions, building trust and credibility with citizens is highlighted as critical.
Source: IMF blog post "Transparency Makes Central Banks More Effective and Trusted", July 30, 2020.