Multilateralism Can Survive the Loss of Consensus

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International cooperation can advance even when the most powerful players are at odds.
Geopolitical competition strains the multilateral system, but competition can sometimes raise cooperation (example: US leadership during the Cold War).
Multilateralism is splintering not only because of geopolitical competition but because it is an expensive global public good that benefits all humanity while distributing costs unevenly across nations.
Key normative goals that rivals can still agree on: a hospitable planet, control of future pandemics through sensible public health safeguards, and global economic policy that yields prosperity for all.

Carbon has been accumulating in the atmosphere for centuries; disputes arise over dividing the burden between past and present emitters.
Financial stability and global growth provision are costly; advanced economies may expend resources while others fail to behave prudently.
Multilateralism requires incentive compatibility: support must align with self-interest and deliver visible gains for every contributing nation.
Central question posed: How can the system endure without goodwill or consensus between critical actors?

Middle powers—those with sufficient economic and financial firepower—may substitute for absent great-power leadership.
Evidence: rules-based free trade agreements emerged without continuing US leadership (example: Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a 12-member free trade pact formed after the US failed to ratify the Trans-Pacific Partnership).
Middle powers can provide global public goods more easily than small states but, like great powers, require incentive-compatible benefits to uphold multilateralism.

Core proposition: incentive compatibility should replace the idea that size alone determines provision of global public goods.

1) Inadvertent cooperation

Definition: countries cooperate even when they disagree, doing the right thing for the wrong reason.
Mechanism: positive spillover benefits cause collective gains without explicit consensus.
Example: COVID vaccine development—mRNA technology plus competition across countries led to faster vaccine development that benefited everyone.
Example: energy transition—competing subsidies for electric vehicle production can increase global supply of clean vehicles and reduce carbon emissions even if motivated by retaliation rather than climate concerns.
Policy implication: design policies that create positive spillovers so that self-interested actions yield public-good outcomes.

2) Overcoming the prisoners’ dilemma (nudging)

Problem: when all countries pursue narrow self-interest, a prisoners’ dilemma leads to mutually destructive outcomes; unilateral deviation is punished by others.
Mechanism: smaller nations can nudge the international system out of gridlock by coordinating or persuading others to act collectively.
Example: advanced economies restricting market access harms developing economies, suppresses income growth, and increases outward migration—if developing economies persuade advanced economies to act as a group, freer trade’s impact is diffused across advanced economies and rising incomes reduce migration incentives.
Policy implication: use coordinated nudges to enable great and middle powers to achieve collectively preferred outcomes they cannot achieve unilaterally.

3) Pathfinder multilateralism

Definition: subgroups of countries that favor multilateralism work together when broader consensus fails.
Examples:
The World Trade Organization’s Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA): provides an independent appeals process when the main appellate body lacks a quorum; MPIA membership has tripled to more than 50 nations since 2020.
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: a 15-nation free trade agreement committed to rules-based order; includes ASEAN members and countries as politically diverse as Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea.
Connection: these coalitions resemble the IMF’s concept of “pragmatic multilateralism.”
Policy implication: encourage and legitimize coalition-based arrangements that sustain rules-based practices even when full international consensus is absent.

Findings
- Multilateralism is splintering because it is costly and distributes costs unevenly.
- Middle powers can play consequential roles when great powers withdraw, but they require incentive-compatible benefits.
- Inadvertent cooperation, strategic nudging, and pathfinder multilateralism are viable routes to sustain cooperation without full consensus.
- Concrete institutional evidence: MPIA membership > 50 nations since 2020; CPTPP exists as a 12-member pact formed after US nonratification; RCEP is a 15-nation agreement including ASEAN plus Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea.

Policy recommendations
- Design domestic and international policies to generate positive spillovers that create inadvertent cooperation incentives.
- Support coordinated nudges by smaller or developing countries to move great and middle powers out of prisoners’ dilemmas.
- Legitimize and expand pathfinder multilateral arrangements (e.g., MPIA, RCEP) as pragmatic mechanisms to preserve rules-based order when universal consensus is unattainable.
- Ensure that contributions to global public goods are structured so they deliver visible, incentive-compatible gains to participating nations.

Even as consensus falls among geopolitical rivals, international cooperation can be sustained through:
- inadvertent cooperation,
- overcoming prisoners’ dilemmas via nudges,
- and pathfinder multilateralism among committed coalitions.
These approaches can restore important elements of the international rules-based system without relying solely on great-power consensus.

Source: Danny Quah, "Multilateralism Can Survive the Loss of Consensus," F&D Magazine, September 2025.

Multilateralism Can Survive the Loss of Consensus
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