Why Development Feels Harder
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Bibliographic details
- Authors: MUHAMAD CHATIB BASRI
- Published: September 2, 2026
Main argument
- Growth that no longer creates secure employment and upward mobility spreads insecurity beyond the poor into the aspiring middle; expectations outrun opportunities, and politics becomes the binding constraint.
- Premature deindustrialization: growth continues but absorbs less labor, producing a middle class large enough to have expectations but not secure enough to feel safe.
Evidence and patterns across emerging economies
- Indonesia: two decades of 5 percent growth, low inflation, fiscal deficits below 3 percent of GDP, yet mass protests followed the August 28, 2025 death of a 21-year-old gig worker.
- Income and consumption patterns:
- Drivers for Jakarta’s super-app companies earn about $272 a month, nine times the $30 poverty line.
- Indonesia’s middle class shrank from 21 percent of the population in 2019 to 16.6 percent by 2025.
- The aspiring middle expanded to nearly half the country—about 137 million people in 2024.
- Households between the 50th and 80th percentiles saw their real consumption fall from 2019 to 2022.
- In Indonesia, 80 percent of new jobs in 2019–24 were informal, paying about $114 a month, below the $181 minimum wage.
- Regional parallels: Middle class is also shrinking in India, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brazil; Chile’s 2019 unrest began after a 30 peso (US 4 cent) subway fare rise.
- Structural shifts:
- Less than 10 percent of export growth comes from new products in new markets.
- Growth increasingly flows through capital-intensive resources (e.g., nickel smelting) and services rather than labor-intensive manufacturing.
Labor market dynamics and limits of services-led growth
- Deindustrialization dynamics:
- Value chains dominated by incumbents; automation and reshoring shrink labor-intensive work.
- “Servicified” production: design, software, logistics, and R&D add more value but absorb few workers.
- Two limits of services-led growth:
- Polarization (Baumol’s “cost disease”): high-skill tradable services raise productivity but absorb few workers; labor-absorbing services (care, education, hospitality) offer little productivity and rising relative costs.
- Non-tradability: many services cannot be exported, so services-led growth is capped by domestic purchasing power.
- Skills and technology:
- High-skill activities absorb few workers and hit a skill ceiling.
- AI threatens to cap labor absorption even in mid-skilled activities, sharpening the need to upgrade skills so workers complement automation.
Constraints on reform and political economy
- Reform space narrows when the aspiring middle feels insecure because visible costs of reform hit them directly (example: fuel subsidy removal).
- Red tape and vested interests:
- Cutting red tape removes income sources for bureaucrats who will resist reforms.
- Good arguments alone are insufficient; the private sector must do more to drive change.
- Institutional durability:
- Reforms reliant on a minister’s conviction are fragile; writing reform into law and institutions is essential to outlive political turnover.
Policy recommendations (prioritized, politically feasible, fiscally disciplined)
- Protect the aspiring middle through recalibration rather than net new spending:
- Use existing administrative data (example: state-owned electricity company records combined with social protection data) to better target subsidies and direct compensation to the poor and aspiring middle.
- Recalibrate conditional cash transfers: compensate first, then reform.
- Restore labor absorption with lean, capability-focused industrial policy:
- Prioritize export-oriented investment in global value chains and tradable services.
- Focus on activities that absorb mid-skilled labor while raising capabilities on the job: electronics and components assembly, garment and footwear production for export, food processing, digitally enabled logistics and back-office services.
- Use incentives for firms to train workers themselves rather than relying on state-run training.
- Improve the business environment without large fiscal outlays:
- Lower barriers to trade in goods and services to pull firms into export-oriented value chains.
- Create a cleaner business climate, broader financial inclusion, and lighter regulation so private firms create the jobs educated young people want.
- Address political economy barriers explicitly:
- Recognize and confront the interests that profit from the status quo; letting go of protection and taking on vested interests are necessary parts of reform.
Political and social implications
- Economic policy alone is insufficient; rebuilding trust is central as middle-class demands shift toward public goods that work and fairness as habit.
- Transparency and honest explanations help but may not be sufficient to gain acceptance for reforms (Indonesia’s 2013 fuel subsidy cuts were sound and openly argued yet still faced resistance).
- The broader task is a long conversation: policy, institutions, and trust-building across societies whose dashboard prosperity has outrun confidence on the street.
MUHAMAD CHATIB BASRI, September 2026.
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