Contingent Capital: Economic Rationale and Design Features
Staff Discussion Notes, January 25, 2011
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Bibliographic details
- Authors: Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, Jianping Zhou, Vanessa Le Lesle, Michael Moore
- Published: January 25, 2011
- Series: Staff Discussion Notes
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781462304141.006
Overview
- Authors: Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, Jianping Zhou, Vanessa Le Lesle, Michael Moore
- Publication date: January 25, 2011
- Series: Staff Discussion Notes No. 2011/001
- Issue: 001
- Summary: "The causes of the global financial crisis were multi-faceted but revealed still unresolved weaknesses in national and international financial oversight and resolution frameworks. In particular, many governments in the crisis-hit countries had to provide unprecedented levels of support to contain the crisis and protect financial stability. These interventions have not only contributed to a significant increase in sovereign exposures but, in many countries, they have also risked weakening market discipline and worsening moral hazard."
Key findings and themes
- The global financial crisis exposed unresolved weaknesses in national and international financial oversight and resolution frameworks.
- Many governments in crisis-hit countries provided unprecedented levels of support to contain the crisis and protect financial stability.
- These government interventions contributed to a significant increase in sovereign exposures.
- In many countries, interventions risked weakening market discipline and worsening moral hazard.
Subject and keywords
- Subject: Banking, Basel III, Capital adequacy requirements, Contingent capital, Contingent convertible capital, Stocks
- Keywords: capital, capital ratio, equity capital, SDN, share price
Contingent Capital: Economic Rationale and Design Features, Staff Discussion Notes 2011, 001 (2011), IMF.
Content in this bundle
- _sdn1101 - Executive Summary