How Do Countries Choose their Exchange Rate Regime?
IMF Working Papers, May 1, 2001
Source details
- Canonical URL
- How Do Countries Choose their Exchange Rate Regime?
Other formats
Bibliographic details
- Authors: Hélène Poirson
- Published: May 1, 2001
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451846553.001
Summary
- Study scope: 93 countries during 1990-98.
- Main analytical approach: cross-country analysis of variations in international reserves and nominal exchange rates; regression analysis of regime choice.
- Key empirical distinctions:
- (i) truly fixed pegs and independent floats differ significantly from other regimes
- (ii) significant discrepancies exist between de jure and de facto flexibility
Major empirical findings
- Fixed pegs and independent floats are empirically distinct from other exchange rate arrangements based on observed variations in international reserves and nominal exchange rates.
- There are significant discrepancies between de jure classifications of exchange rate regimes and de facto exchange rate flexibility.
Determinants identified by regression results
- Political factors:
- political instability
- government temptation to inflate
- Reserve adequacy:
- variations in international reserves influence regime choice
- Currency substitution:
- dollarization (currency substitution)
- Exchange rate risk:
- exchange rate risk exposure
- Optimal currency area criteria and capital movements:
- some traditional optimal currency area criteria matter, in particular capital mobility
- The regressions highlight the combined influence of the above factors on exchange rate regime selection.
Research and publication metadata
- Publication type: IMF Working Papers
- Pages: 33
- Volume: 2001
- Issue: 046
- Series: Working Paper No. 2001/046
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451846553.001
- ISBN: 9781451846553
- ISSN: 1018-5941
Hélène Poirson, "How Do Countries Choose their Exchange Rate Regime?", May 1, 2001.
Content in this bundle
- How Do Countries Choose Their Exchange Rate Regime? - WP/01/46