Banking Supervision: Quality and Governance
IMF Working Papers, April 1, 2007
Source details
- Canonical URL
- Banking Supervision: Quality and Governance
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Bibliographic details
- Authors: Alessandro Gambini, Salim M. Darbar, Marco Arnone
- Published: April 1, 2007
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451866469.001
Authors and Publication
- By Alessandro Gambini, Salim M. Darbar, Marco Arnone
- April 1, 2007
- IMF Working Papers, Working Paper No. 2007/082, Issue: 082
- Pages: 30
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451866469.001
- ISBN: 9781451866469
- ISSN: 1018-5941
- Stock No: WPIEA2007082
Research Scope and Data
- Assessments used:
- Basel Core Principles coverage: 116 countries
- IMF Code on Transparency in Financial Policies coverage: 53 countries
- Overlap between the two assessments: 51 countries
Main Findings
- There is a positive correlation between the transparency of the supervisor and the effectiveness of banking supervision.
- Better accountability and integrity practices of banking supervisors are associated with higher independence of the supervisory agency.
- Higher independence of the supervisory agency is, in turn, associated with better compliance with the Basel Core Principles.
- These results are largely robust across different stages of financial development.
Subject and Keywords
- Subject: Bank supervision, Banking, Basel Core Principles, Financial sector development, Personal income
- Keywords: banking supervision, independence, practice, WP
Access and Formats
- Available via IMF eLibrary in multiple formats.
- Options noted on the page: Download PDF, More Formats on IMF eLibrary, Order a Print Copy, Create Citation, Share
Source: IMF Working Paper "Banking Supervision: Quality and Governance" (Working Paper No. 2007/082).