Financial Innovation, the Discovery of Risk, and the U.S. Credit Crisis
IMF Working Papers, July 1, 2010
Source details
- Canonical URL
- Financial Innovation, the Discovery of Risk, and the U.S. Credit Crisis
Other formats
Bibliographic details
- Authors: Enrique G. Mendoza, Emine Boz
- Published: July 1, 2010
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781455201754.001
Summary
- Uncertainty about the riskiness of new financial products was an important factor behind the U.S. credit crisis.
- The authors show that a boom-bust cycle in debt, asset prices and consumption characterizes the equilibrium dynamics of a model with a collateral constraint in which agents learn "by observation" the true riskiness of a new financial environment.
- Early realizations of states with high ability to leverage assets into debt turn agents optimistic about the persistence of a high-leverage regime.
- The model accounts for 69 percent of the household debt buildup and 53 percent of the rise in housing prices during 1997-2006, predicting a collapse in 2007.
Model and mechanism
- Core mechanism: agents face uncertainty about the riskiness of a new financial environment and update beliefs "by observation" of realized states.
- Collateral constraint: leverage capacity tied to asset values constrains borrowing and amplifies belief-driven cycles.
- Learning dynamics: favorable early realizations increase perceived persistence of high-leverage regimes, inducing greater borrowing and asset price inflation; eventual reversal leads to collapse.
Quantitative findings and empirical fit
- Model accounts for 69 percent of the household debt buildup during 1997-2006.
- Model accounts for 53 percent of the rise in housing prices during 1997-2006.
- Model predicts a collapse in 2007 consistent with observed boom-bust dynamics in debt, asset prices, and consumption.
Subjects and keywords
- Subjects: Bonds, Consumption, Credit, Financial crises, Land prices
- Keywords: credit market, financial crisis, WP