The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Principles and Practice
IMF Working Papers, March 1, 2005
Source details
- Canonical URL
- The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Principles and Practice
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Bibliographic details
- Authors: Michael W Taylor, Marc G Quintyn, Eva H. G. Hüpkes
- Published: March 1, 2005
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451860702.001
Overview
- Title: The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Principles and Practice
- Authors: Michael W Taylor, Marc G Quintyn, Eva H. G. Hüpkes
- Date: March 1, 2005
- Series: Working Paper No. 2005/051
- Issue: 051
- Pages: 51
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451860702.001
- ISBN: 9781451860702
- ISSN: 1018-5941
- Summary of purpose:
- Policymakers' uneasiness about granting independence to financial sector regulators stems to a large extent from the lack of familiarity with, and elusiveness of, the concept of accountability.
- The paper gives operational content to accountability and argues that it is possible to do so in a way that encourages and supports agency independence.
- The paper first elaborates on the role and purposes of accountability. Second, it shows that the unique features of financial sector supervision point to a more complex system of accountability arrangements than, for instance, the conduct of monetary policy. Finally, the paper discusses specific arrangements that can best secure the objectives of accountability and, thus, independence.
- The findings have a wider application than financial sector supervision.
Major findings
- Accountability can be given operational content while supporting agency independence.
- Financial sector supervision’s unique features require a more complex system of accountability arrangements than the conduct of monetary policy.
- Specific arrangements can best secure the objectives of accountability and independence.
- The paper’s conclusions are applicable beyond financial sector supervision.
Key concepts and terminology preserved from the source
- agency independence
- chief executive
- enforcement power
- judicial review
- minister of finance
- regulatory agency
- RSAS concrete
- WP
Policy implications and recommended arrangements
- Elaborate the role and purposes of accountability to reduce policymakers' uneasiness about granting independence to financial sector regulators.
- Design accountability arrangements that reflect the unique, more complex characteristics of financial sector supervision compared with other policy areas (for instance, monetary policy).
- Adopt specific institutional arrangements that secure accountability objectives and thereby support independence of supervisory agencies.
- Recognize that the design principles and arrangements discussed have broader applicability beyond financial sector supervision.
Publication metadata and access
- Publication title: The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Principles and Practice
- Publication type: IMF Working Papers
- Format availability noted on landing page: Download PDF; More Formats on IMF eLibrary; Order a Print Copy
- Disclaimer reproduced verbatim: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate.
Source: IMF Working Paper No. 2005/051 (Michael W Taylor, Marc G Quintyn, Eva H. G. Hüpkes), March 1, 2005. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451860702.001