Sovereigns and Financial Intermediaries Spillovers
IMF Working Papers, February 27, 2019
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Bibliographic details
- Authors: Hamid R Tabarraei, Abdelaziz Rouabah, Olivier Pierrard
- Published: February 27, 2019
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781498300704.001
Summary of core findings
- The paper examines spillover effects between sovereigns and banks in a model with a heterogeneous banking system.
- An increase in sovereign’s default risk affects financial intermediaries through two channels:
- Banks’ funding costs might increase, inducing higher interest rates on loans and bonds and a cut back in these assets.
- A financial regulator’s risk-weighted asset framework would assign higher weights to lower quality assets, implying a portfolio rebalancing and more deleveraging.
- Capital adequacy requirements have a dual role:
- They weaken the impact of shocks emerging from the real economy.
- They amplify the effect of shocks on banks’ balance sheets.
Mechanisms and model features
- Heterogeneous banking system underpinning the analysis.
- Two primary transmission channels from sovereign risk to banks:
- Funding-cost channel: higher funding costs → higher interest rates on loans and bonds → contraction in these asset holdings.
- Regulatory risk-weight channel: lower quality assets receive higher risk weights → portfolio rebalancing and deleveraging.
- Interaction between regulatory capital frameworks and shock origins:
- Real-economy shocks: capital adequacy requirements mitigate effects.
- Balance-sheet shocks (e.g., sovereign downgrades): capital adequacy requirements amplify balance-sheet pressures.
Policy implications and considerations
- Regulatory design matters for how sovereign shocks propagate to banking systems:
- Risk-weighted asset frameworks can induce procyclical portfolio adjustments when sovereign risk rises.
- Capital adequacy requirements can be stabilizing for real-side disturbances but destabilizing for direct balance-sheet shocks tied to sovereign risk.
- Monitoring and managing sovereign-bank linkages is essential given the two distinct transmission channels identified.
Key statistics and publication metadata (as presented)
- Pages: 33
- Volume: 2019
- Issue: 043
- Series: Working Paper No. 2019/043
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781498300704.001
- Stock No: WPIEA2019043
- ISBN: 9781498300704
- ISSN: 1018-5941
Subjects and keywords (as listed)
- Subject: Bank credit, Bank deposits, Banking, Financial institutions, Financial services, Labor, Loans, Money, Self-employment, Sovereign bonds
- Keywords: balance sheet identity, bank capital, Bank credit, Bank deposits, banking sector, Contagion, deposit bank, Europe, Global, hiterbank market, interest rate, lending bank, leverage ratio, Loans, Northern Europe, Self-employment, Southern Europe, Sovereign bonds, Sovereign risk, sovereigns-banks nexus, wholesale bank, WP
By Hamid R Tabarraei, Abdelaziz Rouabah, and Olivier Pierrard. February 27, 2019.
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- Working Paper