Industrial Policy and Supply Chain Bottlenecks in Commodity Markets: Evidence from Rare Earth Elements
IMF Working Papers, July 17, 2026
Source details
- Canonical URL
- Industrial Policy and Supply Chain Bottlenecks in Commodity Markets: Evidence from Rare Earth Elements
Other formats
Bibliographic details
- Authors: Christian Bogmans, Francis Cuadros-Bloch, Jean-Marc Natal, Andrea Paloschi
- Published: July 17, 2026
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9798229043243.001
Summary
- Recent supply shortages have heightened concerns about supply chain bottlenecks and prompted industrial policies to promote reshoring and friendshoring.
- Rare earth element (REE) markets display highly concentrated supply chains across stages, particularly refining.
- The paper quantifies costs of reducing supply chain concentration using a dynamic global trade model calibrated with detailed market, industry, and geological data.
- Upstream (mining) and downstream (refining) production are modeled as slow-moving and determined by investment in capacity (CAPEX).
- Policy objective evaluated: raise U.S. downstream REE self-sufficiency from 10 to 25% by 2035.
Model and Methodology
- Framework: dynamic global trade model calibrated with detailed market, industry, and geological data.
- Production dynamics: upstream (mining) and downstream (refining) capacity determined by CAPEX and evolve slowly over time.
- Policies evaluated: CAPEX subsidies and downstream price floors.
- Policy settings: unilateral action by a single importer (the U.S.) and coordinated action among importers.
Key Quantitative Findings
- Target: increase U.S. downstream REE self-sufficiency from 10 to 25% by 2035.
- Fiscal cost of downstream unilateral CAPEX subsidies:
- Reaches 141% of the annual U.S. REE market by 2035.
- Absolute approximation provided: about $1.2 billion by 2035.
- Fiscal cost under coordinated action:
- Falls to 96% of the annual U.S. REE market by 2035.
- Relative effectiveness:
- Downstream price floor policies are equally effective in raising self-sufficiency but are more fiscally inefficient than CAPEX subsidies.
- Fiscal feasibility:
- Despite large costs relative to the market, absolute fiscal costs are contained, indicating de-risking REE supply chains is fiscally feasible.
Policy Comparison and Implications
- CAPEX subsidies vs. price floors:
- Both can achieve the 10 to 25% self-sufficiency increase by 2035.
- CAPEX subsidies deliver greater fiscal efficiency compared with price floors.
- Unilateral vs. coordinated action:
- Coordination among importers reduces fiscal cost (141% → 96% of annual market).
- Fiscal policy takeaway:
- Large fiscal commitments relative to market size are required, but absolute dollar costs remain contained and potentially manageable.
Subject Tags and Keywords (as presented)
- Subjects: Capital spending, Demand elasticity, Economic sectors, Economic theory, Expenditure, Exports, International trade, Mining sector, Supply shocks
- Keywords: Capital spending, Demand elasticity, Europe, Exports, Global, Global Supply Chains, IMF working papers, Industrial Policy, Mining sector, Rare Earths, REE exposure, REE importer, REE market, supply chain bottleneck, Supply shocks, Trade Restrictions
Christian Bogmans, Francis Cuadros-Bloch, Jean-Marc Natal, and Andrea Paloschi. "Industrial Policy and Supply Chain Bottlenecks in Commodity Markets: Evidence from Rare Earth Elements", IMF Working Papers 2026, 072 (July 17, 2026).
Content in this bundle
- Working Paper