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Author/Editor:
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Ueda, Kenichi ; Weder di Mauro, Beatrice
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Publication Date:
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May 01, 2012
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Electronic Access:
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Free Full text
(PDF file size is 1,043KB).
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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
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Summary:
Claimants to SIFIs receive transfers when governments are forced into bailouts. Ex ante, the bailout expectation lowers daily funding costs. This funding cost differential reflects both the structural level of the government support and the time-varying market valuation for such a support. With large worldwide sample of banks, we estimate the structural subsidy values by exploiting expectations of state support embedded in credit ratings and by using long-run average value of rating bonus. It was already sizable, 60 basis points, as of the end-2007, before the crisis. It increased to 80 basis points by the end-2009.
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Order a print copy
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Series:
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Working Paper No. 12/128
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Subject(s):
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Banks | Cross country analysis | Financial institutions | Subsidies
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Author's Keyword(s):
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Systemically important financial institutions | bank funding subsidy | bank bailout |
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English
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Publication Date:
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May 01, 2012
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Format:
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Paper
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Stock No:
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WPIEA2012128
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Pages:
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27
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Price:
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US$18.00 )
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Please address any questions about this title to
publications@imf.org
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