IMF Working Papers

Credibility of Central Bank Independence Revisited

By Timo T Valila

January 1, 1999

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Timo T Valila. Credibility of Central Bank Independence Revisited, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 1999) accessed September 18, 2024
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

The specific role of central bank independence in determining the overall credibility of monetary policy is addressed in this paper. It is argued that the credibility of delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank is endogenous to the credibility of the inflation target because a “conservative” inflation target may not be compatible with the fiscal policy stance. Also, lack of transparency in designing the institutional set-up is shown to be welfare-reducing.

Subject: Central bank autonomy, Fiscal policy, Inflation, Inflation targeting, Public sector

Keywords: Central bank, WP

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    16

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

    ---

  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 1999/002

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA0021999

  • ISBN:

    9781451841749

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941