Institutional Arrangements for Macroprudential Policy in Asia

Author/Editor: Cheng Hoon Lim ; Rishi S Ramchand ; Hong Wang ; Xiaoyong Wu
Publication Date: July 17, 2013
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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
Summary: This paper surveys institutional arrangements for macroprudential policy in Asia. Central banks in Asia typically have a financial stability mandate, and play a key role in the macroprudential framework. Smaller and more open economies with prudential regulation inside the central bank tend to have institutional arrangements that give the central bank a leading role. In larger and more complex economies where prudential regulation is outside the central bank, the financial stability mandate is usually shared with other agencies and the government tends to play a leading role. Domestic policy coordination is typically performed by a financial stability committee/other coordination body while cross-border cooperation is largely governed by Memoranda of Understanding.
Series: Working Paper No. 13/165
Subject(s): Macroprudential Policy | Asia | Central banks | Financial stability | Central bank role

Publication Date: July 17, 2013
ISBN/ISSN: 9781484338360/1018-5941 Format: Paper
Stock No: WPIEA2013165 Pages: 22
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