International Environmental Taxation in the Absence of Sovereignty

Author/Editor:

Bernard P. Herber

Publication Date:

December 1, 1992

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

Traditional public finance theory may be applied to the internalization of international environmental externalities. The policy constraint imposed by the absence of sovereign international government may be partially overcome through international environmental agreements. Instruments such as cost sharing, found in existing agreements, are generally unsophisticated. Two proposals entailing improved instruments are considered: (a) an international carbon tax, and (b) a global commons trust fund financed by earmarked excise taxes or charges. Political realities appear to preclude the early adoption of sophisticated international environmental taxes, but modest improvements in the design and implementation of existing instruments may be feasible.

Series:

Working Paper No. 1992/104

Subject:

English

Publication Date:

December 1, 1992

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451947847/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA1041992

Pages:

37

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