Russian Economic Policy at the Start of the New Administration -- Remarks by Stanley Fischer, Acting Managing Director of the IMF
IMF News, April 6, 2000
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- Published: April 6, 2000
Overview and main messages
- Prepared for the conference "Investment Climate and Russia's Economic Strategy", State University: Higher School of Economics, Moscow, April 6, 2000.
- Four main points made:
- After ten years of experience in over 25 transition economies, the evidence is clear that the basic economic reform and growth strategy recommended by mainstream economists works.
- Despite many disappointments and setbacks in Russian economic reform, substantial achievements have been made.
- The way ahead for economic policy in Russia is clear: strengthen macroeconomic stability and intensify sectoral structural reforms, including improving the social safety net.
- Economic programs are most likely to succeed when they are "owned" by the country; the IMF and the international community stand ready to help support a serious Russian economic reform program, whose seriousness is demonstrated by progress in its implementation.
International experience and empirical findings
- Study basis and methodology:
- Analysis used data from the 25 countries for which it was available.
- The extent of structural reforms was measured using indices of different elements of structural reform constructed by the EBRD.
- Empirical conclusions:
- Both stabilization policies and structural reforms, particularly privatization, contribute to growth.
- The faster the speed of reforms, the quicker the recovery from the inevitable initial recession, and the more rapid the growth.
- Caveats:
- The application of the basic strategy varies by country; implementation is technically and politically difficult.
- Determinants of reform effectiveness include political support and governance, not just technical expertise.
Russia's achievements over the last decade
- Political and macroeconomic shifts:
- A consensus that transition to a market-based economy is irreversible and should continue.
- A commitment to low inflation and sound fiscal policies has taken hold across a broad segment of the public and political elite.
- Counterfactual noted: some policymakers after 1998 suggested welcoming moderate—say 40-60 percent—inflation; that did not happen.
- Resolve to limit public expenditures to available revenues and to avoid inflationary financing.
- Market and institutional reforms:
- Domestic market liberalization: price and wage liberalization; dismantling most of the system of state direction of economic activity.
- Privatization (flawed in several respects) has allowed market incentives to govern much economic activity.
- Far-reaching exchange and trade liberalization: liberalization of exports and imports, introduction of current account convertibility, and unification of the exchange rate.
- Strengthened institutional setting: a modern central bank and payments system; liberalized interest rates; elimination of low-interest CBR direct credits.
- Fiscal reforms: large reductions in subsidies; improvements in the tax system (not yet finished); establishment of a treasury.
- New institutions and legislation: bankruptcy procedures, competition policy and anti-monopoly regulations, improvements in accounting standards, a securities commission, and regulatory agencies for natural monopolies.
- Implementation shortcomings:
- Enforcement and implementation of new laws and regulations have been inconsistent.
- Social outcomes:
- Despite reforms, basic social indicators show worrying trends: life expectancy declining and incidence of poverty increasing.
What needs to be done — macroeconomic stability and structural reforms
- Recent context:
- 1996 saw decisive progress in macroeconomic stability; thereafter fiscal policy and structural policy implementation were poor, contributing to the 1998 financial crisis.
- The recovery in output, improved fiscal position, and financial stability have been due in large part to the sharp real depreciation of the ruble after 1998 and the jump in world oil prices.
- Policy imperatives:
- Sustained growth and further fiscal consolidation require a broad-based acceleration of structural reforms to spur investment and strengthen exports, plus comprehensive tax and expenditure reforms.
- The investment climate must improve for Russian savings abroad to return and finance domestic productive investments.
- Six priority reform areas (selected by the speaker):
- Industrial restructuring, including privatization, improving the business climate—especially corporate governance and strengthening of the rule of law.
- Measures to eliminate nonpayments and barter problems.
- Restructuring of the banking system, including reform of the central bank.
- Tax reform, and expenditure reform, including reform of the civil service, which has grown remarkably in the last decade.
- Strengthening of the social safety net.
- Agricultural reform and land ownership reform.
- Institutional and transparency priorities:
- "State regulation of the economy: freedom and the rule of law"—increase transparency in both public and private sectors; critical to securing external support.
Failures of implementation and the case for program ownership
- Causes of past failures:
- Fundamental reason: failure to overcome fierce resistance from vested interests and weak government consensus.
- Examples:
- Bank restructuring: after the 1998 crisis many banks were allowed to become "mostly empty shells" before bankruptcy procedures were applied, making restructuring more expensive.
- Tax enforcement: politically influential enterprises have often paid well below statutory tax obligations; enforcement has included tax restructuring, rescheduling, and negotiated settlements rather than strict enforcement backed by bankruptcy or criminal proceedings.
- Rule of law and governance: weak rule of law and poor governance are central to weak investment, failure to restructure enterprises, and capital flight.
- Quantitative indicators mentioned:
- FDI in Russia has run below 1 percent of GDP, compared with around 3 percent of GDP in the Central European transition economies.
- Capital flight has averaged $10-20 billion per year since the early 1990s.
- Opportunity at the start of a new administration:
- The new administration and a new Duma present a rare opportunity for a "second beginning".
- Success hinges on developing a reform program "worked out by Russians" and backed by strong public consensus and leadership—i.e., program ownership.
- If that happens, the IMF and the international community will be ready to support and strengthen the program.
Implementation and support
- Emphasis on domestic ownership:
- Programs are most likely to succeed when "owned" by the country implementing them.
- The IMF and bilateral lenders can support programs, but the program's design and implementation must be Russian-led to increase chances of success.
- Readiness of international community:
- The IMF and the rest of the international community stand ready to help support a serious Russian economic reform program demonstrated by progress in implementation.
Remarks by Stanley Fischer, Acting Managing Director of the IMF, Prepared for the conference on "Investment Climate and Prospects for Economic Growth in Russia", State University: Higher School of Economics, Moscow, April 5-6 / April 6, 2000.