Washington, DC
:
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the
Article IV consultation
[1]
with Colombia
[2]
on March 25, 2022. This also included a discussion of the findings of the
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) exercise for Colombia
[3]
.
Colombia’s very strong policy frameworks and comprehensive policy response
to the pandemic supported the economy’s resilience. A flexible exchange
rate, central bank credibility under inflation targeting, effective
financial sector supervision and regulation, a medium-term fiscal rule, and
strong institutions have helped the country to withstand external shocks
and promote economic growth. Over the last two years, the authorities have
used the flexibility of their macroeconomic framework to deliver a
coordinated and timely response to mitigate the impact of the pandemic.
Colombia’s economic recovery in 2021 was among the fastest in the
region. After a strong economic rebound last year, Colombia’s economic
momentum is expected to continue into 2022. Above-potential growth is
expected around 5¾ percent this year, led by robust household
consumption and continued recovery of investment and exports
. Supported by a still accommodative monetary stance, the output gap is
projected to close by 2022H1. Over the medium term, GDP growth is expected
to converge to its potential growth rate of about 3½ percent. The projected
increase in the price of key commodity exports would lead to a significant
reduction in the current account deficit from -5.7 percent of GDP in 2021
to -3.3 and -3.4 percent of GDP in 2022 and 2023, respectively.
Inflation continues rising led by supply-side shocks in the context of
strong demand. Higher inflation is expected to persist and will likely
remain above the upper limit of the central bank’s tolerance band (4
percent) throughout 2022, with upside risks. Inflation is projected at
around 6¾ by end-2022.
Risks to growth remain tilted to the downside.
External risks remain elevated led by an intensification of the ongoing
war in Ukraine. While Colombia stands to benefit from higher
hydrocarbon prices, rising and volatile international prices for food
and energy, as well as more persistent disruptions in global supply
chains, would exacerbate domestic inflationary pressures. Global
financial market volatility arising from the conflict or the monetary
tightening cycle in major economies could also create shocks to capital
flows. New outbreaks of Covid-19 variants could lead to subpar or
volatile growth in trading partners
.
Domestic risks are also tilted to the downside—including uncertainty
around the domestic evolution of the pandemic and political risks
associated with the upcoming elections.
The banking system entered the COVID-19 pandemic from a position of
relative strength, and the authorities mounted a strong policy and support
response. As a result, the financial system has weathered the pandemic
relatively well so far. As outlined in the FSSA, overall, banks are largely
resilient to solvency and liquidity shocks. But it is essential to monitor
interconnectedness and contagion in view of the complexity of financial
conglomerates and increasing cross-border exposures. Bank supervision has
been enhanced, including by introducing a comprehensive framework for
conglomerates. Macroprudential oversight is overall effective, but some
macroprudential tools and data collection should be expanded to address
leakages and risks from potential rapid household debt growth. The crisis
management and safety net framework has been strengthened significantly,
but recovery and resolution planning needs further improvements, including
for cross-border institutions.
Executive Board Assessment
[4]
Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They
commended the authorities for their very strong policy frameworks and a
comprehensive pandemic response, which have supported the economy’s
resilience and a strong recovery. Directors noted that uncertainty and
downside risks remain elevated, including from inflation, global financial
conditions, and geopolitical tensions. They agreed that policies need to be
recalibrated carefully to sustain the growth momentum, manage inflation,
further strengthen public finances, and reduce external imbalances.
Directors agreed that an accelerated monetary tightening is appropriate to
reduce inflationary pressures and safeguard the credibility of the monetary
policy framework. They emphasized the need to ensure that policy decisions
remain data-driven and accompanied by clear communication. Directors
welcomed the authorities’ commitment to maintain a flexible exchange rate
to help absorb the impact of global shocks, including swings in commodity
prices. They encouraged the authorities to continue with international
reserve accumulation over time to help maintain reserve adequacy and insure
against external liquidity risks. Directors noted that the Flexible Credit
Line provides additional buffers and enhances market confidence.
Directors commended the authorities for the improved public finances and
strong commitment to maintain fiscal credibility. They recommended
continued efforts to save revenue windfalls, control spending, and phase
out exceptional support measures, as conditions allow. Directors recognized
that the Social Investment Law, including a new debt anchor, is an
important step to strengthen the fiscal framework. They stressed that
deeper fiscal reforms to secure new revenue sources and enhance spending
efficiency would safeguard key social programs and public investment, while
further reducing debt.
Directors welcomed the strengthening of the regulatory and supervisory
frameworks. They encouraged the authorities to build on this progress by
implementing the 2022 FSAP recommendations. Directors underscored the need
to enhance data availability, crisis management, and the bank resolution
and macroprudential frameworks.
Directors stressed the importance of further structural reforms to boost
productivity, external competitiveness, and greener, inclusive growth. They
called for continued efforts to strengthen governance and the
anti-corruption and AML/CFT frameworks. Directors looked forward to further
progress in implementing the green strategy, reducing trade barriers, and
increasing labor force participation. They commended the authorities for
their ongoing efforts to integrate Venezuelan migrants into the economy.
[1]
Under Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds
bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff
team visits the country, collects economic and financial
information, and discusses with officials the country's economic
developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff
prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the
Executive Board.
[2]
Disclaimer: This Staff Report was prepared by a staff team of the
IMF for the Executive Board’s consideration on March 25. The Staff
Report reflects discussions with the Colombian authorities from
February 1- 15, 2022 and is based on the information available at
that time. It focuses on Colombia’s near, and medium-term
challenges and policy priorities given the pandemic and subsequent
economic recovery. The report was prepared before the
Russia-Ukraine conflict and, therefore, does not reflect the
implications of these developments and related policy responses.
The Supplementary Information is based on the information available
as of March 11, incorporating initial effects from the ongoing
conflict which has amplified uncertainty and downside risks around
the outlook.
[3]
Under the FSAP, the IMF assesses the stability of the financial
system, and not that of individual institutions. The FSAP assists
in identifying key sources of systemic risk and suggests policies
to help enhance resilience to shocks and contagion. The last FSAP
exercise for Colombia took place in 2012-13.
[4]
At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as
Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors,
and this summary is transmitted to the country's authorities. An
explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found
here:
http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm
.
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Table 1. Colombia: Selected Economic and Financial
Indicators
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Projections
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2017
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2018
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2019
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2020
|
20211
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2022
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2023
|
2024
|
2025
|
2026
|
2027
|
|
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(In percentage change, unless otherwise
indicated
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National income and prices
|
|
|
|
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|
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|
|
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Real GDP
|
1.4
|
2.6
|
3.2
|
-7.0
|
10.6
|
5.8
|
3.6
|
3.4
|
3.4
|
3.4
|
3.4
|
|
Potential GDP
|
2.9
|
3.0
|
3.1
|
-2.0
|
5.0
|
4.4
|
3.8
|
3.4
|
3.4
|
3.4
|
3.4
|
|
Output Gap
|
-0.8
|
-1.2
|
-1.1
|
-6.2
|
-1.2
|
0.1
|
-0.1
|
0.0
|
0.0
|
0.0
|
0.0
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GDP deflator
|
5.1
|
4.6
|
4.0
|
1.4
|
6.6
|
7.5
|
3.4
|
3.1
|
3.1
|
3.1
|
3.1
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|
Consumer prices (average)
|
4.3
|
3.2
|
3.5
|
2.5
|
3.5
|
7.7
|
4.2
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3.5
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3.0
|
3.0
|
3.0
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Consumer prices, end of period (eop)
|
4.1
|
3.1
|
3.8
|
1.6
|
5.6
|
6.9
|
3.8
|
3.0
|
3.0
|
3.0
|
3.0
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|
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External sector
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Exports (f.o.b.)
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16.8
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8.1
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-5.4
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-20.5
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32.3
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47.0
|
1.8
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-3.4
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-0.3
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2.6
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2.2
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Imports (f.o.b.)
|
1.9
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12.1
|
2.3
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-18.5
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37.7
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16.3
|
3.7
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2.9
|
1.9
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3.4
|
3.4
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Export volume
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2.6
|
0.6
|
3.1
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-9.1
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-0.8
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4.1
|
14.7
|
4.2
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1.2
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3.6
|
2.4
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Import volume
|
1.0
|
5.8
|
7.3
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-15.9
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17.8
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6.1
|
3.8
|
2.5
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1.1
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2.8
|
2.6
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Terms of trade (deterioration -)
|
9.9
|
3.5
|
-2.3
|
-12.2
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13.4
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26.6
|
-11.1
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-6.3
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-1.8
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-1.4
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-0.7
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Real exchange rate (depreciation -) 2/
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5.6
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0.7
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-9.1
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-11.1
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-1.9
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…
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…
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…
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…
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…
|
…
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Money and credit
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Broad money
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6.4
|
5.7
|
10.0
|
10.3
|
12.3
|
12.2
|
8.5
|
7.8
|
7.6
|
7.5
|
7.5
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Credit to the private sector
|
12.8
|
6.8
|
11.6
|
-0.8
|
11.5
|
12.5
|
8.5
|
7.9
|
7.8
|
7.6
|
7.5
|
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Policy rate, eop
|
4.8
|
4.3
|
4.3
|
1.8
|
3.0
|
…
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…
|
…
|
…
|
…
|
…
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(In percent of GDP)
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Central government balance 3/
|
-3.6
|
-4.8
|
-2.5
|
-7.8
|
-8.2
|
-6.1
|
-3.7
|
-3.6
|
-2.6
|
-2.5
|
-2.5
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Central government structural balance 4/
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-2.6
|
-2.2
|
-2.1
|
-6.1
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-7.3
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-5.8
|
-3.9
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-3.9
|
-2.7
|
-2.5
|
-2.5
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Consolidated public sector (CPS) balance 5/
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-2.4
|
-4.5
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-2.9
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-6.9
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-7.2
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-4.4
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-2.1
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-1.3
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-0.8
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-0.9
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-1.0
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CPS non-oil structural primary balance
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-0.1
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-1.2
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-1.7
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-4.3
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-4.9
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-3.3
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-2.4
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-2.0
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-0.7
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-0.2
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-0.3
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CPS fiscal impulse
|
0.1
|
1.0
|
0.6
|
2.6
|
0.5
|
-1.6
|
-0.9
|
-0.4
|
-1.2
|
-0.5
|
0.1
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Public sector gross debt 6/
|
49.4
|
53.6
|
52.4
|
65.7
|
64.6
|
60.6
|
59.2
|
57.5
|
56.3
|
54.5
|
52.9
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Gross domestic investment
|
21.6
|
21.2
|
21.4
|
19.2
|
19.7
|
19.0
|
19.2
|
18.9
|
18.9
|
19.0
|
19.3
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Gross national savings
|
18.4
|
17.0
|
16.8
|
15.8
|
14.1
|
15.6
|
15.9
|
15.1
|
15.0
|
15.2
|
15.4
|
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Current account (deficit -)
|
-3.2
|
-4.2
|
-4.6
|
-3.4
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-5.7
|
-3.3
|
-3.4
|
-3.8
|
-3.9
|
-3.9
|
-3.9
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External Financing Needs
|
13.5
|
14.3
|
15.3
|
17.9
|
17.8
|
13.9
|
14.1
|
15.3
|
15.0
|
14.8
|
14.6
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External debt 7/
|
47.3
|
46.7
|
50.1
|
65.6
|
60.3
|
58.1
|
58.4
|
59.1
|
59.0
|
58.6
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58.2
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(In percent of exports of goods and
services)
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External debt service
|
73.7
|
70.8
|
77.8
|
113.0
|
87.0
|
59.5
|
62.6
|
72.1
|
73.1
|
72.8
|
73.7
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Interest payments
|
10.7
|
10.7
|
14.7
|
16.4
|
12.9
|
10.2
|
11.2
|
12.6
|
13.2
|
12.9
|
13.1
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(In billion of U.S. dollars; unless
otherwise indicated)
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Exports (f.o.b.)
|
39.8
|
43.0
|
40.7
|
32.3
|
42.7
|
62.8
|
64.0
|
61.8
|
61.6
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63.2
|
64.6
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Of which: Petroleum products
|
13.3
|
16.8
|
16.0
|
8.8
|
13.5
|
21.4
|
23.5
|
22.4
|
19.9
|
19.3
|
18.5
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Gross international reserves 8/
|
47.1
|
47.9
|
52.7
|
58.5
|
59.1
|
60.2
|
61.5
|
62.9
|
64.2
|
65.1
|
65.9
|
|
Share of ST debt at remaining maturity + CA
deficit
|
102
|
99
|
113
|
106
|
125
|
119
|
106
|
104
|
103
|
99.7
|
102.6
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Sources: Colombian authorities; UNDP Human
Development Report; World Development
Indicators; and IMF staff estimates.
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1/ Estimate for monetary sector variables
(except for poliy rate) and fiscal sector
variables.
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2/ Based on bilateral COL Peso/USD exchange
rate.
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3/ Includes one-off recognition of
previously unrecognized accounts payable
worth 1.9 percent of GDP in 2018 and
central bank profits. For 2021 includes
privatization receipts worth 1.2 percent of
GDP that, under GFSM 1986 which is used by
the authorities, produces a headline
deficit of -7.0 percent of GDP.
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4/ IMF staff estimate, excludes one-off
recognition of arrears.
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5/ Includes the quasi-fiscal balance of
Banco de la República, sales of assets,
phone licenses, and statistical
discrepancy. For 2021 includes
privatization receipts, see 3/ above.
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6/ Includes Ecopetrol, Fogafin and Finagro.
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7/ Current account deficit plus
amortization due including holdings of
locally issued public debt (TES).
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8/ Excludes Colombia's contribution to
FLAR; includes valuation changes of
reserves denominated in currencies other
than U.S. dollars.
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