June 6, 2025
PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez
Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org
Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the Article IV Consultation for Spain.[1] The authorities have consented to the publication of the Staff Report prepared for this consultation.[2]
With a growth rate of 3.2 percent in 2024, Spain has been one of the fastest-growing economies in the euro area. Growth has been fueled by robust services exports and labor force growth, including due to immigration. Because high GDP growth has been accompanied by high employment growth, GDP per capita gains have been more modest. Despite recent progress, Spain still has one of the lowest employment rates in Europe, and a persistent gap in (hourly labor) productivity vis-à-vis the euro area and—even more so—the US.
Growth is projected to reach 2.5 percent in 2025 before slowing to 1.8 percent in 2026 as export and working-age population gains normalize. Growth will be primarily supported by private domestic demand, including due to a decline in the household saving rate and a pickup in investment. Inflation is projected to decline further and return close to the ECB’s target by end-2025.
Executive Board Assessment[3]
The Spanish economy has continued to outperform the euro area but per-capita income gains have been more modest. Two major drivers of Spain’s strong growth have been, on the supply side, labor force growth, and on the demand side, services exports. Labor force growth has particularly benefitted from recent migration inflows, which have risen sharply above pre-pandemic levels. Services exports have been fueled by the strong post-COVID recovery in tourism, but also by improvements in the performance of Spanish exporters in non-tourism services. Amid strong exports and still subdued imports, the external position in 2024 is preliminarily assessed to be stronger than implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. Because high GDP growth has been accompanied by high employment growth, GDP per capita gains have been more modest. Still, Spain reduced its per-capita income gap vis-à-vis the highest-income euro area economies by over 3 percentage points during 2022-24, helped by an acceleration in productivity growth. Despite recent progress in reducing the unemployment rate, it remains the highest in the euro area at about 11 percent. Looking through recent volatility, disinflation has continued to proceed steadily.
Growth is projected to remain robust in the near term and to slow gradually thereafter as its recent drivers normalize, with risks predominantly to the downside. Growth should remain strong at 2.5 percent in 2025 before declining to about 1.8 percent next year, close to its medium-term potential. On the demand side, tourism is expected to expand at a slower rate, while a weaker global environment—including elevated trade policy uncertainty and US tariffs—will also weigh on external demand. This drag is expected to be partly offset by robust domestic demand, including a pick-up in investment. On the supply side, a gradual slowdown in net migration and demographic aging will slowly weigh on labor force gains. Key downside risks include an escalation of trade measures, particularly those involving the EU, and domestic political fragmentation, which could hamper the response of fiscal policy in the event Spain’s deficit reduction fell short of its commitments or market concerns about sovereign risks were to emerge.
The authorities should seize upon the strong growth momentum to more swiftly rebuild fiscal space and reduce sovereign debt risks, in the context of an enhanced medium-term fiscal plan. Staff projects that, in the absence of further consolidation measures besides social security contribution increases from the 2021-2023 pension reforms and the non-indexation of PIT brackets (about 1 percent of GDP overall over 2025-29), the deficit would stabilize above 2 percent of GDP by 2030, while the debt-to-GDP ratio would remain above 90 percent before rising again in the longer term as fiscal pressures from aging intensify. Weighing fiscal risks on the one hand, and the economy’s strong cyclical position on the other, staff recommends frontloading the authorities’ planned 3 percent of GDP adjustment over 2025-2029 rather than 2025-2031. This effort, which would require about 2 percentage points of GDP in new measures, should be underpinned by an enhanced medium-term fiscal plan that lays out well-identified tax increase and spending reduction priorities. Harmonizing VAT and enhancing environmental taxation would deliver the recommended effort while reducing economic distortions. Given the widening projected gap between pension expenditures and social security contributions over the coming decades, pension reforms should also be undertaken, prioritizing employment-friendly options. Should downside risks materialize, fiscal policy should remain flexible, letting automatic stabilizers play out. Temporary discretionary support should be considered only in the event of a severe shock and provided sovereign funding costs remain low.
Systemic risks in the financial system remain low but ongoing efforts to further bolster its resilience should be maintained. Banks are well-capitalized, liquid, and profitable, though capital ratios are still somewhat below euro area peers. Household and corporate balance sheets are sound, supported by low debt and rising incomes. The rapid growth in house prices has eroded affordability and should be primarily addressed through measures that stimulate housing supply. While it does currently not raise financial stability risks, pre-emptive borrower-based measures should be considered if there were early signs of an easing in lending standards. Staff supports the ongoing phasing-in of the one-percent positive neutral CCyB and encourages continued implementation of other 2024 FSAP recommendations to further enhance resilience.
Fostering income-per-capita convergence toward higher-income advanced economies requires further raising the employment rate and boosting productivity. Despite recent progress, Spain still has one of the lowest employment rates in Europe, and its (hourly labor) productivity gap vis-à-vis the euro area—which has itself been falling behind the US—remains about as wide as it was 25 years ago. Enhancing activation policies and financial incentives for jobseekers is key to durably reducing unemployment to single digits. The planned reduction of the working week in the private sector should be carefully designed to mitigate adverse effects on output and workers’ incomes, with a major role for collective bargaining including in setting the level and remuneration of overtime. Closing the productivity gap will require reforms that facilitate firms’ scaling-up and innovation. These include completing both the Spanish and EU single markets for goods and services, streamlining firm size-related tax and regulatory thresholds, boosting venture capital through progress toward the CMU complemented by domestic incentives, and promoting excellence in higher education—including through greater autonomy and performance-based funding of universities.
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Spain: Selected Economic Indicators (Annual percentage change, unless noted otherwise) |
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Projections 1/ |
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2022 |
2023 |
2024 |
2025 |
2026 |
2027 |
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Demand and supply in constant prices |
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Gross domestic product |
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6.2 |
2.7 |
3.2 |
2.5 |
1.8 |
1.7 |
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Private consumption |
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4.8 |
1.8 |
2.9 |
2.1 |
2.0 |
1.9 |
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Public consumption |
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0.6 |
5.2 |
4.1 |
3.5 |
1.7 |
1.9 |
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Gross fixed investment |
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3.3 |
2.1 |
3.0 |
5.0 |
2.1 |
1.2 |
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Total domestic demand |
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3.9 |
1.7 |
2.9 |
2.9 |
2.0 |
1.8 |
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Net exports (contribution to growth) |
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2.5 |
1.2 |
0.4 |
-0.2 |
-0.1 |
0.0 |
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Exports of goods and services |
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15.0 |
3.3 |
3.4 |
2.2 |
2.5 |
3.1 |
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Imports of goods and services |
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7.8 |
0.4 |
2.6 |
3.0 |
3.2 |
3.4 |
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Potential output |
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2.1 |
2.7 |
2.6 |
2.6 |
2.3 |
2.1 |
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Output gap (percent of potential) |
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1.1 |
1.1 |
1.6 |
1.6 |
1.1 |
0.7 |
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Prices |
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GDP deflator |
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4.7 |
6.2 |
3.0 |
2.4 |
2.4 |
2.4 |
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Headline Inflation (average) |
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8.3 |
3.4 |
2.9 |
2.2 |
2.0 |
2.1 |
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Headline Inflation (end of period) |
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5.5 |
3.3 |
2.8 |
1.9 |
1.9 |
2.1 |
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Core inflation (average) |
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5.2 |
5.8 |
3.0 |
1.9 |
2.0 |
2.0 |
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Core inflation (end of period) |
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6.7 |
4.0 |
2.6 |
1.8 |
2.0 |
2.0 |
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Employment and wages |
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Unemployment rate (percent of total labor force) |
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13.0 |
12.2 |
11.3 |
11.1 |
11.0 |
11.0 |
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Labor costs, private sector |
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2.6 |
5.6 |
4.7 |
3.5 |
3.4 |
3.4 |
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Employment |
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3.6 |
3.1 |
2.2 |
1.3 |
0.9 |
0.7 |
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Balance of payments (percent of GDP) |
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Current account balance |
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0.4 |
2.7 |
3.0 |
2.5 |
2.4 |
2.2 |
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Net international investment position |
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-57.7 |
-51.3 |
-44.0 |
-38.5 |
-33.5 |
-29.7 |
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Public finance (percent of GDP) |
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General government balance |
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-4.6 |
-3.5 |
-3.2 |
-2.8 |
-2.4 |
-2.3 |
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Primary balance |
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-2.5 |
-1.7 |
-1.3 |
-0.6 |
0.1 |
0.1 |
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Structural balance |
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-5.3 |
-4.1 |
-3.1 |
-3.2 |
-2.8 |
-2.7 |
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General government debt |
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109.4 |
105.0 |
101.8 |
100.7 |
99.1 |
97.7 |
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Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook; data provided by the authorities; and IMF staff estimates. |
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1/ The projections incorporate spending financed by the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility (including the grant and the loan component) amounting to about 0.7, 1.7, 1.3 and 0.3 percent of GDP from 2024 to 2027. |
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[1] Under Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country's economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.
[2] Under the IMF's Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires the member consent. The staff report will be shortly published on the www.imf.org/en/Countries/ESP page.
[3] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country's authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.
