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Introductory Remarks at the IMF’s African Department Press Briefing
April 16, 2026
Good morning, and good afternoon to colleagues joining us from around the world.
Thank you for joining us for the release of the IMF’s April 2026 Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa entered 2026 with the strongest economic momentum it had seen in a decade. And then came the war.
How to hold the line—preserving hard-won gains while absorbing yet another shock—is the central challenge this report addresses.
Let me begin with the good news, because it deserves to be recognized. In 2025, economic activity accelerated across nearly all country groups, with regional growth reaching 4.5 percent, the fastest pace in over a decade. This was underpinned by a combination of favorable external conditions and, more importantly, sound domestic policy choices. Countries such as Ethiopia and Nigeria reaped the benefits of macroeconomic reforms: exchange rate realignments, subsidy reductions, and strengthened monetary policy frameworks. The results were tangible: improved fiscal positions, declining inflation, and sovereign rating upgrades in several economies.
Inflation fell to a median of 3.4 percent by end-2025, down from 4.8 percent the year before. Fiscal deficits narrowed, public debt declined, and current account balances improved.
In short, 2025 was a year of hard-won stabilization gains, and policymakers across the region deserve credit for achieving them.
But as we enter 2026, those gains are under pressure. The war in the Middle East is a major new external shock. Oil, gas, and fertilizer prices have surged. Shipping costs have risen. Trade with Gulf partners has been disrupted. Tourism and remittances are being squeezed. Financial conditions have tightened, particularly for fuel-importing countries.
We have accordingly revised our growth forecast downward to 4.3 percent in 2026, some 0.3 percentage points below our pre-war projection, with median inflation expected to rise to 5 percent by year-end.
The impact of the shock is highly uneven. Oil exporters may benefit from higher revenues but remain vulnerable to volatility and the risk of procyclical fiscal responses. Oil importers, particularly non-resource-rich and fragile states, face deteriorating trade balances, rising living costs, and limited buffers.
The human consequences could be severe.
Also important to note, this latest shock comes on the heels of the dislocation caused by the sharp, unprecedented decline in official development assistance, which is compounding all these pressures. We dedicate a full chapter to it, titled “Aid Cuts in Sub-Saharan Africa: This Time Is Different”—and we mean it.
Past aid shocks were largely cyclical; donors cut back and then returned. What we are seeing now appears more structural. And it is falling hardest on the region’s most vulnerable countries: fragile states and low-income economies that depend on aid not as a supplement, but as a critical source of budget financing, healthcare, and food assistance.
Against this backdrop, policy priorities to be considered are:
In the near term, countries must keep inflation expectations anchored and protect the most vulnerable through targeted, time-bound support. Fiscal strategies must balance credibility with flexibility. Oil exporters should treat windfall revenues as temporary and rebuild buffers. Oil importers must protect priority social and development spending while mobilizing domestic revenues—and there is real room to do so.
Over the medium term, accelerating structural reforms is essential to unlock private-sector-led growth. Our second analytical chapter lays out concrete reform options: improving governance, strengthening business environments, and deepening domestic financial markets. In a shifting geopolitical landscape, regional integration, particularly through the African Continental Free Trade Area, can boost resilience and open new opportunities.
Productivity growth is the long-term prize. The responsible adoption of artificial intelligence—in agriculture, health, and public services—could be transformative. But realizing that potential requires investment in the basics: reliable electricity, digital infrastructure, and skills.
Let me close with this. The region has weathered crisis after crisis—and has kept reforming. The gains of 2025 are real, and they are worth defending. The policy choices made now will determine whether those gains can not only be preserved, but prove a springboard to stronger, more inclusive growth.
The IMF stands ready to support countries across the region with financing, policy advice, and capacity development as they navigate this difficult period.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
