Speakers:
ABEBE AEMRO SELASSIE Director, African Department, IMF
AMADOU SY, Assistant Director, African Department, IMF
Moderator:
KWABENA AKUAMOAH-BOATENG, Senior Communications Officer, IMF
Transcript:
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: It's good to see so many of you. Good morning and hello to everybody. Welcome to those here and those joining us online.
I am Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng with the IMF's Communications Department. I am pleased to have Abebe Aemro Selassie, Director of the IMF's African Department, and Amadou Sy, Assistant Director in the African Department, who will present the key findings of our latest Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa titled ‘Hard Won Gains Under Pressure’.
Before we turn to Abe and Amadou, a reminder that we have simultaneous interpretation in French and Portuguese online and in the room. And the report and analytical chapters are now available on our website at IMF.org/Africa.
Abe, over to you.
MR. SELASSIE: Thank you so much, Kwabena. Very good morning, and good afternoon to colleagues joining us from around the world.
Thank you for joining us for the release of the IMF’s April 2026 Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa. The region entered 2026 with the strongest economic momentum it had seen in a decade. And then came the war.
How to hold the line, preserving hard-won gains while absorbing yet another shock, is the central challenge that our reports, authored by Amadou's team, addresses.
Let me begin with the good news because it deserves to be recognized. In 2025, economic activity accelerated across nearly all country groups, with regional growth reaching 4.5 percent, the fastest pace in over a decade. This was underpinned by a combination of favorable external conditions and, more importantly, sound domestic policy choices. Countries such as Ethiopia and Nigeria reaped the benefits of macroeconomic reforms, exchange rate realignments, subsidy reductions, and strengthened monetary policy frameworks. The results are tangible and improved fiscal positions, declining inflation, and sovereign rating upgrades in several economies.
Inflation fell to a median of 3.4 percent at the end of 2025, down from 4.8 percent the year before. Fiscal deficits narrowed, public debt declined, and current account balances improved.
In short, 2025 was a year of hard-won stabilization gains, and policymakers across the region deserve credit for achieving them.
But as we enter 2026, those gains are under pressure. The war in the Middle East is a major new external shock. Oil, gas, and fertilizer prices have surged. Shipping costs have risen. Trade with Gulf partners has been disrupted. Tourism and remittances are being squeezed. Financial conditions have tightened, particularly for fuel-importing countries.
We have accordingly revised our growth forecast downward to 4.3 percent in 2026, some 0.3 percentage points below our pre-war projection, with median inflation expected to rise to 5 percent by year-end.
The impact of the shock is highly uneven. Oil exporters may benefit from higher revenues but remain vulnerable to volatility and the risk of procyclical fiscal responses. Oil importers, particularly non-resource-rich and fragile states, face deteriorating trade balances, rising living costs, and limited buffers.
The human consequences are almost certain to be severe.
Also important to note, this latest shock comes on the heels of the dislocation caused by the sharp and unprecedented decline in official development assistance, which is compounding all these pressures. We dedicate a full chapter to it, titled Aid Cuts in Sub-Saharan Africa: This Time Is Different, and we mean it.
Past aid shocks were largely cyclical; donors cut back and then returned. What we are seeing now appears more structural. And it is falling hardest on the region’s most vulnerable countries, fragile states, and low-income economies that depend on aid not as a supplement, but as a critical source of budget financing, healthcare, and food assistance in many cases.
Against this backdrop, policy priorities to be considered include, in the near term, countries must keep inflation expectations anchored and protect the most vulnerable through targeted, time-bound support. Fiscal strategies must balance credibility with flexibility. Oil exporters should treat windfall revenues as temporary and rebuild buffers. Oil importers must protect priority social and development spending while mobilizing domestic revenues, and there is real room to do so.
Over the medium term, accelerating structural reforms is essential to unlock private-sector-led growth. Our second analytical chapter lays out concrete reform options such as improving governance, strengthening business environments, and deepening domestic financial markets. In a shifting geopolitical landscape, regional integration, particularly through the African Continental Free Trade Area, can boost resilience and open new opportunities.
Productivity growth is the long-term prize. The responsible adoption of AI in agriculture, health, and public services can be transformative. But realizing that potential also requires upfront investment in reliable electricity, digital infrastructure, and skills.
Let me close by saying that the region has weathered crisis after crisis in recent years, but kept reforming and shown tremendous resilience. The gains of 2025 are definitely worth defending. The policy choices that are being made now will determine the extent of which these gains are preserved.
As always, the IMF stands ready to support countries with financing, policy advice, and capacity development. And we are having discussions with all our country authorities that are this week on these issues.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Thank you, Abe. We will now turn over to you for your questions, but before we do that, a reminder of our ground rules. When I call on you, please identify yourself, your affiliation, and then please try and stick to one question so we can cover as many questions as possible today. And then also a reminder that we still have simultaneous interpretation available. So, for those of you joining online, you can switch to either French or Portuguese if you need it.
I will start from the room. Gentleman here.
QUESTIONER: Thank you very much. Two quick questions. The original one is this: a number of African countries are now leaning towards revenue measures to cushion this shock, slashing VAT, slashing excise, and beefing up subsidies. IMF is pushing back, especially where the fiscal space is constrained. Is there imminence of an omnibus intervention, such as the DSSI, kind of ask to cushion these countries in view of what's happening? Then secondly, on Kenya, any update on the conversations? The program is up in the air. Article IV has been delayed.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Thank you. I see we have another one online on Kenya. Maybe we can go there.
QUESTIONER: And the question is on countries specific to Kenya or the program, the status of the program. There's been some hesitance, more so on the part of the authorities and not the IMF, in regards to whether we renew or sign up to a new program. If you would inform us how far those discussions have now come, how far they've come, and what's to expect, especially with the hesitance that we've seen. And the second part of that question is the Governance Diagnostic Program. It would also offer an update that was in 2025. Is it complete, and when can we expect report on the theme? Thank you.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: I will read one more online question, and then we can come to Abe and Amadou.
Abe, there's a question report suggests that the IMF has uncovered hidden debt in Kenya that could derail possible Fund-supported program. Is this accurate, and the reason the discussions have stalled? Abe?
MR. SELASSIE: I'm going to take maybe the questions on Kenya, and then Amadou, can I ask you to answer the revenue question?
So, first on Kenya, on status of program discussions, you know, we continue to have discussions with the government, but you know, the government is in this position where it's not unique to Kenya either. We see this in several other countries in the region, and outside also. Kenya is, of course, a market access country -- or shifting towards a market access country. And you know, the market access these days has become very, very volatile. And so, the government is continuously thinking about how to best address its financing needs. IMF, of course, is an option, but in the long run, of course, it wants to be a market access country. They've done a lot of liability management operations to push back big lumpy repayments, and of course, flow service. And of course, as market conditions become difficult, you know, also been thinking about relying on IMF resources. So, these discussions are ongoing.
What I can tell you is that from our side, we've always congratulated the government for the strong effort that's been made to build buffers, particularly on the external front. But we also have been pointing out that there needs to be a path towards credible fiscal consolidation, and we'd like to see that. So that's one of the things that, you know, we would like to see for program discussions to advance. But you know, we're having very cordial and very good discussions with the government.
Second, on this hidden debt, I don't know what that's in reference to. What I can say is that we, our Statistics Department, put out a report yesterday, or last couple of days, about the appropriate statistical treatment of certain types of government transactions. And I think this includes transactions to do with some of the levies which the government is collateralizing and borrowing against. And you know, what the report was discussing is how it should be treated in public accounts. At the IMF, we believe that this should be treated as debt and have always done that. The government has shared that information with us in the past, and this report was simply reflecting on that.
If this is otherwise in reference to the issue of payment arrears, again, we've known the outstanding stock of payment arrears. It's always been the case. We've not included them in our debt statistics because the government is going through a process of certifying these arrears, and that's very standard practice. As in, when these are certified, they tend to get included in debt statistics. But there is no issue of hidden debt in Kenya that I'm aware of.
Lastly, on the governance diagnostics, the draft report has been shared by our team with authorities, and we're waiting for their comments on that before presenting it to our Board and publishing it.
Amadou, do you want to respond to this question about some of the effort that's being made to address the pressure by tax cuts?
MR. SY: Yes. So, on domestic revenue mobilization, I think the principle is to mobilize revenue while having limited incidents on the poorest segments. I mean, as usual, two levies, tax policy, and tax administration are being pursued with capacity development assistance from our colleagues here, and also trying to rely as much as possible on digitalization if there are clear benefits. Another avenue also that is being explored is how to reduce tax expenditures, with a -- such as deductions, preferential rates, which are estimated to cost about 3 percent of GDP in the region. And finally, looking at some avenues like property taxation and so on. Yeah, I'll stop there.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thanks, Amadou. Abe, anything else to add?
MR. SELASSIE: Oh, just on the –you asked about the DSSI-type initiative. I mean, so what is under consideration, and what we are discussing right now is how best to help countries that have asked for financial support. So, as Kristalina was saying yesterday, also in many, you know, with quite a few countries we have programs, existing programs. So, where governments are asking for more support, we are trying to see if we can provide more financing through existing vehicles or rephasing access through those programs. That's the first thing that we're trying to do. And then we are expecting -- we've also had a request for new programs, and of course, we're going to initiate those in the coming days.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thank you. We'll come to the middle.
QUESTIONER: Good morning. Quick question about the Sahel countries. We might assume that they might be quite impacted by the energy crisis, but also the fertilizer disruptions. I wanted to have your opinion about that and how concerned are you about the situation in those countries. Thank you very much.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thank you. We'll pick one more.
QUESTIONER: Thank you, Kwabena. I have two questions, one on Nigeria and the other on Africa. Having gone through the reports, it credited Nigeria's efforts, the reforms for supporting stronger growth in 2025. Yet it also shows that across the region, the inflation will be elevated to, I think, 5 percent fiscal deficit widening. In several countries, the fuel price pass-through already increasing social pressure. At what point do reforms stop being stabilization gains? Is that also becoming like a drag on welfare, where transmission to inflation and living costs is immediate now in Nigeria, and socially sensitive even as we're in a pre-election year in Nigeria?
There are other questions on Africa. The report also noted that one-third of countries in Africa at high-risk of debt or already in debt distress, while at the same time, countries are being advised by you to protect social spending, invest in infrastructure, and accelerate reform. So how can countries really realistically meet these development needs when debt service is already crowding out fiscal space? Are we not asking the government to do more with structurally less?
Let me also add this, the report also noted the 20 percent increase in global food prices could push 20 million people in Africa into food insecurity across the region. What immediate tools do African governments actually have beyond targeted support to prevent this from becoming a full-scale social crisis? Thank you.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thank you. Maybe we take one more Nigerian question. Please, the lady in the front.
QUESTIONER: Yeah, my question is, the IMF projected Nigeria's debt-to-GDP ratio to decline to 32.3 percent in 2026. And considering the sharp rise in the country's total debt up to about $117 billion, do you advise Nigeria to slow down on external borrowing? Does it still have more space for borrowing? Thank you.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thank you. Abe?
MR. SELASSIE: Starting with Sahel, almost certainly kind of, there's going to be tremendous pressure on the countries in the region, particularly in Sahel. All of the countries, honestly, where conditions already were fairly difficult for various reasons, conflict, you know, initial conditions in terms of per capita income, and development challenges. So, there will be pressure. Of course, at the margin, countries like Niger could benefit some, you know, because they export oil. Chad also potentially. But we expect that even that to come down the road rather than immediately. So, the immediate effect will be quite a bit of pressure, including on food security issue that Nancy mentioned. You know, aggravating those conditions either through the limited availability of fertilizer, expensive fertilizer, or even more immediately, as transportation costs have gone up, it's going to raise the cost of food, and so quite a bit of dislocation. So, you know, we see that.
We also recognize very much, you know, we need to underscore, as I touched on in my opening remarks, we're already seeing quite a lot of increase in transportation prices that people are facing already. Transportation costs are very high for people in urban areas, and rural areas even more. So, we are already seeing quite a bit of, of a pinch from the crisis on people. You know, it's impoverishing people, if it's making life difficult for people.
Against this backdrop, what is it that governments can do given the limited fiscal space, given the constraints? I think first point I need to make, and I want to reiterate again, is we shouldn't underestimate just how much governments have done to try and position themselves better to whether more of these shocks. So, in recent years, steps have been taken to stabilize debt and to reduce fiscal deficits. So that stabilization, I think, helps now when another shock like this comes because, you know, there is a little bit more scope to try and defray the cost, the impact of this shock on people's livelihoods.
So, I think, you know, in terms of policy response, it has to be very country-specific, and even within countries, you know, it could vary from region to region. And what we are trying to do is identify the amount of space that governments have to make interventions. Where interventions are being made, what we are pleading is that these are consistent with the medium-term objectives that countries have and that they're not thrown off course by this because that would be a double whammy for countries.
Lastly, on Nigeria and the debt situation, whether there is room to borrow externally. Again, these kind of issues, whether to borrow externally, domestically has to be seen in totality. I mean, what's really important is, of course, trying to keep the level of debt as manageable as possible relative to debt service capacity, first and foremost. And then, second, to do liability management operations that will make sure that you extend maturities. So, it's difficult for me to answer whether to tilt borrowing structure external or domestic. I mean, Nigeria has fantastic DMO, they know how to manage these things, and you know, depends on time and context. Thanks.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: And then the food security question, maybe, Amadou?
MR SY: So, on the food security, the one on protecting social spending, so this is a difficult task, of course, but it's also a signal that these countries that have this high debt distress have less caution to absorb shocks. So, in the medium term, the idea is to rebuild buffers and fiscal buffers and so on. But in the short term, there's definitely, in terms of spending, the idea is to reprioritize spending with protecting priority spending. That's one. And the other one also to see how to improve the efficiency of spending.
Two is of course, efforts which we discussed earlier on domestic revenue mobilization. Again, tax policy, tax efficiency. And finally, the capacity to elaborate policy, but also implement policy. And all of that will require difficult discussions, and communication is important. Engaging stakeholders is important.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thank you. We come back to the room. Gentleman on the far side.
QUESTIONER: You were kind of trying to lower growth for the region because of developments in the Middle East. But are there any countries that stood out that have been able to build some reserves or buffers to withstand the shocks? I looked at Ghana's numbers. Earlier this year, you projected about 4.56 percent than the REO or the World Economic document is talking about 4.8. Is Ghana one of those countries that is standing out because of the Fund program? That is one.
But two, also going forward, there are fears that post exit of this program in August this year, Ghana could be back again in terms of getting off track. Are you worried, or you think that you put in place the right structures to ensure that after they exit the program, they will still be disciplined in terms of spending all those things? Because you've gone to the Fund program. This is about the 17th time. So, what comfort does the Fund got when Ghana exited this program in August this year? And the final one, what is next for you? You are retiring in May this year. Where are you going to?
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thank you. Any more Ghana questions? Yes, the gentleman there.
QUESTIONER: Yeah, just to add -- I want to find out from you what you, as we exit the program, what the Fund actually is looking at. What are the tools that you think, if we put in place, we can sustain the growth that we have, and we don't have to actually come back to the Fund? And do you actually think that the quality and durability of this recovery that we see is one that is good for the country? And what should these policymakers be looking out for, especially looking at the Iran war and its effect on the energy sector in the country?
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thanks. We come back to Abe and Amadou.
MR. SELASSIE: So on Ghana, on growth, where things are, I mean, you know, we have been happy, very happy to see the continued improvement in macroeconomic outcomes in Ghana in the last year and a half, couple of years after the difficult crisis that the government had with people of Ghana, of course had gone through in 2022-2023, yeah? So that continued performance is really good. And it's on the back of continuing to implement the reforms that the government had identified as being important on the revenue side, addressing the challenges in the state-owned enterprises and the energy sector, you know, clearing the path for recovery that we are seeing.
Growth-wise, we hope that this can be sustained. And really, for Ghana, I think it's going forward. It's really about how to make sure that the fiscal balance remains contained and there is a continued balance between addressing development needs and avoiding that sustainability challenges the program has or the commitments the government made under the program have ensured that. So, it's about sustaining that in the post-program period. You asked what steps we've taken to ensure that, you know, this is not for the IMF. This is for the people of Ghana, for the government, for the private sector, for civil society to take. It's not for the IMF.
And I think, hopefully, the lessons of the recent past, hopefully, will be salutary, and going forward, there will continue to be a decent path. But we are very optimistic about Ghana. I mean, the potential there, of course, is tremendous, and we're very hopeful that the economy will continue to grow from strength to strength.
And on your question, you know, just to note that there are rumors that I'm going to go play for Arsenal. (Laughter) It's not true. (Laughter) Maybe coach them.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Okay, so we come back to the room here. We'll turn with a gentleman in the first row.
QUESTIONER: Thank you very much. And of course, we have learned that you are preparing your retirement, and we wish you a peaceful retirement. And we hope that you will also witness a new African sovereignty following your contribution to the North–South dialogue. Also, may this crisis and all what's happening now in this world contribute to fostering an understanding of the concept of interdependence. My question, following earlier clarification by the IMF on Senegal's previously undisclosed debt progress since last October, appears limited in terms of progress. Senegal has expressed reluctance toward debt restructuring, while the IMF appears to view it as possible option. Is this a substantive disagreement, and how is it being handled in your discussion? And let me tell you also, from a policy perspective, how do you assess the Senegalese current debt sustainability outlook? And what concrete signals, whether in terms of governance, fiscal consolidation, or engagement with international partners, would you consider most critical to restoring confidence and concluding a new program with the country? Thank you very much.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thank you. Any more questions on Senegal? First row.
QUESTIONER: On Senegal, the government there relies increasingly on the regional bond market. Does the IMF believe that these regional bonds should be included in a potential debt restructuring? And I had another question on Gabon while I have the microphone. You forecast Gabon's current account deficit to expand very significantly compared to the 2025 figure. Can you just explain what's behind that?
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right. Any questions on Senegal? Or Gabon?
QUESTIONER: Thank you very much. If you could talk to us about the real sticking points in the negotiations with Senegal. Is this mainly a transparency and credibility problem, you know, after the undisclosed debt revelations? Or does the Fund now believe Senegal's debt burden requires a more painful fiscal adjustment than maybe Dakar is willing to accept? Thank you.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Abe, will you take these ones?
MR. SELASSIE: So, where to begin on Senegal? So, on the status of program discussions, you know, we continue to have very, very good discussions with authorities, including here this week. Fundamentally the, you know, we have, as we've said time and again, we really have congratulated the government for identifying the big challenges that they uncovered on coming to office. They alerted us very quickly and have been doing really very solid work to try and, you know, identify the totality of the misreporting, shared those assessments with us, also trying to identify what the root causes, the breakdowns, and systems were, and we're grateful for that. So, there's no issue about transparency of the dead stock, et cetera? Far from it. This administration has been incredibly candid and very transparent, and it's something that we've commended them for.
They have, however, inherited a legacy of very significant debt. And the question now is how to deal with that, and what's the optimal way of dealing with that. And as I mentioned in response to a question earlier, this is a time where, you know, there's so much volatility in terms of market access, in terms of, you know, doing even debt sustainability analysis because, you know, the sustainability requires thinking ahead about what the economic outlook is, market access terms look like.
And at this volatile time for countries that are on the border of market access. It's work that requires quite a lot of diligence, quite a lot of deliberation. Going down one route that is irreversible is not exactly the ideal route to go. So, you know, we've wanted to take time and allow the government time to come up with a program strategy that's going to be credible, financeable, and avoids too much austerity on the people of Senegal. So, these discussions require quite a lot of reflection, quite a lot of deliberation, and first and foremost are for the government to develop. So, we are at that stage, and those discussions are continuing.
The regional market has been a source of help, and we have absolutely no view or no point to make about what the perimeter of any debt restructuring will look like. That's -- we never enter into those discussions and don't think it's appropriate for me to comment, and typically have not ever asked domestic debt, et cetera, unless, you know, [inaudible] to be included in any debt parameters.
Last but not least, on Gabon, the current account deficit, you know, there has been very significant increase in spending in Gabon in recent years and investments that have been undertaken, and we expect that's what we are expecting to push the current account deficits to be wider than last year. Of course, since the projections were made, we've seen oil prices being revised upwards. So, you know, we may have to revisit that, but that's what the wider current account deficits reflect.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thanks. I will go online now.
QUESTIONER: So, I wanted to know if there would be an emergency special drawing rights for Sub-Saharan countries since there is a major shock to the economy. In addition to that, how will the IMF support the countries in addition, in the way that the governments are asking? And I wanted to know if it's okay --
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: I think we lost you. You can also put your question in the chat, and I'll come back to it.
We also have another question online I want to take. It says, "On Mozambique and Lusophone countries, how are the tighter global financial conditions and exchange rate pressures, as well as the impact of the Middle East conflict, shaping the outlook?" And the questioner also wants to know "Generally, what the outlook is for Lusophone countries." Anything on Lusophone countries in here? Angola? Cape Verde? Okay, Abe?
MR. SELASSIE: Okay, thank you. So, I think [on Ethiopia the] question was about whether the IMF is considering doing a special drawing rights issuance, and I'm not aware of any such discussions. Rather, as I mentioned earlier, what we are trying to do is at the individual country level to try and see how best we can help. As Kristalina has been saying, this crisis is different to the pandemic. The pandemic was something that hit all countries almost uniformly and required a uniform response by countries, by policymakers. This one is hitting countries in a very asymmetric fashion. Even in our region, we have oil-exporting countries. As our report goes through in explaining, you know, the response has to be very country-specific and depending on how countries are being hit. So, what we're trying to do, as I said, is, you know, with individual countries having very deep discussions and seeing how we can best help.
On Mozambique, you know, Mozambique basically is one of the countries where debt sustainability is borderline, and conservative reform effort is needed to try and move the country forward and address the development challenges the country has. And that's even before the latest shock. But of course, you know, fundamentally this is a country also with tremendous natural resources and stands to benefit from the exploitation of gas in due course, once that starts being exported. So, we're hopeful that there will be a framework in place that will help, you know, make sure that the country can benefit from that in due course.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We'll take some questions from the room now. The second row.
QUESTIONER: Thank you. Good morning. To what extent do you expect the geo-economic fractures to undermine South Africa's ongoing structural reform agenda alongside its new inflation framework? Thank you.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thank you. The lady in the back. Yes, thank you.
QUESTIONER: Well, thank you. Before I ask my question, I just wanted to say thank you. I know you are retiring from the Fund, and now you've -- undo some of the toughest crises from Ebola to other crises in the past. So, we will miss you.
Okay, now to my questions. With the rise of AI digital currency and decentralized finance, how is the IMF advising African countries on the fiscal and regulatory challenges that this new financing system poses? In your report, you also mentioned AI. So, could you talk about how you are advising ministers on how to harness artificial intelligence in their system?
My other question, in your report, you also mentioned the impact of U.S. tariffs on African nations that has been modest. However, regional trade among African nations is still very low due to high tariffs. So what advice, what recommendation? And in the past year, how are you advising ministers regarding this? Thank you.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thank you. Abe, so maybe we can take South Africa, then Amadou, and the tariff question. Then we'll come back to the room for one last round of questions.
MR. SELASSIE: Sure. You know, so on South Africa, like other countries in the region, I think it is of course being impacted first and foremost by what's going on in the war. But more generally kind of an environment where there's so much volatility in global economic and financial variables. And it's something that all our countries are going to have to get used to navigating in the coming years.
I think there's a big shift in the global order. One where, for the last 20-30 years, until around the pandemic, conditions were generally very favorable for our countries. Global growth was strong. There was a lot more certainty about the trading, even peace environment. And that seems to have atrophied, creating a lot of volatility. So, it's one of the things that we have to contend with. Policymakers, I think, in South Africa have been navigating it really very well. The inflation targeting regime, in particular, I think, has served the country tremendously. We've seen some fiscal consolidation, which is also beginning to bear fruits and helping stabilize that. And market access terms are improving. So, you know, resilience, you know, continuing to build on that resilience, I think, is the answer for South Africa and many of our other countries.
I'm going to ask Amadou to weigh in on the tariff question.
But on AI, I think we remain extremely optimistic about what it means. Yes, there are issues to do with preparedness that our countries need to work on. But I think fundamentally, what it allows, much as the internet and access to information did for the region, what it will allow is level the playing field for human capital knowledge to be as accessible to our countries, you know, as it was -- as it is for most other players. And I think I'm already seeing incredible strides in, you know, using AI for design of gardens, houses, et cetera, making tremendous headway in the region. These things are often very costly. So, we see tremendous benefit. That's just normal lives of people in the government space. We're already seeing also quite a lot of efforts by governments to use AI to improve tax systems, to improve service delivery. So, I think it's something that, if managed well, should help the region converge faster, and not at all something to be feared, I don't think.
Amadou, on the tariff?
MR. SY: Yes, on the tariff, so maybe I'll just focus on the African Continental Free Trade Area. And we've seen real, real progress, but uneven progress. So, there are key negotiations to be concluded on issues like the rules of origins, tariff concessions, and that limits the effectiveness of trade as diversification, as a shock buffer. But the long-term potential is clear, and it's about reducing non-tariff barriers, modernizing customs procedures, and deepening trade and services. And I would just add, also having a look at the financing of trade, which is often overlooked. It's a key area.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, I said I was going to come back to the room. We are running out of time. So just one last question, maybe to the side of the room. The lady in the first row.
QUESTIONER: Thank you, Kwabena, for taking my question. Yesterday, the Managing Director did mention that there is between $20 and $50 billion available in support to countries. Will there be any consideration of reducing IMF surcharges or lending for vulnerable economies, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa? Thank you.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thank you. Abe, that's the last question for today.
MR. SELASSIE: Thanks. You know, as she also pointed out, that we are spending this week having intense discussions with authorities to see exactly how they want us to help, which is exactly what we are doing now. I think, as always, things like looking at the terms of financing, the tenure, et cetera, are things that take time. And time is of the essence for some countries in terms of the support that we can provide. So, what we are going to try and do is use existing vehicles and roll out other emergency financial support or new medium-term programs to support countries in the region. But you know, as she also stressed, you know, this IMF basically is the institution that countries tend to at times like this. And we're, you know, we've geared up and are having these discussions to see how we can support countries as quickly as possible.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thanks, Abe. Unfortunately, that brings us to a close. I know there were so many questions we couldn't get to, but please send them to media@imf.org, and we'll try and get back to you as soon as we can.
The report, as I mentioned, is now available on IMF.org/Africa, so please go ahead and download it and send us any questions you may have.
The Spring Meetings continue. We have the Press Briefings for the Middle East and Central Asia Departments, as well as the African Finance Ministers, today. And then tomorrow, we have press briefings for the European and Western Hemisphere Departments as well as the IMFC.
But before we wrap up, I just want to note, as many of you have also noted, this is Abe's last Regional Economic Outlook press conference as Director of the African Department. I mean, thank you. I mean, thank you. I mean, over the years, we all have interacted with Abe, and his leadership, and his deep commitment to our region has really shaped a lot of what we shared from this stage. So, Abe, on behalf of the African and Communications Departments -- and I believe everybody in the room and online -- a heartfelt thank you. And we wish you the very best of what comes next. Thank you.
MR. SELASSIE: All right, thank you.
