Press Briefing Transcript: Middle East and Central Asia Region, Spring Meetings 2026
IMF News, April 16, 2026
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- Published: April 16, 2026
Overview of the shock
- Outbreak of the war on February 28 delivered a severe, multifaceted shock disrupting three pillars of stability: energy markets, trade routes, and business confidence.
- Energy at the center:
- Strait of Hormuz “has come close to a standstill.”
- Strikes and precautionary shutdowns have reduced oil and gas output by an estimated 13 million barrels per day of oil.
- Brent crude surpassed $100 per barrel, peaking at 118 before retreating following the ceasefire announcement.
- European gas prices rose by roughly 60%, exceeding the spike after Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
- Commodity and services disruptions:
- One third of global fertilizer trade transits through the strait.
- GCC countries account for over 40% of global sulfur exports and roughly 20% of ammonia and nitrogen fertilizer exports.
- Air traffic collapsed, maritime insurance premiums surged, shipping routes lengthened, logistics chains weakened.
- Financial market effects:
- Sovereign spreads widened by 50 to 100 basis points across several countries during March, before returning to pre-conflict levels after the ceasefire.
- Capital outflows and higher borrowing costs in countries with limited policy space.
Regional economic outlook and key projections
- MENAP region:
- Growth in MENAP projected to slow to 1.4% in 2026 under the reference scenario.
- This constitutes a downgrade revision of 2.3 percentage points from the October forecast (one of the largest six-month downgrades since the global financial crisis).
- Impact is highly uneven: conflict-affected oil exporters (five of eight economies) are now projected to contract in 2026.
- Qatar faced the steepest revision, nearly 15% from October projections.
- Oman faced only a modest downgrade due to sea access lying outside the strait.
- Low-income and fragile states:
- Food items account for 45 to 50 percent of total imports in Yemen, Sudan, Somalia.
- More than half of their populations are already experiencing food insecurity.
- Higher import prices risk widening current account deficits, depleting reserves, and amplifying social risks where buffers are thin.
- Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA):
- Region ended 2025 with growth of 6.2%, about half a percentage point above expectations.
- Growth now projected to slow to 4.8% in 2026 as tailwinds from the Russia war in Ukraine fade and Middle East conflict headwinds emerge.
- Inflation remains elevated at around 8% on average.
- Public debt projected to reach 23.4% of GDP in 2026, about three percentage points below earlier forecast.
- Oil price reference vs. adverse scenarios:
- Reference scenario assumes Brent averages $82 per barrel in 2026.
- Adverse scenario assumes Brent averages $100 per barrel in 2026.
- At time of briefing, market prices were around $95 per barrel; using today’s prices through year-end would place outcomes between the reference and the adverse scenario.
- Other specific figures cited:
- Saudi Arabia diverted flows enabling exports valued at $5.7 billion (about one day of Saudi exports).
Transmission channels and asymmetric impacts
- Primary transmission channels:
- Higher energy and commodity prices (food, fertilizers).
- Disruptions to trade routes and logistics.
- Weaker remittances and reduced ODA for vulnerable countries.
- Financial market tightening: wider spreads, capital outflows, higher borrowing costs.
- Asymmetric nature of the shock:
- Countries differ by exposure (proximity to Strait of Hormuz; reliance on transits), fiscal buffers, and prior reforms.
- Examples:
- Qatar: large negative revision due to extensive infrastructure damages.
- Oman: limited impact because sea access lies outside the strait.
- North Africa: mixed effects — Algeria and Libya are windfall beneficiaries; energy-importing North African countries face higher import bills and potential fiscal pressure.
- Fragile states (Somalia, Yemen, Sudan): particularly exposed given low fiscal revenues (e.g., Somalia fiscal revenues noted as not exceeding 3% of GDP) and high food import shares.
- Fertilizers and food security:
- Fertilizer disruptions can pass through to food prices with a lag; countries reliant on imported fertilizers (including phosphate-based producers) remain vulnerable.
- Remittances and tourism:
- Remittances may weaken if the conflict persists.
- Tourism patterns shifted in early weeks: occupancy rates higher in North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) and lower in the Gulf.
Country- and region-specific notes
- GCC and oil exporters:
- Fiscal buffers vary; countries that diversified revenues and strengthened fiscal institutions pre-crisis are better placed to respond.
- Authorities tended to react in a measured manner, targeting the vulnerable and providing liquidity/financing support through financial systems (examples cited: UAE, Qatar).
- Oil importers and vulnerable emerging markets:
- Ability to cushion shocks depends on access to international markets, debt levels, and existing programs.
- Egypt and Pakistan: programs in place; exchange rate flexibility and targeted support helped limit transmission; staff-level agreements reached and reviews expected (Egypt review expected in the summer; Pakistan program progressing toward a Board decision).
- Jordan: staff-level agreement reached; measures to increase Aqaba port traffic and resilience noted.
- Lebanon and other non-program countries:
- IMF in consultation with Lebanese authorities to assess impacts and explore grants and responses for displacement and reform; no current IMF financing for Syria, Yemen, and certain other countries.
- Saudi Arabia:
- Activated East-West pipeline and other measures to divert trade and mitigate disruptions; facilitated regional logistics and hosted fleets/air traffic to ease disruptions.
- Georgia and CCA countries:
- Potential short-term tourism and trade gains; growth drivers include strong domestic demand, wage growth, remittances; sustainability of elevated growth expected to moderate toward more sustainable levels.
- UAE and Saudi non-oil sectors:
- Non-oil activity expected to recover gradually; impact depends on conflict duration, sector composition (financial services, tourism, downstream activities), and potential scarring.
Policy priorities and recommendations
- Core message: discipline — calibrated responses that protect the vulnerable without compromising medium-term stability.
- Recommended measures:
- Allow automatic stabilizers to operate.
- Deploy targeted, temporary support for affected households.
- Finance support through reprioritized spending rather than expanding deficits.
- Do not reinstate or expand broad fuel subsidies.
- Central banks facing persistent inflation, particularly where policy stances remain accommodative, should maintain or tighten restrictive positions.
- Financial supervisors should sharpen oversight of liquidity and foreign currency mismatches and stand ready to deploy backstops where needed.
- Medium-term resilience and regional integration:
- Diversify trade routes and strengthen critical infrastructure.
- Deepen regional cooperation: greater regional integration of energy markets, harmonized customs systems, and regional liquidity facilities to strengthen collective shock absorption.
Scenarios, uncertainty, and outlook
- High uncertainty; risks firmly tilted to the downside.
- Reference scenario assumes conflict lasts a few weeks with gradual normalization by mid-2026 (June–July 2026).
- Adverse scenario reflects prolonged disruption with higher average oil prices and deeper economic effects.
- Each additional day without a ceasefire increases the likelihood of an adverse scenario materializing.
Press Briefing Transcript: Middle East and Central Asia Region, Spring Meetings 2026 — IMF Communications Department, April 16, 2026