Speakers:
JIHAD AZOUR, Director of Middle East and Central Asia Department, IMF
ROBERTO CARDARELLI, Assistant Director of Middle East and Central Asia Department, IMF
Moderator:
ANGHAM AL SHAMI, Communications Officer, IMF
Transcript:
MS. ALSHAMI: Good morning to everyone joining us here, and hello to everyone also joining us online. My name is Angham Shami, I'm here with the Communications Department, and I will be your moderator for today.
Today we're launching the Regional Economic Outlook for the Middle East and Central Asia. This report discusses the implications of the war and policy challenges facing countries across the region. If you have not... done so, I encourage you to go to our website and read the report. You should have been able to get access to it through our press center.
I'm here today with Jihad Azour, Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department, and also we have Roberto Cardarelli, Assistant Director in the same department, and he also leads the team that prepared this report.
A quick reminder that interpretation is available in Arabic and French, both online and in the room. As always, we will begin with Jihad giving an overview and then we will open the floor for your questions. Jihad, over to you.
MR. AZOUR: Thank you, Angham. Good morning, everyone, and thank you for joining us. I would like also to welcome and thank those who are joining us remotely. Good afternoon.
Today, we are releasing the IMF April 2026 Regional Economic Outlook for the Middle East and Central Asia. This update comes at an exceptionally difficult moment, and I want to begin by expressing my deepest empathy to all those across the region who are enduring the human and economic consequences of this conflict.
The outbreak of the war on February 28 has delivered a severe and multifaceted shock to one of the world's most important economic corridors. It disrupted three pillars of stability: energy markets, trade routes, and business confidence.
At the center of the shock is energy. The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one fifth of the global oil supply and above one quarter of global LNG transit has come close to a standstill. Strikes and precautionary shutdowns have reduced oil and gas output by an estimated 13 million barrels per day of oil. Brent crude surpassed $100 per barrel, peaking at 118 before retreating following the ceasefire announcement. While European gas prices rose by roughly 60%, exceeding the spike observed after the Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Commodity disruptions extend beyond oil and gas. One third of global fertilizer trade transits through the strait. GCC countries account for over 40% of global sulfur exports and roughly 20% of ammonia and nitrogen fertilizer exports. These price increases translate directly into higher food costs for some of the world's most vulnerable populations in economies across MENA, South Asia, and Africa.
The war has also affected services. Air traffic collapsed, maritime insurance premiums surged, and shipping routes lengthened. Logistics chains also weakened.
Financial markets have retracted and reacted with wider sovereign spreads. Capital outflow, and higher borrowing costs, often in countries where policy space was already limited. Taken together, this shock is broad, deep, and still unfolding.
Turning to the regional outlook, prior to the conflict, the MENAP region was one of the most promising trajectories. Growth gaining traction, inflation easing, and the non-oil sector performing well. That progress has been sharply reversed. Even under our reference scenario, growth in MENAP is projected to slow to 1.4% in 2026, which constitutes a downgrade revision of 2.3 percentage points from our October forecast. To put this in context, it's among the largest six months downgrades to the regional growth projections we have made since the global financial crisis.
The impact is highly uneven across countries in the region. Conflict-affected oil exporters, five of eight economies, are now projected to contract in 2026. Qatar faced the steepest revision, nearly 15% from our October projections, reflecting extensive infrastructure damages. Oman, by contrast, faced only a modest downgrade, given its sea access lies entirely outside the strait.
For all importers, vulnerabilities are compounding. These economies face higher energy costs, weaker remittances, and tighter financial conditions at a time where their buffers were already limited.
Sovereign spreads have widened by 50 to 100 basis points across several countries during March, before returning to pre-conflict levels after the ceasefire.
Low-income and fragile states face the most severe pressures. Food items already account for 45 to 50 percent. Of total imports in Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, and more than half of their population are already experiencing food insecurity. Higher import prices risk widening current account deficit, depleting reserves, and amplifying social risks where macroeconomic buffers are thin.
The uncertainty around our projection is high, and risks are firmly tilted to the downside.
Turning now to the Caucasus and Central Asia. This region ended 2025 with growth of 6.2%, around half a percentage point above expectations. Growth is now projected to slow to 4.8% in 2026 as tailwinds from Russia wars in Ukraine fade and new headwinds form the Middle East conflict emerge. Inflation remains elevated at around 8% on average. Uneven buffers leave the region exposed to tighter global financial conditions. Public debt is projected to reach 23.4% of GDP in 2026, about three percentage points below earlier forecast. Nonetheless, the risks for this region are also to the downside.
Turning to policy priorities, the IMF's core policy message at this juncture is one of discipline. This is a moment for carefully calibrated responses that protect the most vulnerable without compromising medium-term stability. Governments should allow automatic stabilizers to operate and deploy targeted, temporary support for affected households. Those should be financed through reprioritized spending rather than expanding deficits. Broad fuel subsidies should not be reinstated or expanded. Central banks facing persistent inflation, particularly where policy stance remain accommodative, should maintain or tighten restrictive positions. Financial supervisors must sharpen oversight, liquidity and foreign currency mismatch and stand ready to deploy backstops where this is needed.
Looking ahead, beyond the immediate response, this shock underscores the importance of building resilience and strengthening integration. This includes diversifying trade routes, strengthening critical infrastructure, and deepening regional cooperation. Greater regional integration of energy markets, harmonized custom systems, and regional liquidity facilities can meaningfully strengthen the region's collective shock absorption and capacity to withstand the shock.
With that, I would like to thank you for your participation today. My colleague Roberto and myself will be happy to answer your questions.
MS. ALSHAMI: Thank you very much, Jihad. We will open the floor now for questions. Maybe we'll start with the gentleman here on the third row, please.
QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning. Thank you for taking my question today. So just going back to the WEO briefing earlier this week, there was mention of this reference forecast and this adverse scenario. And every day that passes without a ceasefire, we're one day closer to that adverse scenario. So, I just want to get your perspective. Given that oil prices are still above $90 a barrel, given the damage to infrastructure throughout the region, and given the broader political backdrop without a ceasefire, what are you seeing that tells you that the Gulf isn't facing this adverse scenario already?
MR. CARDARELLI: As you know, we had to stop the clock in our projections around mid-March. So at that point, we used projections based on this assumption that the conflict would last a few weeks -- back in those days, mid-March -- and there will be a gradual normalization in energy trade and production by mid this year, let's say June, July 2026. Of course, since then, things have moved in the direction of making it more likely that the damage, for example to infrastructure, has been stronger than we anticipated at the point.
And the futures on Brent, which we use as a reference for our projections on oil prices, we use the Brent as a benchmark, they moved up. So just to give you a sense, our reference scenario, assume that oil prices on average are going to be $82 per barrel, the Brent as a benchmark, on average in 2026. The adverse scenario has $100 per barrel on average, in 2026. Right now, oil prices are a little bit below $194, $195. If you take today’s prices, $95 per barrel and you take them until the end of the year --assume that they're constant where they are -- we are kind of in between the reference and the adverse. If you use futures or prices as of today, you get a little bit closer to the adverse scenario.
I think it's still too early to say that our reference scenario is old. But again, as every day that goes by and the conflict continues, and if prices are what the market is pricing right now, we're getting closer and closer to the adverse scenario.
MS. ALSHAMI: Thank you, Roberto. We'll take another question in the front here, please.
QUESTIONER: Good morning, Jihad. Good morning Roberto. I have two questions about the oil exporters and the oil importers. About the GCC and oil exporters, I want to ask whether the IMF believes that the GCC oil exporters have enough fiscal buffers to withstand these exogenous shocks that have affected these economies significantly. And on oil importers, Jihad and Roberto, what does the IMF single out as the most important factor that can categorize these MENA countries' abilities to cushion these shocks? And Jihad, in your opening statements and remarks, you mentioned that sovereign spreads have widened to 50 to 100 basis points. How does the IMF see this playing out on the fiscal abilities of these oil importers?
MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much. On your first question. This shock is an asymmetric shock. Therefore, countries were not affected in the same way. In the introductory remarks, I mentioned that country like Oman, who has access to the sea, was mildly affected by the shock, whereas others who, or because of their high dependence on the Strait of Hormuz or the destruction of output and production capacity, were more affected. Therefore, it's an asymmetric shock with different type of implications.
The second important point is countries in the region have already, before this crisis, worked on diversifying their fiscal revenues, increasing the size of the non-oil revenues, and also developing and strengthening their fiscal institutions. Yesterday, the Minister of Finance of Qatar was sharing with us the various measures that they have been taken before that helped them address the shock.
The third dimension, countries do not have the same level of financial buffers and therefore definitely countries who have higher level of buffers and have diversified their assets will have more capacity to respond. What we have seen so far that countries reacted in a very measured way trying to reduce the impact on the most vulnerable groups and also provide some liquidity and financing support through their financial system. This is what we saw for example in the UAE as well as also in other countries.
For the oil importers, I think it's important to, in fact, separate the various groups. And here, I would group them in three. The emerging economies, those who have access to international financial markets, but those who have high level of debt. Those, of course, were affected. Some of their spreads widened -- the case of Egypt or Pakistan. The good news is after the signing of the ceasefire, this situation has reversed. And now the level of spreads have returned to the pre-crisis.
The second group is the group who are in conflict. And those are the most affected, especially because the increase in prices, which is the main channel of transmission, will affect key commodity prices. And this is something that, for a certain number of countries, represents a large portion of their input. Therefore, the impact on those countries is higher. At a time where their buffers and capacity are extremely thin. In certain cases, this is compounding other problems, like, for example, in the case of Somalia, where you had already droughts and where ODA is declining.
And you have the rest, countries who are more insulated, like countries who are in North Africa. Those are going to be affected through price increase and if there is physical disruption.
MS. ALSHAMI: Thank you, Jihad. We'll take the gentlemen on the third row, please.
QUESTIONER: Thank you, Angham. Good morning, Jihad. Quick question about the countries that are in the vicinity of the conflict, such as Jordan or Oman, or a bit larger, like Pakistan or Tunisia, but were in a quite difficult fiscal situation. How concerned are you about those countries? And what are the steps that they should take in the near future to avoid the consequences of the shock?
MR. AZOUR: Well, I think it's important to mention that those countries have been subjected to shocks over the last five years. And as the Managing Director mentions regularly, we live in shock-prone economy these days.
You mentioned Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan. With the three countries, we have already programs. And in each of those programs, those programs were designed in order to help those countries address those kind of shocks and reduce their vulnerabilities. For a country like Egypt, of course, the impact was through the increase in prices, but also impact on the financial markets, and we saw the widening of their spreads. But also what we saw that the authorities took the right measures in order to protect the economy from any external shock. They used the flexibility of the exchange rate as a way to reduce the transmission of this external shock, learning from the crisis in 2022 the Russia-Ukraine crisis that increased the pressure from the external factors. Also, the level of use of fiscal instruments was measured and only targeted to those who are needed. Therefore, the ability of the authorities to manage the first wave of the shock was rewarded by the market, where we saw a return of inflows and also narrowing of their spreads.
Jordan, as you know, we have reached the staff level agreement yesterday or the day before yesterday, which also rewards Jordan for taking the wise measures in order to protect their economy. Jordan will be affected by price increases, and also Jordan has already taken a certain number of measures to strengthen in its capacity to respond. By increasing the level of traffic through the Aqaba port and also strengthening their ability to respond to the shock.
In the case of Pakistan, Pakistan will be affected, like all important countries, through price transmission, but again the impact will be less on fertilizers because of the stock of fertilizers and the fact that Pakistan increased its capacity to produce fertilizers. The program with Pakistan also is progressing. We have reached a staff level agreement, and we expect to go to the Board soon to release a new tranche.
But broadly speaking, I think what we are seeing today is that countries that took a certain number of immediate measures to reduce the impact of the shock, used in a relative wise manner fiscal instruments to provide support to those who need it.
MS. ALSHAMI: Thank you, Jihad. We will take the first lady here.
QUESTIONER: My question will be in Arabic. I'd like to ask you about the nature of the economic reforms that will be focused on Egypt, within the program we have now with Egypt, and also in light of the recent development that occurred regarding the war. And is the government and the Egyptian authorities required to – asked you to delay any of the reforms that are to be taken under the program? Another part is related to the intervention by the central bank in order to protect the monetary reserves. I wanted to know if there are arrangements for this intervention that have been agreed on with the central bank and between the central bank and the IMF.
MR. AZOUR: If you allow me, we will take all the questions on the impact on the region, and then we will go back to the questions related to the different countries. If there are questions on region, we would take these questions now, and after that, we will move on to the questions on each country. Then I will reply to your question on Egypt. Any question on the region? Please go ahead.
QUESTIONER: I wanted to ask about generally North African countries. Does the IMF see that they have the fiscal abilities to cushion this conflict?
MR. CARDARELLI: Well, North Africa is a stark example of how the shock affects the region differently. You have winners and losers, and in the region you have the winners, Algeria and Libya. Clearly they have the windfall of higher energy prices. They can produce, they can export. For them the pressure is actually going to be, it's going to have more demand for their production to satisfy the needs - from Europe in particular.
And then you have countries that import energy and those are actually affected negatively. I mean, these are the channels that Jihad was mentioning before. Clearly, they have to pay more for the imports of energy. Whether this is going to be a fiscal challenge or not depends on a lot of things, including how high are the subsidies. The more the subsidies, the more it's going to be a fiscal story as opposed to simple damage to the purchasing power of households. Somewhere is going to show up either as lower growth or higher fiscal deficit, most likely on both.
And there's other channels, the tourism. Tourism is actually, it's an interesting thing. North Africa can actually even benefit maybe. We have seen, we're following occupancy hotel rates, so the degree to which hotels are hosting. And they're higher for North Africa the last week of March compared to the same week last year. They're incredibly lower in the Gulf, but they're high in Morocco, in Algeria, in Tunisia. And that kind of tells you that maybe, they're going be less affected there.
The financial conditions, of course, that's a channel that... Jihad was talking about. And then the other channel of contagion, of transmission -- we discussed it in the report -- that kind of worries us is really the fertilizers. The impact on the cost and the availability of fertilizers. Even the countries that have a phosphate-based fertilizer like Morocco, they need to import nitrogen-based fertilizers, and a lot of it comes from the Gulf. They have reserves, they have stocks, but the agricultural season is now. So, if the conflict ends now, fine. If it continues, there may be issues down the road. And as Jihad said, an increase in fertilizer - almost half of it is passed through to food prices, with some lag, not immediately. And there's countries that depend very much on food in the region, in particular, for example, Mauritania is one of the countries that imports almost 50% of the food it consumes.
MS. ALSHAMI: Thank you, Roberto. On the regional topic, we actually received a question online. How do you expect the non-oil economies and the GCC to perform this year, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE?
MR. AZOUR: Well, this depends on the duration of the crisis, the extent that this crisis will last, and what will be the outcome of this crisis. Of course, in the first few weeks, and during, I would say, the first 40 days, we had military actions that had impacted the normal activity, not only in the oil and gas sectors, but also in the non-oil sector. In the last week or so, we see less disruptions, and therefore we expect that the non-oil activity will gradually recover. But again, the extent and the duration of this conflict and the tension will determine the speed at which the non-oil sector will recover.
Mind you, the composition of the non-oil sector in the GCC countries is not the same. You have certain markets where financial services, tourism, play a larger role. Whereas in other countries you have downstream activities or other types of businesses that are the leading sectors. And therefore, the impact will be differentiated.
What we saw is that the authorities have responded to, on one hand, allow the private sector to keep working by deploying some of the measures that were deployed, if you recall, during the COVID crisis. Therefore, for Alaa's question, I think it has to be assessed case-by-case depending on the nature and the resilience of each sector to this type of shock.
MS. ALSHAMI: We also received a question online from Mahmoud Youssef from Al Jazeera. What are the channels through which the war affected fragile and low-income economies in the Middle East? And how do you have, do you have measures in place for these countries to mitigate the impact of the shock?
MR. AZOUR: Well, those countries are, first of all, the most vulnerable because they have already weaknesses and their fiscal capacity is usually very limited. In a country, for example, like Somalia, fiscal revenues do not exceed 3% of GDP. Therefore, it's very difficult to address these kind of shocks. How these countries are affected, I mentioned it earlier. The main channel is the prices, the price of food, the price of fertilizers. Those are important and direct channels of transmissions.
The second channel is their capacity to export. Some of those markets rely on the GCC market as destinations and therefore their capacity to export to those markets has been impaired because of the war.
The third level also, something that we saw before the crisis but has been exacerbated since, is the drop in ODA. Some of those countries have been relying on ODA for years and the drop of ODA cannot be easily replaced. If the war lasts, they may be also affected by the remittances drop. Some of the populations generate high level of remittances that in certain cases are an important lifeline and stable lifeline to those communities.
MS. ALSHAMI: Thank you, Jihad. Any more regional questions before we move to country-specific questions? The lady here in the front, please.
QUESTIONER: Good morning. Central Asia is growing and Uzbekistan is one of the key drivers, but how sustainable is this growth if the region still depends on remittances and commodities?
MR. AZOUR: Do you want to take it?
MR. CARDARELLI: The CCA (Caucasus and Central Asia) region continues to do well in 2025 growth was a half percentage point faster than we expected last October, about 6.2% on aggregate for the region. It is true for all the countries in the region is above what we think it's sustainable, that's what we call potential. So it's sustainable in the long run. So what's not sustainable, is not going to be sustainable, hopefully, if we're right. So that means that this growth is expected to come down. But again, every year we meet you and we discuss projections, we are surprised at how resilient the region is.
The story there is mainly very strong demand, domestic demand, fueled by very strong wage growth. Remittances, as you said, again, it's not just Uzbekistan, it is true for many countries in the region. Monetary and fiscal policy, which have remained relatively accommodative, they're actually being adjusted gradually, appropriately. And there's the spillovers from the Russia war in Ukraine that we were very much concerned about at the beginning of the war, but they actually turn out to be some sort of, form of support to domestic demand in terms of capital that move there, human capital. Also not just financial capital move there, remittances. We expect still it's going to fade away, so still expect growth to fall to a more sustainable level, but still robust base next year.
Inflation is the other side of the coin. Inflation has actually been pretty high, even if a little bit more moderate than we expect in last October. And we still expect inflation to come down as domestic demand and growth continues to soften to a more sustainable pace going forward. Again, this is a story that is impressively the same for countries in the region, even with their own differences, of course. There's differences across countries, oil importers, oil exporters, those who are closer to the war and those that are further away from the war, but the common theme remains of resilience and... and high inflation.
MR. AZOUR: I would like to add two points to what Roberto said, more on the regional level. I think you need to watch the performance, or the evolution, of the commodity markets outside oil and gas, which constitute an important set of activities for several countries in the region. The second, of course, the impact of the Middle East crisis, especially on the inflation side. Especially given that in some of those countries, inflation has picked up in the last few days, sorry, few years, that requires from policy makers to address it. And the last dimension is the capacity of those countries who have over the last few years strengthened their regional cooperation, is to go a step beyond that. And this would require them to tackle some of the structural reforms. Address some of the long issues of the role of SOEs and the public sector in the economy.
MS. ALSHAMI: Thank you. Now let's maybe the lady here in the front will stick with CCA region.
QUESTIONER: Thank you. Thank you for this opportunity. So, my questions will be regarding Georgia. Hello, Mr. Jihad. So how this war in the Middle East will affect Georgia's economy? It is written in your outlook that maybe some countries, for example, Georgia or Armenia, will benefit from this war because of some tourism and some revenue inflows. And what kind of effect this war will have on Georgia? My first question. And my second question, we know that in Georgia economic growth still is relatively high. In two months, it was about... 8.4 percent. In your opinion, what drives right now Georgia's economy? It is still some leftovers from war in Ukraine, because we know that we had migrants and so on from Russia. So please, one question about this effect of Middle East war, and second one, what drives, right now, Georgia's economy? Thank you so much.
MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much. We'll take country questions now. Well, Georgia, the impact of the war in the Middle East on Georgia will be similar to all the countries who could be affected by the increase in oil and gas prices. Therefore, the transmission is through prices.
How Georgia could benefit? Of course, Georgia has been, over the last few years, deploying certain number of comparative advantages that allowed Georgia to have and experience higher level of growth. Since 2022 and the war in Ukraine, Georgia was able to attract investments, talents that helped grow both economic activity and demand. Going forward, what could be a potential positive impact? Yes, tourism, trade, especially the role that Georgia could play in the middle corridor. And also, Georgia could benefit from greater integration among Caucasus and Central Asian countries.
MS. ALSHAMI: Thank you. OK, we'll go to some country questions. Maybe the gentleman there.
QUESTIONER: Saudi Arabia during the crisis has activated the East-West pipeline. How will this affect the market, the energy market, globally? And is this going to enhance the economy of Saudi Arabia in particular? Thank you.
MR. AZOUR: During the few weeks, the early few weeks of the war, Saudi Arabia managed to take certain measures. The first one was to divert the importation of energy through the pipeline that enabled Saudi Arabia to export $5.7 billion, which is about one day of exports for Saudi Arabia. And this mitigated the consequences of higher prices because of the inability to export through the Hormuz Strait.
Also, Saudi Arabia enabled certain countries in the region to use the facilities -- the airports and ports -- in order to facilitate their traffic, and also hosting fleets of airplanes including from Bahrain. This was a very important role and it shows adaptability investment by the kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the past decade as the most important, one of the most important exporters. Demonstrates its resilience and also its strength. This was also an opportunity to build on …between the Gulf countries, to deepen the partnership between these GCC countries. Participating actively at the level of infrastructure, connectivity, electricity in order to face and withstand shocks.
QUESTIONER: Hi. Are you able to hear me?
MS. ALSHAMI: Yes, we can hear you now.
QUESTIONER: According to the latest IMF World Economic Outlook, UAE growth downgraded from 5% to 3.1, down by 1.3% for 2026. Will it be possible for the UAE to get back some of their last growth this year? If the situation improves dramatically, both on the Strait of Hormuz front. And also on the front of non-oil sectors such as tourism. Is it possible to get a better number in the middle of this year if there is unusual development in terms of progress of the geopolitical situation and also tourism, which is the key core activity of non-oil sector? Thank you. That is my question.
MR. CARDARELLI: Well, the numbers are certainly going change soon, so not just for the Gulf, for all countries in the region. I expect, as we discussed before, every day that goes by that the conflict remains, and as energy prices remain higher than what we were assuming at the time we did our reference scenario, which is the one we're going to show, we're going to get closer to an adverse scenario. If I were to bet any amount of money on our projections, I would bet on them showing worse number, not better numbers. But, you know, again, very much, as we say, depends on how the conflict ends, when it ends.
And there's also an upside. If it ends soon and in a comprehensive way, I mean, we may have some positive effects on our own energy in particular. I mean, the energy, it's easier for us to read in terms of the disruptions, there’s some uncertainty on the disruption, but more or less we know how much has been cut from what was produced before. So we know much is going to come back if the conflict is resolved. The non-energy, whether there's going to be some scarring effect, what we call some long-term lasting effects from the crisis on the region, it is a little bit more of an uncertain point and we will certainly follow it closely -- all the numbers that we're going to see in the region.
MS. ALSHAMI: Thank you, Roberto. So, we only have five more minutes, and I will take a very quick round of the last group of questions. The lady here in the front, please be very, very brief. We'll take a group of question, and then we'll turn to Jihad and Roberto.
QUESTIONER: Thank you. Rani Abouhassan from Jaret Al Nahar. Dr. Jihad, quick questions. You mentioned... The shock in the region, will the IMF be able to contribute to reduce this shock, especially in Lebanon? And helping the displaced? If there will be a permanent ceasefire, what are the expectations for the return of the economic boom in these regions?
QUESTIONER: Good evening, I am from Egypt. Quick question on Egypt. The new installments of the loan and the new review that will happen, how much is the amount, the remaining amount, and when will the review take place? And where will the mission take place? And what is the volume, as I said, of the money that the Fund is going to provide to Egypt? Another thing, we raised the price of oil exceptionally in Egypt because of the developments in the region. Will there be flexibility to reduce the prices of energy in agreement with the IMF? Will the program allow for that?
MS. ALSHAMI: Will the International Monetary Fund provide assistance to countries affected by the war? And then we had already the questions on Egypt, and we have only three minutes left, so I'll turn to you, Jihad, on these countries.
MR. AZOUR: Thank you. Quick answer. Yes, the Fund from the first day of the war was in contact with all the countries that were affected by this crisis, and the approach was different.
For countries with programs, we adjusted these programs based on the development. This facilitated the ability for these countries to face the shock, and it also was good in terms of investor sentiment.
Of course, there are certain countries that... were exposed, a country like Lebanon. Lebanon does not have programs currently with the Fund. As you know, we are in consultation with the Lebanese authorities. They are here in Washington at this time in order to know exactly the impact on Lebanon, what are the direct consequences, and how Lebanon can benefit from grants. And also to help with the displacement problem and how to restore economic reform and to relaunch the economy of Lebanon.
Our ability is not only financial, but we also contribute through policy and consultation with some countries like Syria, Yemen, and other countries, which the Fund cannot finance at this time.
Back to Egypt. The first question, of course, the Egyptian authorities took early measures in order to face this economic shock through a high committee to monitor the situation. And there were some measures at the level of the central bank and also at the government level in order to face this shock. The abilities of the authorities developed by time and the program, targeted protecting the economy from these shocks. There was flexibility of exchange rates adopted, and the ability of the central bank to face the crisis gave more confidence. And also the reserves at the central bank is an additional confidence boost.
The measures taken by the Ministry of Finance also contributed to improving revenues. And also they used tools like Takaful and Karama programs in order to protect to the most vulnerable. The effect is still manageable on the Egyptian economy, and we've seen a reduction on the spreads. And they return to what they have been a few weeks ago.
We had consultations, and the Board released the installments, and our team is in contact with the Egyptian authorities, and we expect in the summer to have the review.
MS. ALSHAMI: This brings this press conference to an end. Thank you all very much for all your questions, and again please do check out the report online on IMF.org. And if you have any questions please contact us directly. Thank you very much.
