World Economic Outlook, April 2018: Cyclical Upswing, Structural Change
World Economic Outlook, April 2018
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Bibliographic details
- Published: April 9, 2018
Global outlook and headline findings
- The global economic upswing that began around mid-2016 "has become broader and stronger."
- World growth strengthened in 2017 to 3.8 percent, with a notable rebound in global trade.
- Global growth is expected to tick up to 3.9 percent "this year and next."
- Drivers of the acceleration include:
- "an investment recovery in advanced economies"
- "continued strong growth in emerging Asia"
- "a notable upswing in emerging Europe"
- "signs of recovery in several commodity exporters"
- The report notes "the domestic and international repercussions of expansionary fiscal policy in the United States" as a supporting factor for near-term momentum.
- The partial recovery in commodity prices should allow conditions in commodity exporters to "gradually improve."
- For most countries, "current favorable growth rates will not last." Policymakers should seize this opportunity to:
- bolster growth,
- make it more durable,
- equip their governments better to counter the next downturn.
Chapter 1: Global Prospects, Risks, and Policy priorities (high-level)
- Projection summary:
- Advanced economies as a group will "continue to expand above their potential growth rates this year and next before decelerating."
- Growth in emerging market and developing economies will "rise before leveling off."
- Forecast-supporting factors listed: strong momentum, favorable market sentiment, accommodative financial conditions, and fiscal stimulus effects.
- Report sections addressing policy and risk include:
- Recent Developments and Prospects
- The Forecast
- Risks
- Policy Priorities
- Scenario Box 1. Impact of Recommended Policies in the Group of Twenty Economies
- Special feature: Commodity Market Developments and Forecasts.
Chapter 2: Labor Force Participation in Advanced Economies — key findings and implications
- Despite "the acceleration in population aging in almost all advanced economies over the past decade," aggregate labor force participation rates "show divergent trajectories."
- Group- and age-specific shifts:
- Participation has increased among prime-age women and, more recently, older workers.
- Participation has fallen among the young and among prime-age men.
- Drivers and explanations:
- Aging and "the drag from the global financial crisis can explain a significant share of the decline in the participation of men during the past decade."
- The rising participation of women "underscores the importance of other factors in shaping participation decisions."
- Labor market policies and institutions, structural changes, and gains in educational attainment "account for the bulk of the dramatic increase in the labor force attachment of prime-age women and older workers in the past three decades."
- "Technological advances such as automation, while beneficial for the economy as a whole, have weighed moderately on participation rates."
- Chapter structure emphasizes: Patterns of Labor Force Participation; Understanding Trends; Prospects; Conclusions and Policy Implications; several boxes and extensive annexes analyzing demographics, policy drivers, and projections.
Key statistics and exact numeric projections
- "mid-2016" — start of the global upswing.
- World growth in 2017: 3.8 percent.
- World growth expected: 3.9 percent "this year and next."
World Economic Outlook, April 2018: Cyclical Upswing, Structural Change
Content in this bundle
- C1
- c2
- c3 — Introduction and Executive Summary
- C4
- Dataset overview: Figure 1.1. Global Activity Indicators
- fig1_1
- Dataset: fig110csv
- fig1_10
- Figure 1.11. Emerging Market Economies: Capital Flows
- fig1_11
- Figure 1.12. Terms-of-Trade Windfall Gains and Losses
- fig1_12
- Figure 1.13. GDP Growth, 1999�2023
- fig1_13
- Figure 1.14. Per Capita Real GDP Growth
- fig1_14
- Figure 1.15. Fiscal Indicators
- fig1_15
- Figure 1.16. Global Current Account Balance
- fig1_16
- Figure 1.17. Real Exchange Rates and Current Account Balances in Relation to Economic Fundamentals
- fig1_17
- Figure 1.18. Net International Investment Positions
- fig1_18
- Figure 1.19. Growth for Creditors and Debtors
- fig1_19
- Figure 1.2. Contributions to the Change in Real GDP Growth, 2016�17
- fig1_2
- Figure 1.20. Geopolitical Risk Index
- fig1_20
- Figure 1.21. Risks to the Global Outlook
- fig1_21
- Figure 1.22. Recession and Deflation Risks
- fig1_22
- Scenario Figure 1. Inflation Surprise and Term Premium Shocks in the United States
- fig1_s_1
- Figure 1.1.1. Global Sales of Personal Computers and Smartphones
- fig1_1_1
- Figure 1.1.2. Global iPhone Sales
- fig1_1_2
- Figure 1.1.3. China: Smartphone Export Cycle
- fig1_1_3
- Fig121csv
- fig1_2_1
- Fig122csv
- fig1_2_2
- Fig123csv
- fig1_2_3
- Figure 1.3. Global Investment and Trade
- fig1_3
- Figure 1.2.4. Changes in Sectoral Inflation, 2011-17 versus 2002-08
- fig1_2_4
- Figure 1.3.1. Different Measures of Growth
- fig1_3_1
- Figure 1.3.2. Production Function Decomposition: Selected Large Advanced Economies
- fig1_3_2
- Figure 1.3.3. Investment in Selected Advanced Economies
- fig1_3_3
- Figure 1.3.4. Total Factor Productivity Growth
- fig1_3_4
- Fig141csv
- fig1_4_1
- Fig151csv
- fig1_5_1
- Figure 1.6.1. Selected Trade Policy Indicators: Example with Group of Twenty Member Countries
- fig1_6_1
- Fig162csv
- fig1_6_2
- Figure 1.SF.1. Commodity Market Developments
- fig1_sf_1
- Figure 1.4. Contributions to Trade Growth
- fig1_4
- Figure 1.SF.2. Detrended IMF Crude Oil Index and Economic and Market Conditions
- fig1_sf_2
- Figure 1.SF.1.1. Hundred Years of Cobalt Mining
- fig1_sf_1_1
- Figure 1.5. Commodity and Oil Prices
- fig1_5
- Fig16csv
- fig1_6
- Figure 1.7 — Advanced Economies: Monetary and Financial Market Conditions
- fig1_7
- Figure 1.8. Real Effective Exchange Rate Changes, August 2017�March 2018
- fig1_8
- dataset overview
- fig1_9
- Figure 2.1. Demographic Transition: Recent Trends and Projections
- 108930.Figure.2.1
- Figure 2.10. Changes in Participation Rates, 2008�16
- 108930.Figure.2.10
- Figure 2.11. Drivers of Participation Rates: Policies
- 108930.Figure.2.11
- Figure 2.12. Drivers of Participation Rates: Additional Policies
- 108930.Figure.2.12
- Figure 2.13. Changes in Participation Rates, Actual Versus Predicted, 1995–2011
- 108930.Figure.2.13
- Figure 2.14 — Average Contributions to Changes in Participation Rates, 1995–2011
- 108930.Figure.2.14
- Figure 2.15. Change in the Odds of Being Active
- 108930.Figure.2.15
- Fig216csv
- 108930.Figure.2.16
- Fig217csv
- 108930.Figure.2.17
- Figure 2.18. Projected Changes in Participation Rates under Alternative Scenarios
- 108930.Figure.2.18
- Figure 2.1.1. Labor Force Participation by Age Group
- 108930.Figure.2.1.1
- Figure 2.2. Change in Labor Force Participation Rates, 2008–16
- 108930.Figure.2.2
- Fig212csv
- 108930.Figure.2.1.2
- Figure 2.1.3. Youth Labor Force Participation by Gender
- 108930.Figure.2.1.3
- Figure 2.1.4. Implied 10-Year Improvement in Country Gender Gaps for Youth
- 108930.Figure.2.1.4
- Figure 2.4.3. Labor Force Participation Rates of Prime-Age Natives and Migrants, 2000–16
- 108930.Figure.2.2.1
- Figure 2.2.2. Change in Labor Force Participation Rate by Metropolitan Area
- 108930.Figure.2.2.2
- Fig223csv
- 108930.Figure.2.2.3
- Dataset overview: fig224csv
- 108930.Figure.2.2.4
- Figure 2.3.1. Change in Labor Force Participation by Region, 2000�16
- 108930.Figure.2.3.1
- Fig232csv
- 108930.Figure.2.3.2
- Figure 2.3.3. Decomposition of Labor Market Changes
- 108930.Figure.2.3.3
- Figure 2.3. Labor Force Participation Rates by Gender and Age
- 108930.Figure.2.3
- Figure 2.3.4. Initial Routine Exposure by Region, 2000
- 108930.Figure.2.3.4
- Figure 2.3.5. Initial Offshoring Exposure by Region, 2000
- 108930.Figure.2.3.5
- Fig241csv
- 108930.Figure.2.4.1
- Figure 2.4.2. Projected Evolution of Labor Force Participation Rates
- 108930.Figure.2.4.2
- Figure 2.4.3. Labor Force Participation Rates of Prime-Age Natives and Migrants, 2000�16
- 108930.Figure.2.4.3
- Figure 2.4.4. Change in the Odds of Being Active
- 108930.Figure.2.4.4
- Annex Figure 2.2.1. Changes in Labor Force Participation Rates, 1985–2016
- 108930.AnnexFigure.2.2.1
- Annex Figure 2.2.2. Share of Households by Employment Composition, 2000–16
- 108930.AnnexFigure.2.2.2
- Annex Figure 2.2.3. Changes in Labor Force Participation Rates of Prime-Age Men and Women, 1985–2016
- 108930.AnnexFigure.2.2.3
- Annex Figure 2.2.4. Average Annual Changes in Labor Force Participation Rates
- 108930.AnnexFigure.2.2.4
- Figure 2.4. Labor Force Participation and School Enrollment of the Young
- 108930.Figure.2.4
- Dataset overview
- 108930.AnnexFigure.2.2.5
- Fig25csv
- 108930.Figure.2.5
- Figure 2.6. Subgroups of the Inactive, 2000 and 2016
- 108930.Figure.2.6
- Fig27csv
- 108930.Figure.2.7
- Figure 2.8. Average Annual Changes in Labor Force Participation Rates
- 108930.Figure.2.8
- Figure 2.9. Decomposition of Labor Market Shifts
- 108930.Figure.2.9
- Figure 3.1. Share of Manufacturing in Aggregate Employment
- 108930.Figure.3.1
- Figure 3.10. Estimated Change in Manufacturing Shares and Relative Prices, 1960�2015
- 108930.Figure.3.10
- Figure 3.11. Manufacturing Gross Output and Final Expenditure on Manufacturing Goods, 1995–2011
- 108930.Figure.3.11
- Figure 3.12. Change in Services Employment Share, 1970–2015
- 108930.Figure.3.12
- Fig313csv
- 108930.Figure.3.13
- Figure 3.14. Distribution of Labor Productivity Growth of Individual Industries
- 108930.Figure.3.14
- Figure 3.15. Sectoral Labor Productivity, 2005
- 108930.Figure.3.15
- Figure 3.16. Structural Transformation and Aggregate Labor Productivity Growth, 2000–10
- 108930.Figure.3.16
- Figure 3.17. Estimation Results, Beta-Convergence
- 108930.Figure.3.17
- Figure 3.18. Sigma-Convergence
- 108930.Figure.3.18
- Figure 3.19. Productivity Gap in 2005
- 108930.Figure.3.19
- Figure 3.2. Sectoral Employment Shares
- 108930.Figure.3.2
- Figure 3.20. Average Gross Wages in Industry and Services in the 2000s
- 108930.Figure.3.20
- Figure 3.21. Labor Income Inequality in the 2000s
- 108930.Figure.3.21
- Figure 3.22. Contribution to Change in Overall Labor Income Inequality between the 1980s and 2000s
- 108930.Figure.3.22
- Figure 3.1.1. Nonmanufacturing Value-Added Content in Gross Manufacturing Output, 1995–2011
- 108930.Figure.3.1.1
- Figure 3.1.2. Services Value-Added Content in Gross Manufacturing Output, 1995 and 2011
- 108930.Figure.3.1.2
- Figure 3.1.3. Change in Services Value-Added Content in Manufacturing Gross Output, 1995�2011
- 108930.Figure.3.1.3
- Fig314csv
- 108930.Figure.3.1.4
- Figure 3.2.1. Exports of Services
- 108930.Figure.3.2.1
- Figure 3.2.2. Increase in Service Trade, 1980–2014
- 108930.Figure.3.2.2
- Figure 3.2.3. Services Exports by Industry, 1990–2014
- 108930.Figure.3.2.3
- Figure 3.3.1. Sectoral Employment Shares and Wage Inequality
- 108930.Figure.3.3.1
- Figure 3.3. Change in Manufacturing Employment Share and Inequality, 1980–2010
- 108930.Figure.3.3
- Figure 3.3.2. Wage Gap between Manufacturing and Services
- 108930.Figure.3.3.2
- Figure 3.3.3. Wages of Workers Switching to Manufacturing Jobs
- 108930.Figure.3.3.3
- Figure 3.3.4. Inequality in Manufacturing and Services
- 108930.Figure.3.3.4
- Annex Figure 3.3.1. Distribution of Total Factor Productivity Growth of Individual Industries
- 108930.AnnexFigure.3.3.1
- Annex Figure 3.3.2. Sectoral Labor Productivity Growth, 2000�10
- 108930.AnnexFigure.3.3.2
- Annex Figure 3.3.3. Skill Composition of Workers by Sector, 2000–07
- 108930.AnnexFigure.3.3.3
- Annex Figure 3.3.4. Sectoral Labor Productivity, 2010
- 108930.AnnexFigure.3.3.4
- Annex Figure 3.3.5. Sigma-Convergence
- 108930.AnnexFigure.3.3.5
- Figure 3.4. Share of Manufacturing in Aggregate Employment and Output
- 108930.Figure.3.4
- Figure 3.5. Estimated Trends in Manufacturing Employment and Output Shares, 1960�2015
- 108930.Figure.3.5
- Figure 3.6. Cross-Country Distribution of Estimated Trends in Manufacturing Shares, 1970–2015
- 108930.Figure.3.6
- Fig37csv
- 108930.Figure.3.7
- Figure 3.8. Share of Manufacturing in Final Consumption versus Income per Capita, 1980�2011
- 108930.Figure.3.8
- Figure 3.9. Relative Price of Manufacturing, 1970–2015
- 108930.Figure.3.9
- Figure 4.1. International Patent Families by Publication Year
- 108930.Figure.4.1
- Fig410csv
- 108930.Figure.4.10
- Figure 4.11. The Effects of Global Value Chain Participation and Policy Variables
- 108930.Figure.4.11
- Fig412csv
- 108930.Figure.4.12
- Fig413csv
- 108930.Figure.4.13
- Figure 4.2.1. Innovation Intensity
- 108930.Figure.4.2.1
- Figure 4.2.2. Foreign Patents by Source Country, 2013
- 108930.Figure.4.2.2
- Figure 4.3.1. Sub-Saharan Africa: Net Foreign Direct Investment and Aid Inflows
- 108930.Figure.4.3.1
- Figure 4.3.2. Official Development Assistance Commitment by Sector
- 108930.Figure.4.3.2
- Fig433csv
- 108930.Figure.4.3.3
- Annex Figure 4.2.1. Diffusion of Knowledge from G�5 with Expanded Emerging Market Economy Sample
- 108930.AnnexFigure.4.2.1
- 108930.Figure.4.2
- Fig4annex22csv
- 108930.AnnexFigure.4.2.2
- Annex Figure 4.2.3. Reduction of Knowledge Flow with Additional Barriers: Unrestricted Cited Sample
- 108930.AnnexFigure.4.2.3
- Fig4annex24csv
- 108930.AnnexFigure.4.2.4
- Figure 4.3. Patenting and Research and Development at the Frontier
- 108930.Figure.4.3
- Figure 4.4. Countries at the Technology Frontier
- 108930.Figure.4.4
- Figure 4.5. Slowing Patenting and Productivity
- 108930.Figure.4.5
- 108930.Figure.4.6
- Figure 4.7. Knowledge Diffusion across Barriers over Time
- 108930.Figure.4.7
- Figure 4.8. Contribution of Foreign Knowledge to Labor Productivity Growth
- 108930.Figure.4.8
- Fig49csv
- 108930.Figure.4.9
- Executive Summary
- Foreword
- World Economic Outlook: Tensions from the Two-Speed Recovery
- Info
- Preface
- statapp
- Table parta
- Table partb
- Full Report
References
- Global Economy: Good News for Now but Trade Tensions a Threat
- IMF Blog: Wanted: Policies to Encourage and Enable Work in Advanced Economies
- IMF Blog: The Decline in Manufacturing Jobs: Not Necessarily a Cause for Concern
- IMF Blog: Globalization Helps Spread Knowledge and Technology Across Borders
- Blog