Good, Bad or Ugly? On the Effects of Fiscal Rules with Creative Accounting
IMF Working Papers, October 1, 2000
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Bibliographic details
- Authors: Gian M Milesi-Ferretti
- Published: October 1, 2000
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451858563.001
Summary
- Research question: Do fiscal rules likely lead to fiscal adjustment, or do they encourage the use of “creative accounting”?
- Approach: A model in which fiscal rules are imposed on “measured” fiscal variables that can differ from “true” variables because of a margin for creative accounting.
- Key mechanism: The probability of detecting creative accounting depends on its size and the transparency of the budget.
- Focus: The model studies the effects on fiscal policy of different rules, separates structural from cyclical effects, and examines dependence on the underlying fiscal distortion and the degree of budget transparency.
Model and Mechanism
- Measured versus true fiscal variables: Fiscal rules bind measured variables; governments may manipulate the margin between measured and true variables.
- Detection probability: A function of (a) the size of creative accounting and (b) the transparency of the budget.
- Effects analyzed:
- Structural effects versus cyclical effects of fiscal rules.
- Interaction with underlying fiscal distortion.
- Interaction with degree of budget transparency.
- Government behavior: Allows for different government types and preferences (e.g., myopic government) and incorporates a loss function framework.
Main Findings (as described)
- Fiscal rules can induce either fiscal adjustment or increased use of creative accounting depending on model parameters.
- Higher budget transparency reduces the probability that creative accounting goes undetected for a given size of manipulation.
- The net impact of fiscal rules on true fiscal outcomes depends on:
- The design of the rule (which measured variables are constrained).
- The underlying fiscal distortion faced by the government.
- The degree of budget transparency.
- Structural versus cyclical decomposition matters for assessing the true fiscal stance under rules subject to creative accounting.
Policy Implications
- Design fiscal rules carefully to minimize incentives for creative accounting by:
- Choosing measured variables that closely track true fiscal positions.
- Enhancing budget transparency to increase detection probability for manipulations.
- Consider underlying fiscal distortions when evaluating expected effectiveness of a rule.
- Account for both structural and cyclical effects when monitoring compliance and assessing fiscal adjustment.
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- Good, Bad or Ugly? On The Effects of Fiscal Rules with Creative Accounting - WP/00/172