Internal Models, Subordinated Debt, and Regulatory Capital Requirements for Bank Credit Risk
IMF Working Papers, September 1, 2002
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- Internal Models, Subordinated Debt, and Regulatory Capital Requirements for Bank Credit Risk
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Bibliographic details
- Authors: Paul H. Kupiec
- Published: September 1, 2002
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451857504.001
Summary
- Shortcomings make credit VaR estimates an unsuitable basis for setting bank regulatory capital requirements.
- If, alternatively, banks are required to issue subordinated debt that has a minimum market value and maximum acceptable probability of default, banks must set their equity capital in a manner that limits both the probability of bank default and the expected loss on insured deposits, largely removing any safety net-related funding cost subsidy and the moral hazard incentives it creates.
- Required equity capital can be estimated using a modified credit-VaR framework, and supervisors can use external credit ratings to indirectly verify the accuracy of bank internal model estimates.
Key Findings
- Credit VaR estimates have shortcomings that render them unsuitable as the sole basis for regulatory capital requirements.
- Requiring subordinated debt with a minimum market value and maximum acceptable probability of default changes banks’ incentives for equity capital setting.
- Properly designed subordinated debt requirements lead banks to limit:
- the probability of bank default, and
- the expected loss on insured deposits.
- These limits largely remove safety net-related funding cost subsidies and the moral hazard incentives those subsidies create.
Policy Recommendations
- Require banks to issue subordinated debt that meets specified market-value and default-probability criteria.
- Set regulatory equity capital requirements so banks internalize limits on both default probability and expected insured-deposit losses.
- Use a modified credit-VaR framework to estimate required equity capital.
- Enable supervisors to use external credit ratings to indirectly verify the accuracy of bank internal model estimates.
Methodology and Verification
- Required equity capital estimation: suggested via a modified credit-VaR framework.
- Model verification: supervisors can rely on external credit ratings to indirectly verify internal model estimates.
Subject Areas and Keywords
- Subject: Banking; Credit; Credit risk; Debt financing; Deposit insurance; Econometric analysis; External debt; Financial institutions; Financial regulation and supervision; Money; Stocks; Vector autoregression
- Keywords: bank default; bank investment incentive; bank liability; bank shareholder; capital allocation; capital requirement; Credit; Credit risk; credit VaR; Debt financing; debt issue; equity capital; funding debt; internal risk models; investment opportunity; market value; regulatory capital requirements; safety net; Stocks; subordinated debt; Vector autoregression; WP
Internal Models, Subordinated Debt, and Regulatory Capital Requirements for Bank Credit Risk — Paul H. Kupiec