Corruption, Taxes and Compliance

By Anja Baum, Sanjeev Gupta, Elijah Kimani, Sampawende J Tapsoba

November 17, 2017

Preview Citation

Format: Chicago

Anja Baum, Sanjeev Gupta, Elijah Kimani, and Sampawende J Tapsoba. Corruption, Taxes and Compliance, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2017) accessed September 18, 2024

Disclaimer: IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

Summary

This paper revisits the effects of corruption on the state’s capacity to raise revenue, building on the existing empirical literature using new and more disaggregated data. We use a comprehensive dataset for 147 countries spanning 1995-2014, compiled by the IMF. It finds that—consistent with the existing literature—corruption is negatively associated with overall tax revenue, and most of its components. This relationship is predominantly influenced by the way corruption interacts with tax compliance. The establishment of large taxpayer offices improves tax compliance by dampening the perception of corruption, thereby boosting revenue.

Subject: Corruption, Large taxpayer office, Revenue administration, Social security contributions, Taxes on trade

Keywords: GDP, Revenue, Tax, Tax revenue, WP

Publication Details

Pages:

31
Volume:

---
DOI:

---
Issue:

---
Series:

Working Paper No. 2017/255
Stock No:

WPIEA2017255
ISBN:

9781484326039
ISSN:

1018-5941

FACTSHEETS

RESOURCES

TOPICS

Flagship Publications

Other Publications

IMF reports and publications by country

Regional Offices

All News

See Also

For Journalists

Press Center

RESOURCES

FLAGSHIPS

KEY SERIES

IMF NOTES

IMF Working Papers