The Debate over Falling Fertility

Source details

Canonical URL

The Debate over Falling Fertility

Other formats

• Markdown version
• Structured JSON version
• Bundle manifest

Bibliographic details

• Authors: DAVID E BLOOM, MICHAEL KUHN, KLAUS PRETTNER
• Published: June 2, 2025

Summary

• Global fertility rates have been falling for decades and are reaching historically low levels.
• World population now exceeds 8 billion and may top 10 billion by 2050, but the momentum of growth is dissipating because of declines in fertility.
• Over the next 25 years, East Asia, Europe, and Russia will experience significant population declines.
• Falling fertility creates ambiguous outcomes: risks to innovation, workforce size, and social safety nets versus opportunities from reallocating resources, higher labor force participation, and reduced environmental pressures.

Fertility rates and population trends

• In 1950, the global total fertility rate was 5.
• The 2.1 benchmark is cited for long-term global population stability.
• Current world fertility rate: 2.24.
• Projected to drop below 2.1 around 2050.
• UN agency expects global population to top out at 10.3 billion in 2084.
• Projections of global population in 2050 range from 8.9 billion to more than 10 billion, with fertility rates between 1.61 and 2.59.
• During 2000–25, fertility rates declined in every UN region and in every World Bank country income group.
• Exceptions: Africa and a number of low-income countries on other continents where fertility rates are still 4 or higher.
• Africa’s share of global population likely to increase from 19 percent in 2025 to 26 percent in 2050.
• Over the coming quarter century, 38 nations of more than 1 million people each will probably experience population declines, up from 21 in the past 25 years.
• Projected absolute population losses over the coming quarter century (selected countries):
  • China: drop of 155.8 million
  • Japan: 18 million
  • Russia: 7.9 million
  • Italy: 7.3 million
  • Ukraine: 7 million
  • South Korea: 6.5 million
• Average annual rates of population decline (relative terms) expected to be highest at:
  • 0.9 percent in Moldova and in Bosnia and Herzegovina
  • 0.8 percent in Albania, Bulgaria, and Lithuania
  • 0.7 percent in Latvia and Ukraine
• In 6 of the 21 countries with average fertility rates of less than 2.1 and fewer births than deaths during 2000–25, immigration prevented depopulation.

Comparison with historical depopulation episodes

• Recent and projected patterns differ from historical episodes that were driven mainly by mass migrations and Malthusian mortality shocks (famine, genocide, war, epidemics).
• Example: Black Death of 1346–53—Western Europe lost upward of a quarter of its population, corresponding to an average annual rate of population decline of 4 percent or more.
• By comparison, the population of Moldova has fallen by roughly 1 percent annually since 2000.
• Ongoing three years of warfare after Moscow’s invasion in February 2022 affect outlooks for Russia and Ukraine.

Challenges of low fertility

• Low fertility and depopulation can impede economic and social progress:
  • Fewer workers, savers, and spenders can potentially send an economy into contraction.
  • Shortage of researchers, inventors, scientists, and other people-based sources of innovative ideas could hurt economic progress.
  • Bourgeoning shares of older people can weigh on growth and create long-term care and health spending burdens for prime-age workers.
  • Slow or negative population growth relative to other countries may reduce military might and political clout.
• Academic concern cited: a 2022 paper by Charles Jones argues low fertility could lead to a drop in the number of new ideas, strangling innovation and resulting in economic stagnation.
• Low fertility contributes to population aging:
  • In countries experiencing population declines, the share of population ages 65 and older will almost double from 17.3 percent to 30.9 percent between 2025 and 2050.
  • In countries whose populations are not shrinking, ages 65 and older will expand from 3.2 percent to 5.5 percent over the same period.

Economic opportunities and countervailing forces

• Potential positives from fewer children and smaller populations:
  • Less need for spending on housing and childcare, freeing resources for research and development and adoption of advanced technologies.
  • Declines in fertility can stimulate economic growth by driving up labor force participation (especially among women), savings, and capital accumulation.
  • Historical demographic dividend: following the end of the post–World War II baby boom this phenomenon contributed as much as 2–3 percentage points to per capita income growth in many countries.
  • A population’s productive characteristics (health and education) matter more than size for knowledge creation and innovation.
  • Falling fertility combined with rising education can lead to human capital formation and long-term increases in prosperity (as argued by Oded Galor).
  • Population decline may reduce environmental pressures: land, air, and water pollution; climate change; deforestation; and loss of biodiversity.

Adaptation, policy options, and restructuring

• Key questions for policymakers: under what circumstances to address declining fertility, and which measures to implement.
• Observations:
  • There is nothing intrinsically wrong with an economy expanding or shrinking along with its population, but side effects may be problematic.
  • Effective fertility policies are notoriously difficult to design and implement.
  • Falling birth rates may reflect societal preferences that could be accepted; the policy focus may then be on mitigating side effects.
• Policy responses implemented or considered in some countries:
  • South Korea: recently reported a rise in fertility rates for the first time in nine years.
  • China: abolished its one-child policy.
  • Japan: introduced flexible work arrangements.
  • Several European countries: overhauling social security systems to ensure sustainability.
• Family-friendly policies that could encourage increased fertility (noted caveats: more children create economic strains and an expanded workforce takes two decades to materialize):
  • Tax breaks for larger families
  • Extended and more flexible parental leave policies
  • Public or subsidized private childcare
  • Subsidies for infertility treatment
  • Policies to enable better balance between work and family responsibilities
• Additional policy levers to offset depopulation effects:
  • Adjustments to migration policies
  • Expansion of education access and quality to enhance innovation capacity
  • Retirement policy changes, such as raising the age of retirement, to forestall workforce shrinkage by removing disincentives to working longer
  • Combining policies (family, education, health, retirement) may be stronger than isolated measures
  • Robust investments in health and education of youths and prime-age adults to enable productive work well past traditional retirement ages
• Policymakers must consider the evolving work landscape:
  • Digitalization, robotics, automation, and artificial intelligence will affect job types, job performance, social interactions at work, and potentially fertility levels and patterns.

Key statistics (exact figures preserved)

• Global total fertility rate in 1950: 5
• Current world fertility rate: 2.24
• Benchmark for long-term global population stability: 2.1
• Projected drop below 2.1: around 2050
• UN population peak projection: 10.3 billion in 2084
• 2050 population projection range: 8.9 billion to more than 10 billion
• Corresponding fertility projection range: between 1.61 and 2.59
• Africa fertility in some countries: 4 or higher
• Africa share of global population: 19 percent in 2025 to 26 percent in 2050
• Number of nations >1 million likely to experience population declines over coming quarter century: 38 (up from 21 in past 25 years)
• Projected population losses (selected):
  • China: 155.8 million
  • Japan: 18 million
  • Russia: 7.9 million
  • Italy: 7.3 million
  • Ukraine: 7 million
  • South Korea: 6.5 million
• Average annual population decline rates (select countries):
  • 0.9 percent: Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina
  • 0.8 percent: Albania, Bulgaria, and Lithuania
  • 0.7 percent: Latvia and Ukraine
• Aging shares:
  • In countries experiencing population declines: ages 65+ from 17.3 percent to 30.9 percent (2025–2050)
  • In countries not shrinking: ages 65+ from 3.2 percent to 5.5 percent (2025–2050)
• Historical comparison:
  • Black Death (1346–53): average annual rate of population decline of 4 percent or more
  • Moldova’s decline since 2000: roughly 1 percent annually
• Demographic dividend contribution to per capita income growth after baby boom: as much as 2–3 percentage points

Article: The Debate over Falling Fertility, DAVID E. BLOOM, MICHAEL KUHN, KLAUS PRETTNER, June 2025. F&D Magazine. Contributions noted from Ravi Sadhu.

Content in this bundle

• The Debate over Falling Fertility
  • The Debate over Falling Fertility (Markdown version)
  • The Debate over Falling Fertility (PDF)